ML20028F974

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Final Deficiency Rept DER 82-54 Re Main Steam Valves W/Internal Corrosion from Outdoor Exposure While Removed for Sys Hydrotest.Const Work Plan Procedures Revised to Address Matl Handling & Storage
ML20028F974
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 01/26/1983
From: Van Brunt E
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To: Sternberg D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, ANPP-22826-GHD, DER-82-54, NUDOCS 8302070259
Download: ML20028F974 (4)


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Docket Nos. 50-528/529/530 e

. . 50.55 (e) Report RgEl 70

!!R Arizona Public Service Company f3 P o BOX 21666 + PHOENIX, ARIZGNA 85036

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'>,l2:5j January 26, 1S83 ANPP-22826-GHIfMRll g-U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. D. M. Sternberg, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1

Subject:

Final Report - DER 82-54 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to Unit #1 Main Steam Valves Have Internal Corrosion From Outdoor Exposure While Removed for System Hydrotest File: 83-019-026 D.4.33.2

Reference:

(A) Telephone ConversaLion between J. Eckhardt and G. Duckworth on September 30, 1982 (B) ANPP-22137, dated October 28, 1982 (Interim Report) ,

Dear Sir:

Attached, is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e), referenced above.

Very truly yours, Cwt A LLk E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

APS Vice President Nuclear Projects ANPP Project Director EEVBJr/GHD:ske i Enclosure cc: See Attached Page 2 i

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C 8302070259 830126 b L DRADOCK05000g

- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Mr. D. M. Sternberg, Chief ANPP-22826-GHD/BSK January 26, 1983 Page 2 i . ._

cc: ' Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 T. C. Woods, Jr.

J. A. Roedel D. B. Fasnacht G. C. Andognini J. R. Bynum B. S. Kaplan W. E. Ide A. C. Rogers J. Vorees J. A. Brand A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher R. M. Grant D. R. Hawkinson L. E. Vorderbrueggen G. A. Fiorelli P. P. Klute Lynne Bernabei, Esq.

Harmon & Weiss 1725 "I" Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20006 R. L. Greenfield Assistant Attorney General Bataan Memorial Building Santa Fe, New Mexico 87503 i

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FINAL REPORT - DER 82-54 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)

ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)

PVNGS UNIT #1

1. Description of Deficiency APS QA surveillance activity found that the Main Steam and Pressurizer Safety Valves were removed for Secondary Hydro and stored in violation of ANSI N45.2.2 and Dresser Instal-lation/ Maintenance Manuals which state: " Valve, either crated or uncrated, should always be stored with the inlet flange down; i.e., never laid on its side, to prevent possible misalignment and damage to the internals." Addi-tionally, care should be taken to prevent the entrance of foreign material.

e Four (4) Pressurizer Safety Valves (PSV's) were stored at the base of the Condensate Storage Tank exposed to the elements and lying on their sides.

e Twenty (20) Main Steam Safety Valves (MSV's) were stored on top of the MSSS Building in uncovered condition. Many of the valves were stored with body drains facing up.

Investigation of this condition revealed that Bechtel Construction removed the valves in accordance with Bechtel Start-Up Work Per-mits (SWP's). However, the SWP's do not identify storage require-ments or responsibility. Subsequently, APS Start-Up Quality Assurance issued a Corrective Action Request (CAR) No. S/S-82-23 to document its concern that a procedure did not exist for con-trol of permanent plant equipment removed for start-up activities.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications The build-up of corrosion on parts requiring close tolerances, and the potential misalignment of valve internals, may preclude valve operation per their design intent; therefore, to assure valve performance to design intent, the aforementioned valves were transmitted to Wyle Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama for testing. Prior to testing, the valves will be cleaned and refurbished as required.

This condition is, therefore, evaluated as Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) as a breakdown in the Bechtel Quality Assurance Program.

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Final R: port - DER 82-54 Page 2

! III. Corrective Action

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1 As previously stated, the valves are being inspected, refurbished and recalibrated as required prior to reinstallation. In response to Start-Up QA Audit No. S-82-011, the responsible individuals have verified that all other applicable components in storage are properly tagged, dated and that the control log is up-to-date.

Corrective actions to preclude recurrence for all future interim storage conditions have been documented on APS CAR No. S-62-045-N which identifies the following actions:

1. Bechtel Construction Responsible Items
a. The Construction Work Plan Procedures governing Start-Up Work Permits (SWP's) and System Turn-back Requests (STR's) were revised to address  !

material handling and storage responsibilities I as indicated below.

SWP-WPP/QCI 31.3, Rev. 2, PCN #11, effective 11/11/82 STR-WPP/QCI 31.4, Rev. O, PCN # 3, ef fective 11/11/82

b. Training was conducted for the responsible individuals.
2. Bechtel Start-Up Responsible Items
a. BPC Start-Up now has an approved procedure for

" Material Control and Storage" (AD-122, Rev. 0).

b. The SWP Procedure (AD-105, Rev. 2) is in revision to describe material control and storage responsi-bilities.
c. Training on these procedural changes will te completed in the near future for the responsible individuals.
3. APS Operations and Maintenance Responsible Items
a. As an interim measure, a Mechanical Maintenance Department Instruction was generated to describe Control and Storage requirements to be followed during maintenance operations.
b. Incorporation of material control and storage requirements in the STR Procedure is currently being completed.
c. Training was conducted on the interim Maintenance Department Instruction. Further training will be conducted as final procedural approval is attained.

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