Text

Core IX-X Refueling Outage ALARA Rept,1980
	ML20031A743
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	11/30/1980
From:	Dionne B, Ross H, Sterrit H; CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20031A741	List: ML20031A740; ML20031A743; ML20031A745;
References
	NUDOCS 8109250346
	Download: ML20031A743 (81)
	v • d • e

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CONNECTICUT YANKEE 1980 CORE IX - X REFUELING OUTAGE ALARA REPORT PREPARED BY: B. J. DIONNC ASSISTED BY: R. STERRITT H. ROSS OF CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT ON NG7 EMBER 1980 l REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY: H. E. CLOW, HEALTH PHYSICS SUPERVISOR f l

l TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL 2 A. Manrem Totals Summary 2 B. Major Job ALARA Review Summary 9 C. Shielding, Flushing, Source Removal and Time Saving 41 Techniques D. ALARA Control Instructions 44 E. Implementation of NU's Procedure #5 " Implementation and 52 Documentation of ALARA for Equipment Installation, l Moolfication, Repair and Maintenance Work in Nuclear Stations Radiological-Areas". F. HELPORE 56 III. RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION CONTROL 58 A. Personnel External Contamination 58 B. Personnel Internal Contamination 62 C. Airborne Contamination 64 D. Tool, Equipment and Area Surface Contamination 69 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 72 e e I

LIST OF TABLES TABLE TITLE PAGE 1 Manrem Expenditsres by Work Group 5 May 3 to August 8, 1980 2 1980 Refueling Outage Major Job &nhour 6 Manrem Summary 1 1 3 Number of Personnel Externally Contam. 60 inated by Work Group 4 Percentage of Personnel External Radio-60 active Contaminations by Body locations 5 Percentage of Personnel External 61 Radioactive Contaminations by Causes I i II

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE -TITLE PACE 1 Daily Cumulative Manrem Totals for 1980 3 Refueling Outage 2 Daily Person Rem Expenditures for 1980 4 Refueling Outage 3 Reactor Cavity and Fuel Transfer Canal 12 Before Reactor Head Removal 4 Reactor Cavity and Fuel Transfer Canal 13 Before Shielding - After Reactor Heat 'l Replacement 5 Reactoc Cavity and Fuel Transfer Canal 14 Af ter Shiciding - Af ter Reactor Head Replacement 6 Fuel Transfer danal 15 7 Steam Generator #1 Skirt Area - Post Decon 19 8 Steam Generator #2 Skirt Area - Post Decon 20 l 9 Reactor Head on Stand in Lower Level - Before 23 ( Shield 10 Reactor Head on Stand in Lower Level - After 24 Shield 11 Core Barrel During Replacement Lift 27 11 Upper Internals Package on Laydown Pad in 28 l Cavity 13 Regen. Heat Exchanger 30 14 Residual Heat Removal, PDT and ADT Areas 31 15 Safety Injection Area 32 16 Containment Ground Floor Outer Annulus and 33 Loops with Steam Generators Initially Flooded 17 Containment Ground Floor Outer Annulus and 34 Loops with Steam Generators Empty 18 Containment Ground Floor Outer Annulus and 35 Loops with Steam Generators Reflooded III

I.IST OF II.I.USTRATIONS (CONTINUED) 1:lIGUlm TITI.E PAGE 19 Steaa Generator #1-4 (Side View) 38 20 Rc' or Coolant Pump #2 40 21 Steam Generator Ventilation System 68 IV

us tno-e Ho. Z H 1 l l l l SECTION I l INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION This report summarizes the major Radiation Protection outage activitics and data, with respect to our accomplishments and their effectiveness and our problems and their recommended improvements. More specifically, the purpose of this report is to document the major radiological precautions and the ALARA techniques which were utilized, evaluate their effectiveness and recommend improvements for future use. This summary of data adds to the previous Connecticut Yankee (CY) ALARA outage reports data base. The benefits of this data base is that they will aid in manrem predictions, provide a manrem reference to quantify the effectiveness of ALARA techniq. 3 assist job / task leaders in job planning. This report is generated in accordance with the Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO) Corporate Management Program for Maintaining Occupational Exposure As Low As Reasonably Achievable procedure. The report covers the period from May 3, 1980 to August 8, 1980 whereupon the unit returned to full power operation. fopics to be discussed include: 1. Radiation Exposure Control - Manrem Summary; Major Job ALARA Review Summary; Shielding, Flushing, Source Removal and Time Saving Techniques; ALARA Control Instructions; Implementation of NUSCO Procedure #5, " Implementation of ALARA"; and HELPORE. 2. Radioactive Contamination Control - Personnel External Contamination; Personnel Internal Contamination; Airborne Contamination; and Tool, Equipment and Surface Contamin-ation. Overall, the Health Physics manpower requirements were adequate to handle the largest and most complex refueling outage ever encountered at CY. The Health Physics staff handled all major radiological events without any major problems and without violating any Federal Radiation Protection regulations. In addition, communications and work logistics were commendable especially considering that the department was greatly expanded with new personnel and contractors. Lastly, the oucage achievements of the first organized ALARA group were significant. However, as wic1. all new programs, some improve-ments are required. Our achievements and recommended improvements are detailed in the following pages. __

t i 09 tilo r3 H 2 H H> SECTION IIA MANREM TOTALS

SUMMARY

Section IIA contains the total outage manrem, daily cumulative I manren totals, daily manrem totals, workgroup manrem totals I and major job manrem sunua;y. 1

II. RADIATION EXPOSURE CONTROL IIA. Ibnrem Totals Summary A total station dose equivalent of 1005 MANREM was expended during the period 5/3/80 to 8/8/80. This total is based on ~ all RWP - Pocket Ion Chanber (PIC) readings which were entered into the HELPORE program. An accurate comparison of the total station manrem with a preoutage prediction cannot be made as the true scope of some major jobs was not known prior to the outage and due to the complexity of this outage's jobs. Fig **re 1 depicts the " Daily Cummulative Manren Totals for the 1980 Refueling Outage", it was estimated from this graph after the third week, that this would be an 800 to 1000 MANREM outage. Figure 2 the " Daily Person Rem Expenditures for 1980 1 Refueling Outage" shows that during the peak period daily person rem ranged from 12 to 16 manrem per day. Also of interest are the three peaks at the tail end of this graph. These peaks represent the three Reactor Coolant Pump seal repair jobs. The breakdown of the station manrem expenditures by workgroups is shown in Table 1. In general, 110 manrem or111% of the total station dose equivalent was received by permanent CY employees, 825 manrem or 82% by contractors and 70 manrem or 7% by offsite utility personnzi. No individual exceeded the federal or Connecticut Yankee quarterly or annual occupational external exposure limits. A listing of the ALARA Procedure #5, Attachment B (> 10 MANREM) ALARA review jobs; Attachment A (1 to 10 MANREM) ALARA review jobs and miscellaneous jobs, Manhour/Manrem totals are shevn in Table II. This listing accounted for approximately 85% of the station outage manrem. The top ten Jc3s for manrem expenditeras are as follows: 1. Refueling 124 MANREM 2. Electrical Penetration Replacement 104 3. Health Physics Coverage 90 4. Primary Steam Generator Inspection 60 and Repair 5. Anchor Bolt and Seismic Support 45 Inspection 6. Rx Head to Pressurizer RCS Vent Mod. 44 7. Containment Decontamination and 37 Housekeeping 8. TMI Mod'.fications 30 9. Reactor Vessel ISI 26 10. ISI (excluding vessel) 22 582 MAFREM -,..

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TABLE 1 MANREM EXPENDITURES BY WORK GROUP MAY 3, 1980 TO AUGUST 8, 1980 1. ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 5. OPERATIONS Total Manrem - 2.223 Total Manrem - 31.296 Plant Per. - (9) - 0.430 Plant Per. - (38) - 31.296 Contract Per. - (1) - 0.025 Utility Per. - (20) - 1.768 2. ENGINEERING 6. MAINTENANCE Total Manrem - 19.134 Total Manrem - 242.620 Plant Per. - (9) - 4.759 Plant Per. - (35) - 53.949 Contract Per. - (14) - 7.809 Contract Per. - (181) - 153.001 Utility Per. - (84) - 7.286 Utility Per. - (141) - 59.159 3. _ CHEMISTRY 7. QUALITY CONTROL Total Manrem - 2.719 Total Manrem - 10.071 Plant Per. - (5) - 2.155 Plant Per. - (3) - 0.425 Contract Per. - (6) - 0.302 Contract Per. - (17) - 9.646 Utility Per. - (3) - 0.262 4. HEALTH PHYSICS 8. MISC. CONTRACTOR Total Manrem - 189.377 Iotal Manrem - 484.071 Plant Per. - (22) 16.530 Contract Per. - (215) - 169.668 Utility Per. - (10) - 3.179 ( ) - indica':es the number of individuals 1 1

TABLE II 1980 REFUELING OUTAGE MAJOR JOB MANil0UR AND MANRIM

SUMMARY

I. CREATER __TilAN 10 PERSON Hl:M JOBS EST. ACTUAL EST. ACTUAL JOB TITLE MANHOURS MANHOURS MANREM MANREM 1. Refueling (Excluding 2699.00 4036.60 100.000 124.433 SFB Operations) 3. CTMT. Elec. Penetrations 7420.00 19630.00 109.200 104.011 3. Steam Cen. Insp. (Primary) 633.00 1590.27 47.766 60.345 4. Rx Head & Press. RCS Vents 2973.00 3553.00 71.930 44.074 5. Rx Vessel ISI (Internals, 1500.00 1437.61 24.300 26.039 Studs, Nonh ) 6. Fire Detection Modification 1310.00 2649.00 15.000 19.900 7. Steam Cen. Insp. (Secondary) 396.00 682.94 14.180 12.350 8. RCS Loop Drain Modification 176.00 194.30 8.148 8.120 II. 1 TO 10 PERSON REM JOBS 44.480 1. Anchor Bolts (IE-79-02) 3834.76 & Seismic Supp. 2. TM1 Modifications A) Detection of Inadequate 262.00 487.00 3.700 7.320 Core Cooling B) PORV & SV Pos. Indicat. 212.00 1734.00 4.800 15.810 C) CTMr lil-RAD Monitor 333.00 257.00 3.200 2.705 D) CTMT H2 Analyzer 526.00 716.00 9.100 4.400 TOTALS 1333.00 3194.00 20.800 30.235 3. ISI (Excluding Vessel) A) Reg. IIcat Exch. 37.80 33.75 3.660 3.565 B) Pressurizer 93.30 14?. 56 5.000 3.398 C) Loop Isolation Valva 146.00 82.07 7.500 3.325 D) 6" Loop Bypass Line 17.25 48.00 1.725 2.292 2.016 175.52 E) Misc. Pipe Inspections F) Seal Injection 33.00 109.02 0.730 1.899 C) RiiR 19.00 58.22 0.580 1.495 II) 3" Chary,e I.ine 8.00 76.06 0.480 1.387 I) S/C 81.00 70.74 4.050 1.204 J) Drain IIcader 33.50 54.59 0.955 0.865 K) Spray Line 8.00 20.08 0.480 0.673 L) Til & TC Nozzles to 13.00 13.67 1.300 0.495 Safe End Welds M) Letdown _ 8.00 9.99 0.160 0.255 TOTALS 497.85 719.75 26.620 22.869 l _

TABLE II (CONT.) 11. 1 TO 10 PERSON REM JOBS (CONT.) EST. ACTUAL EST. ACTUAL JOB TITLE MANHOURS MANHOURS MANREM MANREM 4. RCP #2 Seal Inspection 368.00 514.00 8.500 10.029 5. RCP Oil Collection System 443.00 343.00 8.860 8.992 6. Valve Inspection a) 6" RC-MOV-577 22.00 93.53 0.660 7.780 b) 3" SI-CV-862A 22.00 17.77 0.660

1. 4 ?.0 c) 3" SI-MOV-861A 22.00 21.330 0.660 1.190 d) 10" RH-MOV-781 22.00 36.440 0.660 0.720 TOTALS 88.00 88.20 -

2.640 8.132 7. Replace Core Deluge Valve 184.570 7.898 Multi-Pin Connector 8. Breathing Air Manifold Sys. 525.00 600.98 2.775 7.865 9. Feedwater Nozzle Insp. 1432.00 414.98 8.490 4.725 (IE-79-13) 10. Jib Crane Modification 278.00 400.00 2.780 2.448 III. MISCELLANEOUS JOBS ACTUAL ACTUAL MANHOURS MANREM 1. Ilealth Physics coverage & Surveys 9460.00 89.371 2. Decon Containment 8788.13 36.633 3. Staging Erection / Removal 3150.28 20.914 4. Decon RCA & Radwaste Bldg. 23,738.43 15.956 5. Radwaste Processing 4031.80 13.698 6. Cavity Seal Plate 309.68 12.722 7. Rx Ops & Surveillance 1267.77 12.011 8. Material Transfer in containment 1381.37 11.452 9. RCP Work Platform 405.60 8.965 10. Routine Maint. (Insp. & Check) 917.26 8.600 11. Valves - Operate & Run 713.79 8.162 12. Valve - Repair 342.36 7.759 13. Loop Drain Line Modification 174.23 6.980 14. Decon Cavity 149.50 6.880 ".833 15. Deluge Viv. - Cable Replacement 119.1" 16. Cavity Filters 516.18 3.797 TABLE 11 (CONT.) III. MISCELLANEOUS JOBS ACTUAL ACTUAL MANHOURS MANREH 17. Sipping (Fuel) 920.53 5.019 18. Misc. Insulation / Removal / Replacement 79.25 3.920 19. Shiciding Installation 401.30 3.510 20. Decon Laundry & Resp. 3178.34 3.014 21. Tool Decon 2978.07 2.372 22. Material Transfer in Yard & Radwaste 1797.82 2.143 23. CAR Fans-Filter Replacement / Repair / 679.81 1.865 Cleaning 24. Coolant RTD Cable Replacement 63.75 1.810 1.615 25. Chemistry Blankets 26. Fuel Transfer & Inspection (SFB) 336.54 1.566 27. RHR Haint. 80.83 1.440 28. Thimbles 47.70 0.669 29. Material Transfer in Spent Fuel Bldg. 159.57 0.627 30. HPS1 Maint. 108.07 0.573 31. Material Transfer in Aux. Bldg. 406.02 0.297 32. LPSI Maint. 38.25 0.215 33. Decon Spent Fuel Bldg. 118.48 0.206 34 Operate Containmeit Hatch 312.33 0.170 35. Refueling Water Storage Tank Repair 23.72 0.145 GRAND TOTALS 111,263.86 845.051, --c -4,,-., y.- 9

I cn SECTION IIB L21o R Ho MMOR JOB ALARA REVIEW

SUMMARY

2:

H H Section IIB contains major job summarJ sheets which identify the job, list the tasks and their respective estimated / actual manhour and manrem, list the ALARA controls utilized, describes the effectiveness of the controls, attaches composite survey data and crumerates suggested improvements.

m

1111. Major Job ALARA Review Sununary Attached are the major ALARA review summaries. These summaries identify the job, list the tasks, and their respective estimated / actual manhours and manrem, lists the ALARA controls utilized, describes the effectiveness of the controls, shows survey data and enumerates suggested improvements. It is expected that some of these summaries will be of great aid in future job planning. It is recommended that efforts begin immediately to evaluate and implement where feasible the suggested improvements, such that they can be utilized next outage. The ALARA Review Jobs summarized are: 1. Refueling 2. Electrical Penetration Replacement 3. Steam Generator Primary Side Inspection & Repair 4. Anchor Bolt Inspection 5. Reactor Head / Pressurizer RCS Vent 6. TMI Modifications 7. Reactor Vessel ISI 8. Other ISI 9. Fire Detection 10. Steam Generator Secondary Side Inspection & Repair 11. Reactor Coolant Pump Seai Inspection & Repair _9_

ALARA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

#1 J9B TITI.T.:

Refueling JOB LEADER: Van de Grift WORK CROUP: Westinghouse TYPE REVIEW: B (> 10 MANREM) WORK ORDER NO.: BCR0050 START DATE: 5/4/80 FINISH'DATE: 7/5/80 TASK ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL % MANREM NO. TASK TITLE MANHOUR MANHOUR MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE 1. Prepare for Stud Removal 156 1.7 15.600 4.332 - 72% Remove Missile Shield, 4 Ventilation Ducting, Seismic supports, CRDM Cables, T/C and Head Insulation, etc. 2 Remove and Store Transfer 2 4 .200 0.365 32% Tube Blind Flange l 3. Detension and Store RV 116 317 13.920 11.480 - 17% Studs j' Lower Stud Tensioners, Relax Studs, Remove Studs, Install Stud Hole Plugs, i Install RV Guide Studs, Store Studs, etc. 4. Cavity Preparations 57 466 4.450 18.731 320% I Install Cavity Moat Ring, f Head Lifting Rig, Rtmove l RV Head and Store, Flood Cavity, etc. I 5. Fuel Removal Preparations 68 170 1.360 1.317 -- 3% Disconnect CRDMs, Remove / ' Store Upper Internals, Index Refueling Crane 1 6. Remove Fuel to Spent Fuel 800 513 8.000 1.881 - 76% Pit 7. Reload RV with Fuel From 800 676 6.00 3.301 - 45% SFP 8. Head Rensserbly Prepara-162 599 8.100 5.808 - 28% tions Cleat., Inspect Studs, Head = O-Rings, Install Upper Internals. Latch CRDMs, Drain Cavity, etc. I i I

TASK TASK TITLE , ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL % MANREM [ R0u..,,.. _. MANHOUR _,jg}ging MAGE _jgj;Rfg DIFFERENCE 11% 9 Ilead Inst al lat ton 54 22 10.800 9.550 i Clean RV Flange, Install RV ilead, etc. l 10. Cavity Decontamination 103 149 5.400 6.880 27% 11. Tension Studs 209 468 12.540 36.455 190% Remove Guide Stude, Stud llole Plugs, Clean Stud floles, Install RV !! cad Studs, Tension Studs 12. Remove Cavity Hoat Ring 11 140 1.10 12.370 1057% and Install Transfer i Tube Blind Flange 13. Reassemble System for 156 193 9.36 11.685 25% Startup, Connect T/C's Ins tall RV 18 cad Insulation, Install Seismic Supports, Install Missile Shield, Vent Ducting 10.860 110 14 Drying Off CRDM 3.502 15. Miscellaneous 189 t .. _ ~ ALARA,_ Controls Utilized: Use of personnel shicids in cavity; water shielding in transfer canal; two step equipment laydown; lead blankets on head shroud and on seal ring; flush core deluge; plexiglass beta shield on fuel handling tool MAST; portable ventilation in cavity; SFB fuel handling bridge - lead sheet on deck, Icad blan"cets on rails and shielded operator booth; es.vity wall decon; cavity and spent fuel pool water cleanup systems; cleanup of water in refuel water storage tank before cavity addition; use of stud c1 caning machines; and refuel equipment decon tent. Ef fectiveness of ALARA Ccatrols: Shielding Design on head shroud requires improved design (increase case of installation and increase lead thickness); plexiglass on mast needs more permanent installation; increased cicanup flow and reduced personnel dose on maintenance of cavity an! S.F. pool cleanup systems; reevaluate cavity decon responsibil-ities, use of spray vac and procedures. I Survey Data: Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6. Sugg gted Improvemeng : Obtain new quick acting transfer tube hatch, obtain new RV head 0-Ring spring clips, cover cavity with highly polished statalese steeloor improved canal decon, st ud teasioner mock-up, flushing CRDMs, Conoscal Mockup, Beaver Valley gravity seal ring, permanent segment identification and snap lock fasteners on new mirror insulation, canned poly or parrifin to replace neutron shield drums, ventilation shroud flange improved fasteners, modify stud hole plugs to eliminate crud trap and case of installation / removal, systematic directional radiation surveys, new multi stud detensioners, slip clutch on transfer cart. -

FIGURE 3 or ns.s.te gaAcmAEa O coa 'a='"a rio-CY HEALTH PHYSICS $URVEY on,er/e to s/,de SeV DeV C"-' r i= = Dn Q Botat R. Um Lumi cor. R6-2 '"S'. REACTOR CAYlTY AND C" FUEL 73AM5PER CANAL -DOSE RATE READINC$ ARE IN MREM /HR AT W Al1T LEVEL UNLESS OTHERel5E SPECIFIED. -CIRCLED NUM8ERS h INDfCATE $ME AR LOCATIONS. -CtRCLED Shf AR LOCATIONS AND NUMBE 'NDICATE CONTAuthAflON tEVEL$ te DPM/ loo CM, 2 NW !J w w w l lLO 70 80 00 lC0 300 sLvL A a 500 300 I 1 fro 4 h 70 22d.1 A REACTOP

J g l 300 l 260 1C g Mao 8 2 10 .a ( 169 250 EEE s / \\ fSo gge 100

00 80

/ T fr=a 2 ALL SME AR5 LESS TNAN 1000 DPM/100 CH, CuRRECTlvE ACTION TAKEN YES, NO 73, NEALTN PNYllCS FOREMAN FIGURE 5 OFJ228 8 76 CY HEALTH PHYSICS $URVEY on,e Ocrosavica O coa'a='aa no" up A 7/1/u C"-* Oe* De* vi a _Arrrn f. 2,a)in w.a u pn g_ sw. $,0 2

Insi, REACTOR CAVITY AND FUEL TRAMSFER CANAL Avi2A X H a rld. ar tn 4

Dolt RATI RE ADfMOS 4RE IN MR(MMR AT W Alli LEVEL UNLEll OTHERWilt $PECIPif D.

-C CLE D MUMGE R$ h INplCAT E SMf Ar LOCAfl0NS. I o)lNDICATE CONTAMfMATION L(Vf LS IN DPM A00 CM. .ct:CLta wt AR locations ANo NuMar N =+ 6s w ww g g W Ait T trveo atAD,eus., 50 jo eg., READ.NGS At 2. T gn goe 140 i 100 g 150

10 A30 l L Msi U ell jjg 220 ut4 einD 150 e40

, 810 RtAcfoP Ms Jk2 3So HrAD yoo k ILC lq f 'i '140 g g 09 i eso 9 l 200 J,gp_ 100 E M no \\ Go I,o / w .=.

Sitieldiac, co sisTED e+

4's l'u Vl PL Linacrt n kuws f eN Twc vtsfill,vrioN P/ENuM FIANGC n.0 U PL slentLis P'ltd ou see es seat PInfE. u 2 ALL SME Ari LESS TH AN 1000 DPMM00 CM, CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN Yts HEALM PHYSIC $ FOREMAN NO -14 or mi n-i. CY ltEALTil PHYSICS SURVEY ~ .m Ctacovio O coxvamx4tio FIGURE 6 ShilRo ed TltID 8,y 9,y a-TECH C l f. g Q,1 s ult. PUEL TRANSFER CANAL -DO$t RATt it( AlANCS ARE IN MR[fA/HR ' t WAlli LEVEL UNLE5101HERml1C $PECIFiEO. A -ciRcLEO NUW8tN5 h INDICAic SME AR L0f allON5. -cccuo suc AR tocAtions ANo Nuuc 5@inoicArc cos1 Amin r:on tevets is e,runoo cu).- 36 F ( ) inoicqtr AcAc4 sos-(10 ) ) 00) gg g 0 T^ ua

2. r r r t.~

re. 4-ON s/1:190 beoode rul r.we s. b I O f snosc4rc grn; ass voo) 2

eunt, n~smu tanic,e.2ind. rate'#tMiNGf (c) 6 3rr ennu rI& arrt& u.

et aasn, bu ililgo Arsc< rael secs md necou? C) lto l o u& a...u. y ,,,kr side g g 2 ft /g Of s ufidtill J 7p g (jo0) l ([ h A +( h lib io6 dod_ (10 0) a ~ ss y /hA m _ <t 26 o.a.,.cAnus,1,..eimoorono,a. cm rc,,u A< >.on i..u-a us ~ " c ^ " " "' 5' c 5 ' * * " 0m l ALARA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

#2 Electrical Penetration Replacement and Fire Protection of Cablea Coing To JOB TITLE:

satety gelated Equipment. JOB LEADEls: P. Mosher WORK CROUP: Stone & Webster -TYPE REVIEW: B (> 10 MANREM) WORK GR)ER NO.: BCE0110 START DATE: 3/15/80 FINISH DATE: 7/4/80 ~ TASK ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAI. X MANREM NO. TASK TITLE MANHOUR MANHOUR _MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE 1. Elec. Penetration - 7420 19630 109.200 104.011 - 5% Fireprotection L*.RA Controls Utilized: Portable lead shield racks; shielded drain cooler and local'CVCS piping; prefabbed supporta; use of unistrut for conduit supporti use of templates for support laycut; training of perr.onnel on support installation and conduit installation outside rad area; flushing of seal water return line; shielding of penetration catwalk with curtain type blankets; coordination of work in head laydown area with head removal / replacement; extra supply of sharpened drill bitsi and use of skyjackers to minimize urs of scaffolding. Effectiveness of ALARA Crntrols: Improved method to inj M c hydrogen peroxide into seal water return line, improved suspension method of catwalk curtain shield, and could have used skyjackers more extensively. Survev Data: NONE Suggestedlmyrovements: Earlier ALARA review of support anel conduit design location in future modifications of this type.. - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ALARA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

#3 JOB TITLE:

1 & 2 Steam Generator Primary Side Inspection and Repair JOB LEADER:

? WORK GROUP: Engineering 'IYPE REVIEW:, B (> 10 MANREM) WORK ORDER NO.: BCC0050 START DATE: 5/7/80 FINISit DATE: 6/18/80 TASK ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL % MANRFJi NO. TASK TITLE MAN 110UR MANHOUR -- MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE 1. Radiological Support 72 170 7.261

.370

- 40% Equipment (Installation and Removal) 2. Manway Remocvi 72 170 4.373 5.630 29% 3. Eddy Current Equipment 35 39 0.350 0.225 - 36% Setup & Removal 4. Decon Channel Head & 52 104 7.418 6.303 - 15% Tube Sheet ) 5. Eddy Current Test 250 473 9.330 11.940 28% (1350 tubes) 6. Nozzle Cover Installation, ? 37 ? 4.415 Retrieval 7. P:ofilometry (6 calb. & 180 326 5.900 6.815 15% 4 probes) 8. Explosive Tube Plug 2 69 4.368 8.175 67% (2 tubes) 9. Manway Replacement 144

200, 8.746 12.490 43%

807+ 1,591 47.746+ 60.363 26% ALARA_ Cont rols Utilized: Breathing Air Manifolu & TM1 mod conduit runs post-poned until after manway replacement; shielded container for diaphram storage; lead sheet on platform grating; lead blankets on hot spots in skirt drain lines; water hag manway shield; use of manway bolt holders; S/G ventillation system; S/G tents; automatic indexing eddy current and profilometry probes; channel head decon; jumper briefings; use of TV for locating nozzle coverl shielded eddy current booth; S/G skirt to LLOA communications; and diaphram removal catch pan. Effectiveness of ALARA Controls: S/G Tents containment adequate, however, they took alot of time to setup ; handles are required to facilitate lif ting manway adapters; a slot to accomodate detonation wires may be required in manway adapter gaskets, a sturdiet and fitted manway shield is needed, channel head decon would be more ef fective using Boron grit in II 0; S/C containment weak at tent to skirt connection; and the 2 Mimanco blower used on S/G #1 not as effective as Safety & Supply system (Fig. 21). 1 I

Sur.ygy Detgj Figure 7 and 8 Sjypytyr._ _ improvements : IJse herculite lined plywood prefab shack InstenI of' tent, use mechanical tube plugs instead of explosives, air inflated donut shaped tube to attach tunnel fromi/G tent or shack to hole in skirt. additional S/G ventillation system, tie off and inventory equipment going inside generator,' engineering investi-gztion on improved diaphram and obtain a S/G manway stud detensioner device. 1 I 1 4 l 8

FIGURE 7 OP 322 8 4 '., CY HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEY o.,e o u t. -,am. Q RAtm A Tsca O coa*aao' r s= = DeY '% r ":e E ', Y D, g, STEAM GENERATOR a L ' a 5 '. ru r e rci Aast ' SKIRT AREA -DOSE RATE RE ADINGS ARE IN MREu'NR AT WAIST LEVEL UNLCSS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED. -uRCLE D MuuBER5 h INDICATE Sur AR LOCATIONS. 2 INDICA's CON TAMINATION LEVEL $ IN DPM/10e Cu, -CIRCLED smE AR LoCAfloN1 AND NUMBE y1Ng>),9;j Q4%/4Lg s Ek f,, Ib h, gpq u. i...,.. I 00 225 ' A.- .g h 15e 1 50 f b u N s/ /- ..w. uu a d IW kt / 77-l ['/ / /' f w w OO n.a.... o. M,~.-a.....s V U u 2 O Att s.E ARs tEis THAN ioco oPo<ioa Cu. 1 CORRECTiv E ACTION T AKEN YE5 ]No _ k HEALTH PNyilC$ FOREMAN l

FIGURE P. CY %EALTH PHYSICS SURVEY OP B2J 4 6-?? onve r/v/t. L c i,,i sa g esointio" O co = " *" * o" cow a "5 @AY DeV Oa 0-- STEAM GENERATOR n 2 l1ac. ~<=sr.g o.2 eM a r. SKIRT AREA -DOSE R AT E RE ADINGS ARE IN MREM.'NR AT W AIST LEVEL UNLES5 OTNERWilE SPECIFIED, -CIRCLED NUMBER $ h INDICATE See AR LOCATION 5. 2 IN0tCATE CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN DPM/100 f.M, -C'RCL ED SME AR LOCAf TONS AND NUMdE p.ype.19L, e o + Aes,t, as Q 11h 20h 3 160 [Nat\\CCLDj Ato el loc r l>$ a g $ec. 500 '/ i N s IR harFHN 8 l fu.A 1CO 0 to / 'I / p i ~ /~/ / f' /W \\vV 2 ALL SWE AR$ LESS TNAN 1000 DPM/100 CM, COeeECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YES _1 __ NEAtTN RNv5C5,oREMAN ONo

AI. ARA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

#4_

JOB TITLE: Anchor Bolt Inspection (IE 79-02) & Seismic Support (IE 79-14) JOB LEADER: J. Roach WORK CROUP: C. N. Flagg TYPE REVIEW:_ A (1 to 10 MANREM) WORK ORDER NO.: ACS0060 START DATE: 5/4/80 FINISH DATE: 7/21/80 TASK ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL % MANREM NO. TASK TITI.E MANHOUR MANHOUR MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE 1. Anchor Bolt & Seismic 3834.76 44.480 Support. Al. ARA Controls Utilized: Supports prefabricated prior to installation templates used for support layout, seal water return flushed and work deferred until after shutdown. Effectiveness of ALARA Controls: Safisfactori except for seal water return line flush which needs an improved method of injecting Hydrogen Peroxide intc, the line at a higher velocity. Survey Dat3: NONE Su gested Improvements: Future modifications of this type, due to the large variety of work areas'and lack of knowledge of the full scope of the job during the early phases, should be reviewed in segments. I f, m, -,., ,-.--r , -, ~.. ,<~-<,-._...,.,-,m e,,r,-,., -e---,e .,_.,,m-----r,---- ry,-

AIJJA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

[5_ JOB TITLE: Reactor Head / Pressurizer RCS Vent l JOB LEADER: C. Fenger, K. Argersinger WORK CROUP: C. N. Flagg TYPE REVIEW:_B WORK ORDER NO.: BCC0010 START DATE: 5/15/80 FINISH 'oATE:_7/5/80 1 1 TASK ESTIMA' LED ACTUAL' ESTIMATED ACTUAL % MANREM NO. TASK TITLE MANHOUR MANHOUR MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE _ 1. Head Manifold Installation 370 643 27.250 14.451 - 47' 2. Pressurizer Manifold 225 258 9.000 1.789 - 80% Installation 3. Conduit / Wire / Support 2302 2253 33.180 25.365 - 23% Installation q 4. Miscellaneous 76 99 2.500 2.469 TOTALS 2973 3253 71.930 44.074 19% ALARA _Co_ntrols Utilized: Head vent manifold and supports prefabricated outside containment, head and pressurizer shielding, portable vacuum cleaner used during i drilling into contaminated material, use of power tools whenever practical, and use of pictures for briefing and job pleaning. 3 Effectiveness of ALARA Controls: -More ALARA involvement in conduit run location in design review stages. i i Survey Data: Figures 9 and 10. Improvements: N/A Future r l

OP3338 Fe-74 CY llE ALTil PilYS"O SlJRVEY eme rson g couramination om i e., FIGURE 9 h, o @dY CAT tiu c Dn D~ Renesen, Led era 5,endi.< Lo-c$ LeacI n c"

ss.,ett ree,en.,s,.

3E F*oK'C.5 Hi E LD -oost = AT E Rt atJNGS ARL 1t4 MR(f4/HR.1 Wal%I L EV E L UNLE55 Olht Rat 5E SPE CIF,L O. -ctacLf D NUMP g y Q (Hgg( A}f $gy, LO( A } gCyg, -c,2cuo s uuoc.no~,.un,.u.c g..oic.n cesuoin now uvn.s.,. mn cs. t 10 f O$ 500 @ CoalitT citiM s U 2e e i.at ou cerm m

D

)0 Q3% f-i b.L@ d I - 2se [ Ir'br*,",e$,7,',) 1 6 - ~!l 300@ OurEn Lee es c a,welec da,etuall ~~ - 3 5 g,pce,,r.,ye p,,r 4,(,,, gg, I R ets Q 1l w w., -,.. s,,,,,,,, _. ,8 1 1. . t

J.

i i 1. ,, 1 ip, 7,,,, h & ~'9 cs'tT,ACO 9 sfr. ygme,tur,,,a PLEN u a4 I, f.a N LArO4 bcoGeoar, n og y,7 VZNI e "*W IIIIEhG1 584Gcatr.,+, ps,,, .r.,,,.,r Fl ear,t

I

..M t 3 +- it-3r @ caur., co.eao p art W ed

te h 80*$Nh(taff M

.g on, _,,e y, n,n,m o.m,,,, comcmr. cum a, <~ o,,o

'JP 33 3 8 IS -73 C.' 'f EALTil PilYSICS SURVEY g eAo Avion g conta. avion gjfg oArc .WeY oer. r iu r. Da O~ k,rnc Ton Hcap a $Tnsp en Lowc4 lsyd " c" ast. 3 n t i t e,epr. MIER SHIC LD -Dolt itATE Rf ADlHG5 ARE Ill uRtu'etR At W Al5T L EV EL UNLf 55 OTHE Rel50 SPE CIFitD. -CIRCLL D NUp0t NS Q INDic Ai[ lut A H lor A IlONS. -cinct to Sut AR Loc Avious Ano uvuot(Qinoic ATE cONTAMlHAllOH LEVtt.5 IN OPM/100 C4. 7 500@ CCNTACT or el T a e am, t-- i;o ro lic A J ow c a tW4 Lx i (-- 150(? u) A iT o*4 CA T u' 4 L K l b l60G f((T cN L AT W ALk 3000 0airA uPos carW4m otJTf dWi1LL k-1, Q-4f C Ig,- 7tegcogr,5t09 f ft. rto*4T.rPcime 50dG lo47.,3cco irr {g' J u 4;l:. l A00 9 t6Mr.,3fDO} FT,500el fT CADM = l ~{ Y.f 2 'l

{

To p 46 (d 3009 Cont,'l0091FT VenssLLnst0H '.j., h Pt ruu s d U..\\m.j',r. 'h,k vtNhlLATIOH "g 2500 C ONT.,200VIFT l Lina m Q"Y>j- ~ nauce l ', i*i :. 3009 CcMT,250G1FT NEW VENT \\ ,~ ro A nt.c b w ( - 10 306Cb% 60-909 3rT MAY ~.._ w f,,f--15&CcN7.Bf.n ~ C __ f . [~] A LL Sut M.h L L *,5 IM A N idD DPu/103 C'$ Cy:s, com ciivr Actico 14.:cs n,.,, ,, u u a imin n i. i...., i.

ALARA R2 VIEW JOB

SUMMARY

#6 JOB TITLE:

TMI Modifleations JOB l.EADER: Lou Gonzalas WORK GROUP: Stone & Webster - TYPE REVIEW: 4-A WORK ORDER NO.: START DATE: FINISH DATE: TASK ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL .% MANREM NO. TASK TIT 12 MANilOUR MANHOUR MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE 1. Detectten of Inadequate 262 487 3.700 7.320 98%- Core Cooling 2. PORV & 3V Position 212 1734 4.800 15.810 229% Indiator 3. CTNT lli-Rsd Monitor 333 257 3.200 2.703 - 15% 4. CTMT 112 Analyzer 526 716 9.100 4.400 52% j. 1333 3194 20.800 3ts.235 45% ALARA.C ntrpir Uti1jred: Shielded pipe trench for 112 analyzer, selectinn of cable 9 j routes by ALAR.% shielded hypass line and pressurizer surge line for PORV & SV wndification. f,f f elt;.iysne.sjtpf _ALAltA__Contrala; Satisfactory f , Survey Da,ta,:. NONE

.uy,qevted Improvements: N/A 4

a ALARA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

Q J09 TITI.E: Reactor Vessel ISI .lOli 1.EADEl* : .I. Del.awrence WORK CROUP: W gJng}toggn_,, f TYPE REVIEW: B (> 10 MANREM) WORK ORDER NO.: BCR0020 START DATE: 5/12/80 FINISit DATE: 6/8/80 TASK ~ l ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESIIMATED ACTUAL % MANREM NO. TMK TITLE MANHOUR MANilOUR MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE 1. Remove Core Barrel 34.2 470 2.385 7.900 23:% 2. Set-Up ISI Tool 200 59 1.000 0.660 - 34% 3. Barrel ISI 350 114 4.550 1.405 - 69% 4. Remove ISI Tool 80 9 1.000 0.100 - 90% 5. Re-install Core Barrel 34.2 70 2.385 2.900 21% ' 9 8. '. 722 11.320 12.960 14% 6. 7. 8. Rx Vessel Nozzle ISI 210 203 10.000 10.900 9% l 9. Rx Stud ISI 300 54 1.500 0.205 86% 10. Rx CRD Shaft ISI 300 62 1.500 0.410 73% 1500 1437.61 24.300 26.039 7% . AIARA Controls Utilize;!_: Sprinkler hose to keep core barrel, CRD's and upper intern 41s wet; line up lift rig w/ guide studs before lowering H O level; pre-loh briefing of all 2 personnel involved; 1imited number of personnel on charging floor to minimum necessary ; installation of shield between ISI electronics station and core barrel; H O shield tanks 2 around core barrel; and personnel to maintain distance as far as possible from barrel. Ef]3Stiveness of MARA Controls: Sprinkler hose installation prevented airborne but installation technique was crude - better attaching method needed, actual H O levels were 2 maintained above those projected - avoiding additional sheilding, hoses going to barrel fill / vent lines were cumbersome and could have been installed to prevent obstruction, electronics station shielding worked well. Survey Data: Figures 11 and 12 S,ugges,t ed, _ Imp ro vemen t s : Sprinkler sparger for cavity and internals, design an, improved method to fill water shields, maintain water in cavity oa high as possible and use personnel shield hooths during litt. ( ! {

cr m eio.,e CY llE ALTil PilYSICS SURVEY @ hatd Af tom C CONTA,MIMafiON 3 A i g- ) j b4Y DAY flu t On D.~ .*ir. n fe r a, # is. CORE 8mcl b i c. R celaccr.m " c" L g FT (1Ma'rtal t o.s tl e.** $f f) .D!$t RAr E RI ADtHG5 Alet IN MRCMhf R Al WAlSI o cVf L UNLt15 011tf Rel5E SPictfitD. -CIICLED NUuSL N'e h $NDICA f c 'ut AR t Of AltONS. -rinctED sur An iocArious AnD uusistg3,noicArc costAui,atic,n ttvros in ocu/ino en.2 f y-- m Tuitser srnt en / 7.0 [r 9 Toa,r B u nt Fla.cr / e 15 r t nw ei y s f l 0 r. n u t ot,a.z e rr i 1

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vicuar 12 ( /,5le C $4Y C#Y 1 wc Da O-Und Iniumk hcv w ir.cen,,g,,,o insi. 06 I Av DowH. Pa m.Cs:Ty -Dc5[ 4 ATE Rf AfstNGS ANE IN R[u/HR Al WAli, LEVEL UNLES$ oTHCRwl1E SPECiflED. -CIRCLED NuMBCP$ h lHDICATC $ME AR LOC AllONS. -C Cuo m AnoC 1,ons so ~u ui>@,~oit re Co,u,,inA11on uvus in o,. mo Co. r 4 4 4 y' 's l,gg en ccultasTep o t L i rt igt:, et q, } + I I 14.0 6 IN cENif *@ TCP. os wa uccw.m ,a e 7l ay {_h,.7 <f'k;I[Whf%: Ata m Tugrs y io.o 6 3,u.,,,, cuc., u.o6 e 3,4 am u u. urer<. ~,e t w t ) os urren surnu ( 0 ,g ) I} eau .) ) p C I I! 0 l} h L 0 9 r o )( I' ( g 0 ( / I l i 0 a 's 34einwwcEscorew s ) ( I 0 g ) cao.~ ( )U C r ) 1 ) j t ) ) i

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ALARA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

#6 JOB TITI.E:

ISI (Excluding Vessel) JOB LEADER: J. Delawrence W0l'K CROUP: Engineerina ACC0110, ACC0162 TYPE REVIEW: 13-A WORK ORDER NO.: AAC0050, BCC0030 START DATE: 5/10/60 FINISH DATE: 7/4/80 i TASK EST)

ED ACTUAL FSTIMATED ACTUAL

% MANRIM NO. TASK TITLE MANHOOR MANHOUR MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE 1. Regen. Ilcat Exchanger 37.80 33.75 3.660 3.565 - 2.5% 2. I'res su r i ze r 93.30 1<,2.56 5.000 3.398 - 32% 3. Loop Isolation valve 146.00 82.07 1.500 3.325 55'. 4. 6" Loop liypass Line 17.25 48.00 1.725 '.292 - 32% j 5. Misc. Pipe Inspection 175.52 2.016 6. Seal inject 1on 33.00 109.02 0.730 1.899 160% 7. RilR 19.00 58.22 0.580 1.495 158% 8. 3" Chargine Line 8.00 76.06 0.480 1.387 90% i 9. Steam Generator 81.00 70.74 4.050 1.204 - 70% 10. Drain 11eader 33.50 54.59 0.955 0.863 9% a 11. Spray Line 8.00 20.08 0.480 0.673 40% 1 j i f 12. Til 6 lic Nozzles 13.00 13.67 1.300 0.495 - 80% 13. Lutdown 8.00 ~/19.75 26.620 22.869 1 14% 9.99 0.160 0.255 10% 49/.85 AIK A Controls Utilized: Shielded where nad when practical, prefabricated insul-atton

1. Iow dose rate area, deconed and inspected in low dose rate area MOV 577 valve, flushed regen, heat exchangers, and during radiography evacuated local area.

Eff es tlyenns s_nf_ ALAl%.f.un truls.: Regen. Ileat E. changers flush unsuccessful due to lack of high flow aed more shiciding could have been acilized. durvey Data: Figures 13. 14, 15, 16, 17, und 18. Siggestejl Improvements: Uv phouographs for weld location, install blank flange on vegen IIT. 4x., use same technic an tor MI to reconimend shield placement,and use of sky-Jackers instead of staging and use fiber optics im re. note visual inspections. . e , ~ _... ~, m ,,,,,.._,r-. c_ ,,r .,r_, ,,,,,,~_w ..,,c v.,...

p FIGURE 13 a c.4 4:... n. 5 i. ist,,i les I tiv a., 9 1R vt t ,,a i s q walda t eow ll 8 g, 7 f4 ' + g e t- ), l < t x,., *. ~ i us [}n l-)..< 4' ".. ,gg OU . ' _ _ at t l J b REGEN. IIEAT EXCl! ANGER 9/ t. GL < 1 its it e e rai . to u w. u elk a l sal % 4 L i e t i Livet L ts ulait kat)I $ fat (le le p. CiMCLLlbNU4*neW,()Me6HAi4

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FIGURE 14 or unt ie f a CY HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEY oArt goAc vio O coa '*" a a "'a 6///'Fe rc 7/>V/c dY Cp( T ies t h,, p .. T RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL, ,,, n PDT AMD ADT AREAS . DOSE Raf t RE ADINGS ARE IM MEEM/HR AT wally LEVEL UNLESS OTHE RelSE SPECIFIED. -CIRCLED NUW8E R$ Q lNDICATE SteE AR LOCAf TONS. I .CIRCL ED SME.R LOCATIDN$ AND NUMBE INDICATE CONTAdlNAT10N LEVELS IN DPM,100 CM m n u a y to 30 ADT j ADT f I A D T D.U. u' P .. g.. +. g" PUMP 'l $ h &G [0 gg gg ng* j $(, 6C ' W"' .. A er 5c F.C c'c M $M PD.T..P.U. MP _ k Li $L? jl( 1D p PDT PUMP RH R RHR "A" li b gg HX ..gn ^$ {0 f(; 60 106 5'o 1cc it b, t ALL $ME ARS LESS THAN 1000 DPM/100 Ca, CDRRECTivt scTION TAKEN YE$ NO.- -.. -..

FIGURE 15 o,~.... O a*E a "o= O coa'a==^o" CY HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEY "P ones , A. _ 4 Od7 Der ~ 1. r ~ Oa O= SAFETY INJECTION AREA -DOSE R ATE RE ADINGS ARE IN MREM HR AT WAIST LEVEL UNLESS OTNERwlit SPECIFIED. -CIRCLED NUMBE RS h INDICATE SME AR LOCATIONS. I -clRCLED 5ME AR LOCAfl0Nk AND NUMBE INDICATE CONTAMINATION LEVEL 5 IN DPM 100 CM. 2. 4 4 g 1 i '. 0 ~ {l a m i [d LP51 LPSI 1P 1 g p HP51 HP51

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FICURE 18 oc u st..,, CY HE ALTH PHY$lCS $URVEY

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FICURE 17 or mi s.s, CY HEALTH PHYSICS $URVEY - oAve . -/ T /s t/ 4/ A. g e n o. A i.o" O coa 'a ='ao= m.A vi c @4V OeY L" ' ' ' 5'**** Dn Dm CONTAlHMENT CROUND Fi.00R g( 2p in s t. .= s t OUTER AHHULUS AND LOOPS -Dolf R ATE NE ADsNGS ARE IN MREM / Nil AT W AIST LEVEL UNLEin OTHERal5E SPECIFIED. -CIRCLED HUMBE RS h INDICATE SME A R LOC AflCN$. 2 .ClRCL ED $ME AR LOC AflCNS AND NUM3 Lit INDICA TE CONTAMINAflON 1 E VEL $ IN DPM '100 Cu, - RE A DlHGS th'.lDE T RI ANCL E INDICAT E NE UT RON R ADI AT i'A. W anREM.14R AT W AIST LEVEL. H RE ACTOR POmra r 7 e a? it.

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FIGURE 18 CY HEALTH PHY51CS SURVEY oave [Q caci A vio" O coa'a='aa no* con., g/A n e ic Help,- NdV DeV Er Dn Dm ALER SIC = U""'d

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CONTAlHMENT GROUNL FLOOR i OUTER ANNULil5 AND LOOP 5 .DOtt R Att Rt aDINGS arf IN Matp44R A1 WAIST LEVEL UNLt55 0THttel5E SPECIFatD. .CIICLt D NUM8t RS h INDICAf f SME AR LOCa t10NS. I -CIICLt 0 SME AR LOCA flON) ANf NUMSt k INDICAT E CONTAMINA TION LEVEL $ IN DPM/100 CM. - Et ADING$ le,ilOg 1 RI ANGLE IHOICAlf NEUTRON RADI A110N IN MRCMAiR AT WAlli LEVEL. RE ACTCR POetit n [* H m 47

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..n ALARA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

#9 J.)B TIT 1.E:

Fire Detection l.ou Conz'los WORK CROUP: Stone 6 Webster JOB !,EADER:, TYPE REVIEW: B (> 10 MANREM) WORK ORDER No. : ACA0190 START DATE: 5/6/80 FINISit DATr.. 7/18/80 TASK ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACEJAL % MANREM NO. TASK TITI.E MANTIOUR MANil0UR MANREM MAnhEM DIFFERENCE 1. Fire Detection 1310 2649 15.000 19.900 33% L i ~ALARA Controls Utilized: Worked low dose rate areas first for training purposes, prefabricWelf wire connectors Tn annulus before installation in loops, used low done : ate area in annulus for eluipment laydown, and conduit fabrication. Effectiveness of ALARA Controls: Satisfactory Survey Data: NONE ,ufgested Improvements: Utilize shadow shield or personnel shields on scaffolding. S ALARA REVIEW JOB

SUMMARY

#10 JOB TITII:

1-4 Steam Generator Secondary Side Inspection and Repair JOB LEADER:

H. Vong/J. DeRoy WORK GROUP: Engineering TYPE REVIEW: B WORK ORDER NO. : ACC0200 START DATE: 5/7/80 FINISH DATE: 6/4/86 TASK ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL % MM1RD1 NC. TASK TITLE MANHOUR MANHOUR MANREM MANREM DIFFERENCE 1. Sludge Lance Equipment 116 103.79 1.160 0.276 - 76% Setup / Operate / Removal 2. Remove Handholes 16 13.76 0.480 0.547 6% 3. Sludge Lance 208 526.40 9.180 10.192 11% 6. Replace Handholes 32 (?.87 1.120 2.715 142% 5. Photo Flow Slot Test 20 13.33 2.240 0.703 - 69% 392 757.23 14.180 14.42 2% i.LARA Controls Utilizgd_: Used communicat, tons from trailer to platform, z.olded area in front of handholes, channel head & tubes deconed prior to lance, positive seal between hand-hole and lance required, use full recirculation for lacce water and placed lead blankets over handholes when not in use. Effe_ctlycngss of ALARA Cgntrols! Satis f actory. However, one of the largest waste of manrem occurred during the approximately two weeks time between the end of sludge lance and the beginning of photo flow slot when the en.pty steam drum caused elevated dose rates. In addition, the sludge lance equipment developed a leak causing a spill of a few hundred gallons of clean water. Survey Data: Pigures 16, 17, 18 and 19. Sugg ered Improvements: Fabricate lead handhole cover and expedite the filling of the steam generator secondary side, do not schedule jobs ?n the vicinity of the generatorn until they are filled with water and inspect sludge lance squipment for leaks prior to its operation. , )

FICURE 19 CY HE ALTH PHYSICS SURVEY _5]/4/62 - d ons i.3.# IL g o av.o= Q con t amia n fio= cp, 79 8 Y U 'I "hq A,/f Wi el en Ca U" c= STEAM CENERATOR e 1-4 i = s t. T s an * * " '" - (SIDE VIEW) -DOtt Ra f f at ADING% ARE IN MRf M /HR AI W Al%I L E VEL UNLEll OTHt teWitt SPf CIFIED -CIDCLf D NUMsf R$ h INDICA T E SME A D L OC A TIONS. I . CtNCL { D Wf J P LOC A TIONS AND NUMBt INDICATE CONT AMINA fl0N Lf vtLS IN DPM 100 (M, I MANWAY ( l f CH A RGING FLOOR 1 f fit 0 FEED INLEI BNLET l 1 i M A# I l ' A '~U C W ~ dI' nr aff IFT ]bi'ya* a (,,, l, ; HANDHOLE A k NIDLEvtl Ib' u a f 5.1tc,,uw.n \\ l .Nur) ou1Ler m:. ALL last ARS Ltil TNAN 1000 DPM/800 CM / ALL SME ARS Lill TNAN 100 DPes/ ISO CMId I 3 !.S ONo I" ' ' " ' "' ' " "' " comR.C1.. AC,lo ,AR.N c.

ALARA REVIEW JOB SUMMART #11 JOB TITLE: Reactor Coolant Pump #2 Seal Inspection and Repair JOB LEADER: Bill Ventres WORK GROUP: Maintenance TYPE REVIEW: A WORK ORDER NO. : ACC 0042 START DATE: 5/7/80 FINISH u.'.TE: 8/6/80 TASK ESTIMATED ACTUAL ESTIMATED ACTUAL % MANREM No. TASK TITLE MANHOUR MANHOUR MANREM MANREM DIFFFRENCE i 1. Retnove Motor 80 31.92 1.840 0.523 - 71% 2. Remove Piping 40 9.00 0.920 0.158 - 82% 3. Remove Seal 60 30.23 1.380 0.486 - 65% 4. Repair & Inspect Seals 8 13.17 0.184 0.057 - 69%- 5. Replace Seal 60 107.05 1.380 2.197 60% 6. Replace Piping 40 89.49 0.920 1.040 110% 7. Replace Motor 80 245.26 1.840 5.248 185% TOTALS 368 532.12 8.500 10.609 25% 8. 2nd Seal Repair Job 405-212.65 7.800 4.415 43% 9. 3rd Seal Repair Job 405 286.53 7.800 5.830 25% 10. 4th Seal Repair Job 405 280.67 7.800 5.950 25% ALARA Controls Utilized: Shielded platfoim, deconned seals upon removal, repaired seals out of containment. Effectiveness of ALARA Controls: Steam Generators were empty causing higher dose rates, scalt damaged by lead blankets, the blankets not too effective in reducing area dose rates. S gv g Data: Figure 20 Sugcasted Improvements: Perform seal repair when steam generators are full, put markings on shims, improve tool storage and restrict access to crea. 4 -

i l FICURE 20 oe nsi s.r, CY HEALTH PHYSICS SURVEY oara @Ca ce ATsom Q contamiention fgjg g of 9 /gg @dY OeV v i= = 0a Da ,,c, ' * " - R61 A '""- REACTOR COOLANT PilMP-# 1 -DO5E RATE RE ADINGS ARE IN MREWHR AT WAIST LEVEL UNLESS OTNERWISE SPECIFIED. -Cl3CLEO NUMBERS h INDICATE SME AR LOCATIONS. 2 -Cl:CLEO SME AR LOCATICNS AND NUMRE INDtCATE CONTAMINATION LEVELS IN DPM/100 CM, G. A. op CavvAlp 30 -t3D A MAD 8I M0 tor ~.. =.. l 20 1 cdiwalk to 30 ( 20 0 b bb R f] p i = u o y ( IE T 30 seo p ccur. scoS C:$t- [ skari goG essi. tE*L M wmE8 10 10 g ge t.44 a t, y;"- 30 o-4, c.a.. ou T;u, f T 20 - 4c nauu l S t irl l l lM 0 3o 2e 2f 30 o.L _.R,LES,, _ _ O. _ C... CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN YES NO -40_ NEALTH PNYSICS FOREMAN

r l i l i l l I l l l 1 SECTION IIC SMIELDING, FLUSHING, SOURCE REMOVAL AND TIME SAVING TECIDIQUES Section IIC contains a listing of tire various applications of shielding, flushing, source removal -ind time savings techniques tn utilized during the outage. e' H OZ h H O

l l IIC. Shiciding. Flushing. Source Removal and Time Saving Techniques Work areas with " hot" pipes and equipment were identified during the initial containment radiation surveys and the ALARA [ Coordinators initial walk-throughs. Shortly thereafter, lead blankets were used to shield the hot pipes to reduce exposure to the workers. Two additional orders of several hundred lead blankets, and 1000 pounds of \\" thich lead sheets were ordered and delivered during the course of the outage. These shields and other shields were used under the direction of the ALARA Coordinators to: - Shield the reactor head and piping on the top of the pressurizer during the Head /Pressurizec RCS Vent Modification. - Shield the core deluge piping on the Rx head during core deluge cable replacement. l - Shield the seal ring and CRDM's and establish maximum possible water level in the vessel during reactor vessel head replacement. I - Maintain water shielding in the transfer canal during blind flange removal and replacement. - Utilize the 2 - b" steel. personnel shields in the cavity l during refueling operations. - Place additional concrete blocks on the cavicy filters during l cavity filter replacement. - Place plexiglass beta shielding on the refuel bridge mast during fuel moves. - Utilize the shielding afforded by the water during the use of a driver to repair the fuel transfer cart switch. - Install the 10" water shield tanks on the core barrell during ISI. i - Install (" lead plate on the spent fuel pool bridge grating and reiling during fuel replacement. F. rect a shielded buoth in the Spent Fucl Building for W fuel location data logger during fuel replacement. - Shield the sipping equipment during fuel sipping. l - Shield the spent fuel tools upon being removed from the pocl whenever possible. i _.-._,.

- Placed lead blankets on the deck and rails around the RCP during seal inspection and repair. - Install lead blankets around the RCP motor during Oil Collection Modification work. - Placed lead blankets on the plank roof and hung "S" hooks and lead blankets from the tube block staging erected around the RCP #2 bowl during Fire Detection Modification { work. - Placed lead blankets on the railing around the Loop 1 TH Valve during ISI. - Placed lead blankets on the bypass line during the MOV 577 valve disassembly for ISI. - Install shielding on the grating over #4 loop bypass line and pressurizer surge line during the Pressure Transmitter - TMI Modification. - Install shielding on the 861 A & C SI loop stop valves I for PORC and SV, TMI Modifications. - Placed water shield bags over the S/G manway openings during primary steam generator work. - Install shielding to the drain lines and other S/G skirt " hot spots" as well as placing \\" lead sheets on the manway work platform for the primary steam generator work. - Constructed a shielded booth for the Eddy Current and Profilometry operaters in LLOA. - Utilize the movable shield racks, lead blankets curtains on penetration catwalk, lead blankets hung on railing on the catwalk and shiciding of local " hot spots" for Electrical Penetration work eg. drain header and coolers. - Shield the letdown line in containment pipe trench during Hydrogen Analyzer, TMI Modifications. - Shield " hot spots" in RHR, LPSI and Charging Pump Cubic 1La during IST. A dstermination of the actual manrem reduction cannot be made due to insufficient pre and postshielding dose rates and the inability to determine worker location and their respective staytimes. In otherwords, dose rate reduction factors and estimated occupancy factors were not dernmented in many cases. However, in general the shielding caused dose rate reduction factors of 0.50 to 0.33 (50% to 33% reduction). l - 2

Other manrem reduction techniques considered during this outage were source removal eg. flushing and decontamination, time saving techniques and barricading areas. The major examples of these are: - RCP Seal Water Return Line fl sh for Electrical Penet ation and Anchor Bolt Inspection work. - Core Deluge Piping flush for Refueling and Cable Replacement work. - Regen Heat Exchanger flush for ISI. - Movement of the Regen Ht. Ex. ISI booth to a lower dose rate area. - Postponement of the sump pump preventative maintenance until after tne full insertion of the incore probes. - Increase the flow through the Spent Fuel Pool Ion Exchangers during fuel replacement. - Decontamination of the MOV 577 valve and its removal from containment during its ISI. - Evacuation of the local areas during radiography. - Hydrogen peroxide primary system flush following shutdown. The RCP Seal Water Return line and Regen Heat Exchanger flushers were not successful because or the lack of a means to inject large flows through these lines. It is recommended that blank flanges be installed on those lines requiring routine flushing. Aleo, increused use of self indexing hydrolazing equipment should be used in the future. The aforementioned exposure reduction techniques, together with those which were undocumented and the ALARA attitudes which prevailed, definitely lead to a large reduction in the total station dose equivalent this outage..-

l l l l l t l l l SECTION IID ALARA CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS Section IID contains a listing of the various ALARA Control Instructions issued during the outage. to tr1 O8 H b H H U

IID. ALARA Control Instructions A new technique in exposure control was utilized during the outage which proved to be very effective. This was the use of special instructions that detailed ALARA controls. These written ALARA c.ontrol instructions were distributed to all task leaders as well as being attached as an RWP "special instructions". The AtaRA Control Instructions which proved to be very beneficial were: 1. Personnel Radiological Protective Requirements for Steam Generator jumpers. (Attachment A) I 2. Radiation / Contamination Surveillance Frequency During Primary Steam Generator Work. (Attachment B) 3. ALARA Recommendations for Steam Generator Explosive Tube Plugging. (Attachment C) 4. ALARA Recommendations for Core Barrel Reinstallation. (Attachment D) 5. ALARA Recommendations on LPSI/HPSI Charging Pump Flow Test. (Attachment E) 6. ALARA Recommendations for Transfer Tube Blind Flange Replacement. (Attachment F) 7. ALARA Recommendations for Cavity Decon. 8. RWST Precautions. i I l

ATTACHMENT A l PERSONNEL RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS l FOR STEAM GENERATOR' JUMPERS The following are the personnel radiological protective requirements which are to be enforced by the technician covering the primary steam generator work. These requirements apply only to individuals entering the channel head space of (jumping) the steam generators. The H.P. technician shall not reduce any of the requirements without specific written approval by the Radiation Protection Supervisor. 1. 3 pair plastic shoe covers 2. 1 pair rubber shoe covers 3. 2 pair rubber gloves 4. 1 pair cotton gloves 5. cloth hood 6. 1 pair cloth coveralls 7. 1 pair paper coveralls 8. 1 plastic 2-piece suit 9. finger rings (to be pulled and processed af ter each jump) l 10. film badge (to be worn on head - to be pulled and processed af ter each jump) 11. 2 high range PICS (0-1R - one in packet and the other to be worn externally) 12. supplied air respirator (with valveable particulate filter and beta shield) 13. air supplied hood (to be worn over respirator without supplied air) 14. lapel air samplers (to be worn during first few jumps) 15. H.P. coverage with stop watch (max. staytime 90 sec.) 16. Tent containment established at skirt entrance.,

._-. - __ -. _ ~. 4 17. S/G ventilation system in cperation 18. Use gansna exposure rate of 370 mR/ min. and beta dose rate of 160 mrad / min. (periodically verify bef. ore jumps) l 19. Remove.1 pair gloves, 1 pair rubbers, hood, and plastic. suit in tent. Also remove airline and switch respirator over to particulate filter mode. 20. Training of jumper with tube maps, drawings and pictures. 8 4 1 i 4 d d T 1 '}

ATTACHMENT B RADIATIO 3/ CONTAMINATION SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY DURING PRIMARY STEAM GENERATOR' WORK A radiation survey frequency has been established in order to assure - Edequate personnel protection as well as pro'dding consistent data for future Steam Generator work planning. It will be the responsibility of the lead H.P. technician for the primary S/G job to have the surveys performed at the frequency listed on the attached schedule. Also attached for your convenience are the required survey forms. Copies of these surveys shall be kept at the S/G control point. Any deviation from this listing shall be reported to either the Radiation Protection Supervisor or the ALARA Coordinator on site. n f $ \\

ATTACHMENT C ALARA RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STEAM GENERATOR EXPLOSIVE TUBE PLUGGING 1. All personnel not associated with tube lugging shall be restricted from containment, all levels, until plugging is complete. 2. Personnel jumping S/G shall have a minimum of 1500 millirem prior to start of plugging and be trained. 3. Stay time in S/G shall be 3 tiinutes. -This staytime should equate to approximately 1300 millirem. 4. S/G jumpers shall use air fed respirators. 5. All explosives taken into containment shall be triple bagged with poly bags. This is necessary in case explosives have to be removed from containment. 6. No radios are to be used in cor.tainment during the time span that explosives are in containment. 7. All personnel shall be on the plugging RWP. No personnel shall be added to the RWP without the approval of Vince Burk, H. Clow, B. Granados or R. Panciere. 8. Personnel on S/G skirt area shall wear double paper PC's over the cotton and particulate filtered masks. S/G jumpers shall also wear plastics. 9. A Herculite walkway shall be laid from the S/G tent to behind the shield wall. 10. Two HP Techs shall be in full P.C.'s and standing by in the containment shack. 11. Two scott air pac's shall be available in the containment entry point. 12. Finger rings shall be worn by all S/G jumpers. 11, Radiation surveys shall be taken on Ventilation Filters. If filters read > 3 3/Hr. change them prior to more plugging.._.

ATTACHMENT D ALARA RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORE BARREL REINSTALLATION Bring Cavity H O level to ~ 6" of charging floor. 1. 2 2. Trair, all personnel involved in the lift sequence in their responsibilities. 3. Evacuate charging floor except for those needed to support barrel lift. During the lift, only the following personnel should be on charging floor. A. The engineers in charge (2 persons) B. Crane operator C. Transit observer (West side of cavity) D. HP Techs (1 with Eng., I with Transit observer, 1 at top of the foyer stairs from foyer). E. 1 HP Foreman (or RPS) F. Line Handlers The other personnel required for. the job should stay on stairs below the Charging Floor level until the barrel has been lifted up and ever the stand and the bottom of the shields are back under the water. 4. Lift barrel, monitoring dose rates at personnel watch stations as lift progresses. As core barrel is lifted, HP Foreman should evaluate occupied area dose rates to determine if dose rates are likely to become excessive, consulting with engineers in charge and limiting further lifting as'necessary. (Occupied area dose rates of 6 R/Hr. will result in 500 mrem to personnel over a 5 minute period)..

ATTACHMENT E ALARA RECOMMENDATIONS ON LPSI/HPSI/ CHARGING PUMP FLOW TEST 1. Scrub " Bathtub Ring" before dropping H O level. 2 2. Attach sprinkler hose around cavity / canal. 3. Install AMS-2 and low-vol sampler near cavity. 4. As cavity / canal level is dropped, run sprinkler hose intermittently to keep walls and RCC Drive Shafts wet. Guage duration of wetting by RCC Drive Shaft wetness. As a minimum, wet down 5 minutes out of each hour. Periodically check radiation levels around cavity and drain path (planned method is through canal drain, through purification to RWST). Restrict access as necessary. 5. Once upper core package becomes uncovered, open valve to spray down nozzle on west side of cavity and adjust as necessary to provide a spray down of upper core package. 6. During flow test, all available CAR fans should be in operation and access to the Charging Floor should be limited to those required for the test. NOTE: Since large amounts of activity are likely to be introduced to cavity, it is recommended that the cavity filtration be secured during the above operations. A potential for extremely high radiation levels on these filters exists, possibly restricting access to this area of the charging floor and also making filter changeout abnormally hazardous. Following the flow test, an evaluation on the cavity concentrations, l dose rates and filtration system use will be performed. I l l i L

ATTACHMENT F 1 ALARA RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSFER TUBE -BLlit 1FLANCE' REPLACEMENT A. AREA SETUP 1. Setup' bottled air manifold system. 2. Wet down canal walla prior to entry and between' entries. 3. Install ventilation duct from cavity to work location. 4. Cut 6' piece of herculite to cover fuel transfer. cart if needed to lay on while tightening bottom bolt. 5. Setup ladder or use crane for direct access. 6. Shield upender by lowering lead blankets. 7. Ensure that canal water level is at transfer rail level. 8. Decen and flush canal floor and walls. B. RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLG 1. Use the CPMU underwater detector with the long cable. Survey from charging floor about 2-3 feet off ra.il and along access from cavity. 2. Note water le7e1 on survey form. j 3. Periodically read personnel PIC's by running a line down to workers. 4. Outer plastics to be removed before exiting cavity. H.P. technician will perform undressing. Note: Keep unnecessary personnel away from changa area. C. ALARA CONTROLS 1. Brief individuals on: Flange configuration and bolt hole orientation. 2. Put guide pins on bolt holes to facilitate flange lineup. 3. Start bolts while flange is still on the lift. 4. Uae electric impact wrench. 5. Enter and exit by ladder or crane,-whichever is quicker. _ _. _ -

3 SECTION IIE IMPLEMENTATION OF NU PROCETURE #5 Section IIE contains a listing of the problems observed in Procedure #5 upon its initial implementation during the outage and suggests r^ssible solutions to these problems. en til az H H (9

IIE. Implementetion of NU Procedure #5, " Implementation and Documentation of ALARA for Equipment Installation, Modification, Repair and Maintenance Work in Nuclear Stations Radiological Areas" Implementation of Procedure #5 and the ALARA program went reasonably well for a new progrem. It was readily accepted by both station and contractor personnel who became involved in it. Job / Task Leaders were trained in the completion of the ALARA revi;w forms. The cooperation was good, however, it is doubtful that initiation of the review forms by the Job Leaders will occur without assistance from the ALARA Coordinator or without strong upper management enforcement. Documentation of (9) ->10 MANREM 'digh Exposure jobs and (18) -1 to 10 MANREM jobs ALARA reviews were performed by the ALARA group during the 1980 outage. The major problems encountered during the course of thc ae reviews are enumerated below along with recommended improvements. Problem #1 Most Job / Task Leaders arrive onsite shortly before job commencement. They are normally to busy scoping out and getting setup for the job to allow time to complete the ALARA Review forms (Attachnant A, Parts I & II and Attachment B, Parts 1 & II). This sometimes leads to rushed and superficial job reviews. Solution I As much as possible, attempt to get contracts for jobs awarded as far in advance from the job commencement date as possible. i In addition, the contracts should include provisions to have the part time assignment of the Jo,b Leader for ALARA preplanning and to have all workers comply with the ALARA procedure. Problem #2 Inspection and enforcement of ALARA controls by the ALARA Coordinators was weak. The large number of ALARA reviews (27) and difficulties in keeping track of their status with time made auditing difficult. Solution The specific tasks ALARA controls should be placed on the RWP's. The adherence to the ALARA Controls in the RWP's special instructions will be ensured by the HP' technician covering the job. This would be augmented by periodic ALARA Coordinator audits., _.

Problem #3 Some jobs which were greater than 1 manrr < scaped from receiving A1. ARA reviews. This was due partly to:

1) Job /

Task Leaders not completing the total job manhour estimate and HP technicians not completing the manrem estimate on the RWP and 2) Job / Tack Leaders not knowing that ALARA reviews are required for 1 MANREM jobs. Solution No RWP should be processed without a manhour and manrem estimate on it. This should be enforced by the HP technician and Foreman processing the RWP's. In addition all management personnel and workers both permanent station, utility and contractors should be trained in their responsibilities with -respect to the ALARA' program. Problem #4 Some RWP's have vague and general verbal descriptions of the jobs making it difficult to code and accurately account for doses by job. Also, work is done on an RWP other than what is described or work from two seperate jobs are put on one RWP. This makes it difficult to segregate and accurately account for the dose on each job. Solution The RWP's with vague verbal descriptions of the job or having two distinct work efforts, the HP technician processing the RWP should hold these aside and have the Job / Task Leader fill in a more accurate description. In addition, jobs receiving ALARA reviews should have preassigned task codes, which the job / task leader would enter on the RWP's. For work done outside of what is described c,n the RWP, the HP covering the job or in the area should not allow this work to progress. Problem #5 The Attachments to Procedure #5 are very time consuming to complete, vague as to the specific controls to be implemented for each daily tcrk and are to bulky. Solution HoL a meeting between CY, Millstone and RAB ALARA pcisonnel to condense the existing forms and to create a new form to attach to the RWP. This new form would detail the specific ALARA controls to be implemented that shift..

Proh_lem #6 Procedure #5 is to bulky and general to use as a training aid to job / task leaders and workers. Solution Develope both instructions and a training program for Job /Tast Leaders and workers informing-them of their ALARA program responsibilities. Problem #7 According to section 8.1.3 of Procedure #5, the Radiation Protection Supervisor should be assisting the Job / Task Leader in the Attachment A job review. In practice the ALARA Coordinator provides the assistance, since the Radiation Protection Supervisor is normally too busy. Solution Make the appropriate revisions to the procedure to allow the flexibility to allow for the ALARA Coordinator's assistance if so designated by the Radiation Protection Supervisor. Problem #8 According to section 8.2.5 of Procedure #5, the ALARA Coordinator shall notify and make a written report if it becomes necescary to exceed the person-rem estimate by 20% for the > 10 person-rem jobs. During an outage this would require a weekly or daily review of the ALARA review jobs cumulative exposures. The present method of doing this is too time consuming to perform daily (- 1-2 ' manhours /dny). In addition, most > 10 person rem jobs are one time major modifications, which are extremely complex in nature and their full scope of work is often unknown, initially. This resu".ts in gross overestimates or underestimates of the task manhours aad crude estimates of the respective effective dose rates. In short, the time spent to prepare a sritten report whenever the person rem estimates exceeds + 20% of the actual returns is not considered cost beneficial. Solution As for the time consuming daily cumulative exposure review, develope a HELPORE subroutine with a changeable file of the work order number of the required ALARA review jobs. This could produce an instant daily report (similar to WEXSUM). In regards to the written report during job progress, revise -,

the appropriate sections in Proedure #5 to eliminate the pm.paration of a writtan report. As a substitute add the requirement to investigate and initiate corrective actions if appropriate. These corrective actions would later be documented in the Post J,b Review. Problem #9 Section 8.3 of Procedure #5 requires a post job critique by the Job / Task Leader (s) and others for > 10 manrem jobs outside of + 20% of the estimated manrem. Due to the rapid exodus of contractors following startup and the unavailability of accurate actual manrem data upon startup, post job critiques with the Job / Task Leaders were not always possible. Solution The rapid exodus of contractors can not reasonably be avoided. The ALARA Coordinator should try to arrange the meetings as scon af ter job completion as possible. Also, the procedural requirement to have all parties critique the job should be loosened up. As for the timelir.ess of accurate actual manrem, tha problem here is twofolded.

1) The component codes are not entered into the computer on a routine basis. This is due to the backlog of more critical data to be entered by the data entry clerks.

21 Due to vague verbal descriptions (see Problem #5) some RWP's components are coded incorrectly. This requires hand checking all RWP's for each job to assure' accurate component / job code categorization. The recommended solution to (1) is to have a clerk assigned strictly to ALARA for dats antry purposes, generation of manrem summary reports and miscellaneour data filing. The recommended solution to (2) is to give the Job / Task Leaders a copy of the appropriate codes to be put on their RWP's before the start of the job. Also to train station foremen of the proper use of the codes. The recommendationa listed above represents the first post implementation procedural improvements. It is'important that these improvements be evaluated and the practical improvments implemented, since they will detezuine the future success and development of this important program. _ ~.

+ SECTION IIF HELPORE Section IIF contains a licting of the problems and suggested improvements to decreasing HELPORE processing time, to refine HELPORE data output and to facilitate and make more correct the RWP data output. i i ? t .... ~. - -

..- =-... 'IIF. HELPOF2 Tha HELPORE program was instrumental in the fast and. accurate processing of the large number of personnel dosimetry information (5,175 dosimetry packets processed) and RWP imformation (8,U S RWP entered into HELPORE) which occured during the outage. The implementation of standardized procedures and the late arrival of their i associated forms, at the beginning of the outage, caused t.aining problems, loss of time due tc'decresead_ clerk efficency, and frustrating inconveniences at a very crucial point in time. In spite of the large numbers and procedural changes the 10 persons in the Health Physics records gtoup i did an outstanding job in processing records in an efficient and controlled manner. Although the HELPORE program aided in improving record processing turnaround time, jome improvements could be made to decrease processing time. A great deal of the records clerks' time was wasted or lcst by slow computer 1 response time, frequent prolonged downtime, having to space through fields which are not being utilized, and the inability to have more than one clerk inputting into the same subroutine. Recommended improvements.to the problems listed above are increased computer speed or additional computers; microwave transmission or additional independent telephone transmission paths; use imaging like on the CICS operating system; and development of an improved distributive processing network for individual subroutines, respectively. In addition, an experiane records clerk should be assigned to each shift. The aforementioned improvements would reduce the time for inputting information and thus would save money by requiring fewer r(rord clerks. During the course of the outage it was desirable to review various types of dosimetry data for tracking and trending purposes. Some of these data computer sorts were not always i possible to perform in a timely manner. The desired dosimetry data computer sorte ere (1) work group annual manrem, (2) work group average quarterly exposure, (3) 4 automated manrem summaries by pre-selected W.O. numbers (see section IIE., problem 9) all systems, all components and all component / job combinations; and (4) work group mpc. hr., Whole Body Counter results, and urinalyr,is results vs. number of individuals. The data summaries listed above would be of great aid to the Rad. Protection Supervisor and ALARA Coordinator in tracking the effectiveness of their programs and job supervision. It would also save time for the ALARA Coordinators in the preparation of the outage and annual ALARA reports. j

,= The use of HELPORE's, RWPR and RWPT subroutines were an aid in tracking job historical manrem data for the ALARA reviews and in periodically.following major job ranrem status. 11cvever, some of the information is inaccurate and the sorting method 1olgy is of limited use. More specifically because of vague verbal descriptions of the jobs and inconsistencies in coding methods the system / component / Job codes on the RWP are inaccurate. Also, work other tnan what is described on the RWP is performed. This leads to dose being attributed to the wrong system / component / job code. Job leaders put general job deceriptions on the RWP's. This prevents the use of task codcs to break down the jobs dose by task. Due to the general nature of the system / component / job codes, extraction of a specific task on a specific plant component, requires looking through the verbal descriptions of the hardcopy RWP's listed on the computer part. Lastly, system / component / job codes on the terminated RWP's were not entered into the computer until 1 or 2 weeks after they were used. This made live time manrem summaries impossible. Reconnended improvements for the problems enumerateo above are: 1) Utilize a small verbal deccription to be entered in the component I.D. # blocks on the RWP. This brief verbal description would be prescribed by the ALARA Coordinator. It would be outputed aside the RWPR outputs of RWP f, dates, manhour and manrem to aid in task breakdown. 2) Procure an ALARA technician to enter in the computer the system / components / job codes to obtain a more timely manrem summary. This individual would also verify the accuracy of the codes, thereby having more time for the ALARA coordinator to do more productive projects. 3) Hav'- Job / Task Leeders and Foreman put censistent system / component / job codes on the RWP's. For :ontractors, the ALARA group would prescribe the appropriate codes and verbal description of their expected jobs. 4) The ALARA group must be located in the flow path of the RWP cycle. There he can more easily be consulted for ALARA controls, keep track of new jobs and prescribe RWP system / component / job codes. The above recommendations will improve the accuracy of the dose accountability by job and facilitate this data's extraction for routine use. tn L4o F-] H 93 H H H >= SECTION IIIA PERSONNEL EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION Section IIIA contains tables of the number of personnel contaminated by workgroups, by body location and by cause. It also lists the total number of documented personnel external contaminations, the jobs having the highest incidence and corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence. P

III. RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION CONTROL IIIA. Personnel Exiernal Contamination A total of approximately 400 Personnel Contamination Forms were completed on individuals having external radioactive surface contamination in excess of 1000 dpm By. Considering the total number of manhours spent in the Radistion Control Area this outage (141,304 MANHOURS), 400 conta.nination occurances represents a small incidence in personnel external contamination. Ideally however, and in the interest of ALARA, personnel ccatanination should be reduced to zero incidence. In an attempt to reduce future external contamination to near zero, a review of the Personnel Contamination was performed to identify reoccuring problems. Table 3 shows the number of personnel receiving external radioactive contamination for the various work-groups. As expected tra work groups having the largest number of workers contaminated were those performing the high risk radiological operations. Table 4 shows the regions of the body which received the largest percentage of external contamination. This sort is indicative of poorly designed protective equipment or weaknesses in the way protective clothing are being donned and removed. The head, ruck and face were the regions having the highest incidence. This is partly due to the fact that the face is usually the only area left unprotected to loose contamination. In addition, it is also due to the poor design and improper use of the " flap-tie type hoods" utilized du*ing the outage. It is recommended that this type of hood be phased out and replaced with the " Mil Spec" or equivalent type hood. The second highest region of the body receiving external centamination was the hands. This is to be expected since the gloved hand comes in contact with nighly contaminated equipment more than any other part of the body. However, glove size problems augmented the number of hand contaminations. It is recommended that several glove sizes be made available at all times. Table 5 shows the most common causes for external personnel contamination. Improper removal of protective clothing caused the highest number of personnel contaminations. The next highest contributor was improper respirator removal..For the problems of improper removal of protective equipment, it is recommended that during Radiation Indoctrination training the inexperienced radiation workers can properly don / remove protective clothing and respirators. This together with H.P. technicians, inspection and enforcement should reduce the problem. The jobs which caused higher than expected number and levels of personnel contamination are (1) Reactor Coolant Pump repair and inspection, (2) Reactor Vessel Stud Tensioning /Detensioning and hole cleaning, (3) scraping of Reactor Vessel Seal Rings, (4) Replace-ment of Fuel Transfer Tube Blind Flange, (5) Sludge Lancing of the Steam Generators and (6) Photo flow Slot Photographs. f..

TABLE 3 NUMBER OF PERSONNEL EXTERNALLY CONTAMINATED BY WORK GROUPS 1. Laborers 127 13. Nuclear Consultants 5 2. Decon Techs. 55 14. Service Group Electricians 4 3. Refueling Crew 40 15. QA Inspectors '4 4. Plant Personnel 39 16. QA Consultants 4 5. Service Company 22 17. Computer Services 4 6. Electricians 21 18. Services Electricians 3 7. Mechanics 20 19. QA rechnicians 3 8. Decen Services 16 20. Laundry Services 2 9. System Electricians 13 21. Health Physics Evaluator 1 10. Health Physics Techs. 11 22. Divers 1 11. Insulators 9 23. Visitor 1 12. ISI Crew 5 24. Security i TABLE 4 PERCENTAGE OF PERSONNEL EXTERNAL RADI0 ACTIVE CONTAMINATIONS BY BODY LCCATIONS BOLY LOCATION PERCEhTAGE 1. Head, Neck, Face and Hair 57% 2. Hands and Arms 27% 3. Body or Trunk 9% 4. Nasal 5% 5. Feet and Legs 2% -

= TABLE 5 PERCENTAGE OF PERSONNEL EXTERNAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATIONS BY CAUSES CAUSES PERCENTAGE 1. Improper donning or removal of protective clothing 40% '2. Improper use or removal of respirators 17% 3. Inadequate protect ive clothing and ' improper use 13% 4. Wet protective clothing 11% 5. Self contamination and carelessness 10% 6. Scratching, wiping er rubbing face or body 5% l l 7. Reading Dosimeter 5% 8. High Airborne radicactivity 5% i I. I 4 l l I i ~ ( 1 i I I' ! t -, ~,..,,., _

SECTION IIIB us tn PERSONNEL INTERNAL CONTAMINATION Q Ho= Section IIIB contair.s the nueber of personnel internally g contaminated above administrative acticn points, recammended H co..rective Actions to prevent reoccurrence, air sampling j and respiratory protection program.

IIIB. Parronnel Internal Centeninatien A total of approximately 3,300 Whole Body Counts (WFC) were performed during the period 5/3/80 to 8/8/80. Out of these 3,300 counts only 2 individuals had bonafide internal radioactive body burdens which exceeded the action points requiring internal dose calculations. However, no individual exceeded the NRC's internal exposure limits. This is based no the amount of personnel internal contamination determined by measurement of radioactive concentrations in air together with the individuals staytime. Subsequent assessment by Whole Body Counting verified thst no individual exceeded any NRC internal exposure limits. Recommended corrective actions to prevent reoccurance of the 2 incidents causing the two personnel to receive body. burdens in excess of our administrative action point are: l 1) To wear lesther work gloves when working with 3 harp contaminated objects if possibic. l l 2) Have Health Physics, Maintenance eni Operations l supervision perform a valithrough to assure { that all lead blankets have been removed from potentially thermally h t pipes. The success in minimizing personne1 internal contamination ~ can be attributed to the strong air sampling program and respiratory program. In general, the sir sampling program roved to be satisfactory during this catage. The number of air samples, the frequency of sampling, and the time and j place of the samoling locations was adequate. Alpha l counting capabilities both go.?ntative and qualitative were improved over the last catage. The determination of the large number of individual mpe. hrs. was time consuming and cumbersome. But it was accomplished in a thorough and controlled manner. New 1reathing zone air samplers were utilized this outage. The improved respiratory protection program which was instituted in April 1980, experienced minimal problems for a new program. In general respiratory inventory, cleaning, repair, inspection, issuance, testing and training all were satisfactory. l h l L

Minor short term delays were caused by the requirement for supplied air and..ack of clean respirators. Due to short lead times the preparation of the bottled air manifold system caused delays for sot jobs. This problem should be alleviated by the new containment breathing air manifold system. Although the new respirator cleaning facility averaged 450 respirators per day occasional shortages of respiratore still occurred. This is partly due to workers not returning respirators ar.d " gang" issuance and return of respirators. It is suggested that additional respirators in telation to the expected usage amount be ordered to minimize this problem. The respirator beta shields caused several problems. Namely, the tape used to hold the second lense on the mask attracted contamination and the additional MSA faceplate hindered vision.

i I i l l l l i i i SECTION IIIC AIRBORNE COF'_ AMINATION 1 Section IIIC contains the r.i.rborne contamination occurrences and their associated radioh.gical consequences. It also lists the various applications of ventilation systems to during the outage and recommendations for ventilation system improvements, j G H H H O i vem--m.--=- -m. -

IIIC. Airborne contamination in geacral, the degree of banafide airborne contamination much lower tr.is outage than in the last few outages. waa. This is believe? ',o be due to the cleanup of fission products from the primary system during this cycle; the peroxide addition following shutdown which dissolved the loose crud that was subsequently cleaned up in the resins; the increased use of ventilatidn, decontamination and containment systems; and the radiological control ptactices implemented by the H.P. Department. None of the airborne occurances resulted in personnel internal exposures above the NRC limits nor did they result in personnel external surface contamination which exceeded NRC allowable radioactive release limits. The four major airborn contamination occurances and their associated -adiological consequences are listed below: l 1. On 5/17/80 two insulators were removing lagging from pipes in the loops. Lead blankets which were left on the #2 hot leg piping were removed from the piping. The contaminated Icad wool inside 1. the blanket had deteriorated from being exponad to high temperatures. Upon lifting of the Liankets radioactive lead dust dispersed. The containment l was evacuated for 4 hours, CAR / Purge fans were l run at full capacity and periodic. air sampling l was initiated. l 2. On 6/15/80 the LPCI flow test created airborne conditions on the charging floor. Although the portable cavity venti 11ation and cavity sprinkler i Spray system were in operation, the large amount of crud released and the turbulence of the high flow caused localized airborne conditions on the charging floor. The control room was notified and requested to increase venti?ation flow. Respirators vere required on the charging floor l for about 3 hocrs. 3. On 6/27 from 1922 until 2045 ie. I hrs.'the containment was evacuated due to high airborne l caused when moving a Rx guide pin from the cavity to i its storage location. The refueling crew took the most dirnet path to the storage location which was directly over the exhaust of the portable cavity ventilation system. On 6/28 from 0810 to 1053 ie. 3 hrs. refueling personnel moved a

l o highly contaminated equipment storage box over the exhaust of-the same portable cavity ventilation -system. Also on 6/28 from 1317 co 1556 ie. 3 hrs. 1 the charging floor had radioactive airborne conditions due to wirebrushing of the stud holes. .The last two. occurances led to the use of respirators i on the charging floor during those periods. 4. On 7/2/80 when replacing the blank flange 93 the fuel transfer tube a short term localized airborne condition arouse due to agitation of highly i contaminated surfaces of the canal. The six j individuals who entered the canal and the two observers who watched from the charging floor became externally contaminated and received internal burdens less than the investigation level. No loss of work time was cuased by this occurance. Some of the noteworthy minor airborne contamination occurances which wet; documented are listed below: 1. On 5/12/80 the refueling crew while working ^ under an RWP for refuel tool checkout, had l two people scraping the seal ring. This caused the cavity and charging floor to be 4 evacuated.for - hour due to high airborne i contamination, On 6/20/80 the refueling crew while cutting the z. reactor vessel used 0-Ring, caused localized radioactive airborne conditions near the head laydown pad. The use of respirators-in the lower level outer annulus was required near the 2/3 loop entrance during cutting. 3. On 7/8/80 laborers caused an airborne condition of short duration in the loops. The laborers were droppir.e open bags cc-taining contaminated equipment from the ground level to the lower 1cvel in the loops. t Portab10 ventilation equipment which was on hand and operational at the beginning of the outage were (1) - 1680 CFM Safety end Supply Blower, (2) - 1500 CFM NUMANCO Bowers, (1) - CY Venturi Blower and (1) - 200 CFM CGR Blower. j These blowers were used by the ALARA Coordinators for: - Reactor Head Pressurizer RCS Vent job during head catwalk boring and during surface preparation for pipe supports. L i

Vesnel Nozzle ISI inside the biological shield during nozzle weld preparation. Steam Generator Primary Side Inspection and Repair during manway removal, eddy' current testing, channel head decon, explosive tube plugging and profilometry. - Low Pressurizer Safety Injection Test inside the Pressurizer Relief Tank Manway during pressurizer rellaf. - Hydrogen Analyzer. TMI modification during argon welding in the containment 'ipe trench. Blind Flange replacement on the transfer tube. 4 Refueling operations inside the cavity. Reactor Coolant System Drain lines modification in the lower level loops during pipe cutting and welding. Stud cleaning machine exhaust Cicanup of air inside the refueling equipment decon tent on the charging floor - Cleanup of air inside RCA yard decon tent during equipment decon. The use of portable vartilation was a major contributor to the decrease in the number of airborne occurances as compared to previous outages. However, more ventilation blowers could have been used. It is recommended that an additional Steam Generator Ventilation System as shown in Fig. 21, an additional 1500 CFM NUMANCO blower, and 1 additional 500 CFM portable blowers be procured for the next outage. It was observed during the laggers removal of the lead blankets and the LPCI Flow Test airborne occurances that air flow is from the inncr annulus to outer annulus. An investigation was performed to locate drawings which would show the air flow patterns in the containment for the various fan lineups and amperage. Fo information was available.,

~. Also, during tha time when all psrtchle ventilation blowers were being used there existed vther jobs requiring ventilation cleanup. It was suggested that a ventilatf.on hose be tied into the ( Jntainment Air Recirculation (CAR) fans..This was not possible because of the lack of a suction inlet port. It is recommended that the contair. ment air flw patterns for the various fan lineups be determined. With this knowledge, ventilation currents can be manipulated to our advantage. In addition, 'it is reconenended that an 8" and 10" O.D. ventilation duct inlet ports be added on each CAR fan auction plenum. l l I I l-l i l l l l l l.

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1 I 1 F 4 SECTION IIID TOOL, EQUIPMENT AND AREA SURFACE CONTAMINATION Section IIID contains the various applications of decontamination, containment + spray systems used during the outage and recommended actions for contamination control improvements. cn tT1 8 a= H Ha

IIID. Tool. Equipment and Area Surface Contamination In general, the levels and degree of radioactive surface contamination experienced this cutage were much lower than what was experienced in the last few outages. This is primarily due to the large amount of decontamination; containment and sprays used; the cleanup of primary piping loose crud; and the contamination controls recommended by the HP Department and practiced by the workers. No major uncontrolled spread of radioactive contamination occured during the outage. There existed the minor short term requirements for respirstors based on smearable contamination on the charging floor and lower level outer annulua, but these are to be expected. As can be seen in section IIIA. Very few individuals received external surface contamination and none were released offsite with fixed contamination levels above federal limits. The major contamination control techniques utilized this outage were ventilation, decontamination, containment and spray systems. The use of ventilation systems was addressed in the previous section IIIC. The major examples of decontamination used during the outage are: - Steam Generator channel head decon (104 manhours) - Initial and final Cavity decon - (149 manhours) - Initial and periodic containment decon and housekeeping (8,788 manhours) - Periodic Radiation Contro' Area (excluding Containment and Spent Fuel Bldg) dec. (23,738 manhours) - Periodic Spent Fuel Bldg. decon (118 manhours) - Refueling bridges decon - Ultrasonic decon of tools and equipment - Ultrasonic decon of MOV 577 valve for ISI - Decon of Cavity Seal Plate dogs in washing machine before machining - Decon of Reactor Vessel studs in stud cleaning machines - Decon of Reactor Vessel Head while on laydown pad - Decon of Vessel Stud Detensioner devices in the ~ charging floor tent. - -.

Decon of Refueling Equipment and Tools in the charging floor tent 4 - Decon of scaffolding in the RCA yard Decon tent The major examples of containment systems used during the outage are: - Steam Generator tents and the hurculite curtain around the skirt base - Stud cleaning machines - Structures built around the ultrasonic sinks, the trash compactor and the laundry machines. - Two tents erected on the charging floor for initial stud washdown, detensioner decon, refueling tool / equipment decon and safety valve dissassembly. - Tent used to decon tools and equipment coming out of contairment. - Herculite covcr used to protect the Reactor Head during cavity decon. - Steam Generator diaphram leakage catch pan The major examples of spray systems used during the outage are: - Cavity wall apray system - Core barrel spray system - Upper internals spray system - The spray used over the blind flange replacement work area. Improvements which would enhance our tool, equipment and area surface contamination control capabilities are as follows. 1) Utilize quick and easy to assemble prefabricated, reusable housings to replace the steam generator tents, charging floor decon booths and the decon tent outside containment.

~~l i 2) Develope inhouse hydrolase capabilities by procurring a water compressor, hydrolase guns and self indexing hydrolasers. 3) Design and install an improved tool and equipment decontamination facility. 4) Procure or construct a contaminated valve pressure test box. 5) Evaluate and implement an improvul method of tool inventory, storage and transfer. 6) Install a hard piped cavity wall sprinkler system and increase the number of primary water hose outlets around the cavity. F i 1 l I e _71_

SECTION IV CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS El az H 4

I 1 i IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECp1MENDATIONS a IVA. Conclusions In conclusion the 1980 Refuelicg Outage from a Radiological perspective was a success'. The Health Phyoics Department handled all major radiological events without any major problems and without violating any Federal Radiation Protection Regulations. Key factors contributing to this success are the expanded Health Physics Organization, state of the arts Health Physics equipment and programs and strong corporate and upper management support. The achievements of the first organized ALARA group during-the out'ge were significant. This report documents our efforts, descri5es their effectiveness and details the lassons learned. It is intended that this report will be a great aid in planning and implementing ALARA techniques for the 1981 Core X-XI Refueling Outage. IVB. Recommendations Based on the ALARA Coordinators observations made during the 1980 Refueling Outage thc following recommendations are made. These -uggested improvements, should be evaluated with respect to thcir feasibility and implemented, if determined to be reasonably achievable. 1. Implement where feasible the " Suggested Improvements" enumerated in section IIBs Major Job ALARA Review Summary sheets. 2. Utilize when appropriate the shielding, flushing, source removal and time saving techniques listed 4 j in section IIC during future outages. 3. Develop Radiological Control procedures for major repetitive outage jobs similar to the ALARA Control Instructions in section IID. 4. Discuss with NUSCOs Radiological Assessment Branch personnel the problems and suggested solutions in section IIE concerning the NU Procedure #5 entitled, " Implementation and Documentation of ALARA...*4ork in Nuclear Stations Radiological Areas" and revise accordingly. 5. In order to improve HELPORE record processing turnaround time: increase computer speed or additional computers; 1 utilize microwave transmission or additional independent telephone transmission paths; use imaging like on the CICS operating system; and develop an improved distributive processing network. -Rb

6. In order to refine HEL? ORE data output to provide data summaries which would aid in determining the effectiveness of the Health Physics Programs develop subroutines to output": 1) workgroup annual manrem summary; 2) workgroup average individual quarterly exposure; 3) automated manrem summaries by preselected Work Order (ALARA Code) numbers, all systems, all components and all component / job combinations; and

4) workgroup mpc. hrs., Whole Body Count results and urinalasis results vs. number of individuals.

a 7. In order to facilitate HELPORE RWP infamation extraction and increase its accuracy and usefulness, implement where feasible the recommended improvements at the end of section IIF. 8. Prior to startup have Health Physics, Maintenance and Operations perform a walkthrough of containment to assure that all.1 cad blankets have been removed from potentially thermally hot pipes. 9. Utilize when appropriate the ventilation, decontamination and containment systems listed in section IIIC and IIID during the next outage. 10. Procure an additional Steam Generator Ventilation System (see Fig. 21), a 1500 CFM portable blower and 3-500 CFM portable blowers. 11. Determine the air flow patterns for various CAR / purge fan lineups and amperages. 12. Add an 8" and 10" O.D. ventilation duct inlet port on each CAR fan suction plenum. ThJs would serie as a backup to the portable ventilation blowers for purposes of directing ventilation cleanup suction at desired locations in containment. 13. To enhance area surface cantamination control, design and construct profabricated reusable housings to replace steam generator tents and charging floor decon booths. 14. To enhance equipment surface contamination control, develope inhouse hydrolaze, procure or construct a contaminated valve pressure test box and install a hard piped cavity w&il sprinkler system. e v-

4 15. To enhance tool surface contamination control, design and Install an improved tooi and equipment decon facility and evaluate and implement an improved method of tool inventory, storage and transfer. 16. To expedite the evaluation and implementation of the aforementioned engineering techniques to reduce occupational exposure, implement an AIARA Committee similar to that at Millstone. 17. Develop a worker and supervisor AI. ARA training program to develop aLARA attitudes in station personnel and inform them of their respoasiblities with aspect to the ALARA program. j 4 1 4 i -74 ..}}

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