ML20028F070
| ML20028F070 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1983 |
| From: | Longenecker J ENERGY, DEPT. OF, CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLANT |
| To: | Grace J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| HQ:S:83:204, NUDOCS 8301310092 | |
| Download: ML20028F070 (2) | |
Text
O Department of Energy t
Washington, D.C. 20545 S 83 5-:
JAN 271983 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Director CRBR Program Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Dr. Grace:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE (DHRS) TEMPERATURE LIMITS-CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLANT Enclosed is additional information requested by the staff regarding DHRS temperature limits. This information will be included in Section 5.6 of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report in a future amendment.
If you have any questions regarding the enclosed information,please contact Mr. A. Meller (FTS 626-6355) or Mr. D. Florek (FTS 626-6188) of the Project Office Oak Ridge staff.
Sincerely, D
J n R. Longene er Acting Director, Office of Breeder Demonstration Projects Office of Nuclear Energy Enclosure cc: Service List D00 Standard Distribution Licensing Distribution 8301310092 830127 DR ADOCK 05000537 PDR
3:
- s. '.9 INSERT 'for Section 5.6 of the PSAR The requirement to accommodate the failure of a. single active com-i ponent, as described in paragraph 5.6.2.1.1.e, resulted in the necessity to perform a single failure analysis. The inputs for this updai.ed DHRS single failure analysis include:
e Two PHTS loops operating e No I':TS heat capacity 4
e No SGS heat capacity e One Na makeup pump at 600 gpm o One NaK pump at 600 gpm e One air blast heat exchanger e Conservative decay heat used e No EVST heat load
]
e Heat losses through insulation included The results of the single failure analysis indicate a peak hot le'g temperature of approximately 1137'F, as shown in Figure 5.6-14.
The paak temperatures for the single failure assessment slightly exceed (by47'F) the structural peak temperature analyzed for the.,
F-2 transient. Th!; i; j d ;^d acceotahlo bsead ca crap 4a; saslyejs s
ain:: th^
er'ti'it; :f th; pr' :ry $ u9r; t;.~;..Lo;..., ;. ;;t = 1 L L;;rity, h$ e ad nn c'-==a e t:
- r. id;.atiec.;, ;t t: p = t. u J gp.emixtcl.,1200'E is approximately iUG he c-;.
Specific features which incorporate the single failure capab.ility include 1) a redundant valve in parallel with the existing valve at the OHX inlet to ensure OHX flow if either valve fails to open, and
- 2) the addition of remote manual operators on the valves at the dis-charge from the makeup pumps to permit operation from the Main Control l
{
Room. These features are shown in Figure 5.1-7 and in Table 5.6-10.
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