ML20024G106
| ML20024G106 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1975 |
| From: | Dance H, Kohler J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024G105 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-75-01, 50-263-75-1, NUDOCS 9102070536 | |
| Download: ML20024G106 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000263/1975001
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COFDilSSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULA ?ORY OPERATIONS
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REGION III
Report of Operations Inspection
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IE Inspection Report No. 050-263/75-01
Licensee:
Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, Minnesota
55401
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
License No. DPR-22
Monticello, Minner.ota
Category:
C
Type of Licensee:
Type of Inspection:
Routine, Announced
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Dates of Inspection:
January 15 - January 17, 1975
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Dates'of Previous" Inspection:
December 26-27,1974 (REP)
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Principal Inspector:
J . E. Kohler
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(Date)
Accompanying Inspector:
H. C. Dance
Other Accompanying Personnel:
None
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Reviewed By:
H. C. Dance
Senior Reactor Inspector
'(Da't e )
Reactor Operations Branch
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9102070536 750212
ADOCK 05000263
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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Enforcement Action
The following noncompliance item was noted during the inspection.
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Violations:
None.
Infractions
Technical Specification 6.5.C. states that detailed written procedures,
including the applicable check-off and instructions, chall be prepared
and followed for preventive or corrective maintenance of plant equipment
and systems that could have an effect on nucicar safety.
Contrary to the above, detailed written procedures had not been prepared
for the inspection and repair of the "A" Loop Residual Heat Removal Heat
Exchanger in progress on January 17, 1975.
This infraction was identified by the inspector and had the potential
for causing or contributing to an occurrence with safety significance.
Deficiencies: None.
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Items:
Not applicable.
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Unusual Occurrences:
None.
Other Significant Findings: None.
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.anatemert Interview
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At the conclusion of the inspection the inspectors met with Messrs. C.
Laraon, Plant Manager: M. Clarity, Superintendent Plant Engineering and
Radiation Protection: W. Anderson, Superintendent Operations and Main-
tenance; and D. Antony, Plant Engineer, Operat ' >ns; and discussed the
following:
1.
The inspector stated that the failure to have a procedure detailing
repair plans of the No. 11 RHR Heat Exchanger was considered an
inf raction to Technical Specifications 6.5.C.
The licensee indicated
corrective action would be taken.
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2.
The inspector stated that review of the May 1974 startup check-
sheets did not indicate if identified abnormalities had been
corrected, such an locking requited valves or by issuance of
WRA's.
The review also indicated revisions may be in order for
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several checksheets. The licensee stated that data sheets are
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completed and reviewed within the guidelines provided in Operations
Manual Volume C.1.
The licensee indicated a review would be made
of the checksheets in view of the above comments.
3.
The inspectors discussed with the licensee preliminary comments per-
taining to the proposed standardized technical specifications for
engineered safety feature filtration systems.
The licensee plans
to submit his comments to the Directorate of Licensing.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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C. Larson, Plant Manager
M. Clarity, Superintendent, Plant Engineering and Radiation Protection
W. Anderson, Superintendent, Operation and K11ntenance
W. Sparrow, Operations Supervisor
W. Shamla, Plant Engineer, Technical
D. Nevinski, Engineer
J. Henage, Engineer
D. Antony, Plant Engineer, Operations
B. Day, Engineer
J. Pasch, Engineer
L. Eliason, Radiation Protection Engineer
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P. Krumpus, Quality Assurance Engineer
D. Shea, NUS Corporation
L. Lieber, General Elcetric Company
J. Zilinski, General Electric Company
2.
Present Plant Status
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The Monticello Generating Station is. presently shutdown for
refueling and inspection of Jet Pumps, 4 inch recirculation
This refueling outage was
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piping, and feedwater spargers.,Ed, because+ fuel" performance...va-
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earlier than had been anticipat
as indicated by higher than normal off-gas release rates',
required lower power operation to minimize fuel deterioration.
Presently the core consists of three types of fuel assemblies.
They are the original 7 x 7 fuel, improved 7 x 7 fuel with
champhored pellet design, and the new 8 x 8 matrix fuel.
The
core contained 116 8 x 8 fuel assemblies prior to the present
refueling outage, and 80 additional 8 x 8 fuel assemblies are
scheduled to be inserted in the core to replace leaking or orig-
Burnup on the lead asacably as of January 9, 1975, was
inal fuel.
about 15,000 mwd /t, while the average burnup was about 13,897 mwd /t.
Detection of leaking fuel assemblies was done in the fuel storage
Because
pool by sipping and analyzing the coolant for Xe-136.the end of the
the fuel sipping investigation was not completed at
inspection, the following information was obtained from the
licensee by telephone on January 24, 1975:
A total of 54 fuct assemblica (all 7 x 7) were identified as
a.
Of these 54 assemblies, 42 were positively ident-
leaking.
ified as leaking, giving a full scale reading on radiation
monitoring equipment, and 12 assemblies were suspected of
leaking.
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b.
The configuration of the core at the end of the present
refueling outage, January, 1975, will be 168 of the
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o-iginal 7 x 7 fuel assemblies, 20 of the improved 7 x 7
fuel, and 196 of the 8 x 8 fuel assemblies.
The earliest date at which the entire core will be composed
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of 8 x 8 fuel is scheduled to be Septemocr, 1975.
3.
Reactor Refuelinn Activities
The inspector verified that Technical Specifications 3.10 and
a.
4.10 were incorporated in the detailed procedures in use for
the refueling outage,
b.
The Shif t Supervisor's Log and Control Room Log was reviewed
from January 9 to January 15, 1975.
No deficiencies were noted.
Drywell deinerting was noted to have been initiated as permitted
by technical specifications prior to the reactor shutdown. On
January 13, 1975, the fuel handling gripper was noted to b
e
been successfully tested with a simulated 1,500 lb. load,
The normal vertilation system was maintaining secondary con-
c.
tainment in the reaccor building by drawing a vacuum of at
least .25 inches water gauge differential pressure. The
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standby-gan treatment system was successfully tested on
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January 10, 1975, prios to the present. outage, as called for
in Technical Specification 4.7.C.1.d.
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procedures were reviewed confirmir,c th:.t the refueling
interlocks were successfully tested on JaL aary 13, 1975.
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The inspector confirmed that the control room was in constant
communication with personnel perfortaing the refueling opera-
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tions through telephone and Di radio,
f.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's method of progranming
fuel aasembly moves during the refueling.
The fuel moves
planned were determined by members of the nucicar technical
staff. The fuel movement procedure was then checked by a
computer program that verified the configuration of fuel in
the core and the fuel storage pool.
The program was abic
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to detect any logic errors. This was demonstrated during
the inspection. Once the logic for a particular fuel move
was accepted h/ the computer, it van printed cut in copien
of four, and became the master procedure used on the
refueling bridge, defining the nequence of fuel assembly
moves to take place. Logic of the sequence of fuel troves
was independently verified by two members of the nuclear
technical staff prior to approval,
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The inspectors verified that the core was accurately identified
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schematic diagrams located on the refueling floor, and
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in the nucicar staff office. All fuel movement done on tha
refueling bridge was followed in the control room with an
identica.1 fuel movement procedure list.
Fuel inspec'tions of designated assemblies were performed by
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members of the Cencral Electric Company. Visual inspection
of individual fuel rods as well as eddy current and ultrasonic
testing of selected f uel rods was being performed.
1.
The inspectors verified that fuel sipping activities, to
determine Icaking ! ;' assemblies, was perf ormed in accord-
How-
ance with approved fuel sipping procedures No. 9008a.
ever, no acceptance criteria was set to establish tbc lower
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limit of marginal leaking fuel assemblies.
The licensee had prescheduled all activ'ities expected during
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the outage and was updating daily the activities for the next
three days. Review of the major maintenance activities estab-
lished that procedures existed f or the bulk of activities,
such as required surveillancs tests. safety /rcifef valve
pilot and in-place leakage tests, and control rod drive over-
haul.
An exception was noted in the case of the No. 11 RHR
Heat Exchanger inspection to determine cause of internal
leakage. No procedure existed describing the proposed plan
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of inspection or repair. Discussion with supervisory person-
nel established that a vendor's manus 1 and drawing were7e*
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available and a verbal plan of approach was established.
The
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heat exchanger is manuf actured by Perfiex and is of a two pass
floating head design.
The Work kcqucst Authorization listed
the valve positioning and tag requirements, but no other require-
ment cuch c.s testing.
The absence of a maintenance procedure
is contrary to Technical Specification 6.5.C which requiren
detailed written procedures to bc prepared and followed for
prevention or corrective maintenance of plant equipment and
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systems that could have an ef fect on nuclear safety.
4.
The inspectors confirmed the following activities during refueling:
Core monitoring in the control room during refueling operations
a.
in accordance with Technical Specification 3.10(b) and 4.10(b).
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b.
Containment integrity was main *ained in accordance with
Technical Specification 3.8.C defining the requirements for
maintaining secondary containment integrity.
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c.
Fuel movement of at least two fuel bundles was conducted
in accordance with established procedure specified by the
cottputer printed fuel movement sequence list.
d.
Core internals, Icads, and vessel studs were stored to pro-
tect ar,ainst damage,
llousekeeping on the refueling deck and bridge as well ar.
c.
radiation protection requirements were acceptable.
f,
in accordance with Technical Specification 6.1.C the coniposition
of the crew on the ref ueling deck and in the cont rol room
was acceptable,
n.
In accordance wit h Technical Spacification "l.10.C f uel pool
storane water level was inaintained at a level of at least
33 feet.
h.
As required by Technicial Specification 3.10.A the reactor node
switch vac locked in the ref uel position during the refueling.
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Control blade reinoval checks were confirtned to be included
on the fuel novement sequence sheets.
5.
Startun ,Proced,urey
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The inspector confirmed"that selected startup procedures were com '
pleted in mid May 1974, the previous refuelinp outate.
The systems
confirmed were the recirculat ion, nuclear instrumentation, condensate
and f eedwater, control reid drive, and the core spray.
Several
notations of snecific plant status were noted on the procedures
and check lists reviewed, but no nathod uas available to confirm that
the anomalics had been corrected or revisionr. to the data t.heets
made. The licensee indicated this area would be reviewed.
The
licensee also indicated that similar system checks are performed
durint refuelinn outages, et.rrently in progrees, to estahlinh that
system lineups are proper.
In addition, the inspector confirmed
that the system check lists had been conpleted and that both
control rod drive sequences with a predicted critical rod pos-
ition were available prior to the startup.
6.
Vencel internaln
The inspector 3 witnessed a portion of the jet pump insnection being
performed with t he aid of an underwater television camera and beinp,
recorded on tapes.
flenolut ion van good. Gl personnel. responsible
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for the inspection stated no abnormal conditions were noted on
either the jet pumps or the f eedwater spargers.
.Sa_f_ety/ Relief Valves (S/RV)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's increased / surveillance as
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a result of the S/RV premature of extended operation.
Temperature
plots (approximately 4 per week) are being maintained by the engineer
responsibic for the S/RV offluent lines. To improve sensitivity,
the licensee plann to relocate four thercocouples presently located
6-12 inches from the valve discharge flange, to a 22 5/8" location,
conenon to the four newiv" installed (5/74) ef'1uent lines.
A temocr-
ature range of about 12'0 - 250"F has been experienced on the 600 F
recorder.
A common alarm point is in use.
Procedures had been
prepare l and work scheduled f or the it. place testing of the first
stage pilots on the S/RV's this outane.
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8.
Control Rod Driven
The inspector confirmed that procedures existed for replacement of
25 CRD 4 during the outage.
Included in the CLD replacement will
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be the
ist four drives, with one nil inner screens (other CRD's
have ten mil screen sir.e.)
Review of recordn indicated scram
times for 90% int.crtion on three of the drives with one mil screen
vere 3.63 to 4.45 seconds compared to an average of 2.60 seconds
for the,50% sampling of other CRD's taken in November 1974. All
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of the above scram times are within requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.C.
Two of the core's 121 CRD's have modified
inner screens nounted on the stop pisten.
The licensee stated
no problems have been experienced with these irives, and that
current plans do not include such modification on other drives.
9.
Standhv Cas Treatment Sv a t em _(SGTS1
In accordance with Surveillance RequircrTnt 4.8.b, the inspector
confirmed that the SG'IS was tested on knuary 1975,11ay 1974
November 1974 and found that the filters were freon tested at
'? 99% removal efficiency and the llEPA filters were DOP tested
at ) 99% rernoval efficiency.
The inspector also reviewed with the utility their preliminary
comments on the proposed standardized technical specifications for
enginected safety features filtration systems to be r.ubmitted to
Licensing for review.
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Ltr Mager to O'1,eary, dtd 11/25/74 (A0 263/74-24).
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UNITE D' $1 Af t $
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCE!!ENT
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REGION lll
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799 noottvrLt noAp
OLEN ELLYN. ILLit40ll 40437
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A.
IE Inspection Report No.
n e n_ g3 p e_n1
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Tranornittal Date
February 12 ; 1(175
Distribution:
Distribution:
IE Chief. FSLEis
IE Chief. FSLEB
IE:l!Q (5)
IElllQ (4)
DR Confrni Tiins
L D/D for Fucis & Materials
Regulatory Standards (3)
DR Central Files
' Licensing (13)
IE Files
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IE Files
IE Chief ,11LPPB
L:D/D for Reactor Project
B.
IE Inquiry Report No.
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Transmittal Date
Distribution:
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IE Chicf, FS&EB
TE Cliief.4 FS&EB
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IE:11Q (5)
IE UQ
DR Central Files
DR Central Files
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Regulatory Standards (3)
IE Files
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Licensing (13)
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IE Files
C.
Incident Notification From:
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(Licenuce 6 Docket No. (or License No.)
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Transmittal Date
Distribution:
Distribution:
IE Chief , FS6EB
IE Chief , FS;EB
IE:11Q (4)
IElllQ (4)
Licenning, (4)
L:D/D for Fueln 6 Materials
DR Central Files
DR Central F13 cs
IE Files
IE Files
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