ML20027E401
| ML20027E401 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/23/1982 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027E400 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-428 NUDOCS 8211150172 | |
| Download: ML20027E401 (1) | |
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During a tour of the Control Room on April 29, 1982, the NRC inspector observed that the traces on radiation monitor constant recorders 93537, 93538, 93539, and 93540 were either indistinguishable or were not inking properly.
This appeared to be attributable to the way the pens record over the same area in different colors one after another.
This caused the second and third recording pens to pick up the color of the first recording pen; to stop inking; or to ink in a barely distinguishable fourth color, which is a mix of colors.
These recorders were purchased and placed in service to aid in the tracking of the radiation monitors since the previous recorders were multi-point recorders with some radiation detectors being recorded only once every 6 minutes.
The radiation detectors recorded on the constant monitors are as follows:
6212 Radioactive Liquid Waste 6213 Radioactive Liquid Waste 6314-1 Gas Waste Exhaust 6314-2 Gas Waste Exhaust 7324-1 Reactor Plant Ventilation Exhaust 7324-2 Reactor Plant Ventilation Exhaust 7325-1 Stack Iodine and Particulate
-7325-2 High Range Iodine 31193 Air Ejector Exhaust 93251-1 Reactor Plant Exhaust Filter Room This problem was discussed with the licensee, who was informed that it would be considered an open item.
(8209-02)
The NRC inspector had no additional questions in this area.
'l 4.
Surveillance (Monthly)
The NRC inspector reviewed all aspects of surveillance testing involving safety-related systems.
The review included observation and review relative to Technical Specification requirements.
The surveillance tests reviewed and observed were:
SR 5.8.2bc-M Radioactive Liquid Effluent System Instrumentation Functional Test (Releases No. 543 and 550)
SR 5.8.labc-M Radioactive Gaseous Effluent System Test (Release No. 599)-
SR 5.4.1.1.4.b-M/5.4.1.4.2b-M Linear Power Channel Scram Test SP 5.4.1. 2. 5. a-M/5.4.1. 2. 5. c-R Steam Generator Penetraticn : essure Test /Cali brati on S
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I 211150172 821008 PDR FOIA AUDIN82-428 PDR
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SR 5.4.1.3.4.a-M/5.4.1.3.4.c-R Circulator Penetration Pressure Test / Calibration SR 5.4.1.2.6.b-M Rehest Header Activity Test SR 5.4.1.1.8.b-M Reheat Scram Temperature Scram Test SR 5.4.1.3.1.b-M Circulator Speed (Steam and Water) Test No violation or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance (Monthly)
The NRC inspector reviewed records and observed work in progress to ascertain that the following maintenance activities were being conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Speci-fications, and appropriate Codes and Standards.
The following maintenance activities were reviewed and observed:
CN 1436B/CWP 82-57 Interspace Pressurization Modification (Instrumentation and Gas Waste)
PTR 4-285 Fabricate Spare Moisture Monitor Flow Element in accordance with MP-93, " Moisture Monitor Flow Element Fabrication" and MP-100, " General Welding Procedure" PTR 4-41 Repair MM 1116 in accordance with RP-48, " Dew Point Moisture Monitor Detector Head Operation and Maintenance Manual" PTR 4-114 PV-21244 Repair in accordance with RP-90, "Masoneilan Valves and Controllers" CN 1496/CWP 82-68 Cap Tube 4FT21 and install Sample Lines l
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During a walkdown of the new interspace pressurization l
sample system installed by CN 1436B, the NRC inspector determined that the support hangers were not installed in accordance with the CN 1436B/CWP 82-57 requirements.
The sample header consisted of stainless steel tubing routed inside rigid conduit and the conduit was required to be supported at each free conduit end and at intervals not to exceed an eight foot span.
The NRC inspector noted i
several cases where conduit free ends were not supported.
The licensee was informed of the NRC inspector's findings and all deficiencies were correcrea prior to the new system being placed in operat1Jn.
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During;a review of the welding specification WPS-8S-1, which was referenced in MP-93, " Moisture Monitor Flow Element Fabrication," the f1RC inspector determined that the delta-ferrite content of the welds made during perfor-mance of PTR 4-285 had not been monitored as required.
WPS-85-1, Issue 2, ' dated April 6,1981, states in part that, "... Welding shall be monitored for delta-ferrite content by using a calibrated severn ferrite indicator...."
The licensee stated that this requirement was accomplished by determining the delta-ferrite content of the weld filler metal as indicated in the Mill Test Reports prior to use of the filler.
In accordance with the licensee's specification 1-M-2, this is an acceptable method for controlling delta-ferrite content of the deposited weld.
As presently written, the welding specification WPS-8S-1 requires this to be performed on the weld after completion of the weld.
The NRC inspector informed the licensee that the deviation from the requirements for delta-ferrite deter-mination in accordance with WPS-8S-1 and the current deter-mination method is considered an open item.
(8209-03) c.
The licensee had reported that a leak existed in a Pressurized Concrete Reactor Vessel (PCRV) Liner Cooling System Tube F4T21, which cools the core support floor.
This leak allowed reactor coolant (Helium), which is at a pressure greater than the cooling water (700 psia vs. 125),
l to enter the tube.
The leak was first suspected on April 7, 1982, when fission products were detected in Loop 1 of the cooling system in conjunction with increasing pressure in the PCRV Liner Cooling System surge tank.
It was then evident that a flow path for the coolant existed through the core support floor casing and into the liner cooling tube.
l Subsequent testing confirmed the presence of radioisotopes j
and a leak rate of 1.3 lbs, per hour.
Tube F4T21 is 1 of 21 coolant tubes on subheader 37 of the PCRV Cooling System.
The tube was successfully capped utilizing Cl41496/CWP 82-68 l
on May 2,1982.
The installation utilized a primary cap j
and a secondary cap with an interspace pressurization system similar to that utilized for other PCRV penetrations.
No violations or deviaticns were identified.
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8 6.
TMI Action Plan P.ecuirements j
The following TMI Action Items have been closed:
II.E.4.2 Contair. ment Isolation Dependability.
Closed in accordance with March 24, 1982, letter Clark to Warembourg.
II.K.3 Final Recommendations, B & O Task, Force.
Except for item II.K.3.17 ECCS Outages, this item is not applicable to Fort St. Vrain in accordance with the i
March 24, 1982, letter Clark to Warembourg.
Note that.the activity required in II.K.3 has been partially satisfied by. response to IE Bulletin 80-06 j
and reported in NRC report 50-267/82-08.
l See PSC letter datec March 26, 1982, and NRC letter Clark to Warembourg dated March 24, 1982, for status of TMI Action Plan requirements anplicable to Fort St. Vrain.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Crack in Fuel Element 1-2415 l-On April 26, 1982, while performing an inspection of elements that had been removed during the second refueling on July 1,1981, it was observed that fuel element 1-2415 was cracked on one face.
The crack was observed to extend vertically down the full length of the Block, 31.2 inches, and across the minimum cross section j
between a coolant hole and the face, approximately one-half inch.
No estimate or measurement of-the crack width has been made although it is evident to the naked eye when seen through'the remote handling facility viewing port.
It is likely that the crack penetrates the cross section.
It should be noted that the fuel rods themselves were not affected.
The records indicated that the element was placed during. initial core loading on January 4,1974, in region 8, column 5, layer 6 where it remained until it was removed and achieved a burnup of 19497 MWD.
There is no evidence of damage to the element and the licensee believes this to be an isolated case based on the extensive inspections that have been performed.
An ultimate decision regarding disposition of the fuel. element has not been mace and the licensee is evaluating various possibilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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9 8.
Report Reviews The NRC inspector reviewed the following reports for content, reporting recuirements, and adequacy:
Mcnthly Operating Information Report, March 1982
!'cnthly Operations Report, March 1982 No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview Exit interviews were conducted at the end of various segments of this inspection with Mr. D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Production, and/or other members of the Public Service Company staff.
At the interviews, the inspectors discussed the firdings indicated in the previous paragraphs.
The licensee acknowledged these findings.
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LOFT
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LOFT FUEL CASK ACCIDENT - PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION On June 21, 1982 at approximately 9:00a.m., the LOFT fuel module insertion and removal cask (FMIRC) was involved in a transportation accident when it hit the overhead electrical power lirfes. The accident occurred when it was being moved from the TAN support area to the LOFT hanger building.
At the time the accident occurred, the fuel cask was empty and no radioactive release occurred. No personnel injuries occurred during this accident.
The power transmission line was damaged by being shorted to ground through the fuel cask and minimal damage occurred to the cask itself (approximately
$30K). At the time of the accident, the LOFT reactor facility was in a 2
shut down condition and no damage occurred to the reactor facility. One of the two off-site power buses was damaged and is currently not available.
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- LOFT, The LOFT fuel module insertion and removal cask (FMIRC) involved in an accident on June 21, 1982 has been examined and damage is estimated hbove $50K. A detail cost and schedule for the repairs is being developed. The repairs scheduled for the FMIRC are estimated to be completed close to the time that the cask will be required for removal of the F1 bundle. NRC and DOE are following this closely.
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