ML20024F177
| ML20024F177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1983 |
| From: | William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR LIC-83-222, NUDOCS 8309090003 | |
| Download: ML20024F177 (11) | |
Text
9 Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 402/536-4000 September 1, 1983 LIC-83-222 l
Mr. Robert A.
Clark, Chief U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Licensing Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Washington, D.C.
20555
Reference:
Docke t No. 50-285
Dear Mr. Clark:
Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Control of Heavy Loads The Commission's letter to the Omaha Public Power District dated May 17, 1983 provided an updated version of the draft Technical Evaluaticn Report (TER) prepared by Franklin Re-search Center (FRC).
This TER identified the open items re-maining to be addressed.
The open items were summarized as a request for additional information.
In accordance with the request, the District's responses to the open items are attached.
Sincerely, Iones J
W.
C.
Divi on Manager Production Operations WCJ/DJM:jmm l
Attachment cc:
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
1 Washington, D.C.
20036 Mr.
E.
G.
Tourigny, Project Manager g
Mr.
L.
A.
Yandell, Senior Resident l
Inspector 0309090003 830901 PDR ADOCK 05000205 p
POR 45 5124 Employment with Equal Opportunity Male! Female l
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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS NUREG-0612 RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ENCLOSURE 2 OF NRC LETTER DATED MAY 17, 1983 t
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1.
RECOMMENDATION /OPEN ITEM To ensure that loads are safely handled at the Fort Calhoun Station, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) should (1) designate specific load paths or load corridors for the movement of heavy loads and (2) provide suitable visual aids to assist crane oper-ators when moving heavy loads.
RESPONSE
As discussed in our earlier response, there ar'e only two areas (containment building and spent fuel pool area) where a load drop could impact irradiated fuel and/or safe-shutdown equipment.
In order'to comply with the TER recommendations (TER-C5506-356),
the District will develop procedures that designate safe load corridors for load handling operations in containment and in the restricted area (spent fuel pool) of the auxiliary building.
4 Auxiliary Building The. auxiliary building crane is restricted'by interlocks from carrying loads over the spent fuel pool.-
A crane supervisor is.present when the interlocks are bypassed.
The District'will develop' detailed load' handling procedures for'the restricted area.
These procedures.will designate specific load corridors for the heavy loads listed below.
A procedure describing safe load paths will.be used for handling shipping casks.
The following' list of heavy loads'will require a load corridor procedure:
1.
. Spent fuel pool gate 2.
New fuel receipt 3.
_ Spent' fuel pool storage rack installation and removal Existing procedures-for heavy loads handled by the auxiliary l
building crane will be revised to ensure that the load handling
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procedures meet the intent of criteria provided in NUREG-0612, A
drawing.of the load corridor will be included.in the procedures, along with a definition of the responsibilities of the crane signalman.
The crane signalman shall be responsible for walking i:
the -load corridor and verifying no obstructions are in the path of crane-travel.
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- Containment
-The District will develop detailed load handling procedures for the containment area..
These procedures will. designate speci-
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fic load corridors for the heavy loads listed below:
i-i, 1.
Missile shields 2.
Reactor vessel closure head 3.
Upper guide structure 4.
Ventilation ducts
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For item 4, There is some_ doubt.as to whether the venti-c :lation ducts are actually heavisci than the 1500 lb. we ight limit.
The dicts have not been weighed and the determination to include
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s them as heavy loads is baned upon calculations only.
If, during subesquent refueli'ng outages, the District determines the ducts weigh less than.1500 lbs.', ~ thesesducts will no longer be con-
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sidered part'of.the above list.
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Exis'cing procedures for hhavy loads handled by the polar
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,c'rane will be revised to ensure that the load handling procedures
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meet the intent of the' criteria provided in NUREG-0612.
A drawing of the load corridor will be' included in the procedures, along i
with a definition of the responsibilities of the crane signalman.
The crane signalman'shall be responsible for walking the load c
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corridor and verifying no obstructions are in the path of the e
crane travel.
s The load' corridors may vary between refueling outages, as
, ; decided by the Plant ~ Review Committee.1 Existing handling pro-
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cedures listed above~will-be appropriately revised.
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' Schedule 4
Load handling procedures for the polar crane and auxiliary building shall be revised before the next refueling outage,
. scheduled to begin in March, 1984.
-2.
RECOMMENDATION /OPEN ITEM OPPD should develop and; implement a program which verifies, through scheduled periodic testing., that special lifting devices continue to meet performance. criteria and are capable of reliable
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and safe performance of their functions.
Such a program should conform'to the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 5.
In ad-4 dition, the licensee should load test the reactor closure head m
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lif t rig _ ac part of this program to ensure continuing compliance.
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RESPONSE
In order.to meet the~ requirements of Guideline 4 of NUREG-0612, OPPD will develop an inspection program for the reactor ves-sel closure head and upper guide structure lift rigs.
The program will include visual inspection on all welds on the reactor vessel head lift rig'and upper guide' structure lift rig every refueling outage.
The program will'also-include non-destructive testing on-all welds which are below the ANSI N14.6 design safety margins.
Section 5.l' of ANSI N14.6-1978 will be used as guidance when these procedures are written.
These inspections will be performed and documented by the District's' quality control personnel.
This program will be implemented during the 1984 refueling outage.
j The District has reviewed Franklin's recommendations in re-gard to load testing the reactor vessel head lift rig and the upper guide structure lif t rig and has the following comments: -
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N Franklin suggests overstrensing the reactor vessel head lift rig.by load testing the rig to "a. capacity sufficiently in excess of the maximum load lifted".
The maximum load the lift rig lifts is 115 tons.
In order to overstress the rig, the District would have to load test the rig above 115 tons.
To comply with what FRC feels is a suf ficient margin for the load test, the District would have to load test the reactor vessel head lift rig to a load of at least 144 tons (125%).
Since the. District's polar crane is only rated to 130 tons, it would not be possible for the District to perfo'rm this test onsite.
The District would not be able to ship the rig _offsite for ioad testing without' sectioning 'the rig.
In addition, the rig could probably not be decontaminated enough to be released offsite. _Therefore, the lead test must be performed inside containment with the polar crane.
Since the design of the rig is 175.75 tons (which is greater than 150% of the maximum load of 115 tons), the District feels this load test is unnecessary.
Additionally, the District feels that performing the load test raises the potential for a Inad drop and, therefore, could result in an unsafe conditionc Based on this, the District takes ex-ception to performing this test.
3.
RECOMMENDATION /OPEN ITEM Confirmation is requested to ensure that the following pro-visions are incorporated into the continuing compliance program for special lifting devices:
Should major maintenance or substantial overstress occur, lifting devices will be tested in accordance with sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 of ANSI N14.6-1978.
Inspections are performed by operating pe rsonnel in accordance with Section 5.3.6 of ANSI N14.6-1978.
RESPONSE
j3 The District will implement an inspection program and non-destructive test program for use in'the event that major mainte-nance or' overstress occurs.
The testing and programs will be in accordance with the guidelines provided in ANSI N14.6-1978.
s Visual inspections will be performed by operating personnel and shall be included as'a requirement prior to initial use of the
- lift rigs during refueling outages.
These programs will be imple-mented during the next refueling outage.
U 4.
RECOMMENDATION /OPEN ITEM
~ OPPD should verify that the intake structure gantry crane complies with the added requirements of CMAA-70.
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RESPONSE
The District has evaluated the intake structure crane de-sign, as per FRC's recommendations, and has concluded that the crane design meets the intent of the CMAA-70 code, as shown below.
The following items are addressed:
1.
Non-symmetrical Girders Were Not Used Thus, the design meets the requirements of CMAA-70 for girder design, which specifies symmetrical girder de-sign.
2.
Longitudinal Stiffeners - None Meets all requirements of CMAA-70 for proportions (see calculation sheets, Attachment 2).
3.
Fatigue Failures The intake structure crane is used to lift loads less than its design capacity.
Thus, the near design loading cycle is substantially less than the 20,000 frequency cycles limit for streus evaluation listed in the CMAA-70 code.
Thus, the requirements are not of consequence to the design of the intake structure crane.
4.
Drum Design The District is not able to address this item due to a
. lack of information from the vendor.
However, since this crane was designed to EOCI code, the drum was de-signed to withstand maximum load bending and crushing.
The combination of the two was not part of the ECCI code, but we feel that the drum design meets the in-tent of the CMAA-70 code.
5.
Drum Design a.
Drum groove depth minimum required
.211",
actual:
information unavailable.
b.
Drum pitch minimum required -
.64",
actual:
information unavailable.
We are unable to-prove that drum design meets the CMAA-70 code.
6.
Bridge Brake Design The intake structure crane does not use cab control, or cab on trolley control.
Thus, the District meets the criteria set forth in the CMAA-70 code.
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7.
Holst Brake Design The hoist, trolley, and bridge motors are provided with rectified DC magnetic brakes.
Each brake is rated to 150% of full motor torque for hoist, 50% for trolley, and 100% for bridge.
In addition to the specified motor brake, the hoist is furnished with an electrical load brake (magnetorque).
Thus, the hoist brake design meets the CMAA-70 code.
8.
Bumpers and Stops Spring-type bumpers limit trolley travel on the bridge.
Rubber bumpers are provided on all four corners of the crane bridge.
This design meets the CMAA-70 criteria.
9.
Control System The intake structure crane uses a full magnetic five-step variable speed crane control with the following features:
NEMA I enclosures with rubber gasketed covers, A-B contactors, thermal overload protection, inainline contactor offering low voltage protection controlled from " Start /Stop" push buttons, and magne-torque reversing control on trolley and bridge.
All motions have two-step time acceleration.
Since it is not a static control system, the CMAA-70 code is not applicable.
10.
Restart Protection The intake structure crane, HE-5, utilizes a relay that drops out on loss of power and cuts the main power feed to the bridge, trolley, and hoist motors.
Pushing the " Start" button is required to re-enable the relay and, thus, all three motors.
l 11.
Breaking Strength of Rope The cable provided has a minimum safety factor of 5/1.
The minimum crane load weight, plus the weight of the bottom block, divided by the number of parts of rope, does not exceed 20% of the manufacturer's published breaking strength.
The cable provided meets the i
CMAA-70 code requirement.
As detailed above in the District's response to FRC's com-l ments concerning the intake structure crane design, good engineer-J ing practices were used and, though not designed to CMAA 70, the crane substantially meets the code's criteria.
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We believe that in the cases where FRC's comments could not be answered, the crane meets the intent of the CMAA code.
The Dis-trict would like to take exception to answering items 4 and 5 due to the lack of information and on the basis that not meeting these criteria does not indicate unsafe practices.
This was considered 4
acceptable in Franklin's evaluation of the polar crane design re-quirements.
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