ML20028A445
| ML20028A445 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1982 |
| From: | Gallo J, Thornton P CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.), ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028A442 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OLA, NUDOCS 8211220170 | |
| Download: ML20028A445 (10) | |
Text
l 11/16/82 4
UNITED STATES OF AliERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD l
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-155-OLA CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
)
(Spent Fuel Pool
)
Modification)
(Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant)
)
i CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY'S EXCEPTIONS TO INITIAL DECISION CONCERNING CRITICALITY Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S 2.762(a), Consumers Power Company
(" Licensee") hereby files its exceptions to portions of the Initial Decision (Concerning Neutron Multiplication Factor) entered by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(" Licensing Board") on October 29, 1982.
1.
Page 1, lines 1-6:
This initial decision considers whether the proposed alteration of Consumers Power Company's (applicant) spent fuel pool, which is located within the containment of the Big Rock Point Plant, complies with regulatory requirements and guide-lines requiring that the neutron l
multiplication factor (criticality pool never ri3bf)bove 0.95.
constant or K of the spent fuel a
Exception 1 The Licensing Board erred in stating that there is a regulatory requirement that k-effective never rise above 0.,9,5 in a spent fuel pool.
l 8211220170 821116 DRADOCK05000gg
O
. 2.
Page 15, lines 4-24:
We conclude that Dr. Kim's view of criticality is preferable to that of Mr. Lantz.
His testimony adequately analyzes the possibility of critica-lity occurring, assuming that all pool cooling systems were lost and the pool began to boil.
We believe that his calculations of k at high waterdensitieswouldbec8kbectif his underlying assumptions about pool thermodynamics were appropriately conservative.
However, as we explain below in Section II of this opinion, we do not accept Dr. Kim's assump-tions as conservative because Dr.
Kim's analysis depends on the non-conservative assumption the fuel pool will remain full of water.
Dr.
Kim's model does not adequately consider the possibility of extended boil-off, as might occur during a TMI-2 incident in which the contain-ment could not be entered to gain access to the fuel pool.
This might sufficiently reduce the water level to fnvalidate the assumption of a 212 F water inlet temperature at the bottom of the fuel racks.
Although this extended boil-off might be averted if the makeup line applicant is installing is reliable, k is intended to remain above 0.9$ kor all f
conditions in the pool and we con-clude that it is not proper for us to t-consider a makeup line as mitigation of this requirement.
In Section II of this opinion, we find that the Commission's guidelines do not allow an applicant to plan a spent fuel pool in which there are even unlikely circumstances, such as pool boil-off, in which k may rise above 0.95.
eff Exception 2.1 The Licensing Board erred in concluding that Dr. Kim's assumptions were not appropriately conservative.
Exception 2.2 The Licensing Board erred in assuming that Dr. Kim should have considered the possibility of extended
- boil-off of the water in the storage pool.
Exception 2.3 The Licensing Board erred in concluding that it was not proper to consider a makeup line as an appropriate engineered safety system designed to prevent significant water loss in the storage pool, contrary to the general regulatory treatment of engineered safety features in 10 C.F.R. Part 100 and Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, and the specific l
regulatory guidance established by the NRC Staff for meeting General Design Criterion 61, namely, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.13, Revision 1 (December 1975); NRC Branch Technical Position entitled "OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications," attached to a letter of April 14, 1978 from Brian K.
Grimes to all power reactor licensees; NRC Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, dated July 1981, S 9.1.2; and Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.13 (December 1961).
Exception 2.4 The Licensing Board erred in expanding the reach of General Design Criterion 62 to include the boil-off or loss-of-water case in contravention of the regulatory treatment of this scenario under General Design Criterion 61.
Exception 2.5 The Licensing Board erred in its interpretation of the phrase "all conditions," in that the Board's interpre-tation is contrary to the context in which the phrase is used in the Staff's SER as well as the NRC Branch Technical Posi-tion, supra.
~~
- - w A
s,
Exception 2.6 The Licensing Board erred in assuming that Y.
I applicable NRC guidance intended that the Staff's 3cceptance
.?
criterion of 0.95 on k-effective should apply to the extended
.c boil-off accident hypothesized by the Board.
Standard Review
'5 Plan, S 9.1.2, supra; NRC Branch Technical Position, supra.
Exception 2.7 The Licensing Board erred in assuming that its conclusjon about the conservatism of Dr. Kim's assumptions was at all relevant to Dr. Kim's calculations of k-e'ffective at high water densities.
Exception 2.8 The Licensing Board erred in finding that Commission guidelines require pool boil-off to be accounted for in the criticality analyses conducted to satisfy the
' Staff's k-effective guideline of 0.95.
Standard Review Plan, S 9.1.2, supra; NRC Branch Technical Position, supra.
3.
Page 18, lines 3-6:
We do not regard the article on supercriticality as providing ade-quate safety assurance, since the i
article itself states that its analyses are subject to substantial error and those analyses were:
(1) not done on the actual Big Pock spent fuel pool configuration, and
( 'c ) have not been subject to a ca'reful safety review by'the staff.
Exception 3 The Licensing Board erred in failing to recog-nize that the same evidence on which it bases the potential for supercriticality in the Big Rock Storage pool demonstrates that the supercritical condition would never occur in the Big Rock pool.
. 4.
Page 18, lines 11-14:
Nor do we accept the tradition of overlooking the possibility of a mist environment in a fuel pool as bin-ding, particularly with respect to a plant in which the fuel pool is located within the containment where it might be unaccessible during a TMI-2~ accident.
Exception 4 The Licensing Board erred in disregarding all prior decisions approving spent fuel pool expansions, none of which has required the applicant to postulate the boil-off accident.
5.
Page 22, lines 13-15:
First, we believe that the 0.95 k limitation generally applied by t$bf staff should be rigorously applied to spent fuel pools, including applica-tion to all conditions that may be found in those pools.
Exception 5 The Licensing Board erred in inappropriately transforming Commission guidance into en inflexible legal requirement.
6.
Page 22, lines 16-21:
Second, even were we to apply a more lenient standard to the pool, we would accept a portion of Dr. Kim's testimony, adverse to the position of his client in this proceeding, that the calculational methods so far employed for this fuel pool are not adequate to give confidence that keff will remain below 0.95 once the density o'f water had declined below
.50 (Tr. 1944).
Exception 6 The Licensing Board erred in that if it applied "a more lenient standard" Dr. Kim's statement regarding 0.95
. t k-effective at low densities would be irrelevant.
7.
Page 18, lines 14-22:
As applicant argues, very low densities of water could not occur without the pool water boiling-off substantially, but our record leaves us very uncertain about the magnitude of the drop needed to surpass a kef#
of 0.95.
For example, a drop of somewhere between a few feet and a drop all the way to the top of the fuel racks is necessary in order to attain a 40% void fraction, according to a "very wild guess" made by Dr.
Prelewicz (Tr. 1854-1855).
Since there also is substantial uncertainty concerning k at high void fractions, w$ kre not sure how f
quickly voids would occur that would raise k above 0.95.
eff Page 23, lines 4-10:
We have no evidence concerning the amount of boil-off required, during a TMI-2 accident, to make the pool boil rapidly enough to substantially exceed the void formation assumptions
'used by Dr. Kim to calculate k (See the testimony of Dr. Prel8hkc.z at Tr. 1854-1855 concerning the rate of boil-off in the pool.)
Consequently, applicant has failed to demonstrate to our satisfaction that k would remain below 0.95 i
underconditionsof*kkpidpoolboiling.
Exception 7.1 The Licensing Board erred in concluding that there was no evidence concerning the amount of pool boil-off required to substantially exceed the void formation assump-tions used by Dr. Kim to calculate k-effective.
Exception 7.2 The Licensing Board erred in characterizing the pool boil-off condition it hypothesized as " rapid pool boiling" and in assuming that this conditon should have been
. considered for purposes of criticality analysis.
8.
Page 23, lines 36-37:
We find that the applicant has not shown that its fuel storage racks meet this criterion, set forth in the SER for this plant.
Exception 8 The Licensing Board erred in finding that Licensee had not shown that its fuel storage racks complied with the Staff's SER.
9.
Page 23, line 37 to page 24, line 2:
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that there is any reason to vary from i
this criterion by adopting appli-cant's innovative suggestion that we apply Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, July 1981, S 9.1.1, which permits a k of 0.98 for new fuel racks under*$by storage conditions.
Exception 9 The Licensing Board erred in rejecting the application of Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, July 1981, S 9.1.1.
to the loss of water condition it hypothesized.
10.
Page 24, lines 7-14:
The pool is a waste dump containing an extensive inventory of fission products that do not exist in dry, unirradiated fuel.
Considering the large amount of fission products that might be dispersed should a critica-lity accident occur in the pool we see no reason for any leniency about K
The risk associated with such a8 kc.cident is too great to take.
f Further, we note that this is simply a waste dump and there is no tech-nical reason why waste dumps cannot be made safe from criticality accidents.
. Exception 10 The Licensing Board erred in assuming that its questionable characterization of the storage pool as a " waste dump" had any relevance to any issue before the Board.
These errors warrant reversal of the initial decision of the Licensing Board.
Respectfully submitted, Q
cp7 Joseph Gallo Peter Thornton Attorneys for Consumers Power Company Isham, Lincoln & Beale 1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 840 Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 833-9730 l
l Isham, Lincoln & Beale l
Three First National Plaza Chicago, lilinois 60602 l
(312) 558-7500 Dated:
November 16, 1982 l
e
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD i
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-155-OLA CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY
)
(Spent Fuel Pool
)
Modification)
(Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Plant)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Consumers Power Company's EXCEPTIONS TO INITIAL DECISION CONCERNING CRITICA-LITY and MOTION OF CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY FOR IMMEDIATE APPEAL FROM INITIAL DECISION CONCERNING CRITICALITY were served on all persons listed by deposit in the United States mail this 16th day of November 1982.
Thomas S. Moore, Esquire Peter B.
Bloch, Esquire Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory -
Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. John H. Buck Dr. Oscar H.
Paris Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Christine N. Kohl, Esquire Mr. Frederick J.
Shon Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555
,)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Richard J. Goddard, Esquire Docketing and Service Section Richard G.
Bachmann, Esquire Office of the Secretary Counsel for NRC Staff U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 John O'Neill, II Ms. JoAnne Bi.er Route 2, Box 44 204 Clinton Maple City, Michigan 49664 Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Christa-Maria Mr. James Mills Route 2, Box 108C Route 2, Box 108 Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Charlevoix, Michigan 49720 Herbert Semmel, Esquire Judd Bacon, Esquire Antioch School of Law Consumers Power Company 2633 16th Street, N.W.
212 West Michigan Avenue Washington, D.C.
20555 Jackson, Michigan 49201 CeI gf Jbseph Gallo
-.-.