ML20024D107

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NRC Response to Palmetto Alliance & Carolina Environ Study Group 830715 Suppl to Petitions to Intervene Re 19 Emergency Planning Contentions.Contentions EP-9,-14,-15,-17 & -18 Acceptable.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20024D107
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/01/1983
From: Johnson G
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8308030166
Download: ML20024D107 (46)


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August 1, 1983 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of DUKE POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

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Docket Nos. 50-413

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50-414 (CatanhaNuclearStation,

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Unics 1 and 2)

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NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO INTERVENORS' SUPPLEMENT TO THEIR PETITIONS TO INTERVENE CONTAINING EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 1.

INTRODUCTION On July 15, 1983, the NRC Staff received a copy of Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group Supplement to Petitions to Intervene Regarding Emergency Plans (" Supplement").E This Supplement contains 19 contentions challenging the adequacy of various aspects of offsite emergency response planning for the Catawba Nuclear Station. Pursuant to the Licensing Board's direction in its Memorandum and Order of June 13, 1983, the Staff hereby serves its response.U y

Although required to be served on the parties on July 11, 1983, the postmark date on the envelope containing copies for the USNRC Docketing

& Service Branch was July 13, 1983. The Staff obtained a copy of the Supplement from Applicants' counsel on July 15, 1983, but did not receive Intervenors' service copy of the Supplement until July 18, 1983.

y Following several preliminary discussions between counsel, the parties participated in a conference call on July 29, 1983, but were unable to reach any agreement on the stipulation of contentions.

DESIGNATED ORIGINAL 8308030166 030801

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Certified By ll/(

PDR ADOCK 05000413 O

PDR

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II. DISCUSSION A.

Comission Regulations and Precedent Relating To Admission of Intervenors' Contentions Under the Coninission's Rules of Practice, a party is required to supplement its petition to intervene not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference. Such supplement "must include a list of the contentions which petitioner seeks to have litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity." 10 CFR Section 2.714(b). " Additional time for filing the supplement may be granted upon a balancing of the factors in paragraphs (a)(1)ofthissection."E I_d.

Guidance on the application of the basis and specificity standard in Section 2.714(b) has been provided by the case law, most notably, in Philadelphia Electric Company et al. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20 (1974). The Appeal Board's Peach Bottom decision elucidated the Comission's intent, as follows:

(1) "The degree of specificity with which the basis for a contention must be alleged initially involves the exercise of judgment on a case-by-case basis."

Id.

y These factors are:

(i) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time.

(ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected.

(iii) The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.

(iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties.

(v) The extent to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding.

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(2) "It is not the function of a licensing board to reach the merits of any contention" in making the determination whether Section 2.714 is met. M.

(3)

"A purpose of the basis-for-contention requirement in Section 2.714 is to help assure at the pleading stage that the hearing process is not improperly invoked" to (a) attack statutory requirements; or (b) challenge the basic structure of the Comission's regulatory process. M.

(4) "Another purpose is to help assure that other parties are sufficiently put on notice so that they will know at least generally what they will have to defend against or oppose." M.

(5) The requirement assures "that the proposed issues are proper for adjudication in the particular proceeding, i.e., facts pertaining to the plant are at issue, rather than generalizations as to what applicable policies ought to be."

Id. at 21.

(6) Intervenors must show that their concerns apply to the facility at bar and that there is sufficient foundation to warrant further exploration. M.

The Licensing Board took note of this guidance for application of the basis-for-contention requirement in its initial ruling on contentions.

LBP-82-16, 15 NRC 566, at 570 (1982). The Staff has examined Intervenors' contentions in light of the above considerations.

B.

Development of the Case Law in this Proceeding Relating to Admission of Late Emergency Planning Contentions Intervenors' initial supplements, filed on December 9,1981, contained a number of contentions relating to offsite emergency plans.

One contention, Palmetto Contention 27, was admitted unconditionally and four others, Palmetto Contentions 3, 4 and 26, and CESG Contention 8 (Palmetto 35), were admitted in whole or part, conditional upon provision of further specificity after the offsite emergency plans became available.

l The Licensing Board also indicated that it would not apply the late-filing criteria to revised and new offsite emergency planning contentions later proffered by Intervenors because "their ' lateness' is entirely beyond the control of the spensoring intervenor." Id. at 575.

The Appeal Board accepted certification of the two issues raised by the Board's rulings - whether a licensing board can conditionally admit a non-specific contention subject to later specification, and whether a board can waive application of the late-filing criteria where a late contention is based on a previously unavailable licensing document.

The Appeal Board ruled that "a licensing board is not authorized to admit conditionally, for any reason, a contention that falls short of meeting the specificity requirements." ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, at 467 (1982).

Howawr, the Appeal Board substantially agreed with the Licensing Board on application of the late-filing criteria, stating that where the nonexistence or public unavailability of relevant documents made it impossible for a sufficiently specific contention to have been asserted at an earlier date, that factor must be deemed controlling; it is not amenable to being overridden by other factors such as that relating to the broadening of the issues.

I!. at 470.

If a party could show that a contention "(1) is wholly d

dependent upon the content of a particular document, (2) could not therefore be advanced with any degree of specificity (if at all) in advance of the public availability of that document; and (3) is tendered with the requisite degree of promptness once the document comes into existence and is accessible for public examination," the contention could not be rejected based on timeliness.

Id. at 469. The Appeal Board, however, distinguished from such circumstances the situation in which a contention was, in fact, susceptible of filing withis, the period

1 prescribed," _Id. at 470, in which case the late contention would be tested against all five lateness factors.

Up.on remand, the Licensing Board rejected a number of contentions previously admitted conditionally, including Palmetto contentions 3, 4 and 26, based upon failure to meet the specificity requirements of Section2.714(b). The Board admitted the first sentence of CESG 8 which alleged that Rock Hill should be included in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ), although noting that should Rock Hill be included "the contention will become academic." December 1,1982 Order at 4-5.

The Board had no occasion to apply the " wholly dependent" criteria to emergency plan contentions at that point.

On June 13, 1983, the Licensing Bcard noted the availability of the state and local offsite emergency plans for Catawba, and establishe1 July 11, 1983 as the date for serving contentions thereon. However, the Board stated:

Since these plans include much new information and are being made available for the first time, the Board will assume that contentions could not have been filed earlier.

It will not be necessary for the Intervenors to show in the first instance why each contention is " wholly dependent" on these plans.

While the Board relieved intervenors from any duty to demonstrate good cause for the late-filed contentions implied by the " wholly dependent" test set forth by the Appeal Board in ALAB-687, the Staff does not interpret this ruling as preventing a challenge to a late contention based on any part of ALAB-687, as then in effect. That is, any contention proffered could be attacked as having been " susceptible of filing within the period prescribed" in Section 2.714(b), or for not meeting the three-pronged " wholly dependent" test.

In any event, on June 30, 1983, the Comissien, on sua sponte review of ALAB-687, vacated that part of the Appeal Board's ruling dispensing with application of the late-filing factors, ruling that application of all the factors " constitutes a reasonable exercise of the Comission's authority to establish procedural requirements in accordance with Section 189a. of the Atomic Energy Act." CLI-83-19, slip op. at 9, June 30, 1983. The Comission, however, adopted the Appeal Board's three-part "' good cause' test as applied to late-filed contentions based solely on information contained in institutionally unavailable licensing documents."

Id.

The Comission also ruled that "the institutional unavailability of a licensing-related document does not establish good cause for filing a contention late if information was available early enough to provide the basis for the timely filing of that contention." M.at11-12. With specific reference to offsite emergency plans, the Comission noted that while it would be " fruitless" to raise the temporary lack of offsite plans as a contention, contentions based on the onsite plans, and based on assumptions made therein about offsite planning can be raised prior to the availability of the offsite plans themselves.

In sum, then, in considering admission of late-filed contentions based on offsite emergency plans which were previously unavailable, the Licensing Board is required to consider whether there is good cause for j

the late liling (applying the three-part test for good cause set forth in ALAB-687 and affirmed by the Comission in CLI-83-19) and to balance the other four late-filing factors in Section 2.714(a)(1). Given the Board's June 13, 1983 ruling, and the current posture of this proceeding, i

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the Staff believes that, rather than requiring Intervenors to refile their new contentions or to supplement them with the separate showings justify.ing their untimeliness, as required by the regulations and CLI-83-19, Intervenors should be required to make the necessary showings on lateness as to any contention to which Staff or Applicants object basedontimeliness.O The Staff has raised the lack of timeliness with respect to several of the contentions discussed below.

C.

Staff's Positions on the Admissibility of Intervenors' Contentions Emergency Planning Cc.

ntion 1 (EP-M This contention challenges the adequacy of the public in' formation provided by Applicants' brochure for ensuring appropriate responses to notification procedures in the event of an accident.

The general theme that underlies this contention is that many details concerning the health effects of radiation and the implementation of emergency protective actions (found in the plans themselves) are lacking in the brochure. Contention EP-1 must be measured against the planning standard for public education and information,10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7),

and the implementing criteria of Section II.G., NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1.

The planning standard states:

Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of information during)an emergency (including the physical location or locations are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of information to the public are established, y

The Staff suggested this approach during a conference call among the Licensing Board and parties on July 18, 1983.

.......... - -. -. -. -. ~. - -

The contention does not assert that there is no educational information on radiation, that points of contact are not given, or that the public is not informed how it will be notified and generally what responses may be called for. Rather, the contention suggests the absence of a variety of information which is either not required for the public brochure to serve its function (e.g., explanetton of the plume exposure pathway, the procedures for decontamination at the reception centers as well as other emergency procedures, discussion of particular accident scenarios and the amount of time each would take to develop), or is already provided (e.g., direction togofirsttothereceptioncenters). The underlying thread of the contention seems to be that more details would lead to a better response.

However, for this proposition Intervenors furnish no substantial basis.

The " inadequacies" identified, even if accurate, would not establish that the brochure would not serve its purpose.

In short, Intervenors have failed to give "either a reasonable explanation or plausible authority for the factual assertions." See, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24,14 NRC 175, 184 (1981). Because of this, Intervenors have failed to provide, in the Staff's view, a sufficient basis to support that portion of the conten-tion attacking Applicants' emergency information brochure. Similarly, Intervenors furnish no basis for doubting that the State of North Carolina will implement that portion of its plan calling for dissemination of infor-mation to the public through various means. North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of the Catawba Nuclear Station, Part 1, pp. 53,

55. Thus, in the Staff's view, Intervenors have failed to provide the required basis for that portion of the contention asserting that government

officials will not provide adequate information to toe public. This con-tention should, therefore, be rejected as lacking in basis.

Emergency Planning Contention 2 (EP-2)

This contention overlaps substantially with Palmetto Contention 27, which has been admitted, and is currently the subject of motions for summary disposition in this proceeding. The only apparent difference is that EP-2 challenges the adequacy of the Applicants' proposed use of mobile monitoring teams and thermoluminescent dosimeters in providing imediate information required to make protective action recomendations for the public health and safety, and suggests that improvement--such as by use of fixed real time monitor stations--is needed, whereas Conten-tion 27 would direct the use of fixed real-time monitors.

In any event, this contention is impermissibly late, since it is based on the inade-quacy of Applicants' plan, which has long been available. Since the contention is not at all dependent on the offsite plans, there is no good cause for late-filing (Section 2.714(a)(1)(i)). Moreover, Conten-tion 27 provides a full opportunity through which to express these con-cerns (Section 2.714(a)(1)(ii) and (iv)); any difference in the conten-tions is certainly too small to justify repetition of the same disputes on the adequacy of Applicants' plans as already aired in the context of l

Contention 27 (Section 2.714(a)(1)(v)); similarly, it is not at all

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apparent how such additional consideration of these matters would con-tribute to a sound record (Section 2.714(a)(1)(iii)). This contention should be rejected as untimely.

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. Emergency Planning Contention 3 (EP-3)

This contention questions whether the reception center / shelter facilit.ies will be adequate to provide food and shelter, and to process all evacuees. However, Intervenors have made no attempt to address the specific information made available to them. Thus,'while Intervenors suggest that 14 reception centers / shelters cannot adequately handle 75,000 evacuees, no attempt is made to compare the zone-by-zone numbers of evacuees with the facilities and response organizations available for each evacuation zone. For example, Gaston County, North Carolina, has allotted shelter space for approximately 6,000 persons. Part 2, Fig. 6 North Carolina Emergency Response Plan. The sole evacuation zone in Gaston County is zone F-3, with a total resident population of 2,672, transient population of 651, and special facilities population of 469. " Catawba Nuclear Station Evaucation Analysis, Evacuation Time Estimates," PRC Voorhees, April 1983, pp.15,17. Intervenors ady "it.

is very likely that reception centers will become overcrowded."

(Supplement,p.7). But they do not specify which centers and do not provide plausible and specific reasons why the resources to be allocated are insufficient. As a result, it is the Staff's view that this contention i

lacks both reasonable specificity and bases in view of the available L

information and offsite plans, and should not be admitted because it fails to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Section 2.714 in these regards.

Emergency Planning Contention 4 (EP-4)

This contention asserts, "Intervenors are' informed that monitoring equipment used to assess exposure levels of the evacuated populations 4

is antiquated and inadequate," and does not meet 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9). However, there is no indication as to the source of this information, what particular monitoring equipment is involved, whether Intervenors are concerned with projections based on measurements of contamination in the environment, or with personal radiation detectors /

dosimetry. Neither is there reference to any of the offsite plans.

Intervenors have presented neither the basis nor the specificity needed to provide adequate notice of Intervenors' concerns or to warrant further inquiry into the subject matter.

In addition, since intervenors do not reference any offsite plans, and do not indicate how or when they were

" informed," there appears to be no reliance on the only recently available offsite plans, and therefore no " good cause" to support this late-filed contention.

In the absence of any showing under Section 2.714(a)(1), this contention is impermissibly late. On these ' cases, the Staff objects to admission of this contention.

Emergency Planning Contention 5 (EP-5)

This contention asserts that plans for recovery and re-entry into the affected area are inadequate and incomplete, insofar as they relate to decontamination, availability of storage for contaminated items, l

provision for contaminated animals, decontamination of drinking water, l

and removal of dead bodies.

Inasmuch as Commission regulations (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(13))

require only that general plans for recovery and re-entry be developed, l

the assertion in EP-5 of inadequacies based on the lack of detailed recovery and re-entry plans constitute a challenge to Commission

regulations prohibited under 10 CFR Section 2.758, absent the showing of special circumstances required therein. Genersi provisions for recovery and re-entry are found in Part 1,Section IV.G. of the North Carolina State Procedures to Support Catawba Nuclear Station, Part 2 Section IV.G., Gaston County Procedures to Support the Catawba Nuclear Station; Part 3,Section IV.G., Mecklenburg County Procedures to Support the Catawba Nuclear Station;Section IV.A.3, York County, South Carolina, Plan for Emergency Operations of Municipal and County Government; and Appendix VIII, South Carolina Technical Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Because this contention calls for detailed recovery and re-entry planning beyond the general planning required by the Comission's regu-lations, the contention is a challenge to the regulations and should notbeadmitted.E i

y It may also be noted that the Commission has determined that whether a utility could be required to contribute to the expenses incurred by State and local governments is beyond the scope of the current Comission emergency planning regulations. See, Emergency Planning, Final Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 55402, August 19 T9E0 (paragraph IX). Similarly, the regulations require planning to protect 1,he public health and safety, and the Comission has specifically stated

" measures to protect property can be taken on an ad hoc basis as resources become available after an accident." SpecTfTc plans to decontaminate wildlife or domestic animals are not required.

Thus, that part of the contention which states that the plans for recovery and re-entry are inadequate due to lack of provision for paying decontamination crews or decontamination of wildlife or domestic animals constitutes a challenge to Comission regulations on these additional grounds as well. The contention should therefore be rejected.

. Emergency Planning Contention 6 (EP-6)

This contention states a generalized concern that there is no provision for preventing contaminated " runoff," contaminated wildlife, and contaminated persons from going into non-contaminated areas.

It should first be noted that, although Intervenors rely on the Section 50.47(a)(1) provision that there must be " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken," they cite no other regulatory requirement which is not met by the cited " inadequacies."

Section 50.47(a)(1), however, imposes no substantive requirements not otherwise enumerated in Section 50.47(b) or Appendix E.

It speaks to whether, in the subject areas for which specific planning is required, those plans are capable of implementation. For example, in Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, et al. (William H. Zimer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-727, slip op. at 22, 23, n.19, the Appeal Board was unable to conclude that there was " reasonable assurance" that the stated plans concerning evacuation of school children could be efficiently implemented.

It cited questions about comunication, bus l

l drivers, and the availability of busses. However, the " reasonable assurance" standard did not impose a new substantive requirement; this l

l was imposed by the requirement in 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) to provide for adequate protective measures for the public (" Commission regulations l

plainly require the formulation of satisfactory evacuation plans").

Applying this principle to Contention EP-6, there are no sub-stantive requirements for preventing " runoff" - whatever that is -

or for preventing wildlife from moving about in the EPZ, as to which 1

" reasonable assurance" must be demonstrated. As noted in response to EP-5, the regulations require planning to protect the health and safety i

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. of the public. " Measures to protect property can be taken on an g hoc basis as resources become available after an accident." 45 Fed. Reg 55402. On their face, these two concerns do not raise public health and safety issues, are beyond the scope of Part 50, and should be rejected as a challenge to the regulatory scheme. See, Peach Bottom, supra.

In addition, the first concern

" runoff" - is so vague that it fails to provide sufficient notice to the parties as to the nature of Intervenors' concern. Id. Therefore this concern should be rejected as failing to provide the required specificity. M.

With respect to movement of contaminated persons into non-contaminated zones, a different problem exists. There are specific provisions in the offsite plans for directing all evacuees to reception centers for registration, processing, shelter, decontamination, and for security of evacuated areas.

Intervenors make no reference to any of the plans.

If the question is whether these plans can be implemented, per 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1), Intervenors have failed to provide any basis for doubt.

A generalized concern is not sufficient. Rather, there must be sufficient basis to warrant further inquiry. Peach Bottom, supra.

In the absence of basis, this portion of the contention should be rejected.

Emergency Planning Contention 7 (EP-7)

This contention asserts that the emergency plans and brochures do not adequately address the worst possible accident, or the effectiveness of sheltering for such accident, and thus " fail to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency as required by 10 CFR Section

. 50.47(a)(1)." - The contention assumes, incorrectly, that the plans and brochures must address the " worst possible case accident." To the extent,that this contention would require the plans to address a specific " worst-case" accident scenario, the contention is inconsistent with the Comission's interpretation of the current emergency planning rules.

In promulgating these rules, the Comission noted, in the context of addressing a coment relating to notification requirements-The Comission recognizes that no single accident scenario should form the basis for choice of notification capability requirements for offsite authorities and for the public. Emergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents.

4 Emergency Planning Final Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19,1980).

While made in the context of notification capabilities, the Comission's response indicates that it had more than merely notification requirements in mind:

C-Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of fission products in the containment would warrant imediate notification and consideration, based on the particular circumstances, of appropriate protective action because of the potential for leakage of the containment building.

c Id. Thus, while the rule contemplates planning for severe accidents, it does not contemplate planning based upon specific accident scenarios.

Rather, planning is to based upon a wide spectrum of accidents, from mild to severe.

Intervenors' claim to the contrary is therefore a challenge to the emergency planning rules, contrary to 10 CFR Section 2.758.E y

The planning basis is further described in " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/

FE!!A-REP-1, Rev., November,1980, pp. 6-7:

(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

. Nevertheless, the adequacy of plans for sheltering in the event of an event so severe as to preclude ininediate evacuation is not beyond the scope of the regulations, and may be litigated. However, the plans and the Applicants' brochure discuss the possibility of sheltering as a protective action (see, York County Emergency Operations Plan, Annex Q,

p. Q-26; North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of the Catawba Nuclear Station, Part 1, page 57, Part 2, pp. 29-31, Part 3, pp. 31-32),

and to the extent this contention challenges the adequacy of these plans, (F0OTNOTE CONTINL'ED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)

The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose satings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs). [ Footnotes omitted.] No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree.

Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant offsite radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the wors*. possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood. The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences. Rather, it identified the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based upon knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, and release characteristics of a spectrum of accidents. Although the selected planning basis is independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in the development of j

the guidance, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study.

As noted in NUREG-0654, at 6, the guidance in the NRC/ EPA Task Force Report, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plant," NUREG-0396/ EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978, "is now reflected in the NRC Final Rule on Emergency Planning."

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it fails to address the plans at all, or to identify what specific basis there is for believing these plans to be inadequate. This part of the contention is therefore lacking in basis with reasonable specificity and should be rejected.

Emergency Planning Contention 8 (EP-8)

This contention asserts that the various plans " fail to assign clear and effective primary responsibilities for emergency response and fail to establish specific responsibilities of the various supporting organizations." As with the previous contention, Intervenors have faiied to address the particular plans or the provisions therein, to identify any specific lack of assignnent of responsibility, any specific area in which there is likelihood of confusion, conflict, or lack of coordination.

As such, it is little more than speculation, and is too vague for the parties to have notice of particular problems which may need correction.

Similarly, although, as an aside, Intervenors assert that the South Carolina Forward Emergency Operations Center (FE0C) is " located dangerously within the 10 miles EPZ at Clover, South Carolina," no reason is given why that location is inappropriate.

(It may be noted that, while within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, the FE0C is approxi-mately 10 miles from the plant, in a northwesterly direction). As a

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result, Contention EP-8 fails to provide a basis with reasonable 5pecificity and should be rejected.

Finally, it may also be noted that Intervenors have asserted that t

the above problems pertain to the Applicants' plan. While no supporting i

basis is offered, it is also readily apparent that any failure to 4

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adequately assign responsibilities in the onsite plan could have been identified months ago. The recent availability of offsite plans is not a basis.for not previously filing a contention pertaining to the Applicants' plan.

See, CLI-83-19, supra. Since good cause for accepting the portion of this contention directed to Applicants' plan is lacking, and in the absence of any showing justifying late-filing, this aspect of the contention must be rejected as untimely.

Emergency Planning Contention 9 (EP-9)

This contention, which asserts that plans for notification of response organizations and the public are inadequate, is in five parts.

With certain noted exceptions, the contention fails to provide the required basis with reasonable specificity.

First, Intervenors state "there is some question as to whether or not the sirens will operate properly," but suggest no reason why this might be the case.

Intervenors add that back-up systems to the fixed sirens "would involve a significant drain on law enforcement resources,"

again, with no indication of the basis therefor. Nor are the

" inadequacies of public information" identified.

(To the extent this aspect of EP-9 overlaps with EP-1, see Staff's response, supra.)

Finally, with respect to the sirens, Intervenors question whether the sirens would be heard by all affected persons due to " hearing impairments, weather conditions, distance from sirens, etc." While supplementation of the sirens for persons who would not hear the sirens may be needed, Intervenors do not address the adequacy of the specified back-up provisions. On the other hand, Applicants' public brochure states:

. The emergency agencies listed above can notify and evacuate handicapped people during an emergency.

If you are handicapped, call your emergency agency today to tell them about your special needs. Use the phone number for your county listed above.

Despite'these statements, however, the site-specific plans do not appear to address the manner in which hearing impaired individuals would be notified, and what agencies would have responsibility for this function.

The Staff therefore believes basis does exist for admitting the question whether adequate measures have been planned for notifying the hearing impaired in case of an accident.

Second, Intervenors suggest that in an emergency " citizens uncertain as to how to respond would likely not know who to contact for clarification and instructions." However, no basis is given Why the public information and education programs described in the plann together with the notification procedures, would not be adequate.

Accordingly, the Staff is of the view that Intervenor has failed to provide a basis for this portion of proposed contention EP-9.

Third, Intervenors suggest tha need for a contingency plan to operate the emergency broadcast system in the event of a power shortage. However, Intervenors fail to place this contention in the context of the plans, which provide extensive information on the availability of emergency broadcast system (EBS) stations.

Intervenors, for example, offer no plausible basis for presuming that some or all of the EBS stations listed in Annex D of the York County plan and Annex E of the North Carolina plan would be subject to power outages simultaneously.

Thisaspectofthecontentionthereforeiswithoutbasis}and,inthe Staff's view, should be rejected on~that ground.

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Fourth, Intervenors state that provisions for notification of special facilities such as hospitals, prisons, recreation areas, and schools are inadequate. However, the contention ignores the specific provision for notification of these facilities in Annex D, Catawba Nuclear Station Site Specific _RERP. Part4,SCORERP). The mere assertion of inadequacy does not constitute basis for this concern; "either a reasonable explanation or plausible authority for the factual assertions" is required. See Perry, supra. However, to the extent Intervenors' contention is directed to the means by which transient populations at theme peaks would be notified to take protective actions, there does not appear to be any specific reference thereto in the plans, and the Staff does:not oppose admission of this aspect of the contention.

Finally, Intervenors state "the plan" is not adequate because it does not provide "a trained, independent, objective person or agen y to assess a situation and determine when notification of the public and state and local authorities of an emergency or unusual event is necessary." Since the regulations specifically require the licensee to establish procedures for notification of State and local response organizations (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5)), this " inadequacy" challenges the sufficiency of the regulations and is prohibited pursuant to 10 CFR i

Section 2.758.

In addition, no basis is offered to support the proposition that Applicants cannot fully accomplish their assessment and

- notification functions. Further, since this aspect of the contention challenges functions falling within Applicants' plan, it is not at all dependent upon the availability of offsite plans and is impermissibly late. For all these reasons, this matter is not proper for litigation.

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In sum, this contention should be rejected for the reasons stated above, except with respect to whether there are adequate plans for notification of the hearing impaired and of the transient populations at the area's theme parks.

Emergency Planning Contention 10 (EP-10)

This contention also challenges the adequacy of giving Applicants the responsibility for notification of the public and State and local authorities, and suggests substituting a system by which State and local authorities would use real-time monitors to make notification decisions.

As with the similar assertion in EP-9, this contention constitutes an impermissible challenge to the regulatory scheme for emergency preparedness. Under 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5), the licensee has the responsibility for notification of State and local response authorities.

The implementing criterion of NUREG-0654, Paragraph II.E.5, states: "It shall be the responsibility of the State and local governments to activate such a system [for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public]."

In addition, the use of an emergency classification system and Emergency Action Levels based on in-plant measurements is contemplated by Section 50.47(b)(4) and the NUREG-0654 implementing criteria. This contention challenges the adequacy of the regulatory scheme provided for emergency preparedness and should be rejected on that basis. Moreover, as stated in the Staff response to the similar challenge in EP-9, this contention lacks any basis to support the proposition that Applicants cannot fully accomplish their assessment and notification functions. Further, as discussed in response to EP-2, since these functions are described in Applicants' plan, EP-10 is not at all

. dependent on the availability of offsite plans, and, based upon the considerationsinSection2.714(a)(1),isimpermissiblylate. The Staff thus objects to admission of this contention on these additional grounds.

Emergency Planning Contention 11 (EP-11)

This contention asserts that emergency planning for the City of Charlotte "should be required... with the full range of protective actions considered including evacuation of the City's population." As grounds, Intervenors cite the growth of Charlotte's boundaries in the direction of the 10-mile EPZ, the prevailing southwesterly winds blowing from Catawba to Charlotte, as well as the likelihood that many evacuees, including " volunteers" will flee the area by routes going through Charlotte.

First, to the extent this contention would require the City of Charlotte to be treated Ls if it were within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, it is an impermissible challenge to the regulations. 10 CFR Section50.33(g),50.47(c)(2). Since to include Charlotte within the scope of fully developed emergency response planning would effectively expand the plume exposure pathway EPZ to thirty miles, this contention is substantively indistinguishable from the second sentence of CESG Contention 8/ Palmetto Contention 35, which the Licensing Board rejected as a challenge to 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2), providing for a plume exposure pathway EPZ of "about ten miles." LBP-82-16, 15 NRC 566, o

582 (1982).

Second, under 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2), the exact boundaries of the plume exposure pathway EPZ are to be determined "in relation to 1ccal emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such

, conditions as demography, topography, and characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." Adverse meteorological conditions, how-ever, have been factored into the planning basis assumptions and analyses which led to the Comission adoption of the "about 10-mile" standard.

See " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396/ EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978, pp. 16-17, I-26 to I-34. The guidance in this report "is now reflected in the NRC Final Rule on Emergency Planning." NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, page 6.

See also 10 CFR Section 50.47, footnote 1.

Thus, it would be contrary to the regulatory scheme to consider the winds in the Catawba region as a basis for adjusting the "10-mile EPZ." A fortiori, the winds in the area cannot serve as a basis for expanding the 10-mile EPZ to include the City of Charlotte, which extends to thirty miles from the Catawba plant. See, in thi:; con-nection, Southern California Edison Co. et al. (San Onofre Nuclear Gener-ating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1181 (1982). Nor can the flow of evacuees through Charlotte, or the possibility of "volun-teers" adding to the traffic, constitute grounds for treating Charlotte as a part of the plume exposure pathway EPZ, contrary to the regulations.

Finally, the plans need not consider the speculative possibility that in the future, a portion of the City of Charlotte might encroach upon the "10-mile EPZ," as currently formulated.

If this were to happen, the State and local authorities involved could then consider the need for appropriate coordination. However, in any event, the mere fact that a small peripheral portion of the jurisdiction of Charlotte might in the future fall within the currently formulated EPZ would not justify inclusion of all of Charlotte in the EPZ under 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2).

~

. For all of the foregoing reasons, Contention EP-11 should be rejected as a challenge to the Commission regulation limiting the plume exposure pathway EPZ to "about 10 miles."

Emergency Planning Contentions 12 and 13 (EP-12, 13)

These contentions are verbatim repetitions of Palmetto Alliance contentions 4 and 3, respectively, which were rejected by the Licensing Board as lacking the requisite specificity. The Board's earlier decisions d

on Palmetto Contentions 3 and 4 constitute the law of the case, are dispositive of EP-12 and EP-13, and need not be considered again.

Hemorandum and Order, December 1,1982, pp. 4-5.

See also NRC Staff Response to Supplemental Statements of Contentions by Petitioners to Intervene, dated December 30, 1980, pp. 12-15. Moreover, given Intervenors' failure to take into consideration the offsite plans which have been available for formulating these contentions, the burden upon Intervenors to "show enough understanding of the filed materials to indicate that a hearing will have a substantial chance of adding to the preexisting process" (Perry, supra, 14 NRC at 182) makes the case for rejection upon specificity grounds far stronger than under the earlier circumstances. The submission of a contention, such as EP-12 (PA 4),

which claims that State and local plans "have not been developed," and similar claims, is frivolous, wastes the time and resources of the parties and the Board, and should not be tolerated.

l In addition, to the extent these contentions challenge the adequacy of the 10-mile EPZ, they are not substantially different from Contention EP-11, and should be rejected on the same basis. Finally, it should be l

l

. noted that Appendix E to Part 50 does not require that emergency exercises involve actual evacuation of the local population and the assertion in Contention EP-12 that the failure to plan an exercise including such evacuation is an inadequacy constitutes an attack on the regulations prohibited by 10 CFR 2.758. For these reasons, the Staff opposes admission of proposed contentions 12 and 13.

Emergency Planning Contention 14 (EP-14)

This contention asserts that "the evacuation time study presented by Applicants is a piece of fiction in the guise of science and may not be relied upon for determining the ability of Applicants and public authorities effectively to evacuate residents of the Catawba EPZ in a timely manner."

Intervenors' contention asserts several bases as support for their claim that the time projected for evacuation has been seriously underestimated:

(1) traffic flow has been overestimated "by a factor of between three and twelve;" (2) the tt'affic flow is overestimated because it fails to account for " voluntary evacuation" from Charlotte, outside the EPZ, along I-77; (3) more time must be allotted in estimating evacuation times for finding alternate drivers to replace the "high school kids" who nomally serve as school bus drivers, whom, Intervenors claim, "[n]o public official would dare" use; (4) the estimates "should be based only upon worst case conditions, rather than on best case conditions;" (5) the estimate " fails to account for parents going first to their children's schools to pick up their children before evacuating;"

(6) Intervenors challenge the evacuation time estimate's conclusion that

. evacuation of large transient populations at Carowinds amusement park and Heritage USA would not pose a congestion problem to permanent residents evacuating from the 10-mile EPZ on I-77; (7) the study is not "techni-cally valid from a theoretical perspective or based upon assumptions having some relationship to the real world...."; and (8) "a minimum of 33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br />, assuming conservative 600 vehicles / lane / hour vehicle travel time" is required for a " realistic estimate of evacuation time for Catawba...." The Staff believes the foregoing grounds provide suffi-cient basis to permit litigation of these concerns. However, Intervenors' challenge to the assumptions in the evacuation time estimate made with respect to " work and living habits" of the population is too vague in that it does not address which assumptions are involved, and does not provide any basis to support the assertion that the assumptions are erroneous.

Emergency Planning Contention 15 (EP-15)

This contention challenges the adequacy of the offsite plans to provide adequate transportation to persons needing public transportation and to assure that evacuation orders are followed.

First, Intervenors assert there are peculiar conditions in the area, which have not been accounted for, since substantial numbers of adults and children would be home during the day with no vehicle.

Intervenors, however, have not identified any peculiar problem in the area, with respect to homes in which the automobile, or other vehicle is not at home during the day. The evacuation time estimates assume families with vehicles would reunite at home prior to evacuation

1 (CatawbaNuclearStationEvacuationAnalysis,ChapterV),andIntervenors have pointed to nothing, such as uniquely distant work locations or other possible impediments to workers returning home, which furnishes a

" reasonable explanation" for concern sufficient to warrant further inquiry into this particular matter. Thus, the requisite basis is lacking. See, Perry, supra; Peach Bottom, supra. The Staff would, however, admit for litigation the adequacy of plans for evacuating those segments of the population without cars.

Second, Intervenors reassert their concern that high school-aged bus drivers will not be available. As noted in response to Contention EP-14, the Staff would not oppose admission of the particular concern as to the availability of adequate numbers of bus drivers, or of back-up drivers.

Third, Intervenors question whether adeq' ate transportation facilities are available to evacuate hospitals and nursing homes in the EPZ, or whether there is provic. ion for transporting young children at day care facilities. These additional transporation concerns are are adequately specific and should be admitted for litigation.

Fourth, Intervenors assert that the State and local plans fail to address the possibility that parents, regardless of the plans, will want to pick their school children up, rather than to allow children to be evacuated directly by bus. This matter has sufficient basis to warrant further inquiry, and should be admitted for litigation with the other transportation concerns.

L

e e -Fifth, Intervenors assert that without "a full-scale exercise which demonstrated that these hard-headed Scotch-Irishmen are going to leave, no assurance can be had that the public will leave in the event of an evacuation order." As noted earlier, Part 50, Appendix E, does not require public participation in the exercise of the offsite plans, and this assertion is an impermissible attack on the regulations.

Sixth, Intervenors question whether adequate busses will be available, and assert that multiple bus pickups may be needed. However, the York County Emergency Operation Plan, Annex L, provides a detailed description of York County's plans for organizing bus transportation, including, at Appendix 3, a list of available busses and their capacities.

No basis is given why these plans are not adequate. On the other hand, the North Carolina plan does not contain specific references to resources available, but merely allocates responsibility for this function. North Carolina Emergency Response Plan, Part 1, pp. 58-59; part 2, pp. 9, 16; and Part 3, pp. 7-8.

The Staff would, therefore, favor admission of this particular concern with respect to whether there will be an adequate number of busses for transportation of school children in North Carolina, and the Staff would support admission of this contention as it raises the following concerns:

transportation for the institutional populations and those parts of the population without cars, the availability of bus drivers for transportation of school children, transportation of children in day care centers, whether there has been adequate provision to deal with parents driving to schools to pick up their children, and whether sufficient busses are available for transportation of North Carolina school children subject to evacuation.

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. Emergency Planning Contention 16 (EP-16)

This contention asserts that " provisions for medical treatment of those e,xposed and injured by a radiological emergency are inadequate."

The primary ground asserted for this contention is that there is an insufficient number of hospitals capable of handling "a large influx of radiation victims," and it is unlikely that sufficient numbers will agree to provide medical treatment due to the cost and lack of assurance of reimbursement.

Intervenor's contention fails to take into consideration the Comission's recent interpretation of the regulatory requirement in 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(12) that: " Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals." Southern California Edison Cohany, et al. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC (April 4,1983). The Commission there interpreted the requirement to encompass provisions for treatment of individuals who suffer both traumatic injury and radiological contamination and those persons "who have been subjected to dangerous levels of radiation and who need medical treatment for that reason."

Slip o_p_. at 11-12. However, the Comission determined that provision for registering and monitoring residents and transients from the plume exposure EPZ at relocation centers (NUREG-0654, Paragraph J.12), the 1

criterion for administering radioprotective drugs (NUREG-0554, Paragraph J-10), and the listing of medical facilities capable of providing monitoring and treatment for contaminated injured individuls (NUREG-0654, Paragraph L.3), "should ensure that adequate capability exists to handle radiological contamination or exposure." San Onofre, supra, CLI-83-10, slip op_. at 12, n. 12.

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. The Comission explained:

The nature of radiation injury is that, while medical treatment may be eventually required in cases of extreme exposure, the patients are unlikely to need emergency medical care. The non-imediacy of the treatment required for radiation-exposed individuals provides onsite and offsite authorities with an additional period of time to arrange for the required medical service. Thus, any treatment required could be arranged for on an ad hoc basis. Accordingly, emergency plans should include a listTiig of those local and regional medical facilities which have the capabilities to provide appropriate diagnosis and treatment for radiation exposure. No contractual arrangements or special training programs are necessary and no additional hospitals or other facilities need be constructed. No extraordinary measures are required of state and local governments. Diagnosis and treaunent could take place at most existing medical facilities. [ Footnote 12 is omitted; see above text.]

The scope and timing of medical treatment required and the underlying assumptions and structure of 10 CFR $ 50.47 lead us to conclude that adequate medical services could be provided by using existing local or regional facilities including arrangements made specifically for onsite personnel and emergency workers.

CLI-83-10, slip op. at 11-12.

As is apparent from the Comission's San Onofre decision, the emergency response plans need not assume "a large influx of radiation victims" at area hospitals. To the extent Intervenors argue to the contrary, their contention is an impermissible attack on the Comission's emergency planning regulations as interpreted by the Comission in San Onofre. No specific provision to accomodate persons subjected to dangerous levels of radiation is required beyond those arrangements otherwise made for onsite personnel and emergency workers, except to have developed a list of local and regional facilities capable of providing " appropriate diagnosis and treatment for radiation exposure."

id. Such a list is provided in Annex C to the South Carolina Site Specific Plan, together with letters of agreement with four hospitals, l

. and the North Carolina plan provides similar information in Part 1,Section V.B., pp. 79, 81, and in Part 2, pp. 37-38, and Part 3, pp. 39-40.

To the. extent that this contention seeks more than a list of those hospitals considered capable of providing such services, it would seek to impose requirements beyond those of the regulations and should be rejected on that basis.

Intervenors also state that the plans are inadequate in that they do not provide assurance that health personnel will stay "on site to treat victims," and that health personnel are not provided with adequate change of clothing and medical supplies. However, these assertions are vague.

Intervenors do not specify what " health personnel" or which

" site" they are referring to. Further, to the extent the adequacy of clothing and medical supplies at area hospitals is questioned, the contention goes beyond the planning requirements for medical services in 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(12), as interpreted by the San Onofre decision, discussed above.

As a result, Contention EP-16 should be rejected based in part upon its challenge to the Commission's emergency planning regulations, and in part because of its failure to provide adequate basis with reasonable specificity.

Emergency Planning Contention 17 (EP-17)

This contention states that Applicants, local and State officials should be required to place the radioprotective drug, potassium iodide (KI), in each residence within the 10 mile EPI, with instructions on use and purpose. This contention provides basis with reasonable specificity, and the Staff does not oppose its admission.

. Emergency Planning Contention 18 (EP-18)

This contention appears to challenge the adequacy of the con nunications system for notifying emergency personnel, due to excessive reliance on the local telephone system.

First, to the extent this contention challenges the adequacy of emergency comunications links between Applicants and the State and county warning points /E0C's, this contention is untiinely in view of the availability of this information in Applicants' plan since January 1983. See Applicants' plan, page F-1.

Intervenors have offered no reason for their delay, and good cause for their delay is lacking.

10 CFR Section 2.714(a)(1)(i). There is no basis for determining whether Intervenors could be expected to assist in development of a sound record (Section2.714(a)(1)(iii));andtheadmissionofthiscontention would undoubtedly serve to broaden and delay the proceeding (Section 2.714(a)(1)(v)). Assuming Intervenors' interest cannot be represented in any other forum or by any other party (Section 2.714(a)(1)(ii), (iv)),

balancingofthefiveSection2.714(a)(1)factorsstillweighsagainst admission.

Second, to the extent the contention challenges the adequacy of the means for notifying key emergency response personnel, it lacks basis and specificity. Each of the offsite plans details the primary and secondary methods of consnunication among State, county and other local warning points, and with law enforcement, fire, nedical, and other key response organizations.

(See York County plan, Annex B, Annex C, Annex Q,Section VI.B.; North Carolina plan, Part 1, pp. 87-92; Part 2, pp. 19-21; Part 3, pp. 46-48.)

No reference or recognition of this material is provided as basis for the contention, and, therefore, this aspect should be rejected.

. -.. - _ =

A e However, to the extent the contention addresses the manner in which each local response organization will mobilize its workers, such as the school systems' bus drivers, the plans as distributed do not appear to address Intervenors' concern, and the Staff would not object to admission of this specific aspect of the contention for litigation.

Emergency Planning Contention 19 (EP-19)

This contention asserts that State, local and other support personnel with responsibilities under the emergency response plans "do not possess the experience, training and technical ability to prepare for a radiological emergency and effectively implement measures required in the plans." This is an extremely broad contention, and lumps together all levels and types of emergency response personnel, from those with required high levels of expertise, training and experience to those for whom only limited training is planned.

It is quite similar, in fact, to the earlier rejected Palmetto Contention 4, and could easily have been submitted prior to the availability of the offsite plans. Thus, it could be argued that this contention is untimely. However, the major defect is the vagueness and the lack of basis with reasonable specificity. The contention, as proffered, is so broad that the experience, training and 1

technical ability of each and every person involved in some facet of f

implementing the plans would apear to be encompassed. Yet there is no basis provided for such a broad scope, or, for that matter, for a narrower scope limited to student school bus drivers or the "many specified officials" whom Intervenors do not identify. Nor is any aspect of the

training, drills and exercises called for under the plans addressed or accounted for (See, e.g.,Section VIII of Parts 1, 2, and 3 of the North Carolina plan; Sections R and S, Annex Q, York County plan; and Annex B, SCORERP).

The fact that the regulations require that plans make provision for training, drills and exercises (10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(14) & (15))

illustrates that it is not a defect in the plans that such training and related activities have not been completed.

In fact, such programs are of an ongoing nature. Thus the simple claim that all the planned activity has not already occurred cannot furnish the basis for a contention. Rather, the question is the adequacy of the program and whether there is reasonable assurance it can and will be implemented.

These matters are not addressed in the contention. Thus, the contention is vague, and overly broad and is lacking in basis with reasonable specificity.

It should be rejected on these grounds.

III. CONCLUSION While the great majority of the foregoing emergency planning contentions submitted by Intervenors are either unjustifiably late, lacking in basis with reasonable specificity, or impermissible attacks en the Comission's emergency planning regulations, aspects of a number of these contentions do present issues with sufficient basis to justify their admission. These are:

(1) EP-9; those aspects relating to notification of the hearing impaired and of the transient population in area theme parks in an emergency.

(2) EP-14; all aspects except that dealing with the " work and living habits" of the population;

o

. (3) EP-15; those portions relating to the adequacy of provisions for transportation for evacuation of the population without cars, persons in nursing homes and hospitals, and children in day care centers, the number of bus drivers, the availability of busses in North Carolina, and provision for dealing with parents going to schools to pick up their children; (4) EP-17 in its entirety; and (5) EP-18; that aspect questioning whether adequate means of communication are available for notification of local emergency response workers in the event telephone lines become overloaded (which may also encompass notification ofstudentbusdrivers,alludedtoinEP-15).

Therefore, the Staff supports admitting these six contentions narrowed to include only those specific concerns enumerated above.

Resp fully submitte eorge E.

o n

Counsel for NRt Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 1st day of August,1983.

l i

a._ 2 O

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of

)

DUKE POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

Docket Nos. 50-413 50-414 (CatawbaNuclearStation, Units 1 and 2)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO INTERVEN0RS' SUPPLEMENT TO THEIR PETITIONS TO INTERVENE CONTAINING EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's internal mail system, or, as indicated by double asterisks, by express mail, this 1st day of August, 1983:

  • James L. Kelley, Chairman
    • Robert Guild, Esq.

Administrative Judge Attorney for the Palmetto Alliance Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P. O. Box 12097 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Charleston, South Carolina 29412 Washington, DC 20555 Palmetto Alliance

    • Dr. A. Dixon Callihan 21351 Devine Street Administrative Judge Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Union Carbide Corporation P. O. Box Y J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.

Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Debevoise and Liberman 1200 17th Street, NW

    • Dr. Richard F. Foster Washington, DC 20036 Administrative Judge P. O. Box 4263 Sunriver, Oregon 97702 William L. Porter, Esq.

Albert V. Carr, Esq.

Richard P. Wilson, Esq.

Ellen T. Ruff, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General Duke Power Company P. O. Box 11549 P. O. Box 33189 Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Charlotte, NC 28242

    • Jesse L. Riley Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207

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  • Carole F. Kagan, Attorney Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555

~

  • Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555
  • Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555
  • Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 eo ge Joth )n ns or P Staff

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