05000259/LER-1982-059-03, /03L-0:on 820818,during Calibr of Differential Pressure Switch That Initiates Pressure Suppression Chamber to Reactor Bldg Vacuum Breakers,Switch 1-PDIS-64-21 Operated Above Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Drift.Switch Recalibr

/03L-0:on 820818,during Calibr of Differential Pressure Switch That Initiates Pressure Suppression Chamber to Reactor Bldg Vacuum Breakers,Switch 1-PDIS-64-21 Operated Above Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Drift.Switch Recalibr

ML20027B325
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	09/15/1982
From:	Irby B TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20027B321	List: 05000259/LER-1982-059, Forwards LER 82-059/03L-0 05000259/LER-1982-059-03, /03L-0:on 820818,during Calibr of Differential Pressure Switch That Initiates Pressure Suppression Chamber to Reactor Bldg Vacuum Breakers,Switch 1-PDIS-64-21 Operated Above Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Drift.Switch Recalibr
References
LER-82-059-03L-01, LER-82-59-3L-1, NUDOCS 8209200280
Download: ML20027B325 (3)

LER-1982-059, /03L-0:on 820818,during Calibr of Differential Pressure Switch That Initiates Pressure Suppression Chamber to Reactor Bldg Vacuum Breakers,Switch 1-PDIS-64-21 Operated Above Tech Specs.Caused by Calibr Drift.Switch Recalibr

Event date:
Report date:
2591982059R03 - NRC Website

text

4HC FORr. OuG' U. G. TsuCLE AH HEGULATORY CCf.1".11SSION P

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60 G1 DOCKET NUMBER 68 63 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DAT E 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h

.lo(2l l During normal operation of unit 1. while calibratinn a differential Tiressure l

l g o ;3, l switch that initiates the pressure suporession chamber to reactor building vacuum l

l o J.i j l breakers (SI 4.7. A.3.a), dif f erential pressure switch 1-PDIS-64-21 operated ' ~at I

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T. S. 3.7. A.3.a requires the switch to operate at 0.5 psid.

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Event _ Narrative:

Unit'l and 3 were operating nomally at 97-percent and 95-percent power resgectively. Unit 2 was in a retueling outage.

Unit 1 was the only unit affected by this event. While performing Surveillanc,e Instruction (SI) 4.7.A.3.a (Pressure Suppression Chamber - Reactor Building Vacuum Breakers Functional Test

,(;

j an,d Calibraticn) on unit 1, differential pressure switch 1-PDIS-64-21 operated at

.,0 504 psid. Technical Specification 3.7.A.3.a requires the. switch to operate at 4

0.5 psid. The differential pressure switch applies power to operate the vacuum

}*s' Lteakers. The setpoint on the switch had drifted. The Barton model 289-differential pressure switch was immediately recalibrated per SI 4.7.A.3.a and returned to service.- 'Ihere was no effect on puolic health and safety. A I'

redundant switch was available and operable. See attached action plan for

/ corrective acticn, category 3; 4

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e AC1' ION PLAN BBQGS FERRY NUCLEAR PLMTr - REACIOR PPUTECTION SYS'IDI PRIMARY CONTADEENT ISCLATION SYSTD1 AND CORE STANDBY COOLING SYSTD4S PRIMARY SalSOR SNITQlES BACKGFOU!D Th reactor protection system (RPS), the primary containment isolaticn system (PCIS),

and the core standby cooling systems (CSCS) use mechanical-type switches in the sensors that monitor plant process parameters. The plant technical specifications have put very close tolerances on these instruments. As a result, alrcst any change in switch setpoint requires sutnittal of a licensee event report (LER). To reduce the frequency of this type LDl, the following action plan has been developed.

IONG-TEFM SOLUI' ION Advances in technology make it possible'to replace the mechanical type switches with a more accurate and more stable electronic transmitter electronic switch system.

This modification is a major change to these safety systems and requires fully qualified safety grade equi,tnent. This equipment is in limited supply and has lcng procurement times. IVA is presently reviewing bids for this equipnent. We tie-in of the new system to the balance of the RPS, the PCIS, and the CSG requires a -refueling outage. IVA expects to install the electronic systems during the first refueling outage after receipt of equipnent.

INTERIM ACTIONS Because of the long leadtime to implement the lcng-term solution, several interim actions have been taken. They are based on a review of licensee event reports which can be categorized as follows:

Category 1: Individual instruments whose setpoints have drifted two consecutive times.

Category 2: Groups of instruments which exhibit a predictable cyclic setpoint drift pattern.

Category 3: Individual, randomly occurring instruments setpoint drifts which cannot be put in category 1 or 2.

For each category the following cction is taken:

Category 1: The instrument is replaced with an i&ntical instrument.

Category 2: The margin between the instrument setting and the technical specification limit is increased.

Category 3: The instrument is readjusted to the specified setpoint.