ML20030B149

Opposes Operation of Facilities

ML20030B149
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	07/24/1981
From:	Holt J PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, NEW YORK
To:	Ahearne J, Bradford P, Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20030B146	List: ML20030B145 ML20030B149
References
NUDOCS 8108060153
Download: ML20030B149 (29)

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NEW york pubhC WTEREST RESEARCb QROUpf WCo NYPIRG 5 Beektnan Street e New York, N.Y.10038 e (212) 349 6460 om * *., se e

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July 24,1981 y

g Comissioners:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman S

DOCKETED John F. Ahearne USNR0 Peter A. Bradford L

Victor Gilinsky t

JUL 30198f > c Offic cf the Seadwy C U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dockemt & Sena

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1717 H Street, N.W.

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.I Washington, D.C.

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Gentlemen:

As New York State's largest consumer /public interest group - vith 17 campus and 35 community chapters throughout the state - the New York Public (NYPIRG) appeals to the Commission, once again, Interest Research Group, Inc.

to order the immediate suspension of operations at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 on grounds of non-compliance with NRC's Final Rule on emergency planning -

specifically, failure to meet both the April 1, 1981 deadline f In addition, we request the Commission to take four notification capability.

other remedial actions to safeguard the millions of people whose lives, health,

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and homes would be threatened in the event of a catastrophic accident at Indian

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Point (listed on page 18 of this submission).

j We do not make this request lightly, and are fully cognizant of the sub-stantial interests that are involved in any decision the NRC makes regarding However, as this submission will attempt to make clear, the continued operation of the Indian Point reactors is in violation cf both the these plants.

letter and the spirit of spacific NRC regulations, as well as of the Commission's overriding mandate to prc ect the public.

NYPIRG has. for some time been concerned over the threat to public safety posed by the operation of the two Indian Point reactors in.he heart of the If one adds to the most densely populated region of our state and nation.

official census figures for this area estimates to account for undercounted minority groups, illegal aliens, tourists and other transien k

City), it is necessary to conclude that approximately one of every ten people residing in the United States at any given time may be located within the 50-mile ZPZ for Indian Point.

The Commission itself recognized the unique population density of this M

region in its January 8,1981 order for an adjudication of matters pertaining QQ-to Indian Point:

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" Indian Point has the highest population within 10, 30 and 50 miles At 50 miles, O

of any nuclear power plant site in the United States.

gy its population is more than double any other plant site."

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ganizataan estabitsbed.

The New York Pubic intsrest Research Gro@ tre (NYPIRG) is a not-for-proht, renpartisan oD scenbsts and organtzers works o<

h duected and supported h New York State cohege and untversdy students. NYPIRGT staff of M

nergy, hscal

' hb with students and other otizens, developing otizenship skirts and shaping p 03 Om responscihty, polttcal reform and sooal justee are NYPIRG's pnnopal areas of concem

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prge 2 NYPIRG The Co= mission and staff are by now fully aware of NYPIRG's efforts to In accordance with our chosen monitor ail matters pertaining to Indian Foint. role as "public w

-to exercise particular vigilance with regar All too regulatory and enforcement functions expeditiously an ling to act either expeditiously or stringently.

is that higher priority is consistently given to protecting d

t and genetic integrity would be threatened in the event of a major acci ent a the plant.

In spite of our pessimistic expectation that now, as before, the Commis-sion is likely to continue its practice of leniency and delay, and its refusal i

to adequately confront t.c unique societal risk posed by Indian Point, we cons -

k der it our responsibility to bring to your attention the latest example of the i

failure to meet the July 1st, licensees' non-compliance with NRC regulations:1981 deadline for j

19, 1981). Furthermore, there are NRC Final Emergency Planning Rule (Auguststill no implemented off-dian Point -- almost four months after the April 1 implementation deadline.

Despite Director Stello's assurance that were an accident to occur today d"

at Indian Point the licensees' off-site emergency plans "would be impleme y

we who live in the area know better.

finition adequate state of emergency preparedness, by any honest and 4

W of the word " adequate."

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about Indian Point -- its design flaws; its operation, m i

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rating equipment -- continue to hold our breaths and pray.

You have consistently bent your own regulatioau to the licensees' con-We hope that venience in order to keep the Indian Point reactors operating.

t swiftly this time you will use the authority vested in you by Congress to ac d by and forcefully to safeguard the millions of people who vould be endangerethe toughe

Surely, a major accident at this trouble-prone facility.is required for the nation's most de regulf. tory enforcement reactor site.

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The status of emergency planning for Indian Point l

l The Co==ission has received briefings from its staff regarding emergency t

the informa-NYPIRG is of the opinion, however, that planning for Indian Point.

l d and over-tion provided to you in public session has been somewhat fi l

Mr. Grimes, Westchester County officials, and undoubtedly others, we have r optimistic.

d other problems I-to believe that you have been given the impression that these anstaff can be depended if not, are likely to be eliminated shortly, or that, i

to take or recommend appropriate and adequate enforcement act on.

I Our The view form our vantage point is quite differant and disturbing.

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p;F2 3 NYPIRC information cony'inces us that significant problems remain unracolvsd end that adequate emergency preparedness at Indian Point is not yet in sight.

Implementation d

It is almost four months since the April 1st implementation deadline and today the Indian Point reactors continue to operate without y

was not met, implemented off-site energency plans. Though NYPIRG agrees with Mr. Stello that in an emergency everybody would certainly do all they could to safeguard i

the public and to mitigate consequences, the means simply do not yet exist to b/

implement the off-site. plans submitted by the licensees for the four coundes 3

around Indian Point. What could be done were an a cident to occur today would not be very different from what would have been done before the Commission de-

[@d cided that emergency preparednens for nuclear p bnt accidents was inadequate and published its planning guidelines and Final Rule.

Much has been put down on paper and revisions are in the works, but the JJ Without physical means to turn words into " capability" are not yet in pl cc.

attempting to present an exhaustive list, we call the Commissioners' attention to the following: communication equipment required by the four counties around Indian Point in order to conduct inter-and intra-county emergency operatior.s has not been purchased; monitoring devices, protective gear, radioprotective drugs, and specialized radiological training for emergency personnel is signi-ficantly lacking; written agreements with private support organizations, unions

~i4 fd and companies have not been obtained; as of this date, no educational or in-structional material has been distributed to the public; nothing has been done

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yet to identify and register those residents of the 10 mile EPZ who would require spec.ial notification (e.g., the deaf) and' assistance (e.g., invalids

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and the disabled); and, most importantly, the local authorities who would have

."l In the to conduct cmergency operations have not yet approved them as workable.

words of one Westchester County official, "a plan is only workable and imple-mentable when the nuts and bolts details have been worked out."

.e is inade-Legislation recently passed by the New York State Legis:

quate to resolve some of the most significant local emergency p b ning problems, A

and, in any case, will not change the realities enumerated above overnight.

starting point has been reached, but the finish line is still a long way off.

Furthermore, the. legislation leaves untouched many of the problems arising out of the specific local conditions around Indian Point (e.g., inadequate roads and transportation).

Mr. Stello and Mr. Dickey (FEMA) have characterized ma;.y of the obstacles in the way of implementing the Indian Point emergency plans as " political" (and, therefore, presumably, resolvable). NYPIRG objects to this characterization of major difficulties pointed out by local of ficials who have first-hand knowledge of local conditions and are better qualified than federal officials to realis-l tically assess the difficulties involved in implementation of off-site plans l

Also, we would remind the Commission that there is to protect the public.

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little historical basis for expecting that political / jurisdictional disputes l

among New York's utilities, state agencies, counties and municipalities will l

easily or quickly be resolved -- even with legislation.

l, The number and complexity of problems that make adequate emergency pre-

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paredness difficult for the region surrounding Indian Point should come as no l

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m P288 4 NYPIRG They are simply the inevitable surprise to the Commission er to anyone else.

and ever-present reality of existence in one of the most densely populated There should ne'er have been any expectation that parts of our nation.

(if it is indeed ever possible adequate emergency preparedness for Indian Point for this site!) could have been ac.complished within the time-frame required by NRC's Emergency Planning Rule.

the regulations exist and they must be enforced. And, if what is being required for all cannercial reactor sites in the nation is more difficult

Yet, (because of its population, transportation, financial to achieve at Ir.dian Point and political characteristics) that is no excuse for the Commission or staff to On the contrary, enforcement should be swift, scrupulous, relax its regulations.

The greater New York metropolitan area is no place for compromises _

And, we would warn, it is no place for the Commission or its and strict.

with public safety.

staff to retreat to the loopholes in the Emergency Planning Rule in order to per-

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The reactors should be ordered to shut j

mit continued operation at Indian Point.

down until exemplary emergency preparedness exists at this ill-chosen site!

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Unfortunately, every indication NYPIRC has received forces us to predict 1

that instead of the enforcpment stringency required for this unique site, what we are likely to see in the weeks and months ahead is more of the leniency and delay which, in our view, has characterized the NRC's practices and decisions all along with regard to Indian Point.

This impression was reinforced when 1 & E Director, Victor Stello, denied NYPIRG's appeal to the Commission for suspension of operations at Indian Point y

when the licensees failed to meet the April 1, 1981 implementation deadline.

gj NYPIRC did not realize that we were entitledt to appeal this denial to the We would have done so on 4

Commission (until it was too late for us to do so).

interim the grounds that, by relying on past Commission decisions with respe

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C operation of Indian Point,the IP licensees had failed to comply with the April 1 implementa our claim that tion requirement, Mr. Stallo's denial was unresponsive to our " petition.

NYPIRG regards as incredible and reprehensible the evasive performance of NRC spokespeople who, after April 1st, refused to answer "yes" or "no" whenT asked if Indian Point had an implemented emergency plan.the En to twist We do besn submitted and "would be" carried out in the event of an accident.

L not believe this interpretation meets either the letter or the intent of the Furthermore, when NYPIRG argued that implementation of emergency plans by April 1st was a clear requirement of the Rule, meant to precede w Final Rule.

d approvcl the Commission had recognized might be a lengthy review, upgrading, an l

process, NRC officials responded with convoluted interpretations of the Fino Rule. Explanations went something like this:

It was the Commission's intent that ~ plans with no deficiencies" be implemented by April 1st, but that it p

could not be determined cn1 April 1st whether or not That determi-there was compliance for a given site.

nation could only be made later on, post hoc _, after l'

submitted plans had been reviewed and evaluated for Until such time as a plan had been H'

deficiencies.

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i deemed deficient, that plan would be presumed to be I

" implemented." But if, at some indeterminate future date (perhaps a year from April 1, in some cases) a submitted plan was determined to be deficient, a state of non-compliance dating back to April 1, 1981 would then be said to have existed for the reactor site in j

question.

With this tortured reasoning, NRC was able to avoid. admitting what everyone knew on April 1, 1981:

that there were no implemented off-site emergency plans in place, operational and capable 'of being carried out in the event of i

a major accident at Indian Point.

i In any case, now that an extensive list of deficiencies in the Indian Point plans..has been identified by FEMA, and Mr. Stello has begun the "120-day clock" for correction of these deficiencies, NRC's own logic dictates that a I

ruling be made that Indian Point was, and still is not in compliance with the.

Final Rule requiring implementation of emergency plans by April 1. 1981. In addition, the reactors are operating in violation of the requirement that the l

15-minute notification system be operable no later than July 1, 1981.

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The sirens 1

The Indian Point licensees apparently never even attempted to comply with the July 1, 1981 deadline for 15-minate notification capability. In fact, con Edison and PASNY dieln't order the sirens needed to alert the public of an emergency until some time in June. NYPIRG shares Commissioner Gilinsky's puzzlement over this delay:

"I. find it difficult to understand why they waited so long to place an order"

-- Victor Gilinsky The New York Times, July 5, 1981 i

l NYPIRG finds the licensees' explanation for their failure tc have sirens installed and operable by July 1 -- namely, that siren producers are back-logged The liccn-with^ orders,f, rom many other nuclear plant operators -- disingenuous.

sees have known for more than a year that sirens would be needed and that those utilities which placed their orders early would be most likely to be able to meet the July 1 deadline.

(We remind the Commission of its own lengthy deli-berations on this matter (e.g., see transcript of Staff Presentation on Final Rulemaking on Emergency Preparedness, August 18, 1980) and of its decision to allow licensees six months more time to meet the public notification require-ment than had been originally contemplated.) Perhaps Con Edison and PASNY. felt confident that NRC would waive the July 1 deadline as long as sirens were on order, or "if they.have something reasonable"

-- Victor Stello The New York Times, July 5, 1981 Only now are the Indian Point licensees securing sites for their sirens.

Having neglected earlier to obtain permission (and, in some places, variances) 1 i

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Prge 6 h7PIRG for mountint sirens on public or private property, the utilities have w2ctcd And there may be further delays - the licensees' optimistic additional time.

predictions not withstanding - before the rapid alert system is truly oper3-The sirens taust be delivered, installed, tested, and the public in-tional.

structed as to the meaning of the signals.

?M It is common public knowledge that sirens have not been installed.

Y Yet, characteristically, NRC is unable to make that determination for itself until it is so notified by the licensees. A letter requesting this information r.j by July 24 (tod'ay) was sent to all licenseerat the end of June - in effect,

('d'J granting the utilities an additional three and a half weeks to come into com-N:,.,.

hTPIRG finds it difficult to understand why staff was unable to deter-

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pliance.

mine on July 1st which licensees were or were not in compliance. Surely a few phone calls would have turned up the facts -- or a letter sent out earlier

'm Mjt requiring licensees to respond by July 1.

Is it common staff practice to The Commission should MM provide de facto extensions to licensees in this manner?

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not be sTrprised when members of the public conclude that the NRC is not Y@.f terribly serious about emergency preparedness and_is _still putting the licensees' convenience ahead of public safety.

The "120-day clock" When NYPIRG has protested (in letters and phone calls) that NRC is fail-jg ing to enforce either the letter or the intent of its emergency planning regula-ge, tions, staff members have pointed to the 1%t of deficiences in the Indian Point s,p '

But when the 120-day clock runs

$.W plans which must be corrected within 120 days.

Past experience with NRC's slow-out on August 22nd, what can the public expect?

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{5 moving enforcement practices inclines NYPIRG to expect further delays before any deciaions are made.

.? p Some time after August 22nd, a letter will probably be sent by NRC to FEMA asking what progress has been made in eliminating the deficiencies in the of f-site plans for Indian Poit.t.

Next, a communication will go from FEMA to NRC, hopefully with an item-by-item finding of what has and what has not been corrected.

Eut not necessarily.

Apparently, FEMA and NRC are not always basing their determinatiens on objective standards, or even on their own planning objectives and guidelines.

Instead, they are arriving at " professional judgments" based on " feel" (see 37, enclosed h7PIRG report on " Current Problems in Emergency Planning Around So it is entirely possible that in place of definitive Nuclear Power Plants").

objective determinations, subjective evaluations such as " adequate," " acceptable,

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" satisfactory," " appropriate," or " reasonable" will abound. And, though defi- '

ciencies may still be found to exist -- and they are bound to -- FEMA could nevertheless conclude (as it has done with respect to deficient plans for TMI 1 and other sites) that the non-implemented plans for Indian Point are acceptable and " provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and e'

will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."

If, however, FEMA finds that significant deficiencies remain uncorrected, At that point, theoretically, it could judge the Indian Point plans inadequate.

Mr. Stello could reepmmend to the Commissioners that the Indian Point plants be 4

But NYPIRG does not expect this to occur, no matter what deficienciG shut down.

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L P 82 7 NYPIRC remain - and regardless of whether or not local residents and officials have any confidence that the emergency plans would work.

Mr. Stello has already indicated that what he's after is improvement, not necessarily elimination of all identified deficiencies:

"I'm not suggesting that all problems have to be resolved within 120 days... But if nothing at all is l

done, yes, the plants could be ordered shut"

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-- Victor Stello r

The New York Times, April 26, 1981 But, if all deficiences have not been corrected, doesn't that require Mr. Stello (according to the NRC reasoning discussed earlier) to declare that the Indian c

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Point plans have not been implemented? Apparently not. He could simply start some more 120-day clocks and never make any determination on compliance with the April 1st implementation deadline -- unless, that is, the Commission specifically asks him to do so.

And, if sirens have not yet been installed?

"I certainly don't intend to make a big issue if they have something that's reasonable"

-- Victor Stello The New York Times, July 5, 1981 Is this not a signal to the utilities? And, even if Mr. Stello surprises NYPIRG by recommending some kind of enforcement action for Indian Point, it is not likely to be a shutdown. Af ter all, he has received signals, too -- from Presi-dent Reagan who wants more nuclear plants and less regulation. We note, too, that at least one Commissioner has also sent a public signal:

"The object here isn't to shut down plants, but to get them into compliance"

-- Victor Gilinsky The New York Times, July 5, 1981 NYPIRG thought the object of emergency planning was to reasonably assure public health and safety. We find very little reasonableness in NRC's adminis-tration of its emergency planning regulations.

Apparently the lessons have not been learned, the attitudes and " mind sets" have not changed.

It's back to pre-TMI " business as usual," and the best the public can hope for is a process of very gradual safety improvement --

regardless of what the regulations say and what the Commission's post-IFE commitments led us to expect.

Public expectations

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The Three Mile Island accident was accompanied by a traumatic national awakening to the fact that the " incredible" is possible: major accidents can i

p:g 8 NYPIRG occur at nuclear power plants. And if they do, public health and safcty nay The thorny prob-be threatened for many years (even generations) thereafter.

less involved in the clean-up at TMI serve as a constant and grim reminder to us all that if we are to live safely with nuclear power, we must never again let down our guard.

We need not review here the details of all the investigations, delibera-tions, criticisms, recommendations and decisions that characterized the period following the TMI accident. The Commission and staff are well aware of these

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details and all the lessons learned.

For a while, in the months following TMI, the NRC seemed to be making a real commitment to serious change in attitude, policy, and regulatory prac-The Congress and the Auerican people were led to believe that the tice.

promotional and complacent ways of the past had given way to a new, more respon-sible regulatory approach at NRC. Regulatory and enforcement practices were to

d be rigorous, with concern for public safety placed above economic considerations Siting and other basic policies were to be overhauled or industry convenience.

Licensing was no longer to be per-to reduce societal and environmental risk.

The possibility of accidents beyond design basis was to be functory or hasty.

recognized and incorporated into all planning, licensing, and regulatory activi-Engineered safeguards and other design changes were to be significantly ties.

Training and inspection programs were to be greatly enhanced.

Un-upgraded.

Extensive resolved generic safety problems were to be tackled with new vigor.

emergency planning was to be required to protect the public in case all else g;

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failed.

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Above all, we were promised a change of attitude at NRC, a vigilant dd f

devotion to safeguarding our land and our people from the threat of nuclear The commitments made were sweeping and accidents and radiation contamination.

totally essential in order for the nuclear option to survive.

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The reality In a speech almost one year ago, entitled " Reasonable Assurance, Regulation, and Reality," Commissioner Bradford stated:

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"The current relationship between the regulations, the I.

review practices, and'the inspection and enforcement effort is still in some measure a product of the attitude that the goal of the review process as it related to the regulations was simply to get the plants past the intervenors and the Licensing Board, while the funda= ental goal of the enforcement effort was to keep the plants running.

...Our first commitment is to those who live near plants already licensed."

-- Peter A. Bradford September 24, 1980 But old ways Self-criticism such as the above gene us reason to hope.

And recently, even before die hard and complacency is easier than vigilance.

the new administration was installed (with its pro-industry, anti-regulatory bent), the promises made and the expectations raised began to give way to

NYPIRG'~- p:ga 9 pre-TMI business as usual."

Those of us who have been monitoring NRG policies and practices see an alarming reversal under way now that, if allowed to continue, is bound to have tragic results.

In its haste to license new plants, NRC has withdrawn resources from the regulation and inspection of operating reactors. On June 12, 1981, the House Committee on Government Operations transmitted to Congress a report entitled " Inspecting Operating Nuclear Powerplants: Shortcomings in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Program." ~ The report, based-on a study made by the House Subcommittee on the Environment,'~ Energy, and Natural Resources, singled out the Indian Point inspection program for special criticism:

" Indian Point today would not be an acceptable site for a nuclear reactor given NRC standards on site population density. It is the source of sustained controversy and litigation. And as Director Stello noted, it also is unusual in being two sites in one, since there are two utilities operating reactors there.

"Given these special features, it would be rational to assume that the NRC would have devoted above-average resources to that site.

Instead, the Subcommittee in-vestigation demonstrated that the rate of completion of routine inspect $ons at Indian Point was just half that of the region and the Nation. The resident inspector program was not developed better at Indian Point than at other Region I sites with far less sensitivity and fewer special features. As Chairman Moffett stated at the hearing:

1 Mr. Moffett: One of the things that really bothers me is that we are talking about Indian Point of all places.

It doesn't seem to the Chair that we have been giving attention to Indian Point as a special place, with 17 mil-i lion people not very far away.

It doesn't seem l

there has been a sense of Indian Point as one

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of the most critical places, or critical loca-l tions, that only 30 percent of the routine inspection has been done there."

While moving swiftly to bring new reactors on line (e.g., with proposals to short-circuit due process for intervenors in licensing procedures), the Co= mission is proceeding at a snail's pace with respect to basic safety policy l

reform (e.g., siting standards, safety goals, engineered safeguards to prevent or slow down breach of containment, etc.) -- especially for older plants licensed under the relaxed standards of earlier, more innocent, times. The signs i

of retreat from the post-TMI commitments are everywhere.

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NRC commitments for populated sites i

In the wake of the.TMI accident, people living in New York, Chicago, and l

other densely populeted places became alarmed at the proximity of nuclear power i

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p:g2 10 NYPIRG Tha nightmare of a major plants that had once seemed a safe distance away.

I accident that could threaten a massive, trapped population suddenly seemed real and intolerable.

For a while, the NRC seemed to share the public's concern about those nuclear plants sited close to our nation's major population, economic and cul-Statements made at the time by NRC staff members, Commissioners, tural centers.

and other public officials were full of commitments to give special attention to densely populated reactor sites, even to the extent of considering shutting down Note, for example, some of the oldest plants posing the greatest societal risk.

the following interchange between Congressman Moffett and former Chairman Hendrie:

Moffett: Then, is not one of the lessons of Three Milo Island that nuclear powerplants should not be located so close as Indian Point and Zion to heavily populated areas?

Hendrie: I think that is the direction that we have been moving on the regulatory staff for some time.

Moffett:

...I think it is clear to say that the sentiment of the subcommittee on both sides, majority and minority, would be that you should take a hard look at places like Indian Point and others that are so close to major population areas and that you make it a priority.

-- Ma'y 14, 1979 hearing House Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Toby Moffett, Chairman the actions The promises made to Congress and a concerned public were many; taken since then have been outrageously few.

NYPIRG and Indian Point Though NYPI-RG is concerned about the safety of all people living near and transporta-nuclear power plants, uranium mines, radioactive waste dumps tion routes, our prime responsibility and commitment is to work on issues of Believing that nuclear power is neither public interest in New York State.

we have favored an expeditious necessary nor in the public's best interest, phase out of New York State's operating reactors, while opposing the licensing of Shoreham and Nine Mile Point 2.

Following the TMI accident, we became convinced that the threat of dis-No matter aster at Indian Point is a special case requiring immediate remedy.

how low the probability of a major accident at this site (and the record at Indian Point does not convince us that the probability is low), the consequences so enormous that there can be no of a breach of containment are potentially justification for continued operation.

In the fall of 1979 NYPIRG, therefore, became active suppe'*ers of the Union of Concerned Scientists' petition to the Co= mission for an immediate

pigs 11 NYPIRG suspension of operations at Indian Point pending a full investigation of safety and siting issues relating to that facility.

Over the past two years, NYPIRG has attempted to monitor developments j

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relating.to Indian Point and to press for shutdown of the plants in the interest of public safety. We have appreciated the willingness of Commissioners and staff to discuss with us our concerns and to give serious consideration to our views. We are deeply distressed, however, at our failure to convince the Commission that the public interest is not being served by the continued opera-tion of Indian Point. Furthermore, we are angered by the Commission's dismal record of delay and inaction with respect to this plant and the millions of people it jeopardizes.

The NRC and ltdian Point During the months following the TNI accident, the media reported -that NRC was giving serious consideration to closing some older plants located in densely populated areas including Indian Point. The New York Times, for exam-ple, reported the following interchange between Congressman Moffett (Chairman, House Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources) and former Chairman Hendrie during a hearing before Moffett's committee:

Moffett:

If you live near the Indian Point reactor near New York City or the Zion reactor between Chicago and Milwaukee there is no evacuation plan that will be helpful in the event of an accident...

If you are serious about safety, why don't you close down operating plants like these?

Hendrie: That is a possibility...

In some places, some of the older sites, the population density is such that evacuation, where available in principle, might not be entirely successful in the worst kinds of accidents...

- The New York Times November 6, 1979

~ In a d'eposition to the President's Commission on the Accident at Three i

Mile Island (Kemeny), October 9, 1979, Robert G. Ryan, then NRC Director of the Office of State rrograms, testified about Indian Point:

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(A)

I think it is insane to have a three-unit reactor on the Hudson River in Westchester County, 40 miles from Times Square, 20 miles fro = the Bronx.

And if you describe that 50-mile circle, as I said before, you've got 21 million people. And that's crazy.

I'm sorry.

I just don't think that that's the right olace to put a nuclear facility.

...it's a nightmare from the point of view of emergency preparedness.

l Everybody says'what a terrible situation we had at Three l

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prgs 12 NYPIRG Mile Island, and I agree, but can you imagine what it would have been if it had been at Indian Point? tit would have been calamitious. You would have had dozens, hundreds of people killed perhaps trying to get out of the place, because the roads are, you know, they're North-South roads basically and t';e narrow old turkey bridge -- I'm from New York so I know the area fairly well -- there are narrow, old bridges, one of the oldest bridges across the Hudson, the Bear Mountain Bridge, is a two-lane bridge, going, you know, West-East across the Hudson.

It's just a ridiculous place...

(Q)

.. 3ou think that if the accident had occurred at Indian Point there might have been lives lost?

(A) 'Oh, yes, I think there might have been, sure, sure. Lives lost in those roads every day, you know...

You've got some of the worst traffic in the world there, under the best conditions.

You know, you've got the Cross-Bronx Parkway South and the Major Deagan Expressway and you've got the Hutchinson River Parkway and all of those things and they're really awful. Under the best of circumstances, they're awful.

As I say, I'm a New Yorker, and I've sat in road blocks and traffic jams in that area for, you know, hours, hours.

...Harrisburg is a city of what, 70-80,000 people? And it's got a major confluence of East-West and North-South highways.

... You can get a lot of people on those high-ways plus the fact that you've got, you knov, a smaller universe to deal with.

People can get out of that area very rapidly if they have a mind to get out of that area. Not so at Indian Point.

Not so at Indian Point at all, i

Not so in New York....

People in the Northern Bronx don't have cars.

It's an ur-bir. thing and they rely on public transportation.

I What would you do if you had a plume headed down from I

Indian Point toward the Bronx? You've got language prob-l lems. You have a large Spanish speaking community in the Bronx.

How do you get word out to them?... You have all kinds of horrendous problems.

As a matter of fact, at the hearing before the Moffett Subcommittee on the 12th of May last, Chairman Hendrie said that the idea of an evacuation of several hundred thousand people around Indian Point would be too difficult... too difficult to contemplate.

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NYPIRG "- pag 2 13 And he also said that if Indian Point were subject to a licensing proceeding now it would not be sited where it is.

Because that site would not pass muster under the current staff guidance about siting.

At the time the above testimony was presented, Mr. Ryan's office was respon-sible for emergency preparedness.

Mr. Ryan was thus an expert on this subject (in addition to having first-hand f amiliarity with the road and traffic condi-tions around Indian Point. When President Carter established FEMA, Robert Ryan

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was temgparily detailed to that agency from NRC to help in the preparation of FEMA's June 1980 " Report to the President: State Radiological Emergency Plan-ning and Preparedness in support of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants." It is interesting and revealing to contrast Mr. Ryan's views with current attitudes at NRC and FEMA. With little supporting evidence, those agency officials now in charge of emergency preparedness apparently conside, the aftermath of an accident at~ Indian Point manageable and protective measures to safeguard the public there quite workable.

On January 22, 1980, Harold Denton, Director of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion, met with repre.sentatives of New York citizen groups (including NYPIRG) prior to announcing his recommendations with respect to the UCS petition on Indian Point. Asked whether the Indian Point reactors could receive licenses today, Mr. Denton replied, ",I certainly wouldn't recommend it.

...we have come out with new criteria on siting that would avoid sites like Indian Point in the future." Mr. Denton made other comments during this meeting that led us to believe that NRC would be taking significant steps to deal with Indian Point.

"Now, I think, with our increased emphasis on emergency planning, and that study that was done around Indian Point, we find that you really can't move people out to that 10-mile radius that we'd like to nearly as fast as we previously thought people could be moved.

So that that plant, in terms of its risk to the people, is obviously one that's got to be improved.

... things like filtered containment venting...there are a number of things which we never required of that plant, that could have been required, that would have made its risk

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comparable to any nuclear plant."

Admitting that "I wouldn't want Indian Point to operate for the next 30 years l

the same way it's today," Mr. Denton indicated his readiness to permit interim l

operations with some short-term modifications, while planning major long-term modifications for the future.

i l

I think the risks are too high there to be sustainable over a long period of time.

Something needs to be done.

I've asked the staff to come up with an action plan. Let's ask, 'what can we do, and in what kind of time schedule?'

l And I've asked them to look at several different things.

I've also said, what can we do now? What can we do in this interim period that will make the plants safer while we get to this higher level of safety out here?'

So I'm agreeing with.you that changes are needed."

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prga 14 NYPIRG While assuring us that we could anticipate improvements such as filtered con-tainment venting, core catchers, and other additional engineered safeguards for both Indiaa Point and Zion, Mr. Denton remarked -- prophetically, it now seems:

"You have a right to be concerned about promises from the government; will they be kept? will they be changed?"

Shortly after our meeting, Mr. Denton, on February 5, 1980, briefed the Commission on his recommendations for Indian Point 7 and then, on February 11, issued his decision on the UCS petition, granting it in part (revoking the pro-visional operating license for Unit 1) while denying its request for suspension of operation at Units 2 and 3.

The Director's Decision included extensive diccussion of NRC staff efforts under way with respect to Indian Point and Zion:

"Because of their location in areas of high population density, the Indian Point Station Units 2 and 3 and Zion Station Units 1 and 2 (located north of Chicago, Illinois) facilities were recognized as plants for which additional measures might be necessary, inclu-ding the possibility of a power reduction or plant shutdown."

Again, as in his meeting with members of the public from New York and in his subsequent briefing of the Commission, Mr. Denton presented a list of short-term measures he was requiring for Indian Point as a condition of interim operation, while indicating the sorts of long-term modifications that might be required to

" vent-significantly improve safety at the plant over the more extended future:

ed, filtered containment atmospheric release system, core retention devices, and hydrogen control."

Shortly thereafter, we have been informed, Mr. Denton committed himself to reaching decisions on these major modifications expeditiously, sometime during the fall of 1980. NYPIRG has asked, on numerous occasions, for an expla-nation of the extended silence on these long-term requirements. All we have i

been able to learn is that no decisions are to be made until staff has had an l

opportunity to review a new -- and interminably delayed -- risk assessment study

. for Indian Point and Zion commissioned by the licensees.

If, as Mr. Denton indicated many times, the risk at Indian Point and l

Zion can be reduced substantially by the installation of major additional engi-l neered safeguards, why are these being delayed? And for whose benefit?

If NRC knows of ways to improve the odds against catastrophe at Indian Point and Zion, is this not negligence of its duty to the but fails to order these improvements, NYPIRG is forced to conclude that NRC has reneged on its commitment public?

to the public and to Congress to give special and urgent attention to the nation's most populated reactor sites. The short-run has become the long-run, and the safety of many millions of Americans remains at risk.

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NYPIRG- p:ga 15 The Task Forces on Interim Operation / Shutdown In response to widespread public and Congressional concern about Indian and extensive criticism of the Director's Decision -- and, we assume,

Point, sotivated by its own personal and professional concern for public safety -- the Commission, in May 1980, announced its intention to conduct an ASLB adjudica-tion on Indian Point, to establish a Task Force to advise the Comnission on the matter of interim operation of the facility, and to address the generic question of operation of reactors in areas of high_ population density.

Lacking confidence in the objectivity of an NRC staff task force, NTPIRG participated with other public interest groups in the preparation of an indepen-dent " Citizens Task Force Report on Interim Shutdown of Indian Point," which was submittet to the Commission in June 1980. It was our hope, and that of 133 that the Commission would give other organizations who endorsed this report, serious consideration to information, arguments, and concerns raised by informed citizens directly affected by the operation of Indian Point. Urging the Commis-sion to relieve the public of the risk of an accident during the course'of the 1

investigatory hearings, the citizens Task Torce presented its case for interim shutdown.

The concerns and perspectives of the Citizens Task Force were not shared It gave greater weight to a hastily prepared probabilistic by the Commission.(based heavily on the oft-discredited RSS figures and methodo-risk assessment

' logy)* and bowed to the wishes of the Indian Point licensees and the Governor of New York, who argued against suspension on purely economic grounds -- as though the safety issues deemed worthy of investigation by ::he Commission were not significant.

NYPIRG commented extensively (in writing and in telephone conversations) on what we felt were inaccuracies in the staff Task Force Report.**

We failed, however, to convince the Commissioners that the public should benefit from existing doubts about the safety and siting of Indian Point, not the licensees.

continue to operate during the The Commission decided that Indian Point can forthcoming hearings, while the Commissioners review the resulting evidentiary made as to the record and ASLB recommendations, and until final decisions are long-term future of the nation's most populated reactor site.

- Months later, a major flood at Indian Point 2 immersed nine feet of its reactor vessel in brackish water hundreds of degrees cooler than the internal temperature of the vessel. The Commission reviewed its previous decision to In spite of a permit interim operation, but did not reverse its position.

stiff judgment by I & E Director Stello against Con Edison in connection with the October flood,*** the Commission concluded that the licensee could be

• In its January 8,1981 order for Indian Point hearings, the Commission itself recognized the limitations of the Task Force Report " compiled in a short time period and not disclosing its detailed methodology and underlying data."

• • The Commission, in its January 8 order, itself admitted to " uncertainties in estimating overall risk."

• • • Con Edison has thus far refused to pay the $210,000 fine imposed by Stello.

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NYPIRG prga 16 trusted to repair, inspect, maintain, and operate its reactor safely. Many people began to wonder just what it would take for the Ca= mission to put the safety of millions of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut residents ahead of A disaster?

safeguarding the operating licenses of the Indian Point utilities.

On November 1,1979 (one year before the flooding accident at Unit 2!)

Congressman Moffett, at a hearing of his subcommittee, also wondered what it would take:

"1 just wonder what in the world is going to have to happen -- why do we have to go through this rulemaking, for example, with regard to a plant like Indian Point, or why do we have to go through this development of the emergency planning zone -- the new zone, the safer zone? lt seems like we :ould almost make a conclusion now that the Commission could come to some agreement and say, 'Look, we think this is a very serious problem in New York. You had better start to focus on this and plan to shut this thing down and substitute something else -- put in some hardcore conservation measures, and so forth End,so on.'"

-- Toby Moffett, Chairman House Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources The " interim" has by now become the indefinite future, and the Commission's decision for interim operation begins to look more and more like a decision (by

Surely, virtue of default and delay) for permanent operations at Indian Point.

this was not the Commissien's intent:

"...we will not turn a decision on interim operation into of the a final decision on the long-term acceptability indian Point site."

-- January 8, 1981 Order The delayed hearings on Indian Point i

While rules are proposed that would limit due process for intervenors in licensing proceedings (on the ostensible grounds that intervenors create delays), the Commission continues to delay the start of the Indian Point investi-It took 5 months for the Director to rule on the UCS petition; 3 tronths gation.

after that for the Commission to decide that it would order hearings; 7h more months before the wording of an order defining the scope and criteria for these hearings could be agreed on; and now, more than 6 months later, the Commission It is almost two years since the has still failed to appoint a hearing board.

UCS filed its petition, more than one year since the Commission decided to permit " interim" operation, and a half year since the hearing order was published, requesting completion of the investigation within one year!

Meanwhile, public disbelief.in the credibility of the Commission mounts (NYPlRG is frequently asked whether we believe the Commissioners ever really intended to go through with the Indian Point hearings), the limited resources

NYPIRG * -- p:g2 17 of potential intervenors get depleted (but not the unlimited financial and legal resources of the licensees, who can charge all costs to their customers'),

and the Indian Point reactors continue to experience problems.

News circulates throughout the New York metropolitan area about long hours and unsafe working conditions experienced by employees involved in the months of repairs at IP2, about spills and unmonitored releases from the plants, about damaged and malfunctioning equipment, about unmet inspection schedules, about the unusual number of problems and trips experienced by Unit 2 during re-start,* and about controversy within NRC over whether older plants like IP 2 should be shut down because of pressure vessel embrittlement.

The Indian Point emergency plans Though it has not yet become an issue of general public avareness, NYPIRG believes that very shortly the Indian Point emergency plans will arouse considerable citizen concern. As sirens are installed and tested, as instruc-tional material is distributed, as public meetings are held on the revised plans soon to be released, and as residents of the communities around Indian Point begin to learn some of the details of what is envisioned for them in the event of a major accident, widespread reaction is likely.

There is already considerable public and official concern that inadequate, unworkable " paper plans" may be headed for rubber stamping by FEMA and NRC officials who still do not believe that a major accident can happen at Indian Point ** and who refuse to acknowledge that a radioactive plume travelling across any portion of this crowded region of our nation would be an emergency quite unlike the hurricanes, floods, fires, tornadoes and earthquakes so frequently cited as applicable disaster precedents. Before permitting the staff to approve the Indian Point emergency plans, the Commissioners should come to Westchester and Rockland Counties -- and to New York City from which large number of people would self-evacuate even though they live outside the "10 mile island" -- and ask those of us who live here what we think would happen if there were a major accident at Indian Point.

- The New York Public Interest Research Group requests the following Commission cetion on behalf of our thousands of members in New York State and the millions of people who would be endangered in the event of a breach-of-t containment or other major accident at Indian Point:

1.

Immediate suspension of operations at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 on grounds of non-compliance with the NRC Final Rule on emergency l

l planning requiring i=plementation of emergency plans by April 1, 1981, and 15-minute public notification capability by July 1, 1981.

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• 1f our information is correct, Indian Point 2 experienced 9 trips within 2 weeks after going critical on May 21, 1981.

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• • What confidence would people have in medical doctors who did not believe in the possibility of illness or injury?

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pass 18 NYPIRG 2.

Reversal of the July 1980 decision to permit interim operation of Indian Point Units 2 and 3 pending the outcome of the ASLB adjudication on the grounds that the findings of the Task Force were meant only for " interim" applicat:An and are not a suffi-cient basis for what has now become the indefinite operation of the facility.

3.

Immediate appoin ment of an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to conduct the Indian Point adjudication ! with a Chairperson whose fairness and imparticlity the Commission is prepared to guarantee.

4.

Issuance of a Commission directive to staff indicating a desire to increase and strengthen all regulatory, inspection, and enforce-ment activities pertaining to high-population reactor sites -- with

'the urgency characteristic of the immediate post-TMI period.

5.

Expedition of the Commission's decision to conduct a generic pro-ceeding on issues pertaining to densely populated reactor sites --

with early consideration by the Commission of measures to decrease the societa.'. threat posed by nuclear power generation at these sites (including the possibility of plant shutdowns).

1 4

We ask that this submission not be turned over to staff as the items herein are directed specifically to the Commission. We request an expeditious consideration of our deeply felt concerns.

Respe tfully submitted, j

vn Jo

Holt, Project Director The New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc.

July 24, 1981 Enc.

cc:

Congressmen Toby Moffett, Morris Udall, and Edward Markey Members of the New York Congressional Delegation Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York Stanley Fink, Speaker of the New York State Assembly Officials of the region surrounding Indian Point Members of the New York City Council The Union of Concernea Scientists i

Other' interested parties j

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• New York. N.Y. 10038 * (212) 349 6460.

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July 15,1981 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN EMERGENCY PLANNING AROUND NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS When forced into addressing the problem of large scale radiological emergency planning because of the accident at Three Mile Island, the federal government found itself treading on new ground. The consequences of massive accidental contamination of land and people are still unknown. Preparing for such an g

event must be based in large part on speculation.

3 4

The Nuclear Regulatory Conunission (NRC) has published new regulations (NRC d

Final Emergency Planning Rule, August 19, 1981) and guidelines (Nureg 0654/

0 FEMA REP-1) for emergency planning for nuclear reactor accidents. The Federal 1

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) -- created by Executive Order of President U

Carter in response to the TMI accident -- has been charged with overseeing the upgrading of state and local off-site radiological emergency plans. The NRC retains responsibility for evaluation of on-site utility plans.

We are in the early stages of another phase of the nuclear power experiment and things are not going well.

W FEMA is suffering from a lack of money and personnel (see Attachment 1, pp. 4-5, sec. (a)).

It is also caught in the unforeseen situation of having its activity j

dominated by requests from NRC fo " interim findings" on the status of emergency

]

plannin to speed up NRC licensing procedures (see Attachment 1, p. 5, secs. (d) and (e).

FEMA's review of off-site emergency plans was intended to start with a fonnal submission of plans by each state after a collaborative ironing cut of problems by the state and local governments and FEMA. This process is outlined clearly in the " FEMA Proposed Rule" (44 CFR 350).

However, a Novenber,1980 Memorandum of Understanding (M00) between the NRC and FEMA allows NRC to obtain FEMA's assessment of the condition of off-site emergency preparedqess based on draft plans, which are often at an early stage of development.

This variation from the fonnal process was evidently intended to be the exceptio1; but, in the past year, it has become the rule.

The problem is that the care and thoroughness with which the review process was to have been carried out has been seriously undermined. The FEMA regional offices have been pressured by the utilities and the NRC to come up with pre-liminary findings regardless of the state of preparedness. The regional staffs have been insisting, commendably, on running a " drill" of the existing emergency response capability before submitting their findings. This drill in no way satisfies the requiranent under 44 CFR 350 to run an exercise to test the implementability of the state and local plans in their final forms.

What has happened under the MOU process is that FEMA regional offices report-on numerous inadequacies revealed in the drills of draft plans leaving it up to national FEMA to assess the implications of these inadequacies.for public health and safety.

Under the 44 CFR 350 procedures, these problems would have The New York Pubhc Interest Research Group, Inc. (NYPIRG) is a not-for-profit, nonpartisan research and advocacy organaation estabhshed, directed and supported by New York State college and unrversity students. NYPIRG's staff of towyers, researmers, scientists and organcers works with students and other cttaens. Developing citaenship sbits and shaping pubhc pohey Consurner protection, higher educatson, energy, ftocal responsibdity, poirtical reforrn and social jus,tece are NYPIRG's pnncipal areas of concern.

page 2 NYPIRG been realved carefully and thoroughly at the regional lqvel before a report was sent to the national office.

?

It has been difficult te ascertain how national FEMA actually arrives at a determination of " adequacy in spite of deficiencies." In testimony given at e.

the NRC hearing i'i Harrisburg on the re-start of Three Mile Island Unit 1

(

k (July 7 through 9,1981), Mr. John Dickey, director of national FEMA's Radio-logical Emergency Preparedness division, pronounced the off-site emergency b

plans for TMI adequate to protect the public. -Intervenors and attorneys for Jf the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania questioned Dickey and other regional and national officials on how FEMA could render such a deter lination despite 72 h

deficiencies in the TMI state of preparedness enumerated in the regi'nal RMA W

findings. Mr. Dickey made it clear that the determination of adequacy was based on his " professional judgment," or " feel" (his own tenn) for the complex factors involved (see Attachment 2).

Unfortunately, it would seem that Mr.

$p Dickey has very little professional ex,arience with disaster planning and M

radiuiogical emergencies (see his resum6, Attachment 3). And yet, he has the i

final word on adequacy for every off-site radiological emergency plan in the e

country.

i' Mr. Dickey's finding on TMI-l purports that in spite of the lack of a siren system, a school evacuation plan, the distribution of any public information,

,a'y and many other problems, if an accident happened today at TMI-1, the preselit state of preparedness "would reasonably assure that adequate protective p.gi measures would be taken," thus satisfying the language of the NRC Final Rule.

M On the day after Dickey's testimony, the NRC staff presented the TMI-l hearing fu;c W

board with its finding c# overall adequacy (see Attachment 4).

It recommended-only that a few glaring deficiencies be rectified before re-start.

Its decision

!{ O was based on its own review of o_n_-site emergency plans and FEMA's findings on off-site preparedness.

In spite of the questionable nature of the FEMA /NRC decision process with respect to TMI, there was at least a gesture toward following a reasonable procedure.

However, in case a reactor site is so lacking in preparedness that a positive D

FEMA finding cannot be made, there are opportunities to circumvent even this

'4 approach to ensuring public safety.

A reading of applicable rules and regula-jn.

t-ions governing emergency planning reveals that it is most unlikely that NRC 2

enforcement action will ever be taken against any utility for inadequate emer-C gency plans.

First of all, the deadlines of April 1st (for implementation of plans) and July 1st (for 15-minute public notification capability) are not being taken seriously (see Attachment 5).

Secondly, the utility will always be l

able to claim than any deficiencies are not significant for their particular plant, that other compensating actions can be or will be taken, or that "other li compelling reasons" warrant continued operation (NR" Final Rule, Sec. 50.47 (c) l P

(1)). Finally, in the NRC Authorization Act, Public Law 96-235, Sec.109 (a),

it says that even if there is no adequate plan according to the terms of the l1iJ NRC Final Rule, and the utility makes no argument for compensating factors, the NRC can still find that there is a " reasonable assurance" that the public health i R.

i :;i and safety will not be endangered. The situation is heavily weighted in the utilities' favor.

s.

. 5 The unlikelihood of enforcement action against a utility implies that the extra-ordinary efforts required to genuinely protect the public's health and safety O

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NVPIRG - page 3 will probably not be taken.

Furthermore, the many loopholes in the FEMA and NRC rules reflect an underlying attitude that serious accidents still won't happen at nuclear power piants.

Serious emergency planning would require new basic sociological and psycho-logical studies so that we wauld have a realistic basis for predicting and controlling human behavior in a nuclear energency.

At the present time, there seems to be no admission of the need for such studies. The basic point is that l

radiological disasters have unique problems and we know little about them.

i The current thinking relies on highly questionable. assumptions based on natural 1

disasters, which are quite unlike radiological emergencies.

Public trust is perhaps the essential ingredient in successful managenent of an emergency situation. A thorough, honest information/ education program would have to be instituted to build up a reasonable amount of public confidence in the organizations that will be directing protective actions.

Little progress has been r'de in any such program that would reflect a new concern for the primacy of public safety over the utilities' interests. This matter of public trust was emphasized repeatedly by all the commissions and committees that investigated the TMI accident. Yet,neither of the responsible agencies (FEMA and NRC) have addressed the issue when evaluating off-site emergency plans.

Nor have studies been conducted to detennine, at each reactor site, local attitudes with respect to the credibility of those individuals and agencies upon which the public would have to depend for information and instructions in an emergency.

The decision of the TMI-l board in Harrisburg will be a good barometer of things to come.

If licensing new plants and the continued operation of old plants remains the NRC's priority, the entire process of upgrading emergency plans will turn out to be little more than a sham designed to calm the fears aroused by the TMI accident.

John Miglietta, Researcher The New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc.

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t ATTACliMENT 1

(from) FEMA responses to questions from Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Iegulation, Committee on Environmerst and Puolic Works. Pages 4 tnrough 6 of letter dated April 14,1981.

Up to the present time, FEMA has been able to respond to the NRC without causing any documented delays, out this is true only because the major thrust of reviews imbedded in the schedules of 10 CFR Part 50 is just The key policy matter over which FEMA has had little beginning to surface.

or no influence is the NRC's plan for enforcing the mass of preparedness related actions for the 49 sites now operating, for which implementation was due April 1,1981, and the 22 units and associated sites preparing for licensing in CY 1981 and CY 1982.

With all of this concurrent activity superimposed on other obligations for the non-power NRC materials' licensees, and for other Federal facilities of the DDE and DOD, there is little likelihood that FEMA can complete its reviews with existing staff and financial resources before the end of CY 1982.

It is important to note that under existing arrangements for using FEMA findings and determinations, these reviews must be in the hands of the NRC staff some five to seven months before any impending hearing can start, and even under the projected rule changes proposed by NRC, some 12 to 15 months before the final NRC action on a full power license.

Given this ba2kgrourd, FEMA offers the following with respect to the six sub-questions (a) tnrouch (f):

(a) Lack of adeouste resources?

At the time of the Presidential Directive of December 7,1979, which among other things, propcsed 58.9 million in support of State plans development, there was a joint resolution in the Congress which did not allow action on FY 1980 supplementary requests until May 15, 1980.

By the time 51.9 million was appropriated in June 1980, the FY 82 budget submissions were already under development and OMB budget directions gave little opportunity for FEMA to consider a FY 81 supplementary appropriation.

All other Federal agencies supporting FEMA's review process found themselves in the same positien.

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ATTACHMENT 1

5 As things stand today, FEMA's request for additional staff submitted The under the previous Administration has been turned down.

the overall financial plan for FY 1981 leaves little opportunity for staf f or resources reprogramming without jeopardy to the civil defense program, given high priority by the last Congress and the presentTra Administration.

FEMA will find it difficult to meet its obligatibn to the NRC in a timely The budget cycle of State governments also makes their ability manner.

to meet NRC's schedule uncertain.

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(b)

Late submittals by the acclicant?

FEMA has no direct relationship with NRC licensees and has no way of knowing the causes of delay to a process as complex as the NRC FEMA's reviews of State and local preparedness licensing procedure.

under its own Rule 44 CFR Part 350 have been delayed by lack of resources on the part of State and local governments, many of which must look to NRC licensees for financial and material support in the development of their preparedness posture.

Lack of cooperation by State or local covernments?

(c)

FEMA is aware of isolated instances where State and/or local The number of governments are opposed to nuclear power in principle.tnese l

ness development at this time.

(d)

Lack of coordination between NRC and FEMA?

We believe that there is good cooperation as reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding (M3U), the work of the Steering Committee, and j

Two points of misunderstanding, both of which day-to-day staff contacts.

The could affect FEMA's capacity to carry out its role, have emerged.

f.i(st is that FEMA is being asked by NRC for findings and determinations The second is that FEMA has more frequ'ently and earlier than anticipated.

been working under the assumption that its eview and approval procedure (44 CFR Part 350) would be the main vehicle for developing fin determinations.

Both of these factors in_ order to co.mply with NRC requests under the MOU,are he l'

Initially, based on NRC tions are required in the NRC licensing process.senedules, we unoe close to the licensing date, but we are finding that to satisfy NRC hearings, they are required up to 14 months earlier to be incorporated into the staff Safety Evaluation Report which preceeds any hearing action.

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ATTACHMENT 1

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(e) Litigation in NRC hearings of the adecuacy of State and local emergency resoonse plan?

At the present time, FEMA is aware of 42 cases where extensive contentions involving emergency preparedness.are twin 7g6hsidered.'

Tnere is a growing commitment on FEMA's part to support the development of testimony wnich detracts from scheduled preparedness reviews b:ing carried out under the FEMA Rule 44 CFR Part 350.

For example, FEMA nas spent several hundred hours of staff time from Region III, from Meadquarters, and from other Federal agencies on the Three Mile Island Unit #1 Restart.

FEMA Region IX has been unable to simul-taneously meet NRC requests for reviews under the MOU and also participate fully in development of testimony on the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon cases being preparec for hearing.

In aodition, other Federal agencies have advised FEMA that technical staf f neeced by FEMA's review process, already less than adequate in. number for budgetary purposes, cannot be emnmitted to the preparation of testimony on the scale perceived by those agencies.

Tnis places FEMA _in the position of oefending teennir.1 issues raised in its review process with its own staff.

(f) Duolication of Effort?

Tnere is essentially no duplication of effort between FEMA and NRC at this time.

Through the Steering Committee set-up under the MOU, FEMA and NRC meet monthly (or more often) to resolve issues and to clarify lead agency roles.

Wnatever duplicaton exists, involves the activities of preparation and review of testimony in support of NRC hearings which impact most heavily on FEMA's Regional staff and the Office of General Counsel of FEMA.

Tnere is a potential for duplication if NRC spends time and effort

.in. further review,of the FEMA findings and determinations on off-site preparedness.

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ATTACHMENT 2

from transcript of testimony before NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board HearingonrestartofTMbl pp 22,542 and 22,543 11 Q

Let me ask you, I am going to depart from York 12 County now and ask you directly the question, what standards 13 did you use to apply to the overall findings that-you made 14 in this case?

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(WITNESS DICKEI)

Well, I think i g _ime_or g t 16 tha t all parties understand the process that we use at 17 n ational.

Number one, there is a data redu__ction process 18 that starts at the very bottom and works up, and part o f, 19 this function is an aggregtion of the elements that vent 20 into the evaluation, whether good or bad, and I think the 21 tendency has been, as.in.Jeo_sh if,I_,could.be p_hilosophical

• 22 f or _a momen t, you tend to concentrat_e_more,on the negative 2

hen you are reporting on sonebody, than you do on the C

24 positive.

25 In this particular case, however, I think the O

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.

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2 We then took that and looked at it from the level of overall i

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3 signficance, and I will tell you right now that I cannot and

4. vill not define a threshold line that is finit_e..

There is 5 no scorecard that says this one weig'hed 2, this one weighed 69, I aggregate them together and I rose up with 7 or 8 or 75.

There is no mathematical process.

It is professional r....

8 judgmen_t,.th'a t has been applied across the board in the 9 entire country, that has been perfected to date, vill, 10 continue to be applied in that manner, and this is one of 11 the prin ciples of wh.y the n a tional is mak_iAc. a_. final _..

12 decision and not an individual regions...in order to; assure 13 that there is some continuity of judgment, professiona1 C

1,4 judgment across the country.

15 So the process used was not an element-by-element 16 revie e which has been described in these proceedings 17 exh austively.

I did not go through that process.

I vent 18 through an aggregation and a professional judgment, and I to think it is important to note that in the r_esponse to the 20 question of whether FEM A had prior findings.on,oth_er plants, 21 the answer is yes, and indeed, there were so:gnng.gative and 22..some positiv e.

The threshold of what made the difference 23 between a negative and a positive in those cases also was O

2 net e fine sine.

rt vas that the veicht ef res onse was 25 either negative or positive, and in this case ve found it 9

y (to be positive).

l ALDERSoN REPoRTNG COMPANY,INC,

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ATTAC5 MENT 3 from tran2cript of TMI-l Rentart Htcring O

STATENENTOFPROFESSIONAL60ALIFICATIONS John E. Dickey C

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John E. Dickey received his B.A. degree.from the University of Maryland in 1956.

Upon gradt.ation, he accepted a commission in the U. S. Navy, serving until 1971.* Mr. Dickey holds the rank of captain.

In 1971, Mr. Dickey joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), serving in Senior Executive Service positions.

In November 1980, he began his employment with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the Director. of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division (REP).

C Beginning January 23, 1981, he also began duties as the Acting Assistant Associate Director of the Population Preparedness Office in FEMA.

His current position is Acting A'ssistant Associate Director for the "new" Population Protection Office which among other contains the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division.

fir. Dictey'has' been responsible for developing and implementing policy deci-sions involving civil defense systems, planning and preparedness for natural and man-made disasters, including those associated with potential radiologi-cal accidents, particularly commercial nuclear power plants.

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'ATTACBMENT 4 from transcript of TMI-l Restcrt Hocring "6

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NBC STAFF POSITION ON EEERGENpY PREPAREDNESS FOB.THI-1 3The overall emergency preparedness for THI-1 is adequate C'

subject to exceptions listed below and provides reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at T."I-1 3 Unit 1.

The basis for this position ~is the NBC staff review of the TEI-1 Emergency Plan against the requirements of 10 iCFB 50.47(b), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, and the guidance of NUBEG-0654, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," as well as the interim findings and determination of the Federal Emergency Hanagement Agency (FEMA) which indicate that the state and local plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.

However, the staff position is also that the following actions should be completed satisfactorily prior to a restart of THI-1s (1)

Demonstrate the ability to implement the York County Emergency Plan.

(2)

Complete the prompt alerting system for the THI plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone.

(3)

Modify the THI-1 Emergency Plan to reflect the C

commitment that the licensee 's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be staffed and functional within about one hour of the declaration of an emergency of a classification of Site Area Emergency or higher.

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ATTAQiMENT 5 from New York Times of July 5, 1981.

Mr Tus New YORK nuss,.

16 Halfaf U.S. AtomicPlants Miss Deadline on Alerts ;

ByRALPHBLUSGNfMAL own espergency piarudag requirements, ing systems could be need. They said no Aboet half the country's =8run te power adopted last Amgut in rumpn=a to the *=c8ph'y actimt was ph but in March 1979 mer44.nt at the Three Mike letters sent out at the and of June, the.

plants, factudfag all six facilities in New Yort and New Jersey and one in Ca>.

Islanonuclearplantin Penneytuna.

• • asked operators of the 72 nocticut, have mi===4 a July 1 ds-olin, hconcernis not sotouch owrpoesi. working ancient plaats to report the ble danger to the public as it is over the progressof thelmetallatteesbyJuly34.

for tamranatarm of emergency warning systems to alert the surity=vitaqr popula.

Federal enforemanens policy. "We're not "I

don'tintendtomakeabig tion la the event of a serious =ce4d,,,

a bloutp tomorrow," said A1 Issueif they an=stMng that's esa.

fred

. M a=na the Wa-tre==*=" sonable " said Vnctor Stallo, the com.

Federal ornr4als acknowledge. Sosne of Commy Executtw. "We're concerned missica's dinctorof laspection ant en.

theworkis under The delay prompted by that the N.R.C le not good forits werd." m the man = energy =*rnem-ittee and cam *dadem of5ciale YhesystemsaresoppoesttoaDowthe.

aratnentlan of state and local ofBetals athers ' that the Nuclear theWweeinanna,9hstit no smammatma= damper because other wars, withh 15 esinsees of as emergency and cammtamirm was fa!!ing to its SUNDAY, JULY 3,19s1 the bremde==t witlan 30 minutes of a they waited solong to place an order," vincing N.R.C. enL wt action" on warnha ao the.PW inside a 10. lsaid Victor Gilinski, one of,ftve mem. I twoemergencyplanningdaadunsa, silleraraus aims witti any n=n=amary bers of-theinmndudan. "I would have } Cheyras the Jaly 3 d=adun loralarm lastructions.

I tihed town anore **==85=aca " he said, systems:Theotherwasan April 1 dead.

Operstars ef the two atomic but haJuled out many immadiate sanc.

line for

$== Ma emergency nearest New YortOty-Indian 2 tions The A)ect bare isn't to shut-plans. The.enmmer-ico found Daws in and Set Bar*==== N.Y.,about 35 andes dows plants,'but toist them into com. - the New Yout State plan, but granted north of Mambartan - said they planand piimar* "

fourmonthsforrevtekas.

to lastall a shared 22 minian system by.

.In addition tothe New York and New Also voicing.<nocorn was the New, aboeti - ".

Jersey facMities, a, utility spr*astnan York Pubtle Interat Research Group, a la-empiafning the delay. Isarence said the Cra==r*mt' Yanks

• plant in eremuner lobby that has called for the snee.w=aa, a apr*= aman lor coq Alann Radda rB.Cotm.Jwasnot in egenpliance, shutdown of indian Point for aDaged F

widch operatas IndissiPetot 2, said Theleone was raisedlastTuesdayina

- --- ; =+ with Federal rules. "If mestr ututtles had pinned orders with letter from Repneantative Tbhv Mof.

the N.R.C continues tolgnore the intent 4he same alarm =% at about fett,Democratof ramme*M andchair.

and letter of its own emergency stdes,".

i es saase tisne. HerWwledged,how.

man of the Boupe savtrnamare, energy said @centBott, the noctear project 4 gver, that Can Edlene had not placed its andnaturalrumourets =A~=aad*=a to Tector,"**the public meet ennrinda that sederamtBWeem. -'

.. E ct.r the oWgoing temadsBIce temiermest 3o.

the emenmimminn was sauer serkna about "I flad1(daru* to understead,vtty agitt M.2Bendeta, esieging'*Blos tom.

amargencyplanning.**

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