ML20027B213

Fifth Set of Interrogatories Per ASLB 810728 Memorandum & Order.Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20027B213
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	09/13/1982
From:	Hiatt S OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY
To:	CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 8209160534
Download: ML20027B213 (12)

Text

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BELATED COBRNN , Septtg.kETED13, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing oa 15 40:i3 In the Matter of ) 0FFICE OF SECRET

) u00XETJNG & SERV '~We CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING ) Docket Nos. 5V-440 COMPANY, Et A1. ) 50-441

" ) (Operating License)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) .

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OHIO. CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY

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FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO APPLICANTS

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Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy ("0CRE") hereby pro-pounds its fifth set of interrogatories to Applicants, pursuant to the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of July 28, 1981 (LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175).

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Statement of

Purpose:

The following interrogatories are designed to ascertain Applicants' plans for hydrogen control in the PNPP containment following a LOCA and the effectiveness of same.

5-1, What do Applicants consider to be the equivalent of a ,

TMI-2 accident at Perry? Provide the probability of its -occurrence and a thorough description of its con-sequences, including fuel failure modes, effect on containment integrity, and off-site doses to the public at 2, 5, 10, and 50 miles from PNPP.

5-2. Give the percent elemental composition of the Zircaloy fuel rod cladding used in Perry.

5-3. Give the following dimensions of the fuel rod cladding used in PNPP:

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(a) mass (b) volume

. (c) surface area (outside and inside of cladding)

. .. (d) length of fuel rods vio (e) thickness of cladding Q:,[f. ' (f)-diame'ter (outside) of cladding

.., . 3. c 4.y:Q;n ",f5-4..~ Give the model, type, and manufacturer of the recombiners.

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,. .. - Provide all manufacturer.ts data and specifications.

• ) '. . JE ' 5-5. Section 6.2.5.2.3 of the FSAR states that the recombiners are "100% capacity." Explain what is meant by this.

5-6. At what range of H2 concentrations (in volume-%) are the recombiners effective:in reducing the H2 concentration below flammable limits?

5-7. At what concentration of H2 (volume-%) would the recombiners become an ignition hazard?

5-8. Would the recombiners be turned off if this concentration is reached? If not, why not?

q 5-9. Would the recombiners ever be turned off if the H2 con- ,

centration. exceeded a certain value? At what value?

5-10. Provide all details of the Perry distributed igniter system, including type and manufacturer of glow plugs, with all data and specifications, lifetime of the glow plug s , __and whether they are qualified for the environ-ment expected (post-LOCA), including suppression pool loads.

5-11. Are the igniters manually or automatically operated?

Produce all plant operatinE procedures / guidelines per-

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5-12.

taining to the hydrogen control systems, including the

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analyzers, mixers, recombiners, igniters, and back up purge.

.5-13. What parts of the hydrogen control system would be used concurrently? E.g., would the mixers and recombiners

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[beoperatedalongwiththeigniters?

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T@ -:[ l. S :5-14. At what. range of H2 concentrations (volume-%),are the

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igniters effective in reducing the H2 concentration d :t ',.

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5'-15. At what concentration of H2 would the igniters become

- an ignition hazard such that they could trigger an ex-plosion which could threaten containment integrity?

5-16. Would the igniters'be turned off if this concentration .I is reached? If not,' why not?. \

Would the igniters'ever be turne'd'off if the H2 co1-5-17.

. t centration exceeded a certai'a value? At what value?

Describe the expected operational 1 characteristics.d'f. ',

5-18. , ,

the igniter system. .What pressure 'and temperature

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transients will be experience'd by'the containment'.

j and the equipment therein? Is the . controlled; hydrogen ' ,

ignition expected to be cyclic?

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l 5-20., Is the equipment in the containment subject to such

-. conditions qualified for repeated pressure pulses 'and temperature transients? Document all such qualification.

Would cyclic pressure pulses produced by the controlled 5-21.

j hydrogen ignition damage any valves / components between the wetwell and drywell (e.g., vacuum breakers and H2

' mixing system), thereby allowing bypass of the suppression

' pool? Provide documented studies showing this would not i \ s j

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happen.

6 5-22. Can in'dividual glow plugs be controlled separately?

Or are all energized' simultaneously, with no individual

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"? 5-23. ' Provide documentation showing that all parts of the

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' , {x...~ i[- hydrogen control system meet GDC 41 to 10 CPR Part 50, w r j,g, Pertaining t redundan y in mP nents and Power supply.

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73 ' P.'5-24.' Demonstrate that the hydrogen control system meets i GDC 42'to 10 CFR Part 50.

3-25. Demonstrate that the hydrogen control system and PNPP

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'procedusesx will meet GDC 43 to 10 CFR Part 50.

s 5-26.' CHcw quic'bly could hydrogen generation .cause .an . explosive Aixture in the drywell and containment (answer for both) following:

(a) an accident Applicants consider to be the equivalent i

of a TMI-2 accident for Perry;

! (b) what,ppplicants consider to be the worst-case accident

, L in terms of H2 generation for Perry; ,

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's '(c) the following accident sequences as defined in

- NUREG/CR-1659 Volume 4 (RSS Methodology applied N,

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i (18) T23QUV 5-27. What do Applicants consider to be the worst-case accident in terms of H2 generation at Perry? Provide the probability of its occurrence and a tnorough description of its con-sequences, including fuel failure modes, effect n con-tainment integrity, and off-site' doses to the public at -

2, 5, 10, and 50 miles from Perry.

5-28. Describe all sources of ignition within the drywell and ,,

containment. Include in this assessment air components of the H2 control system.

5-29. Provide a diagram of the PNPP containment (including drywell) showing locations of the recombiners, glow

plug igniters, mixer. components, and analyzer sampler areas.

5-30. Does the analyzer have the ability to map the H2 con-l centration in the containment, as recommended in NUREG/CR-1561, p. 1347 5-31. Does the analyzer meet the criteria of IEEE Standards l

323, 33d, and 344? Demonstrate this compliance.

5-32. FSAR Section 6.2.5.2.1 states that delaying the start

- of the H2 analysis until 15-60 minutes following the d' LOCA will avoid exposing the analyzer to severe sample

'gy

' ' I[e; conditions. Are the analyzers designed to withstand 6 What assurance is f @2 ' such conditions? If not, why not?

't,v, there that the severe conditions will not persist beyond

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15-60 minutes after the LOCA?

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, ', 5-33. What judgements will be made by operators as to when in the 15-60 minute period following the LOCA to start

. the H2 analysis? Upon what will these judgements be based?

5-34. ' Describe in detail how the samples are brought to 'the analyzers. Are any manual actions needed?

3-35. How long is the time period from initiation of the H2 analysis to obtaining results?

. 5-36. Does the " grab sample" technique permit continuous monitoring of the containment atmosphere? If not, at ,

what intervals are samples taken? How are these intervals decided upon?

5-37. Demonstrate that the Perry H2 analyzer has met all 9 criteria listed on p. 195 of Volume 2 of NUREG/CR-2Ol7.

5-38. Provide all manufacturer's data and specifications for the H2 analyzer system.

5-39. How many repeat measurements are made of H2 concentration before the operators will accept the results as valid?

5-40. Have Applicants considered any other types .of analyzer

'(sampler-detector) systems, e.g., acoustic or fluidic

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oscillator detectors? If so, provide all conclusions as to why these systems are not used at Perry.

5-41. For containment H2 concentrations above 4 volume-%,

would the mixers accelerate combustion by providing a uniformly combustible atmosphere in the containment?

, If so, is the mixing system shut off when the H2 con-centration reaches a certain value? At what value?

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' 7c 5-42. -Provide offsite radiation doses (whole body and thyroid) to the public at 2, 5, 10, and 50 miles from PNPP Pe'sulting from containment purge following each of the

' accidents listed in interrogatory 5-26.

5-43. Have Applicants considered other hydrogen control measures (e.g., containment inerting, post-accident inerting, halon suppressents in the containment atmosphere, use of sodium metavanadate (NaV0 3 ) in the coolant to in-hibit H2 production from the radiolysis of water) for Perry ? List all measures which were considered and indicate why they were not chosen. '

. 5-44. SECY-80-107A contains view-graphs presented by General Electric to the NRC which state that containment inerting, l

hydrogen ignition, recombiners, and purging are all impractical for significant rates of H2 production.

Do Applicants agree? If not, why not?

5-45. The NRC has stated that hydrogen control methods that do not-involve burning provide protection for a wider spectrum of accidents than do those that involve burning. 46 FR'62282. Do Applicants agree? If not, why not?

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0 5-46. NUREG/CR-1561 at 12 states that recombiners are inadequate for controlling hydrogen generated by metal-water reactions.

Do Applicants agree? If not, why not?

5-47. Could the ignition of hydrogen by the glow plugs pro-duce missiles that could damage the containment or any equipment therein? Provide documentation showing that this could not happen.

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" A 'i 5-48. What methods do Applicants intend to use for the removal of the heat of combustion from containment when using the igniters and recombiners?

5-49. Have Applicants performed any analyses of the type which would be required by the proposed rule, " Interim Require-ments Related to Hydrogen Control," 46 FR 62281, December 23, 19817 Produce all such analyses.

5-50. Describe the design of the high point vents required for the reactor coolant system by 10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)(iii).

Provide diagrams, as appropriate. Into what area would the gases released by the vents enter and/or accumulate? -

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5-51. What is the ultimate strength of the Mark III containment?

Of the drywell?

5-52. 'Has the assessment of containment strength considered both static and dynamic loads? List all assumptions made in this evaluation.

5-53. Has the assessment of containment strength considered containment penetrations as possible points of rupture?

If not, why not?

5-54. Is the assessment of containment strength based on any experimental data? Produce all studies supporting the

containment analysis.

5-55. Could overpressure from hydrogen production alone (no explosion) be sufficient to rupture the containment?

Provide documentation showing that this could not happen.

5-56. Describe the pressure and temperature transients which would be experienced by the containment from the com-plete combustion of the following concentrations of hydrogen (vol-%, assume abundant oxygen):

(a) 4%

(b) 6%

(c) 9%

(d) 12%

(e) 18%

(f) 24%

(g) 33%

5-57. Are the results given above based on any experimental

' data or studies specific to either the Perry or the -

generic Mark III containment? Produce all such studies.

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5-58. List any assumptions made in the preparation of such

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humidity or the effect of containment structures and

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equipment on flame fronts.

5-59. What is the capacity, in scfm, of the mixers?

5-60. Would blowdown through the suppression pool, either through the safety-relief valves or through overpressure in the drywell ( e . g. , large break in drywell) exceed the capacity of the mixers? Provide documentation that this

would not happen.

5-61. Would direct leakage from the drywell to the containment (bypassing'the suppression pool) exceed the~ capacity of the mixers? Provide documentation showing that this could not happen.

5-62. From what area in the containment do the recombiners take suction? Could direct drywell-to-containment leakage l .

, ;_ dissipate hydrogen outside this r'egion? .. Provide documentation showing that this could not happen.

5-63. What pressure head does the mixer compressor create?

5-64. Would the drywell-to-containment differential pressure ever be great enough (e.g., af ter upper pool dump) that the mixer compressor head is insufficient to clear the upper suppression pool vents? Provide documentation showing that this could not happen.

5-85. Would the recombiner exhausts product " hot spots" which .

could adversely affect the containment or equipment therein?

Provide documentation showing that this would not happen.

( 5-66. Are the analyzers capable.of measuring hydrogen concentration '

in a steam atmosphere? Up to what volume-% steam?

5-67. Is there any interlock in the circuitry for starting the r'ecombiners or igniters which requires that the contain-ment spray be operating first?

t 5-68. Do Applicants intend to initiate H2 control only after LOCAs and not transient accidents? If so, justify this in light of the fact that transient sequences are sig-i nificant contributors to the risk of containment failure du.e to hydrogen explosions (see Table 5-4 of NUREG/CR-t

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1659, Volume 4). ,

5-69. List all documents relied upon in answering the above i;

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interrogatories, and list the persons responsible for the' answers, along with their professional qualifications.

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..c Respectfully submitted,

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Susan L. Hiatt

- OCRE Representative tri c c+ -

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8275 Munson Rd.

'. Mentor, OH 44060

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00LKETED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I'#

This is to certify that copies of the forshihg 0 CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATOR ES, TO APPLICANTS were served by deposit in the .U.SrffM&19. %h class, those on the service list below.

Susan L. Hiatt s

........1'----"__._.

SERVICE LIST Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Daniel D. Wilt, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P.O. Bo'x 08159 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Cleveland, OH 44108 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D. C. 20555 Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Comm'n '

Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commin Washington, D. C. 20555 Stephen H. Lewis, Esq.

Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Washington, D.C. 20555 Jay Silberg, Esq.

1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

_.. ._ __