ML20024C869
| ML20024C869 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/28/1983 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Zablocki C HOUSE OF REP., FOREIGN AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024C870 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307190057 | |
| Download: ML20024C869 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES e
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CHAMMAN June 28, 1983 The Honorable Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This responds to your letter of May 3,1983 in which you requested the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's views on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1983, H.R. 1417. Titles I, IV and VI of the bill do not directly affect NRC's activi-ties and therefore the Commission has no coments on those provisions.
Title II directly affects the NRC because, among other things, it would require the Commission to make certain findings before it issues a license authorizing the export of highly-enriched uranium (HEU).
The Commission has long supported the basic intent of Title II, which is to minimize the use abroad of HEU as a research reactor fuel. Several aspects of the proposed statutory requirements have, in effect, already been implemented by the Executive Branch and the Com-mission.
For example, the U.S. Department of Energy has prepared analyses on which foreign research reactors can be converted to use a lower enriched fuel, (LEU) and several countries (e.g. Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and Brazil) have committed to use lower enriched fuel in their research reactors.
A number of other countries are actively studying conversion to the use of lower fuel enrichments through participation in the U.S. reduced enrichment development program. As a result of these efforts to minimize use of HEU, the NRC expects a significant reduction in the number of U.S. exports of HEU in the coming years.
Consequently, the Commission does not believe at this time that any additional significant nonproliferation benefits would be gained if Title II is enacted into law.
Further detailed comments regarding Title II are enclosed.
Commissioner Gilinsky believes that Title II would help ensure that HEU is treated as a nuclear explosive material whose misuse could seriously affect our national security.. All civilian reactors, both foreign and domestic, which are fueled with this ma,terial should be encouraged to convert to LEU as rapidly as possible.
Title III would revise Section 131.b of the Atomic Energy Act to provide the Commission with, in effect, a formal concurrence responsibility for proposed subsequent arrangements involving the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel or the retransfer of over 500 grams of separated plutonium.
(Specifically the Commission would be required to confirm separately the broad judgments of the Departments of Energy and State that such reprocessing or retransfer will not result in a significant increase of risk of proliferation.) The Commission recognizes the inherent proliferation dangers of plutonium and, in particular, is concerned about the difficulties involved in developing adequate safeguards 8307190057 830628 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
s mechanisms for this material.
Under present law, the Commission only " consults" on Executive Branch agency judgments made in connection with approving subsequent arrangements.
Under the new provision in the bill, the Commission would be re-quired, in effect, to " concur" in such judgments. A shortcoming of this provision is that it provides no mechanism to resolve differences, should the Commission and the Executive Branch disagree in their respective judgments. A positive feature of the new provision is that it would give NRC judgments more significance and would roughly approximate our role in nuclear export licensing matters.
Commissioner Gilinsky believes that, in view of the danger posed by separated plutonium, subsequent arrangements involving the reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel or the retransfer of separated plutonium should be reviewed by the NRC, as specified in Title III.
Since the paramount concern with regard to nuclear exports is national security, Commissioner Gilinsky strongly supports the provisions of Title IV which give the Secretary of Defense a central role in deciding upon proposed Agreements for Cooperation, exports of production or utilization facilities or source or special nuclear material, and upon proposed subsequent arrangements.
Title V would prohibit the NRC from licensing the export of essential reproces-sing components.
The Commission has no comments on the merits of this proposal.
While no such exports have ever been made from the United States, we understand that the Executive Branch is considering the future approval of exports to Japan's proposed new reprocessing facility.
Significant U.S. support for this activity would, of course, be precluded under the proposed Section 134 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Commissioner Ahearne and I regret that the bill does not address whether the NRC must consider adequacy of IAEA safeguards and how adequacy is to be defined.
Note that 5127 of proposed H.R. 6318 would have done so. (See page 4 of attached July 22, 1982 letter.)
Sincerely, Lbh
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Nunzio. pa ladino
Enclosures:
As stated i
cc:
Rep. William S. Broomfield 1
1
ADDITIONAL. NRC COMMENTS ON TITL.E II 0F H.R.1417 THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY ACT OF 1983.
Section 136 would require the Commission, before authorizing the export of HEU, to detennine that:
(1) there is no alternative nuclear reactor fuel'available shich' could be used, and the reactor could not use fuel of lower enFichmbnt than that proposed; (2) the proposed recipient has provided assurances that when alternative reactor fuel becomes available, it will use that fuel in lieu of HEU; and.(3) the Executive Branch is taking the necessary steps to dev lop an alter 5ative fuel.
While not making the formal determinations called for by this section, the~
Comission under its current procedures does c~onsider these. same matters before de-ciding to -license an HEU export. Commissioners Ahearne'and Asselstine belie' vel that tEis section essentially codifies existing Executive Branch and Comission policy review practices regarding HEU exports.
However, the requirements for formal deter-minations in Sections 136(1) and 136(3)~ could prove difficult to implement since many of the judgements involved would be subjective.
Furthermore, in view,of past sensitivities abroad regarding the unilateral imposition of U.S. nonproliferation requirements, some foreign governments are likelyltc be concerned about' possible delays resulting from implementation of the proposed requirements, and may resist providing the U.S. with th's fonnal assurances that Section 136(2) would require.
l Commissioner Gilinsky does'not agree with the Commission's comments in this section.
I Section 137 would require the Commission, after~ consulting with the Secr tary of State, to determine a kilogram limit on the amount of HEU of U.S.'drigin, in the form of fresh o'r spent fuel, that will be~ allowed in each foreign co6ntry and at each reactor site within each country.
These limitations would be ipplied'in acting upon applications coveri.ng proposed exports of HEU.
This provision is apparently l
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g designed to provide the Commissien with pre-determined, easily understood guidelines for reviewing each HEU expor,t application.
Currently, DOE's Argonne National 1.aboratord prepares a comprehensive analysis of each significant HEU export license application, which,among other things, analyzes the need for the requested quantity of material.
This case-by-case approach is necessary since the quantity of U.S.-supplied HEU that is actually justified in a particular country can vary widely due to such factors as: (1.) fuel fabrication requirements;-(2) fuel loading schedules; (3) spent fuel storage capacity; (4) changing reactor operating characteristics; and (5) spent fuel reprocessing arrangements.
Accordingly, a kilogram limit appro' val is a.rather crude ~means for detennining appropriate export quantity limits to specific countries in widely differing circumstances.
In addition, because of the complex calculations involved and the large number of recipient facilities, determining, kilogram limits would impose a significant administrative burden on the NRC< staff.-and would probably require considerable negotiation with the Department of State.
Commissi60er Gilinsky does not agree with the Commission's comments in this section.
_Section 138 provides that the Commission and the Executive. Branch shall support efforts to' improve physical security arrangments for the export of HEU, in par-ticular the "TRANSEAVER Program." The Commission has no objection to this section, providing no addigional NRC resources are required.
t Section 139 provides that within three months after the enactment of H.R.1417, the Secretary of Energy, after consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to Congress a plan with respect to the development and the use in foreign reactors of lower enrichment alternative fuels.
As noted in our letter, the Commission has long supported efforts to develop and utilize alternatives to HEU and therefore has no objection to this provision.
We note, however, that Section 139 does not state that U.S. research reactors should also convert to low enriched uranium, wherever possible.
Without such a parallel statement, H.R.1417 may be viewed abroad as being unfair and. discriminatory.
URC is actively reviewing the
3 most expeditious means to achieve conversion of NRC-licensed reactors.
To our knowledge, no coinparable efgort exists with respect to the U.S. research reactors operated by the Department of Energy.
Section 140 defines terms used in Title II.
Those definitions are satisfactory from the Commission's standpoint.
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.2 The Honor'able Clement Zablocki, Chairman
, Committee on Foreign Affairs
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United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C.
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Dear Mr. Chairman:
This responds to your June 18, Regulatory Commission 's' views on H.R.1982 request for the Nuclear 6318.
This bill, which proposes major changes in U.S. law and policy addresses several areas which have been the subject ofre
. Commission interest for several years.
changes would directly affect the Con =dssion's exportSince the propqsed licensing responsibilities, it is appropriate that we
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provide comments on their impacts, bearing in mind that the Congress and the Executive Branch have the primary responsibility regarding the formulation of new statutory and policy initiatives in the nuclear export area.
The first major provision of H.R. 6318 would amend Section 402 (b) of the. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) to ban the export of major critical co=ponents and technology for reprocessing, enrichment or heavy water production facilities.
the merits of this proposal.The Commission has no comments on While no such exports have ever been made from the U.S., we understand that the Executive Branch. is considering the future approval of U.S.
exports to Japan's proposed new reprocessing facility and to Australia 's proposed uranium enrichment project.
Significant U.S. support for these activities would, of course, be precluded under the proposed amendment to Section 402 (b).
A second major provision of H.R. 6318 would prohibit U.S.
approval of reprocessing or. major plutonium retransfer subsequent arrangements until Congress finds that:
(1) effective international safeguards (providing timely
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warning of diversion) would be applied; and (2) adequate international sanctions to deter diversions of material have been established.
With respect to the first proposed finding, the Commission's March 2, 1982 letter to Representative Ottinger responding to safeguards-related questions noted the significant technical difficulties in safeguarding large-scale j
reprocessing facilities and our inability to count on P'
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- inspection alone to. provide timely warning of diversion of separated plutonium to weapon use if the necessary preparatory work has been done.
We believe that problems such as these would make it very difficult for Congress to make the proposed finding.
The U.S. Government and the IAEA, with NRC support, are continuing their efforts to Jimprove safeguards capabilities to correct existing deficiencies in this area.
At the same time, the Commission recognizes that IAEA safeguards cannot be solely relied upon 4
to provide assurances that weapons-grade material has not been diverted.
Information from non-IAEA sources and the nonproliferation credentials of the country involved and its relationship to the.U.S. also play a large role in determining whether or not U.S.
approvals for the 3
reprocessing or use of sensitive materials are granted.
. existing statutory provisions of Section 131.b. of the The Atomic Energy Act provide that " reprocessing or retransfer-will take place under conditions that will ensure timely warning to the U.S. of any* diversion...."
This formulation permits the reviewing agencies to consider both IAEA safeguards adequacy and other relevant factors, including very sensitive intelligence information, in connection with ~ -
reprocessing and retransfer decisions.
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With respect to the second proposed' finding regarding sanctions, the Commission shares a' concern regarding the importance of clearl against violations. y. defined and effective sanctions However, we note the significant' practical difficulties in reaching a broad international consensus in this area.
i The third major provision. of H.R.
6318 would add a new Section 133 to the Atomic Energy Act which would transfer authority over nuclear retransfers to NRC and increase U.S.
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statutory controls over retransfers to cover such activities as brokering.
It.is possible that transferring additional authority to NRC could dilute the Commission's attention to the primary health and safety issues encountered in regulati'ng the U.S. nuclear industry.
Thus this transfer may not be in the overall national interest.
the Commission believes that the factors involved inNevertheless, reviewing retransfer' requests are ersentially identical to those involved in the review of the initial export licensing i
requests and notes that, while o'they factors would be l
involved in such a decision, administratively consolidating in dne agency the authority to control both export and l
retransfer activities would not be unprecedented.
The Department.of Commerce exercises control over the export and e
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wording of S133 (a) and (b)
In any event, the license shall be required for "would be unworkable:
an NRC indirectly assists in any way.any activity which..
he manageable.
This is too broad to
, ith regard to the proposed expansion of the scope of the W
U.S.
. Government's control over transfers outside the U.S.,
the Commission agrees that some changes to current practic nay be warranted.
Both the Department of Energy and the e
State Department have recently agreed to expand existing U. S.
control mechanisms under 10 CFR Part 810 regarding foreign nuclear activities by U.S.
is our understanding tha't there is already an adequatefirms or indiv It statutory basis for changing DOE's regulations and,
.acdordingly, it may not be necessary to adopt any statutory
- amendments.
The Commission, under the provisions of Section 57.b. of the Atomic Energy Act, will be consulted regarding the proposed amendments to Part 810 and intends to support those changes which would further tighten DOE's Part 810 controls so that they coincide with the-Commission under 10 CFR' Part 110.
review we.will examine closely the merits of extendingIn connect Part 810 controls to cover such acti'vities as brokering by U. S. firms.
~The final provision in H.'R.
the Atomic Energy Act to require that the IAEA safeguards t63 j
be applied with respect to nuclear exports will be adequateo to provide " timely warning to the U.S.
of special nuclear material" prior to the time it could beof any diversion.
. converted into a nuclear explosive device.
the technical objective of IAEA NPT-type safeguardsThis relates to diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materialag However, the ability to meet this objective depends on how
" timely detection" and "significant quantity" are defined met at all facilities because of technological,At the pre resource constraints, legal, and and operational problems.
provision of H.R.
This 6318 is similar to the current wording of the NNPA (5131b (2) )
. under conditions that will ensure timely warning to thewhich i
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United States.
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(emphasis added.
allows consideration of the very sens)itive intelligenceHowever $131b information and the US-other country relations.
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proposed language for S127 restricts the findi safeguards, which cannot provide such inforng to IAEA mation.
n As you are aware, Congress has never cl i
regarding the issue of "adequac arified its intent licensing safeguards criterion.y" with respect' to the export
,Section 127 would provide such a clarification The proposed amendment to would not give the Commission the discretiore In this
, as drafted, exports where it could not make a positive fi di n-to license case-by-case basis provide " timely war,ning of diversion."that IAEA safeguards w n
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sufficient detailed safeguards information tstop e that the criterion is met.
o be assured
. are instances, particularly in nations with goodIt should be nonproliferation credentials, where the U S
.other than IAEA safeguards, has adequate assu,r 4
through means diversions.
Arrangements to obtain the de would have to be made with the importing ctailed information sufficient detailed information would not be a ountry, since through the current IAEA system vailable be to request fundamental changes to currAnother possibility w regarding the dissemination of safeguards infent IAEA practices information collected.
ormation and finally explicitly addressing the questioCommis on for Congress Commission must consider adequacy of IAEA n of whether the adequacy is to be defined.
safeguards and how legislation.We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed sincerely, I
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