ML20024G631

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Insp Rept 50-263/75-08 on 750423 & 24.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Const Specs,Visual Exam,Maint & Mod Procedures,Response to IE Bulletins 75-04 & 75-04A, Separation Criteria & Self Contained Breathing Equipment
ML20024G631
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/08/1975
From: Dance H, Maura F
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20024G627 List:
References
50-263-75-08, 50-263-75-8, IEB-75-04, IEB-75-4, NUDOCS 9102130517
Download: ML20024G631 (7)


See also: IR 05000263/1975008

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

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Report of Operations Inspection

IE Inspection Report No. 050-203/75-08

Licensee:

N>rthern States Power Company

414 Nicollet Mall

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

License No. DPR-22

Monticello, Minnesota

Category:

C

Type of Licensee:

BWR (GE) 545 MWe

Type of Inspection:

Special Announced

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Dates of Inspection:

Apri1+23 and 24,- 1975

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Dates of Previous Inspection:

April 2-4, 1975 (Radiological and

Environmental Protection Branch)

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Principal Inspector:

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Accompanying Inspectors:

None

Other Accompanying Personnel:

None

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Reviewed By:

H. Dance

Senior Reactor Inspector

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Reactor Operations Branch

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9102130517 750509

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. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

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Enforcement Action

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None.

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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters

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Not inspected.

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Unusual occurrences

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None.

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Other Significant Findings

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A.

Current Findings

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None.

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B.

Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items

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Not inspected.

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Management Interview

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A management interview was conducted with Messrs. Larson, Plant Manager;

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Clarity, Superintendent Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection;

Anderson, Superintendent Operations and haintenance; and members of the

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licensee's staff at the conclusion of the inspection on April 24, 1975.

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A.

The inspector stated that none of the penetrations appear to have the

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approximate 2" thickness of Flamemastic stated by a Bechtel Corporation

letter dated March 25, 1975.

In fact some penetrations only have

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Flamemastic coating only a few mils thich.

In view that the licensee

no longer uses Flamemastic, but Pyrocreta n Carboline product for which

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a minimum thickness of k" is recommendoo, the inspector requested

that the licensee review the Bechtel's recommendation, reach a

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conclusion as to the required thickness, and implement a program

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to upgrade the present thermal barrier for all electrical penetrations.

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The licensee agreed to proceed with such a program.

(Paragraph 3,

Report Details)

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B.

The inspector noted that, using core spray pumps No. 11 and 12 as examples,

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it appears that the separation criteria outlined in the FSAR for cables

routed through the cable spreading room is being met.

llowever, due to

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the lack of cable identification in the room considerably more effort

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would be required to confirm the condition.

(Paragraph 6, Report Details)

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C.

The inspector stated that a review of the scif contained breathing

equipment at the site, ,in light of the problems experienced at another

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f acility, revealed thrit the licensee should consider:

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Whether an adequate supply of air to refill used containers

exi .'s and where to obtain refills af ter normal working hours,

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specially during weekends.

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2.

Training personnel, specially the members of the emergency or

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fiai teams in the use ot the Scott Rescue Pak.

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The licensee stated the capabilitics of the Monticello, Anoka, and St.

Cloud Fire Departments in supplying breathing air refills to the site

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will be determined. Also a training pronram in the use of the Scott

Rescue Pak will be carried out.

(Paragraph 7, Report Details)

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D.

The inspector requested and the licensee agreed to generate guidelines

to be used.by the station on how to fight all types of fires end in

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particular when to use water on electrical fires.

(Paragraph 8.b,

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Report Details)

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REPORT DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted

C. Larson, Plant Manager

M. Clarity, Superintendent, Plant Engineering and Radistion Protection

W. Anderson, Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance

D. Antony, Plant Engineer, Operations

H. Nimmo, Maintenance Supervisor

M. Hammer, Instrument Engineer

R. Perry, Engineer

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2.

Construction Specifications

The specifications available at the site consisted of Bechtel Dwg M-636

Revision 0, issued for construction on February 13, 1970 and recent

correspondence between the licensee and Bechtel Corporation.

For all

typical penetrations shown in Drawing M-636 Revision 0, the sealing

material specified was polyurethane covered on both sides with Flamemastic

71A of unspecif$ed thickness. The polyurethane used was made by

Instafoam Products, Inc., and has a trade name Insta Foam Froth Pah.

According to a recent letter (March 25, 1975) from Bechtel Corporation

the Flamemastic thickness was apprcximately 2 inches.

The licensee

has recently switched from Flamemastic to Pyrocrete 102, a Carboline

product, as thermal barrier. Carboline recommends a minimum thickness

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gm

,of 1/4; inch.

In addition to the consttuction drawings the FSAR, Section 8,

describes the routing and physical barriers used to separate and

protect redundant channels or systems.

3.

Visual Examination

The inspector verified that:

All cable penetrations have been s:aled as required.

a.

b.

The control room end of the penetrations have been reinspected by

the licensee and where required a new coating of pyrocrete has been

applied. The thickness appears to exceed 1/4 inch.

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In the cable spreading room most penetrations are covered with

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Flamemastic, but a few show areas where the urethane is visible.

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Where applied the Flamemastic thickness appears to range f rom a

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thin coating up to approximately 1/2 inch.

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In the rea tor building most of the penetrations of esbles going

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to the cable spreading room had very thin Flamemastic coating in

the order of a few mile.

Specifically penetrations P-117 thru

P-120 had little 6r no thermal barrier covering the polyurethane

9ealing material,

The same typical deficiencies noted before existed in the turbine

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building penetrations,

In the battery room it was noted that all cables are enclosed

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in donduit and the penetrations are covered by conduit termin-

ating in metal junct' ion boxes.

Spare penetrations are filled with polyurethane and covered with

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Flamemastic.

Smoke detectors are installed in the cable spreading room and

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annunciate in the control room.

The detectors are supplied with

non-interruptible 120 V AC power,

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A Cardox system does not exist at the site.

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4.

Maintenance and Modification Procedures

The licensee does not have procedures which specifically cover how a

penetration is to be made, scaled or repaired. The licensee stated

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procedures for a particular job would b developed as needed and in

accordance with their Administrative' Con, col Directives No. 3ACD 4.2

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Revision 1, Design Change Installation Procedure; and No. 3ACD 4.3

The

Revision 1 Design Change Preoperational/ Operational Testing.

licensee did state that the Task Force will be considering the prepar-

ation of a specific procedure to cover the scaling and/or repair of

cable penetrations. The inspector verified that the licensee has

modified his list of critical equipment (AW1 3.6.1 Revision 2) to

include cabic penetrations in order to require a second Icvel of review

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by plant management prior to the performance of any work on the

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penetrations.

5.

Response to IE Bulletins 75-04 and 75-04A

The licensee had prepared a draft response to IE Bulletin 75-04 and

had submitted it to his HO.

He was not aware whether the response

had been mailed to IE, and if any changes had been made to the draft.

Regarding Bulletin 75-04A the licensee was forming a Task Force to

look into the Browns Ferry fire and the requirements of th, Bulletins.

The members of the Task Force bad not been named as of the time of

our inspection, therefore, the licensee's ef fort in the arets

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covered by IFB 75-04A were yet to commence.

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6.

Separation criteria

The inspector attempted to physically determinu whether the separation

criteria outlined in the FSAR Section 8 had been applied.

Core

spray pumps No. 11 and' 12 control cahics were utilized as examples.

Through the use of cable tray number s, cable routing lists, etc.

the path of each cable f rom the cont ol room to the Rx Building was

traced

Physically, once the cabics leave the control room, there

is no marking which identifies the dif ferent cables found in each

tray. Therefore, it can only be stated that if the cables follow

the path noted in the reviewed drawings and schedules, then the

separation criteria stated in the FSAR was met.

7.

Self Contained Breathing Equipment

A review of the licensee's equipment available to enter areas of

heavy smoke showed that:

There are six (6) Scott Air Packs and two (2) Scott Rescue

a.

Paks at the site.

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b.

Each air pack can supply breathing alc for approximately 20

ainutes and each rescue pack for approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />,

There are six (6) breathing air cylinders used to refill the

c.

air bottles. Three were empty at the time of the inspection.

Approximately 2 air pack bottles can be refilled out of each

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large cylinder, so that at the time of the inspection approxi-

taately 4 main-hours of working time ver Pavailable.

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d.

The large cylinders are obtained at a commarcial place located

in St. Cloud (approximately 30 miles) or in Anoka (approximately

25 miles) and can be obtained only during normal working

hours.

Although the licensee maybe abic to refill the air cylinders

c.

at the Monticello, St. Cloud or Anoka. Fire Departments no

agreements exist with the Fire Departments for such service

nor has the licensee determined to what degree such capability

may exist.

f.

For the Rescue Paks the licensee maintains ten (10) spare

filters and two (2) oxygen bottles.

Therefor 2, approximately

16 man-hours of use time were availabic.

g.

Most plant personnel have been trained in the us.

f the Scott

Air Packs, but very few in the use of the Rescue lak.

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8.

Additionni Findi g

Although no procedt.res exist stating how penetration leaks are

a.

identified the licensee stated that no flame is ever used in

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the location of Icak , instead they use a smoke generator.

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b.

No procedures or guidelines presently exist covering how to

fight the different clacscs of fire which may occur at the

site.

A famability test of new polyurethane was conducted on April 23,

c.

1975, by the licensee and inspector. The results were:

(1) The two fluids which comprise the Insta Form Froth Pak by

themselves did not sustain combustion,

(2)

the properly mixed solid polyurethane did not sustain

combustion, but,

(3)

an improperly mixed, solid polyurethane, which resu1*ed

when a defective valve in one of the canisters faile- to

operate properly, did sustain combustion.

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