ML20029B270
| ML20029B270 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/12/1991 |
| From: | Carr K NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Foley T, Quayle J HOUSE OF REP., SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, SENATE, PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9103060345 | |
| Download: ML20029B270 (7) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
.l WASMNGTON, D. C. 200b5
,,3 february 12, 1991 CHAIRMAN The Honorable J. Danforth Quayle President of the United States Senate Washington, D.C.
20510
Dear Mr. fresident:
I am enclosing a report on the nontlisclosure of Safeguards Inferraation by the Nuclear Rcgulatory Commission (NRC) for the quarter ending December 31, 1990.
This infortnation is subrtitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
The report describes five occasions during this reporting pteriod when the NRC withheld from public disclosure portions of a composite physical secur.:ty plan, deta ils and locations of intrusion-detection devices, procedures for members of the security organization, pt.crol schedules, details about on-site communications systems, locations of safety-related equipment, information on the armament of on-site reserve forces, ano portions of inspection and investigation reports that contain details of a licensee's physical security system.
Sincerely.
JN Kenneth M. Carr
Enclosure:
As stated 9103060345 910212 l
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February 12, 1991 Cit AlhM AN The Honorable Thomas S. Foley Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515 Deer Mr. Speaker:
I am enclosing a report on the condisclosu.e r,f Safeguards information by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis: ion (NRC) for the quarter ending December 31, 1990.
This information is submitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
The report describes five occasions du)ing this reporting l
period when the NRC withheld from public disclosure portions of a composite physical security plan, details and locations of intrusion-detection devices, procedures for members of the security organization, patrol schedules, details about on-site communications systems, locations of safety-related equipment, information on the armament of on-site reserve forces, and portions of inspection and investigation reports that contain details of'a licensee's physical srcurity system.
Sincerely, e %_
s Kenneth M. Carr
Enclosure:
As stated 1
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION QUARTERLY REPORT ON N0NDISCLOSURE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, prohibit. the unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards Infor' nation.
This section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (HRC) to prescribe such reguiations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information. NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 were pu'lished in the o
Federal Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718).
Section 147 also requires that the NRC repor on a quarterly basib the Commission's application during that period of every regulation or order prescribed or issued under this section.
As required by Section 147, the items noted below indicate the Safe <uards Information withheld from public disclosure under the provisiors of the implementing regulations during the period October 1,1990, through Decenter 31, 1990.
-During the reporting period, the following information was withheld from disclosure under four Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests:
1.
Type of Information Withheld On one occasion, the NRC withheld from public disclosure portions of the composite physical security plan of a nuclear power plant.
UnauthorizedDisclosureCoul(HaveAdverseImpact The public disclosure of this type nt information could si'?ificantly increase the probability of unauthorized entry into the p'.
and the information could be of considerab;e value to a potential se -.eur in considering or planning a sabothge attempt.
Assurance That Only the Minimum Amount of Information Was Withheld In this instance, the F01A request specifically sought po-ins of a physical security plan containing Safeguards Informatiot she NRC denied this request in its entirety.
However, other, more bau.
information concerning security at this plant is in the public domain.
2.
Troe of Information Withheld On one occasion, the NRC withheld from public disclosure details and locations of intrusion-detection devices, procedures for members of the security organization, and locations of certain safety-related equipment vital for purpose, of physical protection at a nuclear power plant, e
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4 2
Un' authorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public dischw > of this type of information could significantly increase the prcb-
.ity of unauthorized entry into the plant, and the
-information cegld oc of considerable value to a potential saboteur.in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
Assurance That Only the Minimum Amount of Information Was W'thheld The withholding of this type of Safeguards Information doer not (e..y the public basic information.concerning the level of protection afforded material at facilities. A -line-by-line review of the documents was conducted to ensure that only the minimum amount of information was withheld.
-3.
Type of-Information Withheld On two occasions, the'NRC withheld from public disclosure details and locations of intrusion-detection devices, locations of certain safety-related equipment vital for purposes of physical protection, patrol schedules,.-details of the on-site communications systems, armament of on-site reserve forces, and portions of an inspection report that
-Hsclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in tM physical l security system at a nuclear power plant.
Unauthorized-Disclosure could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could significantly
-increase the probability of unauthorized entre into the plant, and 6 information could be of considerable val e to rutantial saboteur in
-considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
Assurance That Only the Minimum Amount of Information Wa> Withheld
!Tne' withholding of this type of Safeguards Information does:not deny the publi.c basic information concerning> the level of protection afforded material at facilities. - A line-by-line review of the documents was-
-conducted to ensure that only the minimum amount of information was withheld. -
s
- 4 Type of Information Withheld' On one occasion, the NRC withheld from public disclosure locations of certain safety-related equipment vital for purposes of physical
. protection and portions of an-investigation report that disclose uncorrected' defects, weaknesses, and/or vulnerabilities in the physical security system at a nuclear power plant.
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure-of this-type of information could significantly increase the_ probability of-unauthorized entry:into the plant, and the
'information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
Assurance That Only the Minimum Amount of Information Was Withheld The withholding of this-type of Safeguards Information does not deny the.
public. basic information concerning the level of protection afforded material at facilities. A line-by-line review of the documents was Leonducted to' ensure that onsy the minimum amount of information was-withheld.
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ATTACHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE 1.
Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security-Information relating to the protection of facilities that process formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material at power reactors.
-Specifically:
( 1 ).-
The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site.
-(ii)
Site-specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical-protection system.
(iii)-
Details:of = alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion-detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, e
alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms.
t
'(iv)
Writtep physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress codes, and patrol schedules <
4
_(v) -
Details of the.on-site-and off-site communications systems
- that are used for security purposes.
-(vi)
Lock combinations and mechanical key design.
- (vii)
Documents and other nk %r that contain lists or locations of-certain safety-related eo 'oment explicitly identified in the-documents as: vital.for put 'ses of physical protection,- as contai_ned in physical secu y plans, safeguards-contingency
-plans,-or: plant-specific saaeguards analyses for production or utilization facilities.
(viii).
The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or
. site.--
, ~_ _ _ -
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) (ix)
Those sortions of the facility guard qualification and training plan w11ch disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.
(x)
P,esponse plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response time, and armament of responding forces.
(xi)
Size, armament, and disposition of on-site reserve forces.
(xii)
Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces committed to respond to safeguards emergencies.
2.
Physical Protection in Transit Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Infsrmation telative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel.
Specifically:
(i)
The composite transportation physical security plan.
(ii)
Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments.
(Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure.
Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.)
(iii)
Details of vehicle imobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and communication systems.
(iv)
Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.
(v)
Details reaarding limitations of radio-telephcne communications.
(vi)
Procedures for response to safeguards tmergencies.
3.
Inspections, Audits, and Evaluations Information not otherwise classified as Re;tricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards inspection and reports.
Specifically:
Portions of safeguards inspectA@ opoca, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain dete!!s of a licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in % system.
Information regarding defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilWies may be released after I
corrections have been made.
Reports of investigations may be l
released after the investigation has been completed, enless withheld pursuant to other authorities; e.g., the Freedon; of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).