ML20027A910
| ML20027A910 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Seabrook |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1982 |
| From: | Lear G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027A704 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-406 NUDOCS 8209100286 | |
| Download: ML20027A910 (7) | |
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DISTRIBUTI0ft Docket File AUG 2 41982 j
HGEB Reading I
.:j Docket flos. 50-443/444
!! Ell 0RA!!DUtl FOR: Franl: J. fliraglia, Chief j
Licensing Branch flo. 3 Division of Licensing a
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James P. Vafght, Assistant Director for Components and Structures Engineering Division of Engineering FR0!!:
George Lear, Chief llydrologic and Geotechnical Engineering Branch j
Division of Engineering 3
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SUBJECT:
IlYDROLOGIC E!1GIi!EERIf;G IllPUT TO TIIE FIllAL j
EllVIR0!!!!E!!TAL STATEl!EfiT b
Plant flame: Seabrook fluclear Power Station Docket tiumbers: 50-443/444 i
Licensing Stage: OL l
Responsible Branch:
LB-3, L. Ilheeler, LPf!
Requested Completion Date: August 18, 1982 i
i In your memorandum dated August 2,1982 you requested liGEB staff response to coment fill-1 on the Seabrook DES. Additionally, on August 12, 1982 i
Accident Evaluation Branch requested our assistance in responding to some comments originally assigned to them by your menorandum of July 12, 1982.
It is due to the lateness of these requests that our input did not meet your requested date.
I Our input is provided in Enclosure 1.
!!e have responded to the coment from the State of tiew 11ampshire (f!!i-1) in four separate responses. Our subdivision of the coment is shown in Enclosure 2.
Additionally, we agree with coment A-38 and request that you change the text on page 5-62 of the DES, paragraph 1 to reference FSAR Figures 2.5-12 and 2.5-14.
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This review was performed by Richard Codell, who can be reached on extension 28018.
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d Enclosure l' Hydrologic Engineering Section Hydrologic & Geotechnical Engineering Branch Responses to Comments on DES Seabrook Nuclear Plant, Docket Hos. 50-443/444 A.
State of New Hampshire _, NH-la, and Department of Health and Human Services, HHS-3 The staff presentation of liquid pathway analyses for hypothetical severe accidents in the Seabrook Draft Environmental Statement is given in less detail than the analyses for the accidental airborne release consequences.
The primary reasons that the staff chooses to present the liquid pathway analyses in this fashion are stated in section 5.9.4.5(5) of the DES, Releases to Groundwater, namely:
1.
Human health consequences of liquid pathway releases, even without interdiction or mitigation, have been shown in almost all cases to be much smaller than the commensurate airborne pathway consequences.
2.
There is usually much more opportunity to reduce the impacts of the liquid pathway releases, either by isolating the source or denying ~
usages of the affected water.
3.
Although the consequences and impacts of liquid pathway releases are known to be generally much smaller than those for the airbor'ne pathways, the analysis for the liquid pathway is at least as dif ficult.
Data needed for the liquid pathway analysis are often lacking or of e
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poor quality, and frequently limit the precision to wdich the calculations Furthermore, it is sometimes virtually impossible can be performed.
to collect meaningful data on ground water until all construction activities at the plant have been finished and the water table has reached equilibrium.
For these reasons, the staff has chosen to perform liquid pathway analyses using an abbreviated methodology by which the Seabrook Site was compared to
. m The the generic sites in the " Liquid Pathway Generic Study," NUREG-0440.
staff used conservative, bounding parameters in simplified models to conservatively estimate population doses. The results for Seabrook were then compared to those for the LPGS sites.
The staff gathered the data from the available site information and from published reports on properties of geological material, but did not rely on preconstruction ground water gradients for the groundwater flow calculations.
The staff concluded that the liquid pathway consequences at the Seabrook site If the calculated were not unique, and that interdiction was possible.
population doses had been much (orders of magnitude) greater than populatio doses reported for the LPGS generic sites, and/or the site was not suitable for interdiction then further analyses of the liquid patnway consequences The staff concluded that further analyses were would have been initiated.
not necessary.
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NH-lb The staff does not imply that ground water interdiction would be Monitoring of ground water necessary after a core melt accident.
The movement following a severe meltdown accident would be prudent.
decision to take interdictive action to prevent or slow the migration of contaminated ground water to the biosphere could be made on the i
ba$1sofpost-accidentmonitoring.
days minimum travel time would apply '
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The conservatively-calculated 17 only to those radioactive constituents released from the core which The staff has would not be sorbed by the rock and soil of the aquifer.
determined that in t'he event of a core melt accident, virtually all of the dose from the liquid pathway would be sorbed and thereby retarded to For this reason, the staff a considerable extent in the aquifer.
estimates that several years would be available before the peak in the I
release of the most hazardous radionuclides to the marsh would occur, and that suitable interdiction measures could probably be taken if it In the case of basemat penetration were determined to be necessary.
without sump water release, still more time wo61d be available for interdiction because debris leaching would not begin until the debris had cooled sufficiently to allow contact with ground water, a time estimated to be at least several months to a year.
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estuary would af ewater, sediment, E
the the HHS 3 ground water toby contaminating inilUREG-0440, s.
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acnt of the the basis vel of radiationbe far l'elow tha On would ls.
the le ion i
, and animaconcluded that hway contaminatmost radiat on-ven the other than d water liquid patmeasurable fract of such release,to humans throu
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,;d) groun into Ossary to kil major impactsof the impact already been ta la ken species. The be in terms has hat nsitive would exposure, which staff concludes t from l
conomic impacts, of radiation estimates.
marsh eco ystems The s
l levels dose damage to incr easedin the populationno direct enviro of the land nmental account would be ation.
uses tamin tion liquid pathway co or denial of theiquid pathway con ntamin a
there ictions believe caused by restr of groundwater lstrong reaso cts because There is Economic impa marsh lated.
contamin ted grouomic losse s
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and waters explicitly calcu additional econ of the Furthemore, the interdiction might be no been not airborne have thert would be marsh, so thereby the liq thway.
ion from that the id it could reach marsh cau of sed d
because vere than the gro of contaminate ctly to the marsh no inte diction dire of the se r
more economic losswould probably if the be was re ven releases tion, e pathway contamina ground water.
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' The staff has identified in fiUREG-0440 and fiUREG/CR'-1596 potential-f ways by which migration of contaminated ground water can be interdicted 1
following a core melt accident. The fiRC is sponsoring research at
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j Argonne fiational Laboratories and Battelle-Pacific florthwest Laboratories e
1 on interdictive techniques. The staff's preliminary conclusion based '
on the research conducted so far is that ground water interdiction i
would be feasible at most sites.
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