ML20024C773
| ML20024C773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1983 |
| From: | Bradley E PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8307130271 | |
| Download: ML20024C773 (23) | |
Text
I PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 EDW ARD G. B AUER. J R.
1215)841-4000
- ':::::.','"..m..u EUGENE J. BR ADLEY associavs esseemas counsst DON ALD BLANKEN RUDOLPH A. CHILLEMI E. C. MIR K H A LL T. H. M AMER CORNELL P AUL AUERBACH assisvant esumma6 counssk EDW A RD J. CULLEN. J R.
THOM AS H. MILLER, J R.
}une }g, 1gg}
IRENE A. McKENN A assestant causessh Mr.
A.
Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Limerick Generating Station, Units 162 Responses to E f fluent Treatment Branch Re fe rence:
PECO and NRC Conference Calls dated May 5, 24, and June 8, 1983 File:
GOVT l-1 (NRC)
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
As a result of the discussions in the referenced conference calls with the E f fluent Treatment Branch reviewer, we are forwarding the following attached documents.
1)
Revised draft response and FSAR page changes to NRC Ques tion 4 60.5.
2)
Additional information related 'to ESF Filter System
' Instrumentation.
l 3)
Draft FSAR page changes to Section 11.3 concerning Hydrogen explosions in the gaseous radwaste system.
4)
Draft FSAR page change to Section 11.4, Solid Waste Management System, that assures suitability of packed wastes for shipment and burial.
I I(
8307130271 830628 1
PDR ADOCK 05000352 i
A PDR
,t
. The information contained on the draft response and FSAR page changes will be incorporated into the FSAR, exactly as it appears on the attachments, in the revision scheduled for i
August, 1983.
4 1
4 Sincerely, Eug eJ Bradley RJS/gra/64 Copy to:
See Attached Service List i
t l
l j
- 6 cc: Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/o enclosure)
Judge Ri~ chard F. Cole (w/o enclosure)
Judge Peter A. Morris (w/o enclosure)
Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Ann P. Ilodgdon (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Frank R. Romano (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Robert L. Anthony (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Marvin I. Lewis (w/o enclosure)
Judith A. Dorsey, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg (w/o enclosure)
Thomas Y. Au, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Mr. Thomas Gerusky (w/o enclosure)
Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Steven P. liershey (w/o enclosure)
Donald S. Bronstein, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Mr. Joseph II. White, III (w/o enclosure)
David Wersan, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Martha W. Bush, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Spence W. Perry, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (w/o enclosure)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (w/o enclosure)
Docket and Service Section (w/o enclosure)
, I)2 AFT - EEVISEb EESPONSG TO
}NS i"#
< ' (V R C.
(
E.W.oegt TveA,ttmedt 8 ste,Ms. Sec.I ord 0
-,]rmnhcerva J u h* 1 f H
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OUESTION 460.5 gte,g.4g-3 U
Provide sufficient information to meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52 in regard to the RERS.
Provide the design description including the provision for control of relative humidity, residence time, etc, as was provided for the SGTS and control room emergency fresh air intake systems.
We will need this information to evaluate the system per SRP 6.5.1.
RESPONSE
Table 6.5-2 has been changed to show conformance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52 in regard to RERS residence times.
"uridity contrc! it not neccccary for the "E".S heee'>er, cc discussed bricw.
During post LOCA R:nO epcration, the maximur calculated long-ter relatice humidity 10 belcu 'O percent.
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/ .I O O b 1,. _ .m l QUESTION 460.5 %g y[3g[ERERS. 3It was al so determined that'demisters were not necessary for the a g. g This conclusion is based upon the f ollowing analysis of a h.g {qp ac 3 postulated situation in which water droplets are assumed to be formed Sffrom system leakage and the possible migration paths of this leakage ) W .t d ^ 3 j'g 7 o the RERS filters. t leakage from the drywell/ suppression pool to the reactor 3 yThe estimated s+ enclosure is limited by several mecnanisms. Tnese are qfy a) The limit of o.5%/ day air leakage imposed by the p leak test technical specification, the periodic th gcontainment e a!nte grated Leak Rate Test and individual valve leak tests. jo ? b) The programs of preventave maintaintence implemented by h h v>.1 }4 NUREG 0737 Section III.D.1.1 to minimize system leakage. This program 1;:dj.4 includes helium leak detection for gaseous systems and liquid detection / inspection for liquid containing systems. 5 J$ c) The postulated passive f ailure of a RHR pump seal and I] IM resulting release of liquid. M f These contributions to the DBA/LOCA are considered in the FSAR Section cg jfdY 15.6.5 analysis and in SRP 15.6.5 Appendices ALB. d.) Air Leakage The 0.5%/ day leak rate corresponds to approximately 1.4 cfm, which dictates only pinhole size leak paths. These small leak paths serve to condense out moisture and preclude droplet formation. Liquid Leakage The PECO preventative maintainence program will maintain normal plant leaks to low flow dripping type leakages. Any leakages with spraying water droplets will be identified and corrected as part of the maintence program. However, for the purpose of this discussion, a postulated passive failure of a RHR pump seal is assumed (SRP 15.6.5 result 3in a 5 gpm leak of l f4 F Q h. Appendix B). This assumption suppression water at less than 212 degrees F,grnd may produce water spray into the air. Since the water is below the boiling point, the airborne water will fall to the floor and subsequently into the floor drains with little or no flashing. Should water be sprayed from the passive failure. it can be shown that any droplets formed travel less than 20 feet; based upon analyses of spray systems where the nozzles are designed to maximize the development of water droplets.2.These analyses have shown that 1000 micron droplet would travel no more than 20 feet in a horizontal direction with an initial velocity of 3000 f t/sec. The travel di st ance from the RHR pump seal to the local RERS exhaust vents i is a approximately 4WP feet vertically and 10 f e:-t horizontally. AJO Anotbu ts a rJ A W3Tfactor virtually el(minating the potential for water droplets d~ dwar. er io hvGt. As b AS 0 c %est d M effecfof the unit coolers in the ECCS rooms. These coolers have flow rates of 9000 to 22000 cfm. The major objective of the unit coolers is to insure cool ambient air in the RHR room and condense excess water vapor. The RHR pump rooms have redundant coolers each operating at 21800 cf m. The unit cooler airflow competes with the 310 cfm RERS exhaust airflow. Over 95% of the I moisture in the air will go through the unxt coolers and not into the ductwork.
g 'g y Go hpodba he Al ^y o AJc n WOAw s hc4 h y fq, CC {c %cen e. 6to q kV $ M f. n w ktAt' Nce 9/9 /\\ water dropisto cntcring tho oxheust duct muot mako'en immediate 90 degree turn. A 155 foot per minute (1.8 mph) RERS exhaust air velocity is not sufficient to overcome the force of gravity to impart a verical upward velocity to any water droplets. Over 400 feet of RERS ducting containing valves and dampers and (at least 15) exist between the exhaust and numerous bends and turns This tortuous path results in droplets either falling the profilters. back or impacting on the walls of the ducting where it will evaporate due to the less than 100% humidity in the airflow. Furthermore, any water droplets suspended in the small airflo (310 RS from is diluted by 59700 cfm entering the,, cfm) f rom the RNR. room other parts of the reactor enclosure. Since the calculated maximum humidity is less than 76.2%, water droplets carried with the airstream would be (eda pov*wo, b4 d to reach the RERS filters, k e. b fbmust first pass through th WCf prefilter and the HEPA filters before impacting the charcoa medium. these filters are more efficient at removing water from air g \\ *O Both of Water removed would be evaporated in the air due to 'T ' than demisters. \\ g y.s h u m b d s [s P g b e'spJ W3 Skgy 7(,, %, the Given these physical conditions and the lack of a significant source of water droplets, there is no need to install a demister on the RERS. I l is 1.Sprayco Co., Catalog "17/A Noz le f or Nuclear Containment Vessels," Spray Engineering Co., Burlington, Mass., includes: Article from Nuclear Tech. Vol. 1. April 10, 1971. " Drop Distribution and Spray Effectiveness," W.F. Pasedag and J.1. Size Gallagher. DRAFT" I 1 g., e
.._m m kWhDN 7-) s f. Additional Information For The ,j m, NPC Pelated To ESF Filter Systm Instrumentation [ FSAR Table 6.5.9 provides a detailed cm parison of the ESF filter instrumentation designed and installed on the Limerick Plant and the 4 recent guidelines provided in Standard Review Plan Table 6.5.1-1. Per the request of Mr. C. Nichols of the USNFC, we are providing further clarification as to why PECo meets the intent of the guidelines that require the following additional instrumentation in the main control rom: - recorded flow rate indication - high flow alarm - recorded pressure drop indication for first HEPA The controls for the Limerick ESF filter systes were designed prior to the issuance of Reg Guide 1.52, ANSI N509, and SRP 6.5.1. We have provided adequate instrumentation to assure reliable operation of the systms. Although not in strict accordance with SRP guidelines, we feel that we have met Reg Guide 1.52, Position C.2.g by providing alternate system instrumentation, to accmplish the aim of the SRP guidelines. r It should be noted that the ESF Filter systms operate for post accident conditions only, with the exception of the limited SGTS operation for drywell purging. Also, per technical specification requirments, we will be periodically operating each sub-syst m to evaluate systm performance. This will include the monitoring of the filter pressure drops and resultant change out as required, as well as syst s flow rates. A. Reactor Enclosure Recirculation Systm (REPS) This filtration system is a constant flow (60,000 CFM) clean-up systs consisting of two 100% redundant fan / filter trains. It provides for the clean-up and mixing of the post ITA reactor enclosure secondary containment atmosphere. We have concluded that recorded flow indication and recorded pressure drop indication of the first HEPA filter in the control rom is not necessary. A low flow switch is provided that autmatically causes a changeover to the standby RERS and initiates a control rom alarm whenever the system flow reduces to approximately 80 to 90% of total systm design flow. This alarm is indicative of high filter pressure drop, as well as any other systm degradation that would cause a low flow condition. This autmatic changeover feature has eliminated the need for the operator to nonitor deterioration of systs performance (flow and filter pressure drop) and manually change over to the standby RERS. We have not provided a high flow alarm in the control room. The flcw control damper for this systs fails closed on loss of power, which would initiate a loss of flow and changeover to the standby REPS. B. Standby Gas Treatment Systm (SGTS) This filtration systm is a variable flow clean-up systs consisting of two 100% redundant fan / filter trains. The SGIS serves two functio =:
- 1) The safety related function is to drawdown and maintain a negative pressure in a secondary containment zone that is affected by accident conditions. The flow through the SGrs filters for this mode of operation l
can vary anywhere frm approximately 500 CEM up to 3250 CFM (max. fan
-= 3 77 i s j d capacity) depending on secondary containment gone leakage n zones simultaneously connected to the SGTS, and the size of the zone. The SGTS fan and fan bypass damper controls constantly adjust the flow rates through the SGrs to meet the changing conditions; 2) The i 1 non-safety related function of the SGTS is to filter 11,000 CFM of air being drawn frm containment for drywell purging operations. Recorded flow indication in the control rom is not provided for this syntm, since the flow rates will nomally vary to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure. A valid measure of SGTS performance is not the flow rate, but it's ability to maintain the secondary containment at the required negative pressure. Secondary containment differential pressure indication and low alarm annunciation is provided in the control room to monitor this condition. SGIS flow rate indication is available in the control rom, but it is not a recording indicator. The SGTS controls provide for autmatic changeover to the standby SGTS on loss of flow. i We have not provided a high flow alarm for this syst m in the control. rom, since it can be normal for the flow rate to match maximum fan capacity (specifically for initial secondary containment drawdown). A recorded pressure drop indication across the first IEPA filter is not necessary, since the maximum effect of dirty filters result in l the inability of the ScrS to maintain the secondary containment differential. This condition is presently indicated and alamed in the i control rom. Additionally, it should be noted that there is little potential for any significant increase in IEPA filterAP. The IEPA filter bank was sized for the non-safety related purge mode (11,000 CFM) and is, therefore, greatly oversized for the safety related mode of operation j (500 - 3250 CFM). In it's long term operation mode relating to a l DBA/IOCA Scenario, all air entering the SGIS has already been filtered I by the RERS which has two HEPA filters. In effect, the first SGTS 1 EPA represents the third IEPA in the RERS/SGIS lineup for this accident condition. C. Control Room Emergency Fresh Air Systm (CREFAS) This filtration systs is a constant flow (3,000 CFM) clean-up systm consisting of two 100% redundant fan / filter trains. There are two specific modes of operation for this systs; the control rom radiation i and toxic chemical / chlorine isolation modes. In the radiation isolation mode, the CREFAS filters approximately 3,000 CFM of air. of this flow, a portion is outside air for control rom pressurization (525 CFM maximum) and the reainder is recirculated air frm the control rom main air conditioning systm (2475 CFM minimum). Control room pressure differential controls vary the outside air quantity in response to control rom pressure. In the toxic chmical/ chlorine isolation mode, no outdoor air is introduced l into the control rom, so the systs handles only recirculated air frm the control rom main air conditioning systs (3,000 CFM). We have taken no credit in the FSAR for the filtration effects of the CREFAS in the toxic chmical/ chlorine isolation mode. We have not provided for recorded flow indication or recorded pressure drop indication or recorded pressure drop indication of the first IEPA l t
.? j filter in the control rom. We have provided for the same autmatic changeover / alarm feature when flows reduce to approximately 80 to 90% of total flow, as previously discussed under the RERS Section. We have provided in the control rom a flow indicator which allows monitoring of the recirculation portion of the CREFAS flow. In the radiation isolation mode this is a majority of the total flow rate; in the toxic chanical/ chlorine isolation mode it is the total flow rate. The outdoor air quantity required for control room pressurization in the radiation isolation mode varies as a function of control roan Jeakage and can be anywhere frm near 0 to 525 CFM. Therefore the real measure of acceptable outside air quantity is not the flow rate, but the control rom differential. We have provided a control rom differential pressure indicator in the control rom for monitoring this condition. We have not provided a high flow alarm for this syst m. The systm flow control damper fails closed on loss of power, which would initiate a loss of flow alarm and changeover to the standby CREFAS. D. D misters. We concur with the guidelines to add a local pressure drop indicator across any safety related d misters. RBA/bls 2/5 i A
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JRAE.TI,. Table 11.3-1 indicates the estimated annual release rate from the offgas system. All moisture removed from the process stream is returned to the main condenser hot well or clean radwaste (CRW). 11.3.2.1.3 System Design Considerations ~ 11.3.2.1.3.'1 Charcos1-Holdup Time The krypton and renon holdup times ar'e closel'y approximated by the following equation: T = 0.26 KM (11.3-1) V' where: T= hold-up time, in hours K= dynamic adsorption coefficient, in em8/g M= mass of charcoal adsorber, in thousands of pounds y= gas flowrate, in scfm Dynande adsorption coefficients for krypton and zenon used to determir:e gaseous ef fluent releases are discussed in Ref 11.3-1, NUREG-0016. The charcoal adsorber beds are designed for a delay time of 35 days for zenon under both of the following conditions: 1. 75 scfm flowrate using manufacturer's guaranteed adsorption coefficients (733 cm8/g for zenon and 31.8 cm8/g krypton) 2. BWR GALE code assumptions (NUREG-0016, Rev. 0) The offgas system is capable of handling changes in noncondensible l flowrate between 0 and 215 scfe, without operator attention. With a condenser air in leakage rate of 30 scfe, the charcoal treatment system provides a design holdup time of 52 hours for krypton and 38.6 days for zenon based upon NUREG-0016 assumptions. Since it is expected that the condenser air inleakage will be below the design value and that the charcoal adsorption coefficients will be higher than the values in NUREG-0016 (see Refs 11.3-3 and 11.3-4), the actual charcoal l holdup time should be considerably longer than the design holdup time. Additionally, experience with newer fuel designs (8 x 8 assemblies) indicates that substantially lower source terms t / those used for system design may be expected. 11.3.2.1.3.2 Detonation Resistance e bou ary of all w an i es of ope tion. Interloc are p 11.3'-5' Rev. 12, 10/82
- ~,.. _ _ _ - . ~ ~ f LGS.FSAR r ,s. e ( utoratica))y shut down the sy's ytepon loss of di steam,7 ( the piping between the-svecnd stage SJAEs he preheater is no gned to withstand a detonation at .ating pressure. Although p. froe.the second stage SJ the preheater is not designed t stand a hydrogen d tionr'this piping is j protected during'a s of opera by ansuring that sufficient dpttion stea sts hjs piping to prevent a hydrogen detonation. Protec 1,rcuits are provided such that loss of,dllution steam wil' automatic system shutdown.,,3 u l Loss ef dilution steam dicated by low flow and high ~ j repombiner outlet ter ature. The c.on r in the standby SJAE t train is maintain 'approximately main nser.hotwell pressure in or - o limit the accumulation o ustible gases due to leak rom the operating train and t ( resistane The cooler condenser, guard bpd,p-essu onation and the 1 charc-adsorbers are designed to with nd the effects of a h ,en explosion, using the meth ogy of Reference 11.3-5. 'Ns 11.3.2.1.4 Cor.ponent Description The recombiner and associated equipment are located in the lowest level of the control structure. Each recombiner system consists of a preheater, recombiner vessel, and aftercondenser. The materials of construction, design temperatures, and pressures are listed in Table 11.3-3. 11.3.2.1.4.1 preheater The preheater is a U-tube parallel heat exchanger. Main steam is used to heat process gas before entering the recombiner. The process gas enters at 2800F and is heated to 3800F. oteam is also available for heating the process gas flow,Auriliary i should cain steam be unavailable. Condensate from the tube side of the heat exchanger is collected in a drain pot underneath the preheater and is routed back to the condenser or to CRW depending [o cn condenser vacuum. 11.3.2.1.4.2 Recombiner ti The hydrogen and oxygen in the gas stream are recombined in the l rocombiner vessel by a catalyst of platinum-palladium. Electric heaters with automatic tem chell of each recombiner. perature control are provided on the h i the recombiner during startuThe heaters are used for preheating condition during shutdowns. p and maintaining it in a dry 11.3.2.1.4.3 Aftercondenser The aftercondenser is a straight tube heat exchanger. lI Service cater is circulated through the aftercondenser tubes to condense the stear in the offgas flow. Noncondensible gases are collected in the aftercondenser, cooled in the air cooler section to 1100F ( i i Rev. 12, 10/82 11.3-6 .' i
tGS FSAB O. TABLE 11.3-3 (Page 1 of 2) OFF GAS 57573M MMOB E00rFMENT DESCRIPTION (Design Codes and Standards are provided in Table 3.2-1) 2001tntnT 10Ulffilltf _MutaBEsS_ 11U R22 NATIBIA$ CAPACITY assica perSSuse [Hg _TEFF. PSIG/*F _Preheater 102/20r-131 Shell ano 2 Shell, Channels CS 681,800 9t u/hr 697 sq. 'f t. Shell elde: 350/450 0-tube futes, St eet SS tifective area Tute side: 3?0/450 Aftercondeneer 10E/203-127 Shell and 2 Shell, Tube 16.3x10* Ftu/hr 100 3 sq. ft. Shell elde: 35Cf1100 Straight tube Sheets SS; Chan-nets CS Tube olde: 150/440 tecombiner 105/205-125 Vertice! Cyl. 2 Shell: SS 1600 1he %essel: 76* l ( internals: 350 1100 / Catalyst C.D., 102*- (Veeeel) Catalyst support i Aeoembly (SS) p Catalyst: Metal pat coated with precious Cat a tyst : 51* d petals dia,135* deer {I i Holup pipe BBC-106, 2 CS [ 26* die a f 859 125 ft. long , Outl et HIPA 10F/20F-371 Vert ical 2 Wessel: CS 300 SCFM at vees l1: i filter ar ti s f a cylinder Internale: C size 0.4 psi ligh 145 die 54"
- /15e filter element Cart : 13* tigh j
11.23' dia Clycol cooter 195/2tE-377 Shell and 2 She11: SS 96,760 100.5 sq. fe. 4ppy150 l Of I condenser strai$t Tubes SS Etu/hr tebe osard ted 195/293-370 Vertteel 2 CS N weseel 975 */154 Y Cy11neer
- e*
di 36* igh r Charcoat ab-tas/198-371 Dertical 2 CS 42,125 tho 132" peta a 354 275/159 eorter weseel 1CS-1GS-371 Cylinder Unit 1 Charcoat oech
- high, i
5 CS 31,500 lba 120" die a 174* 259I150 i Charcoal each high l Charcoal ad-2AS-371 Vertteal 1 CE 78,750 Its 132* dia a 354 375/150 oorber esseet 238-215-371 Cylineer i Unit 2 Diarcoal highl 8 CS 30,375 lbe 120" dia a 174* 250f156 Charcoal eoch t igh ' Charomel bed Setcliffe ? i Unite 1 and 2 ~~ Adeorb coef f. Mee t-size SW16 Seekann 9 t, At design temp. 203C De : 733, Era 31.8 M4rC4fC44 ka C5 %nds ' 6 - b 4estbly Cf 3 k sel ~.,d o W u + A ~ 1 d u y sta r m r m q w + a as w 8
S&I / 6 DRAFT 11.3.2.1.3.2 Detonation Resistance All portions of the Limerick offgas system are designed to withstand the effects of a hydrogen detonation or are provided with protective features to prec1ude the existence of a detonable mixture of gases. Design for extremely short duration (micro-second) loadings which accompany hydrogen detonations is outside of the scope of normal industry design codes (i.e. - ANSI B-31.1, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, etc.). The industry has developed a methodology for detonation resistant design of offgas system piping, pressure vessels, and other components based on extensive theoretical and experimental work. The magnitude of pressure pulses accompanylSa hydrogen detonation have been shown to be a function of component geometry (i.e. - length / diameter ratio), initial system pressure, and proximity to reflection points (i.e. - pipe elbows, etc.). The basic methodology used in the design of detonation resistant BWR offgas systems is described in Appendix C of ANSI /ANS-55.4-1979. That methodology, with slight variations between the - architect-engineers and industry equipment suppliers has been followed since the early 1970's and was used in the Limerick design. The analytical methods used are best described as" static analyses using dynamic material propettlef An appropriate wall thickness is determined using peak dynamic pressure and dynamic material properties. For convenience, this ws11 thickness is often expressed in tems of its code static pressure equivalent. Application of this methodology provides g.a
..m -u_,,,__ A m a conservative design without the'need for detailed and laborious analysis of the gas dynamics of the system. The methodology has been demonstrated to be adequately conservative by theoretical analysis and operating experience: A true dynamic analysis of system pressures will typically require a wall thickness one-half that indicated by this approach. No BWR offgas system pressure boundary failures have been observed despite the occurrence of considerably more than 100 system detonations. An ASME Code Committee (Committee on Air and Gas Treatment, Gas Processing Subcommittee) is currently working towards the codification of the above described industry methodology. The " rule of thumb" guidance provided in SRP 11.3 (i.e. - apprcximately 20 times operating pressure) has been demonstrated to be non-conservative in many applications. All offgas system detonation resistant piping and components upstream of the charcoal treatment system have been analy:ed using the method of analysis employed by Bechtel Power Corporation. All charcoal treatment system components have been analyzed using the method of analysis employed by the system supplier :3est (reference 11.3-5). Both analytical methods closely parallel that. described in ANSI /ANS 55.4 and give approximately I equal results. r.
m -~--.u.. - -. 7 '=. C 3 DRAFT The following is a discussion of factors relevant to the detonation L;~e d 5 ss Tre= ed resistance of the3 system: a) The steam jet air ejectors (SJAE's) are designed to withstand a hydrogen detonation occurring at normal system operating pressure (3.S psia). Since leakage into the standby SJAE train could cause a detonation at higher initial pressures, provision has been made to maintain the standby SJAE train at main condenser Vacuum. b) The SJAE's which are utili:ed do not employ a second ik+5 stage condenser.3 The driving steam from the SJAE second stage provides dilution steam such that a detonable mixture of gases will not exist between the SJAE discharge and the offgas aftercondenser. Protective circuits are provided such the offgas system is automatically shutdown when loss of dilution steam is detected (low system flow or high recombiner outlet t e:aperature). y\\ c) p System valves utill:e spark resistant trim. d) All system piping, valves, vessels, instruments, and other components are designed to withstand the effects of a hydrogen detonation except portions of the piping between the SJAE discharge and the preheater. Detonable mixtures of gases in this piping are precluded as discussed in b) above.
i,? F:sn R. Mc Q ATAobpm4) f/- '" "^" D R AFT 11.4 SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 0 The applicant is committed to providing a solid waste management system that complies with the intent of Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-3, " Design Guidance for Solid Radioactive Waste e a n Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Management Systems Reactor Plants." _ ;taWL _ The solid waste management system collects, monitors, processes, packages, and provides temporary storage facilities for radioactive spent bead and powdered resins and dry solid wastes for offsite shipment and permanent disposal. The solid waste management system does not have any safety-related functions. For the purpose of this section, the term " solid waste" is used for spent bead and powdered resins,and dry solid waste produced from plant operation. Process and effluent radiological monitoring systems are I discussed in Section 11.5. 11.4.1 DESIGN BASES a. The design objectives of the solid waste management ~~' system are , 1. Provide collection, processing, packaging, and storage of solid wastes resulting from normal plant operations without limiting the operation or availability of the plant 2. Provide a reliable means for handling solid wastes and allow system operation with ALARA radiation exposure to plant personnel 3. Package solid wastes in suitable containers for offsite shipment and burial 4. Prevent the release of significant quantities of radioactive materials to the environment so as to. keep the overall exposure to the public well,within 10 CFR Part 20 limits b. Redundant and backup equipment, alternate routes, and interconnections are designed into the system to provide for operational occurrences such as refueling, abnormal leak rates, decontamination activities, equipment downtime, maintenance, and repair. l 1 11.4-1 Rev. 2. 12/81 _w. - _.. _ - _, ~ -. ,,--,,im..-,.,..%wm._,.,,.,-._,y.,_ .r y-y ,r
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