ML20028C224
| ML20028C224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1982 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, SD413-414-82-15, NUDOCS 8301070223 | |
| Download: ML20028C224 (3) | |
Text
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A DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. BOX 33180 CifAHLOTTE. N.C. 28242 i
11 AL H. Tt:CKER TE1.E PHONE vus.e.emo m s
(704) 373-4531 December 30, 1982 m.....
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'/Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 f
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Catawba Nuclear Station
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Units 1 and 2 c_n Docket Nos. 50-413 and -414 n
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
<e Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55e, please find attached a Supplemental ResponsMo C
Significant Deficiency Report SD 413-414/82-15.
Very truly yours, O s.Z Ve l
Hal B. Tucker RWO/php Attachment cc:
Director Mr. Robert Guild, Esq.
Office of Inspection & Enforcement Attorney-at-Law U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 12097 Washington, D. C. 20555 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 Mr. P. K. Van Doorn Palmetto Alliance NRC Resident Inspector 2135k Devine Street Catawba Nuclear Station Columbia, South Carolina 29205
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{*k'$A 8301070223 821230 TE 4 PDR ADOCK 05000413 O
Report # SD 413-414/82-15, Supplemental _ Report Report Date: December 30, 1982 Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station Unit #2 Identification of Deficiency: See SD 413-414/82-15 dated August 20, 1982 Initial Report: See SD 413-414/82-15 dated August 20, 1982 Supplier and/or Component: See SD 413-414/82-15 dated August 20, 1982 Description of Deficiency: See SD 413-414/82-15 dated August 20, 1982 Analysis of Safety Implications The subject fitting was installed in the Safety Injection (NI) System which is an ASME Section'III, Class A system. The undetected defect was in violation of the required code and could have resulted in operational failure or reduced functioning of this safety system.
Corrective Action Duke Power, QA Vendors Division has investigated Custom Alloy Co. in their plant, July 28, 1982 and their surveillance activity concluded the following:
1.
That this was an isolated event. Duke QA reviewed all the orders for ASME III, Class I fittings for the first 6 months of 1982 and found no further evidence where Custom Alloy had not performed volumetric inspection on other Class I fittings.
Their review included purchase orders, process sheets, inspection reports (NDE) and related documentation.
2.
Duke QA reviewed their procedures and they were found to be adequate to preclude tSis from happening in the future.
3.
There was no further evidence found to suggest that this was a gt.neric problem at Custom Alloy.
4.
Custom Alloy has made their employees aware of this problem.
Custom Alloy admitted this was an isolated error and has committed to following the Code in the future.
5.
The 10" fitting has been replaced by Custom Alloy. All tests (NDE) and documen-tation has been reviewed and accepted by QA Vendors at Custom Alloy's plant.
On December 22, 1982, Duke received Custom Alloy's Metallurgical Investigaticn Report dated December 14, 1982, which concluded that this condition was a forging burst composed of sulphides of iron, nickel and/or manganese. The locally high sulphur content can tend to make the steel " hot short", defined as a tendency toward lack of ductility at hot working temperatures. There inclusions may have resulted from positive sulfur segregation during the solidification process
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of the original melt.
Duke Power Compar.y Engineering Department, has performed an independent metal-lurgical evaluation. We attribute the problem to segregation of low melting point inclusion. Based on the similarity of the two independent reports (Duke's and Custom Alloy's) we are confident that the problem has been adequately defined.
This type of forging burst or inclusion would have been detected had volumetric examination been performed by Custom Alloy on their fitting, and since this was the only one of its kind not volumetric examined and finding no further evidence of Custom Alloy not performing NDE on other orders, we concluded that no further corrective action is needed.