ML20028C941
| ML20028C941 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/28/1982 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Sternberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1369 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, ANPP-22610-GHD, DER-82-40, NUDOCS 8301140329 | |
| Download: ML20028C941 (5) | |
Text
Docket Nos. 50-528/529/530 6
g 50.55 (e) Report RECGvEO
!!RC Arizona Public Service Company eo. sox mee. PHOENIX. Am2ONA 85036 f a.'" JAU -5 n' p g December 28, 1982 ANPP-22610-GHD/pSK:,,.
U. S. Nuclear Regislatory Commission Region V Creckeide Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. D. M. Sternberg, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1
Subject:
Final Report - DER 82-40 A 50.55(e) Reportable Deficiency Relating to Unit 1 Circuit Breakers Being Incorrectly Set After Testing (Prerequisite Test Review Investigation)
File:
82-019-026 D.4.33.2
Reference:
(A) Telephone Conversation between J. Eckhardt and G. Duckworth on August 6, 1982 (3) ANPP-21763 dated September 2, 1982 (Interin Report)
(C) ANPP-22364 dated November 22, 1982 (Time Extension)
Dear Sir:
Attached, is our final written report of the Reportable deficiency, under 10CFR50.55(e), referenced above.
Very truly yours, ltL wfg E. 8. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Projects Management ANPP Project Director EEVBJr/GHD:db cc: See Attached Page 2 8301140329 821228
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- 7 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 28, 1982 Attention
Mr. D. M. Sternberg, Chief ANPP-22610-Gild /BSK Page 2 cc: Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 T. G. Woods, Jr.
J. A. Roedel D. B. Fasnacht G. C. Andognini J. R. Bynum A. C. Rogers B. S. Kaplan W. E. Ide J. Vorees J. A. Brand A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher R. M. Grant D. R. llawkinson L. E. Vorderbrueggen G. A. Florelli P. P. Klute Lynne Bernabel, Esq.
Ilarmon & Weiss 1725 "I" Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20005 R. L. Greenfield Assistant Attorney General Bataan Memorial Building Santa Fe, New Mexico 87503 l
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FINAL' REPORT - DER 82-40 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS) h PVNGS UNIT l' I...
, DESCRIPTION OF' DEFICIENCY J
Test results showed that the following Class 1E GE molded case circuit-breakers (components of the inverter and the. ital'ac power t
distribution panel supplied by Elgar Corporation and General Electric, respectively)f trip upon. application of lower-than. expected currents.
Trip currents as low as 59% of the minimum magnetic trip setting of the breaker were observed during testing of the breakers.
-Summarization-of Test Results Allowable Test Toler-- Tripping AMPS Magnetic ance (based at Min.EMag.
% of Minimum.
Breaker Trip Range on EG-206)
Trip Setting' Trip Setting
.1EPNBN12 1200-4000-20perchnt Ph A-706 59 Inverter Input Ph C-881-73 2
750 2500 20. perc^ent Ph A-536 71 1EPNBD26=
AC Pwr Pal Input Ph C-665:
87 1EPNCD27 750-2500 20 percent Ph A-527 70-AC Pwr Pn1 Input Ph C-587 78 Engineering review and comparison of APS Test Procedure (EG-206, Rev.1) to UL489 (Standard for Molded Case Circuit Breakers and Circuit Breaker Enclosures) revealed additional deficiencies in Prerequisite Test (s) data and Procedures. A Prerequisite Test Review Investigative Group (PTRIG) was formed ~to thoroughly examine this subject.
In the overall review effort (APS/Bechtel test data from Bechtel records and APS document control), a total of six thousand five hundred twelve (6,512) data sheet packages were reviewed with the following results:
a.
Approximately. thirty-six (36%) percent were acceptable.
b.
Approximately sixty-four (64%) per cent were rejected following an engineering evaluation.
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e II.
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS These deficiencies are evaluated by APS as Reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) since the large number of unacceptable test data packages includes those of safety-related equipment which might have been incorrectly tested or adjusted, and were it to have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the operations of safety systems of the nuclear power plant. These deficiencies also represent a significant breakdown in a portion of the quality assurance program, and required extensive evaluation as summarized in Section I above.
III. CORRECTIVE ACTION (A)
Prerequisite Electrical Test Procedures have been re-written to meet NUREG-1369.
(B)
The Testing Program, including retesting where necessary, has been revised as follows:
Four (4) tests - Primary Current Injection, Potential Circuit Verification, Differential Circuit Verification, and System Preoperational Test, will be performed on Unit #1 Power Distribution Systems (all feeder and control circuits within the 13.8 KV and 4.16 KV systems).
Since the Unit #1 Power Distribution circuits have been previously tested and have operated properly for over a year, it is relatively certain that the control and power circuits are properly installed and set. To date, no less than two (2) circuits functional tests per circuit have been performed - one at the time of initial energization, and after completion of DCP work prior to re-energization.
The PTRIG has confirmed the acceptability of the use of Primary Current Injection Testing as a verification of the functionality of previously prerequisite tested overcurrent protection circuits, in lieu of reperformance of prerequisite tests for which results were rejected. This has established a precedent for the use of verification testing in lieu of re prerequisite testing, when previously performed, but rejected, test data exists.
The other three tests, Potential Circuit Verification, Differential Circuit Verification, and System Preoperational Test are also functional verification tests, which will provide the same degree of verification, in their scope, as does the Primary Current Injection Test.
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- These four tests have more than sufficient overlap so as
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to assure that complete-functional verification of the overall circuit protection will have been performed.
' The past t'est and operating. history of'this' equipment indicates that the equipment is relatively certainly properly protected and operating. These tests will Lverify and document this certainty, and will detect any exceptional' eases.
(C)
The rejected test data may be re-reviewed in order to facilitate the retesting effort.. If'done, this re-evaluation willibe performed to criteria' consistent with the original PTRIG criteria, modified to incorporate information obtained by Engineering during the evaluation of the 1PERIG's " rejected but evaluatable" documents, QA input regarding acceptability of-data without timely signatures, and experience obtained-
. ith the equipment since the original review.
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