ML20024J242

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Enforcement Conference Repts 50-254/94-24 & 50-265/94-24 on 940923.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Discussed:Corrective Actions Taken in Response to self-disclosing Event Re Two Failures to Adequately Implement Program
ML20024J242
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/03/1994
From: Creed J, Madeda T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20024J237 List:
References
50-254-94-24-EC, NUDOCS 9410130047
Download: ML20024J242 (9)


See also: IR 05000254/1994024

Text

.

. . .

-

..

- -

--

-.

. . _ .

. . . - .

.

. .

. -

.

_

,

.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.i

REGION III

l

t

Reports No. 50-254/94024(DRSS); 50-265/94024(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265

Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

Opus West III

'

1400 Opus Place

Downers Grove, IL 60515

-

Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station, Units I and 2

Meeting Conducted:

September 23, 1994, 12:30 p.m.

'

Meeting At: NRC Region III Office, Lisle, Illinois

!

Type of Meeting:

Enforcement Conference (Fitness-For-Duty Event)

'

/d -7

[

Inspector:

.

Dat4

' /

!

-

trry J. Madeda

hysical Security Inspector

.

Approved By:

,

mes R. Creed, Chief-

Date' '

e

~ afeguards & IR Section

'

Meetina Summary

,

Enforcement Conference on Seotember 23. 1994 (Reports No. 50-254/94024(DRSS):

50-265/94024(DRSS))

Areas Inspected:

Enforcement conference to include a review and discussion of

the circumstances involved, and corrective action taken in response to a self-

disclosing event pertaining to two apparent failures to adequately implement

the facility's fitness-for-duty program.

Results: The licensee did not contest the apparent violations. Corrective

'

actions were adequate.

,

,

!

,

h

9410130047 941003

i

PDR

ADOCK 05000.754

i

G

PDR

i

. . - .

- _ , . .

,

_.

.

-

.

--

!

-

s

.,

.

Rela 11S

,

!

1.

Key Persons Present at the Conference

Commonwealth Edison Company

J. Perry, Senior Vice President, BWR Operations, Comed

E. Kraft, Site Vice President, Quad Cities

J. Morris, Executive Assistant, Site Vice President

G. Campbell, Site Manager, Quad Cities

J. Kudaus, Site Services Director

K. Leech, Site Security Administrator

.

D. Winchester, Director, Site Quality Verificatien

N. Chrissotimos, Supervisor, Regulatory Assurance

R. Baumer, NRC Coordinator, Regulatory Assurance

L. Tucker, Technical Superintendent

P. Welsh, FFD Assistant Program Administrator

U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission

J. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region III

W. Axelson, Director, Division of Radiation Safety & Safeguards,

Region III

R. Capra, Director, Project Division III-2, NRR

C. Pederson, Chief, Reactor Support Programs Branch, Region III

J. Creed, Chief, Safeguards and IR Section, Region III

P. Hiland, Section Chief, Reactor Projects, Section IB, Region III

C. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector, Quad Cities, Region III

T. Madeda, Physical Security Inspector, Region III

P. Pelke, Enforcement Specialist, Region III

2.

Enforcement Conference

An Enforcement Conference was held in the NRC Region III office on

September 23, 1994, at 12:30 p.m..

The conference was conducted to

address two apparent violations pertaining to the inadequate

implementation of the Quad Cities Fitness-For-Duty Program. Our

inspection findings were documented in Inspection Reports No. 50-

254/94018(DRSS); 50-265/94018(DRSS) which were transmitted to the

licensee by letter dated September 7, 1994.

.

The purpose of the conference was to:

(1) discuss the apparent

violations, causes, and the licensee's corrective actions; (2) determine

if there were any escalating or mitigating factors; (3) obtain

information which would help determine the appropriate enforcement

action; and (4) provide any additional information deveioped subsequent

to the inspection noted above.

2

,

.-

.

Regional representatives presented a brief description of the pertinent

facts that led to the apparent violations, the regulatory requirements,

and potential safety significance of the event.

Licensee's representatives provided a description of the sequence of

events, the apparent violations, their safety significance, root cause

analysis and corrective actions.

The licensee concluded that the two

apparent violations discussed in our inspection report occurred because

of a failure to follow Quad Cities Fitness-For-Duty Procedures. The

following contributing factors were identified:

(1) limited review of

the appropriate procedure during the event; (2) site senior management

was misled by the Acting Operations Manager; (3) weak assessment of the

Acting Operations Manager's condition; and (4) operating activities that

had distracted the Shift Engineer from the fitness-for-duty issue.

Corrective actions were taken to address each referred are of failure.

Your agenda for the conference is attached as an enclosurt

, this

report.

Prior to the meeting, the licensee's review of Inspection Reports No.

50-254/94018 and 50-265/94018, dated September 7, 1994, identified on

pages 4 and 7 that the phrase "about 1:00 a.m." should be changed to

"12:30 a.m."

They also indicated that on page 8, paragraph 2, item 1,

the report incorrectly identified that a specific site procedure failed

to identify a time frame to conduct a for-cause test. We agreed that

the referenced section should have read that the specific site procedure

did not clearly denote the specific time period to conduct a for-cause

test.

The above changes were acknowledged.

Licensee representatives discussed mitigating factors which included

their self-identification of the event and apparent violations, prompt

corrective action and that the event had a minimal impact on plant

safety.

The licensee also concluded that the event was an isolated

occurrence and did not represent an overall breakdown of their fitness

for-duty program.

At the conclusion of the conference, the licensee representatives were

informed that they would be notified in the near future of final

enforcement actions.

,

.

3

,

.

.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1994

t

QUAD CITIES ENFORC1' MENT CONFERENCE

,

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY EVENT

.

AGENDA

1.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

. E. Kraft

...... ...

........

.

II.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND APPARENT VIOLATIONS

. ... K. Leech

III.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

. . G. Campbell

.. . .. ...

.

........

IV.

CAUSES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

. . . . . . . . . G. Campbell

.....

V.

CONCLUSIONS . .

. .G. Campbell

l

.... ........

.

....

.

t

,

i

1

1

.

ADM'JFDENFCF WPF

l

.

-

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1

Agenda

e

Initial Perspectives

-

Immediate Site Vice President involvement and initiation of extensive

investigation by Corporate Security.

-

Conduct of Operations Manager was unacceptable.

-

Actions of Shift Engineer did not meet management expectations or procedure

requirements.

)

-

Quad Cities Station and Nuclear Operations Division have taken aggressive

corrective and preventive actions.

,

i

i

.

ADMJTDENFCF.WPF

2

'

.

d

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY

l

'

II. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

7:52 PM

The Shift Engineer called the Operations Manager to inform him of a problem

with the Unit 2 main transformer. The Unit 2 transformer suffered a complete

loss of its cooling fans, and when the cooling fans could not be restored within

a half hour, a rapid load drop was initiated to remove the transformer from

service.

-

,

,

'

8:30 PM

The (acting) Operations Manager called the Shift Engineer for further

discussion and an update on the transformer problem. The Operations Manager

infonned the Shift Engineer that he is coming into the station to provide

assistance. (The Shift Engineer did not request that the Operations Manager

come to the plant.)

,

9:03 PM

The Operations Manager arrived at the station and entered

the protected area.

9:09 PM

The Operations Manager entered the control room.

9:09-

The Operations Manager came in contact with the Unit Supervisors, the Shift

10:10

Engineer, and the unit nuclear station operator and these individuals smelled

alcohol on the breath of the Operations Manager.

9:31

The emergency telephone rang in the control room informing them of a man

'

down in the toms. An ambulance was called to the plant.

9:50 PM

The Unit Supervisors approached the Shift Engineer about

the smell of alcohol on the Operations Manager's breath.

'

10:10-

The Shift Engineer and the on<oming Shift Engineer worked on the shift

10:30

turnover in the Shift Engineer's Office.

10:30 PM The Shift Engineer confronted the Operad9ns Manager in

the Shift Engineer's office (outside the control room) about

this matter. The Operations Manager admitted to having a

beer.

10:44

The Operations Manager re-entered the control room.

ADMiFFDENFCF.WPF

3

i

.

,,_ ,

.

'

.

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY

II. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued)

10:52 PM The Shift Engineer reviewed the for-cause-test

determination guidelines in the applicable procedure and

called the Station Manager. The Station Manager agreed

that a "for-cause" test needed to be done.

-

11:04

The Operations Manager exited the control room and proceeded to his office

with the Shift Engineer. They discussed the for-cause test that needed to be

completed. The Operations Manager indicated that he wanted to complete

some tasks.

I1:20

The Shift Engineer returned to his office to discuss the main transformer

problem with the relief Shift Engineer and to complete shift logs.

12:00-

The on-coming Shift Engineer discussed the transformer fix with the

12:15

Operations Manager in the Operations Manager's office.

12:30

The Station Manager called in to see what the status of the "for-cause" test

was. The test had not been performed yet. The Station Manager told the Shift

Engineer to get the test done.

1:08

The Shift Engineer and Operations Manager exited the protected area to have

the test conducted.

1:15 AM

The "for-cause" testing began.

2:01 AM

The "for-cause" testing was completed.

,

2:05

The Security Supervisor notified the Security Administrator of the test results.

ADM'JTDENFCF.WPF

4

O

e

i

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY

II. APPARENT VIOLATIONS

1)

Licensee did not test-for-cause as soon as possible in accordance with 10 CFR 26.24.a.3 after receiving credible information that an individual is abusing alcohol.

Comed acknowledges that the test was not conducted within the one hour

period set forth in station procedures. The determination to test-for-cause was

made within the one hour period set forth in station procedures.

2)

Impaired workers, or those whose fitness may be questionable, shall be removed from

activities within the scope of 10 CFR 26.27.b.1, and may be returned only after the

'

individual is determined to be fit to safely and competently perfonn activities.

Comed acknowledges that the Operations Manager was not removed from

activities prior to testing. The Shift Engineer had observed no aberrant

behavior and had been told by the Operations Manager thtt he had consumed

only one beer. As a result, the Shift Engineer did not believe that the

Operations Manager was a threat to plant safety.

i

i

ADMiFFDENFCF.WPF

5

.

-

.

,

.

4

&

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY

III. SAFETY SIGNIFICA.NCE

Plant activities were properly controlled by licensed personnel throughout the event.

Although the Operations Manager was in the protected area unescorted throughout the

event, he did not direct actions affecting plant conditions, and by observation and the

information available at the time to the Shift Engineer, the Shift Engineer determined

that the Operations Manager posed no threat to the safety of the Station.

'

Although the desired result was achieved in identifying and dispositioning the FFD

issue, failure to follow procedures concerning timeliness of testing, and candor and

judgement of Operations Manager are issues of significant management concern.

i

i

ADM'JTDENFCF.%TF

6

-

t

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY

IV. CAUSES

APPARENT ROOT CAUSE OF BOTH VIOLATIONS IS:

A failure to follow the Quad Cities Station Fitness-for-Duty procedure.

.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Shift Engineer did not consult the entire procedure during the event.

Shift Engineer was misled by Operations Manager in that he stated that he only had

pm beer.

Shift Engineer's assessment that the Operations Manager was not a threat to plant

safety was based upon observations and misleading statements provided by the

Operations Manager.

Operational conditions and events created distractions for the Shift Engineer,

including a Unit 2 transformer transient and recovery; a medical emergency,

including the possible declaration of an Unusual Event based on the medical

emergency; and the need to provide a thorough shift turnover to the oncoming shift

(based on the events of the evening and current plant conditions).

ADM\\FFDENFCF.WPF

7

1

7

_

___ __---__ --

,

1

I

d

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

1)

Immediate and Near Term Actions included:

e

Operations Manager:

-

immediately denied site access;

,

-

removed from position, and following confirmation of test results;

-

the individual resigned from Comed.

Quad Cities personnel, including licensed shift personnel, received

e

supplemental FFD training from Site V.P. and/or Station Manager on all

aspects of the FFD program, with emphasis on:

-

for-cause test determinations

-

response to odor of alcohol

-

escort requirements

-

time requirements for testing

-

instruction for reporting to work

Shift Engineer was counselled by Station Manager. The Shift Engineer

e

subsequently reviewed the FFD Policy and Lessons-Learned from the event

with all other Shift Engineers.

2)

Programmatic and LAng Term Actions:

FFD training has been reviewed for adequacy and was determined to be

e

satisfactory.

Chief Nuclear Officer has communicated this event in writing to all Nuclear

e

Division Employees, with emphasis on FFD expectations. This

communication and expectations has been incorporated into our training.

ADM'JFDENFCF.WPF

8

I

1L

.-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-

..

- . . .

e

t

9

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY

,

V. CONCLUSIONS

e

The event was identified, reported in a timely manner, and comprehensively

investigated and corrected by Quad Cities Station.

,

,

Although FFD Program procedural requirements were not implemented in a timely

e

fashion, an overall FFD Program breakdown did not occur.

,

The determination of the need for testing was timely.

-

-

Testing was completed and unfitness for duty was properly determined.

6

-

At all times, plant activities were properly controlled during the event, and

overall actions by Operations personnel were reasonable in real time,

e

Aggressive management action was taken to correct the conditions which led to the

event and to prevent recurrence.

l

,

t

'

,

a

.

,

t

.

l

f

,

.

1

1

ADMiFTDr.NFCF.WPF

9

,

.-

. - , , . . - , , , , - ,

-

-

,,,

, , . .

,-.

, , .