ML20024D757
| ML20024D757 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1983 |
| From: | Giesler C WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORP. |
| To: | Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024D755 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-83-142 NUDOCS 8308080120 | |
| Download: ML20024D757 (3) | |
Text
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WISCONSIN P U B LI C S E RVIC E CO R PO R ATIO N RO. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305 July 22, 1983 Mr. C. E. Norelius Division of Project and Resident Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Dear Mr. Norelius:
Docket 50-305 Operating License DPR-43 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant IE Inspection Report 83-04 (DPRP)
The attachment to this letter details our response to the two items of non-compliance identified in inspection report 83-04 (DPRP).
Since items 1 and 2 were the result of one incident and the corrective actions are the same, our i
response to the two items has been combined in the attachments.
Very truly yours, W C. W. Giesler l
Vice President - Nuclear Power Js l
l Attach.
j cc - Mr. S. A. Varga, US NRC Mr. Robert Nelson, US NRC
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8308080120 830802 l
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ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Items of Noncompliance IE Inspection Report No. 83-04 (DPRP)
Appendix A of IE Inspection Report No. 83-04 (DPRP) identified two items of noncompliance. The following responds to those items:
Item 1 Technical Specification 3.1.d.5, states, "When the reactor is critical and above 2% power, two reactor coolant leak detections systems of different operating principles shall be in operation with one of the two systems sensitive to radioactivity.
Either system may be out of operation for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> provided at least one system is operable".
Contrary to the above, the sampling path from the containment to the system sensitive to radioactivity was isolated from 2:45 pm, March 7, 1983, until 7:50 am, March 8,1983, a period of 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />.
Item 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1 states, " Written procedures and administra-tive policies shall be established, implemented and maintained that meet the requirements and recommendations of Section 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972."
ANSI N18.7-1972, Section 5.3 states, in part, " Nuclear power plants shall be operated in accordance with written procedures.".
Administrative Control Directive 4.2, " Operating Procedures", Section 5.5.1, states, in part, "Each shift supervisor shall ensure that during his assigned shift all operation of plant systems are conducted in accordance with the applicable currently approved operating procedure".
Operating procedure N-RBV-18B, " Reactor Building Vent System Cold Operation and Making Releases", Section 4.8, states, in part, " Final shutdown from both modes, return RM-11 and 12 from Vent position to Containment position".
Contrary to the above, RM-11 and 12 were not returned to the Containment position when shutting down from making a release on March 7, 1983. Failure to ensure that the sampling point for RMS channels R-11 and R-12 were returned from the vent position to the containment position following the completion of containment venting, resulted in a Limiting Condition for Operation being exceeded.
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ATTACHMENT 1 (cont.)
Response
Wisconsin Public Service accepts the violations as described. Upon discovery our immediate action was to return RM-ll/12 to the containment sampling position.
Corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence include: 1) having each Shift Supervisor review the event with his crew emphasizing the importance of adherence to written procedures and the need to be more attentive to control board indica-tions, 2) changing the cover on the vent position indicating lamp from amber to red to make the abnormal condition more easily recognizabl,e, 3) revising Operating Procedure N-RBV-18B to more clearly detail the procedural steps performed during containment venting, and 4) revising Surveillance Procedure SP 328-116 to include operator check off and initialing to verify R-11/12 has been returned to the containment sampling position; this is then reviewed by the Shift Supervisor.
WPS considers it significant that this event was discovered by the Operations Supervisor as part of a Control Room walkdown. This supervisory position was recently created and filled by a former Shift Supervisor to provide plant opera-tions with additional depth and daily continuity. Particular emphasis is placed on a review of plant operations, especially those affecting safety related equip-ment.
WPS considers these actions to have placed us in full compliance with technical specifications and sufficient to prevent recurrence.