ML20027A913
| ML20027A913 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 10/13/1982 |
| From: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027A873 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8209150030 | |
| Download: ML20027A913 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES
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e OF ICE OF THE October 13, 1982 COMMISSIONER Executive Dirq toh for Operations MEMORANDUM FOR:
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SUBJECT:
AEOD REPORT O ARKANSAS UNIT 1 OVERFILL EVENT This case study appears to have identified two potentially significant deficiencies in the design of Arkansas Unit 1 and possibly other B&W plants, namely:
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The plant may not be able to withstand OTS$
l overfill transients whiche if confirmed, wouldi
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indicate that GDC-13, -54)and-57havenotbeeh',
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n During these transients, operator action is required in about two minutes to avoid water carryover into the main steam lines.
AEOD concluded that requiring proper operator diagnosis and mitigative action in this time frame is not acceptable.
I would appreciate your providing me NRR's comments on these two findings.
Given that the overfilling of steam generators tends to create a larger heat sink on the secondary side, I also would like an assessment of the implication of the second finding for pressurized thermal shock of the reactor vessel.
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Chairman Palladino Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine OPE SECY Rec'd Off. EDO vmi.':.P.U.M[0 -/Y Date
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OFF6CE OF THE October-13, 1982 CoMMISSIONE R
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Executive Dir tohforOperations FROM:
John Ahearne
SUBJECT:
AEOD REPORT O ARKANSAS UNIT 1 OVERFILL EVENT This case study appears to have identified two potentially significant deficiencies in the design of Arkansas Unit 1 and possibly other B&W plants, namely:
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The plant may not be able to withstand OTSd i
overfill transients which if confirmed, would; i
indicate that GD'C-13, -54 and -57 have not be i,
met, and 5
During these transients, operator action is required in about two minutes to avoid water carryover into the main steam lines.
AEOD concluded that requiring proper operator diagnosis and mitigative action in this time frame is not acceptable.
I would appreciate your providing me NRR's comments.on these two findings.
Given that the overfilling of steam generators tends to create a larger heat sink on the secondary side, I also would like an assessment of the implication of the second finding for pressurized thermal shock of the reactor vessel.
cc:
Chairman Palladino
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Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts s
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Commissioner Asselstine,
OPE SECY Rec'd Off. EDO lb 'lY~E1---
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