ML20024C790

Transcript of ACRS 230th General Meeting on 790615 in Washington,Dc.Pp 262-576.Transcript Incomplete

ML20024C790
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	06/15/1979
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:
References
TASK-06, TASK-6, TASK-GB B&W-0760, B&W-760, NUDOCS 8307130323
Download: ML20024C790 (22)

Text

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ellllP NUCLEAR REG UL ATO RY COMMISSION i

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Date.

Friday, 15 June 1979 Pages :s: - 576 ACR80FRCE00PY.x.'

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g: :;gn s;A;IS 1:UC:IAR REGUI.ATORY CC:0!ISSICN'S 3

ALVISORY CC:0CT"*II C11 RIAC"0R SATICUARDS 4

Friday, 15 June 1979 5

6l The contener of this stenographic transcript of the I

7 prcceedings of tha United States nuclear Regulatory 8

Cc:=nissien's Advisory Cc==ittee en Reactor Safeguards (ACRS ),

9.

as.:eported herein, is.an uncer:cetod recced of the discussicas 10, rece ded at the meeting held en the above date.

. I.Ill No =acher cf the ACRS Staff and no participant at this l

12 nening ace 4 pts any respcasibility for errors or inaccuracies O.

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'AL?tSORY COMMITTEE CN REACTOR SAFIGTARDS 31 i

6-230th GENERA; MEETING 7'

8 Room 1046

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.1717 H Street, N. W.

i Washington, D. C.

I 10 i

Friday, 15 Ju.e 1979 II l The 230th General Meeting of the Advisc:/ Cc==ittee on 12 Reactor Safeguards was recontened, pursuant 'to adjournment, at O.

i II8:20 a.m.

t 14 ;! PRESENT:

ull 15 il DR. MAX W. CARSCN, Chairman 16 '4 DR. MILTON S. PLESSET, Vice Chairman jj MR. MYER SciDER, Merber MR. JESSE E3ERSOLE, Merber 17 *l MR. EAROLD ETHERC GTON, Merber PROF. WI* LIAM KEP.R, Marber 13 ';;

DR. STE? hcl LAWROSKI, Marber DR. J. CARSON MARK, Merber l

i MP. WILI,IAM M. MAT,HIS, Member t

.t DR. DADE W. MOE'"R, Member 20,

MR. JERE'iTAH J. RAY, Merber DR. PAUL S*.'WMON, Marber c

21 j DR. CHESTER P. SIESS, Member it 22 i' i.

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other as to what to think about when' those symptoms showed up, 9

,eij 2 I or does one individual have to think it, parform the action

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simultaneously?

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MR. HERSEIN:

We will let Bill Zewe respond to.thar

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MR.3 EWE:.E111 Zewe, shift supervisor for Met Ed.

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In response to your last questien, really, we conte

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as a group and talk out loud to each other Really, is isn' n.

't J,4 9j one, person that leads and th.e other person that lags, so to

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speak.

We just have a total group effort.

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I rw V,2,1, 11 In any situation that we have,.we try to select the YJ l

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12 proper course of action.- It was qlso true in this case.

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13 l We knew that we nad a problem wi*h the high level

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15 analyze it and trfing to come up with the richt approach.

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&.a 3.2) 16 l MR. BENDER:

I sort of looked through your discussi:

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.M 17 l the interview which had been held witn the people at the

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18 accident.

I couldn't find in that discussion anything that 4v l

19 l suggested that any of you had really addressed that cuestion, L

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,G'y 20 j, whether that valve was stuch or not.

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21 ;i Did it not cross anybody's mind t.:t that. thing

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l 22 might be stuck open?

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MR. ZEWE:

Well, from the indicacitn and from the

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G transient that we had, we knew that it sh:21d nave lifted and

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5 We did refer periodically to t..s discharge of 6l temperatures and also ecnsidered this, but we considered that 7i it had receded.

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3 MR. SENDER:

What was the indication it had been 9,!

closed?

I had trouble trying to discern how you came to that I

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conclusion.

I tried to figure out what I might assu=e, and I II had some trouble, and I wonder how it developed in your mind s

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that the valve was closed.

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I guess, really, from the indications that D

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2 we had that we didn't have the open. command signal and so forth ;

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'3 are right, the discharge temperatures, I felt, would be a very r

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good indication of the actual status of the va'Ive.

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not indicate,t>e-pressure in the drain tank'did not indicate, N

I 6f and we just did not feel at that point in time that it was still; 1

7 open.

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8 MR. BENDER:

Okay.

Well, so you,assuned the normal

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l action of the valve that-had occ',.trred, and there weren't encugh 10 ' symptoms to tell you that that was not the case.

s II MR. ZEWE:

That is correct.

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MR. BENDER: Thank you.

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kdyoufollow-systempressureandfind 13-DR. PLESSET:

14 any ancmaly there?

15 '

MR. : DIE:

Yes.

The system pressure was icw.

16 DR. PLESSET:

You didn't relate that to the possibility 17 of a stuck-open valve?

How did you explain it to yourselves?

18 }

MR. ZEWE:

We really didn'.t know.why the pressure was l'

icw.

We had several possibilities that we considered, because p

20 f we had initiated a large amount of emergent.y feedwater which 21 liwould tend to cool down the primary system and reduce pressura.

22 Also, the pressurizer heaters are powered free the same area as 23 the main steam safety valves, and we have.hsa p chless in the 24 f past with the high termperatures and high sci &:ure centent in ea

,wn.nac.p 25 $ that area affecting our heater capacity.

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un. n.ssaar:

Tne pressuriser level.was not low at e 2

that doint, or some part of this; is that right?

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3 MR. IEWE:

That is true.

The pressurizer level was 4

normal at tha enset, and then it 'Eid come down as soon as we 5

tripped.

But then shortly thereafter, within a few minutes, the.

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pressuri:er level began to increase at an abnormal rate, and it I

i 7' continued to increase.

3 DR. CARBON:

Chet, is your question on this subject?

9.

DR. SIESS:

I think so - if I know what the subject i

10 : is.

It's been changing around.

11 At what point in time did you reali:e that, say, this 12 : isn' t just a transient, this is a real, honest-to-ecodness LOCA l

13 !, that we've been reading about? liow did your thinking about t

I 14 ' thing: change when you made that transition, if you did?

15 MR. ~iWE:

I really didn't realize for qi. tite seme 16 time that we really had a LDCA condition, so to speak, that the 17 valve was open.

We didn't determine that until 6:20' whenever 18 lwe shut the block valve, tihat we actually had for the previous l

- 19 l, 2-1/2 hours, that we had an opening in the primary system going 20 i into containment.

Up to that point, I had no idea that we'd I

21 ' actually had a LOCA ccndition and that we were actually losing l

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22 l coolant water ove.r a continuous span of time.

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23 DR. SIESS:

When you began to think of LOCA, rather 24 h than transient, did it change your approach or your thinking,

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1 I significant change that you can recall 4-that point?

• 2 MR. ZEWE: No real significant change, because at this

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3 point we had already had on full high-pressure injection flow

~4 for approximately 40 minutes prior to finding valves shut.

So,

5. we actually had,all the flow that we had available into the-

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6 reactor coolant system at the' point at which we closed the block l

l 7

valve.

And we continued to keep the high-patessure injection 8,! flow going for sometime after we closed the block valve.

And I

9; then approximately around 7:00, then, we throttled back again 10 lon high-pressure injection flow because of the high pressure and g

i 11 ! high level conditions that we had at around 7:00.

12 j DR. CARBON:

Harold?

13 MR. ETEIRING*0N:

Has the low tail pressure with the 1dlopeningofthatvalvesnowbeenrationalized?

15 MR. ZEWE:

Tc my knowledge, in retrospect, depending

! on the varying condition: that you have and at what poin't your 16 17 l system is initially, you can have a varying tail pipe tempera-1 i

.18 0 ture.

But as far as som'e concern, we should have still had i

19 much higher temperatures indicated than any of,those I was aware, il 20 y to the neighborhood of 228 to 232' degrees.

21 hl MR. ETHERINGTON:

You think it should have been. higher N

22 li than that?

E 23 pl MR.

ENE:

Yes, sir, I do.

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MR. ETHERINGTON:

I would have thought if someone had y a.aom,s. sac. *j 23 $ looked at the te=perature, you'd expect to start with a two-phase 4

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I think it's about whTt 2

you'd expect on it.

Mr. Keaten says that 'the te.*.*.perature we 'd

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' expect in stream is 285.*

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DR. CARBON:

And what was the actual temperature there?

q 3

You said,tha

• .he, temperature you were aware of.

It's my impres-6! sion that you weren't aware of the true temperature; is that 7

correct?

l 8

MR. $ EWE:

That'is true.

I,ater -- and I have now the !

i 9

computer printout that has the discharge temperature at approxi.

10 mately 4:25 that indicated in the neighborhood of 295 degrees, ti andlater,approximatelyanhourlater,atabout5:3berso, 12 there was a fuither printout that showed thati it was about 283

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13 degrees.

Both of which I had no knowledge of at the time.

14 DR. CARBON: And why was that? I have not understood 15 why you weren't aware of that temperature or why thought it was 16 about 230.

17 MR. IEWE:

I have requested that the discharge tempera-18 tures be checked on the computer, and the numbers that I got I

19 back from the computer -- all right -- were 228, 232, none higher 20 than that.

And these numbers, as far as I know, were called up 21 on digital display, which is not printed out on the computer.

a 22 I have not yet dete. mined to this time who actually 23 requested the particular printout that we new have for those g a n.. 24 temperatures at those two particular times.

23 ll oR. cARBcs,. yhen you,ay you ceyue,te, thi,,rcm the I

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tion for you from the computer?

Is that Ghat you're saying:

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3 reported back to you, but it was 2307 1

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MR. ZDE :

Originally, I had asked the Unit 1 shift i

I 5; supervisor to co:pe to Unit 2 right after the trip.

It was this j 6; shift supervisor t. hat I had asked.to look over the computer 7l alarms and to check the discharge tail pipe temperature.

And I 8' can't remember specifically if it was him that told me directly I

9! cr if it was relayed to me through one of the other personnel 10 lt in the control room at that time.

11 DR. CARBON:

And so, believing that it was on the o

12 i order of 230, you felt that that did not indicate a. stuck-open g

F 13 k valve?

i il 14.i MR. ZUE:

Yes, sir.

The few days prior to the acci-15 j dent, the discharge temperatures on both of the. code safetys 16 I and the electrcmagnetic relief valve were in the neighborhood I

li jl, o* 190 degrees, and I knew that the relief valve hadn't lifted, l

18 5 and I. felt the 23 0 degrees, that -the tail pipe te=perature was i

19 !

lstillcoolingdownfrombeinginitiallylifted.

And I really 20 [! didn't have a feel for how 'long you would be at an elevated 21 :{ temperature.

But' I had thought at the time that an hour would

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22 'i not be unusual, to where we would come down within the 200-i 23 fj egree alarm.

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ca. try:33x2, you heye e p cceeuz, ;a3ezed a3nor=at p mesemn sac..;,

25 pressurizer behavior," and you coute he symp*.ns that appear b!

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2 MR. ZEtTE:

I can quote several of them, I believe.

3 You are probably referring to the symptom of " greater than 120 4

dgrees in the tail pipe temperatures."

5 CR. LIP!!! SKI: That's one of the:a.

What are the t

6; others?

7 MR. ZEWE:

The other ones are boron concentration, 8

higher in the pressuri:er than in the reactor coolant system, 1

9f drain tank temperature high'and pressur^e high.

i 10 l DR. LIPI!: SKI: And the 4"-ediate action.

l 11 I MR. IEWE: And the immediate action is to evaluate 12 and then shut the block off.

5 hat part did this procedure play in 13 DR. LIPI: SKI:

14 your analysis in action?

15 MR. % EWE:

It really didn't play any part, in my 16

=ind, in the accident at all, because I really didn't reference 17 the procedure, as such, for those symptoms, because I knew that i

18 we had been 60 degrees or greater than 130 degrees under these i

1 19 symptoms, and I knew -- and it had been evaluated before by l

20 li. management - that we were to continue to operate with one of I-j 21 l the three relief valves leaking by because we were still within 22 l the confines of *our technical specifications and the leakage 23 was not a new thing to us because we had experienced the same 241l sort of leakage on the Unit I reactor plant during its first e n

,wi. sac.l fuel cy l c

l 25 c e stages.

For practically the whole cycle, we had some

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2 So that we were accustomed -- at leasu it wasn't a

'3 brand-new thing to us to have some leakage par. sad on to the relief valve, so it was rather accepted.

And everyone knew a

,3.about it, anc we. accepted it as fact.

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6' DR. LIPINSKI:

But what about the anomalous boron l

! behavior; wasn't there some question in the sequence of events 7

8i as to why the boron concentration was behaving like it was?

.i 9

MR. ZEWE:

Well, I am afraid here that we are talking !

10 [ about,two different things.

Prior to the event, we had had the

• s 11 I spray valve and the manual depressurizer heaters in hand in t

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i 12 j order to equalize the boron concentration, which is higher than,

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13 l the pressurizer, and bring it out into' the reactor coolant sys.

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14 I tem to have an equalized boron concentration.

I 15 :

The other readings that you are referring to all right 16 weze the low boren' readings that I received later on, sometime 17 into the accident, which were of a low boren nature. The 1.8 p'resence of leaking relief' valves causes an increased boren 19 ! concentration in the pressurizar.

Il 20 l DR. CARSON:

Bill.

21 PROF. KERR:

Help my memory.

I seem to have rehd 22 somewhere that earlier in the startup process en TMI-2,'it did 23 have another stuck-open relief valve incident.

Is my memory 24 i playing tricks-on me?

l w mes,w,. sae. ji 23 h MR.

EWE:

That is true, sir.

I belic/c the date was e

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1 March 29, 1978. We 'did have the alectromatic relief valve fa41 =!A' 2

open.

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3 PROF. KEKR: Were the conditions of temperature and f

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4 other things at that time well known? ifas that something --

5 MR. Zrq::

That was the day after initial criticality.,

a 6

All right?

So our temperature was in the neighborhood of 532 7

degrees at that time.

The failure at th$s time was cauced by a power failure 8

e 9 which activated a high-pressure contact to give the control 10, signal to the valve, saying that we actually had a high-pressure -

11 condition which caused the valve then to see high pressure, and 12 lwe opened it in the ner=al manner to a false high-pressure l

i 8

y 1

I 13 signal.

The, power loss was nc.t to the supply of the valve I

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itself, but only in effect to the relay centact that resulted I

-l 15 ' in a falso high-pressure signal as seen by the valve control 16 cirenit.

So that valve then did open, and it was subsequently 17 shut.

18 And we had a. modification to the circuitry.to preclude '

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19 that happening again.

That is when we installed the command 20 ; red light in the control room, saying that if we had a command 21 light on t'o open, that we had a ecmmand signal ordering the valve 22 <to open up.

23 PROF. KIRR: Was there enough familiarity with the 24 le a nm. sac.il system,that you are aware, of what the thermoccuple reading was 25 i following that incident, for example, so that you had scme basis E'

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' for comparing the readings at that point with the readingT'y d~~

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were getting at this point?

Or was the situation so different 3

that compari, son didn't make sense?

4 MR. ZEWE:

Well, I did not beforehand remember what 3I the ter.peratures were as a result of that stuck-open valve

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,really did not have an absolute number -- all right? - to say 0

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l that the temperature should be here,with some firm validity.

8 We had done extansive testing in Unit 1 to a very similar 9

arrangement of the discharge pipes, and I was involved in some IO ' of that data-taking.

And in those we had the temperatures in U

! the neighborhood of 360 degrees, which I did remember those 12 i D

and I sort of expected that ballpark.

But knoving that the I3' exact type arrangement is a little different, I really didn't l'.have, you know, j

a real good, fi :n value for them.

But I expecte-I3 I considerably higher than 23.0 degrees.

I' We had seen Unit 1 as high es 210 or so, or 215 I7 degrees; fue to just normal valve leakage also, and this spread, 18 I figured, was really the. result of the opsning inclosure'still U

going off at this point.

]

20 PROF. KERR: Thank you.

II DR. MOEI.LER:

In answer to an earlier question, you

.22 i

said that at about 6:20 was when you first really began to 23 [ reali=e -- I don't want to misquete you - bu ; to realize th t a

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you really had a problem.

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MR. ZZWE:

No, sir.

That is when !.. C.I.'ed that the H

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I knew early o,e-S 1

2 that we had a problem, and we were trying'to deal with that l

'3 problem.

4 DR. MOELLER:

Excuse me.

I believe this 6:20 is after -

h 5} -- and perhaps even a half or more after - ycu had shut down

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the primary coolant pumps; is thfa correct,?

6 7

MR. ZEWE:

Yes, sir.

At the same time that we secured the last two reactor coolant pumps, whicli were the A side pumps, 8

we initiated full high-pressura injection at the same time, t

10 which was approximately 5:40, if I remember right.

I 11 i DR. MOELLER:

What did you interpret then as the cause i

I 12 i of the vibration in the primary coolant pumps?

I 13 MR. ZEWE:

FroT our curves, from the reactor coolant i

14 h pump, net positive suction c==:ve, we were just helow the net i

15 l positive suction head for the pump..Being a large' pu=p, as it 16 is, I expected to see vibration, change in flow, and al'so the 17 change in amps, because we were below the. net positive suction I

18 head for ths.t pump.

19 I really didn't realize that we had voids in the sys-20 j tem at this point.

I just attributed that to being below that l

Il l

21 i curve for the het positive suction head.

At that time I really

~

didn't have a very definite feel of going below the net pos,i-22 J

l tive suction head for a large pump of that construction, exactly 23 l

24 what I would see other than I should see vibration, flew escil-n noe mn. sm. -

lation, and a variation in amperage.

25

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327-1 DR. MOELLER:

Thank you.

2 DR. CARBON:

Carl.

3 MR.' MICHEL3ON:

I am still a little at a loss as to

-j the operator's it terpretation and response,to the fact of the 4

I j

5!'

f sump pump in containment started at 7-1/2 minutes, another one 4

started at about 10 minutes, a high level of iron in the sample

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7

=cceived, and these pumps continued to run.

]

8.}

E What were you thinking when you watched all this rump 9

pump action?

'd I

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MR. ZZWE:

The first knowledge that we had -

"we" s

11 ; being myself, the shift foreman, and the control rocs operators 3

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a 12 i

. vere aware that the 2c.mps were even on when the auxiliary t

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13 operator called us from his desk at tire rad waste panel in the i

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' 14.! auxiliary bui. ding.

There he had a direct indication of the 1

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j 15 aump level.

Also, he has an indication of both sump pu=ps and d,

16 control of those su=p pumps available.

3

?

17 He called us up and informed us that, in fact the

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18 su=ps showed a six-foot level, which is the ma$cim'd reading for 19 that sump, and also that both sump pumps wehe running.

This was i

I 7^

j approximately 4:35 or so.

When he called the control com, the

,li 21 one control room operator informed me.

Then we asked the con-1 e I

'1j N.,

22 trol room - or the. auxiliary opiitrator, pardon me, to secure 3j 23 !'l both o' these sump pump's and to check his line, which he 'further

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.sas.9 related back that he had secured the pumps.

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24 He did not al'ter

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-J 23 :. any valves, but he did check to see the position of these valves

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5 i.jfor that line.

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1 A: this point, all right, 'it was just about the'*

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.m time when we observed the level, pressure and temperature L

3 in the RC drain tank.

We knew scmething was wrong with the m

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drain tank and that we enuld have transferred water from the

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3j drain tank to the sump.' But we hpd no idea that it was a

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6, continuing' effect of putting water to the sump.

Once we i

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g 7 y indicated six feet, 1

I which is the maximum reading, we had no

'9 8;

further indication l

hat we were putting water continually I

9:

into the sump.

I-lj I

y 10 DR. CARSON:

Mike?

Q

.g 11 MR. BENDER':

A couple related cuestions.

One, A

l C

12 j somewhere along the way you suspected that maybe one of the S

i

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13 I steam generators had developed a leak.

I don't know that ay O

14..

you tried to analyze the si:e of them.

• 3 i

j 15.i Where did that occur in the accident analysis O

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sequence, and what was it that led you to that con =1usio.57 16

-j 17 l'

,ist. zghE:

Okay.

':'he thought that the B steam

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.13{ generator had a secondary side leak,into containment -- well, d

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'I 19 ;

l h

our pressure indicator for the 3 steam generator was about

]4 20 300' pounds less than the A stear generator.

Also, we had 4

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21 ',

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the higher temperatures in the reactor building and an 3

22Ll increased pressure in the reactor building.

M h

3 23 We did not suspect that we had a primary leak.

'S o 24 f I felt at tha.

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• ime that -- we considered that possibly we c

23k had a steam generator leak in the containment from the

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secondary side.

So we ther. isolated, and I'm not sure of%5e-i

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7 2 j " exact time, but prob 2bly in the neighborhood of shortly af ter a

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3, 5:00 o' clock we isolated the' generator.

And then we obscrved ra".g I

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a leveling off and a decrease of the mactor building pressure, e.q i

yg 5i f.3.. BENDER:

Did ti.e radioactivit.y that the

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auxiliary rocm operaterr had reported centribute to that A

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7 conclusion?

A

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g MR. ;ENE:

I'm sorry, sir?

--C 1

9l MR. BENDER:

I thought that the diser.4y that i

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there was some radioactivity in the auxilia..y building was j

11 one of the things that your auxiliary operator reported to h

12 '

ycu.

Did that contribute to that conclusi.on or was that an 4

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p, l

13 l indecendent kind of thing.

l M.

14 ;

MR. :: EWE:

The radiation I learned of later, not U*g II s

u 15

• at that time.

But I believe that you're referring to the M

lM 16 e< monitor that was right i..ar the rad wastes tower.

There's pa 91 l

.9 17 }'

l M

sn RM l4 that we monitor to go between Unit 1.and 2.

The

r.I:

E3 operator had reported, the control rocm operator, that he M.

18 '

$5 19 ;

had seen an increase in that monitor, I'

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d

.I 20 !.

I was not aware at that point.

But that would

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21 J certainly not lead me to think that,we had a secondary side P*

22 I

generator leak phase, that I had an indicatien near the I

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23 ; ' fuel-handling b.'.ilding that we had an ine ca: sed radiation, e.x a.

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MR. BINDER:

Had there been any ir..:iea-ion of leaking

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me-2E MR. ZZWE:

No, there hadn't, to my Pnowledge.

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3; MR. EC: DER:

I understand you ccafir=ed, now, that' l

I 1

4; there is a leak frc= one s*.eam generator; is that true? And i

l 5*

if so, what was the confirmation?

i 8

g 4:

.MR. ARNOLD:

We do have that activity in the j

l 7 i B steam generatar.

It appears that there was a contaminati:n 5-cf the secondary side early on the morning of the 28th, and I

9 since that time there's been no indication of further 10 transfer from pri=ary to secondary side.

So the supposition i

11 at this point is that a leak in one of the tubes.

I guess k

12 there's also the posribility that at some point or other I

13 l there was transfer frcm 'the containment building atmosphere s

14 g into the sec=ndary side through vent valves or back from 15 ]

the drain tank past the seats of those valves.

16,'

MR. BENDER:

Let me get back to one last quick 17 f.

question, I hope.

The cbservatica that the !!PSH was low on il

't" 18 4 - the primary ecolant pu=p line -- what things do you conclude 19 :1 when that occurs? What things would centribute to that 20 i effect?

I 21,j MR. ZZWE:

The pressure and teeperature relationship.

.I 22.:

MR. BINDER: Well, that might happen.

But if it i

e 23 !.

happens,'what.hings can cause it?

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4 24..'

MR. ZEWE:

Depressurization.

a.co e,s. ae. 6 23 -i MR. BE:: DER:

if the pressure is equalized on both is' e

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2, you thinking because the water is hot encugh?

3 l -

MR. ZEWE:

I see.what you're saying. But I consider l 4

i just the normal cavitation effect that you havt vour lowest I

[

l 5

pressure pol..t and you have bubble formatier, and then the I

1 subsequent collapse in the loop would result in the vibration i

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indication, cavitation of the pump.

8l MR. BINDER:

So it just nas to do with the water i

flashing?

i 10 'ii MR. ZIWE:

Yes, it is.

i 11 l MR. SENDER:

Thank you.

i 12 I

~~

DR. P m SET:

Could I just follow up on that same h

I3 question? How far odf the pu=p densign point was it' when you 1

I' I

looked, just before you shut the pu=ps off; do you have.any t

15 l idea?

I' !

MR. ZENE:

I recall icoking at it.

We were below I

II E it.

And I really didn't -- or I can't re===ter at this I:

IIh poin,t exact. points.

But,we.were below it.

Not a great deal 19 -

below it, but we were below it.

2 l

DR. PLESSET:

That's what I wondered, how far down 21 j ou may not have been a great deal down, b'ut just you were.

22 !i somewhat.

23 h MR. ZEWE:

Right.

f 2a l'

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DR. CARBON:

Steve?

r newmi, inc. n 23 :I' DR. EAh'ROSEI:

Somewhere, I guess 1.

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not getting a water solid behavior like you expected from i

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what the pressurizer level was doing.

Can you explain?

j 4

MR. IIHE:

'l'hst is true, because at first, with 5

the high pressurizer level, we should have had, in our I

t 6:

estimation, closs. to a solid system, and if we would have had !

g l

7 a solid system, we would have had a corresponding change in 3

pressure if it went solid all right. So:that we believed at l

9-this point at times that'we did not have true level indication.

f N

So then we did make an extensive effort to try to check out to i

11 our pressurizar level.

l 12 So we selected the other transmitters, of which I

I l

13 i there are three, and thih we selected the co.puter peints for !

s 14 the pressurizer level, which does its own compensation, and 15,

it also has uncompensated level. And I also sent an auxiliary '

16 operator into the auxiliary building to observe uncompensated l i

17 levels locally in the auxiliary building.

And we really 1

13 '

couldn't eenclude anything other than all three instruments 19,.

read the same.

20 [

It could have been some cc::: mon mode of failure.

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21 -

DR. LAWROSKI:

I see.

I 22 l)

MR. ZIWE: We just didn't know at this poin't.

But I

23 we believed that it was a high water level.

i 24 DR. LAWROSKI:

You didn't think of any other things h a mri. sac..

25..

that were accounting for the fact that water solid behavior

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2 j expected from the performance of the pressurizer?

MR. ZEWE:

Yes.

,3l I could not, determine why we 4i did not have the indication.

DR. I AWROSKI:

Did you' try to surmise what might e

6 have been the reasons?,

l i

7 MR. ZEWE:

I did try, sir, yes.

I really could not l 81 deter =ine, all right, exactly why we had that indication.

i 9l DR. I.AWROSKI:

Has anything been included in the jo training, possible reasons for that?

B n

11 MR. ZEWE:

Not that'I was aware of at the time or j

i 12 that I could recall to you, or I would certainly have used 13 it, yes, sir.

~'

34 DR. CARBON:

Does that ques'tions? We're getting l

l

3

• behind.

1 i

I 16 I,et's take a ten-minute break, i

17 (Brief -recess. )

jg j DR. CARBON:

I,et's resume the meeting.

19ll Are we ready for Item No.

4, Mr. Arnold?

l i

20,!

MR. ARNOI.'.):

We have just a couple minutes on i

Item 3-D, if you'd like to pick that up.

3 22 DR. CARSON:

All right, fine.

23

[

MR. HEIGEIN:

Mr..Herbein again.

1 1

24 l.

Continuing under unit operations, specifically with

) a <wn. sac.4 23 3-D, the role of the 3&W site representative.

Our 3&W site

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