ML20024C682
| ML20024C682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1978 |
| From: | Herbein J Metropolitan Edison Co |
| To: | Grier B NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024C648 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-6820, REF-SSINS-SSINS-6, TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-2052, GQL-0114, GQL-114, IEB-77-05A, IEB-77-5A, NUDOCS 8307120954 | |
| Download: ML20024C682 (2) | |
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/ METHOPOLIfAN EDISON COtaPANY
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POST CFFICE SOX 542 READING. PENNSYLVANIA 19603 TELEPHONE 215 - 929 3801 January 20, 1978 GQL 011h Mr. B. H. Grier, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19k06
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 (TMI-2)
License No. CPPR 66 Docket No. 50-320 Response to I.E. Bulletin No. TT-05A, In response to I. E. Bulletin No. 77-05, Metropolitan Edison Company reviewed the THI-2 safety systems as indicated in our letter GQL 0006 of January 13, 1978.
. In-response to I. E. Bulletin TT-05A, Met-Ed expangled its review of the TMI-2 safety systems to include all connectors which are required to function to r.itigate an accident where the accident itself could adversely affect the ability of the system to perform its safety function. This review included areas outside of containment as well as conditions other than a LOCA.
1 As indicated in our response to I. E.Bulletin 77-05, the only electrical connector assemblies concerned are those used for the control rod drive mechanis=s (CRDM's) and the neutron detectors. Only the reactor detectors are of concern, since any power failure to the CRDM results in.a full inserted rod condition. As stated in our letter GQL 0006, it should be noted that the electrical connectors used in conjunction with the, neutron detectors are manufactured by a different company than those which were tested by Sandia Laboratories.
l The Power Range Nuclear Instruments (NI's) are not required to mitigate an accident.
However, if the NI's were required to mitigate an accident, it is in our opinion, that they would be capable of doing so.
This conclusion is based on two factors:
.1) the vide physical separation between the Main Steam (and Feedvater) lines and the electrical connec, tors, and 2) the very short ti=e interval in which the NI's j
vouM be required to function fo'r the design basis accident.
For these reasons the NI connectors would not be adversely affected by the accident environment prior to performing their intended function for accidents inside or outside containment which produce adverse environmental conditions.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
Sincerely, l
s.- : ni g
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8307120954 771100 l
PDR ADOCK 05000289 Vica Provident-Generation G
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Mr. B. H. Grier Director January 20, 1978 GQL 0114 cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear, Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 J. J. Barton (2) bec:
G. T. Broughton I
R. M. Klingaman L. L. Lawyer L. C. Lanese R. A. Lengel' G. P. Miller J. L. Shirk C. W. Smyth*
R. J. Stevens*
H. J. Stromberg G. J. Troffer R. F. Wilson (GPUSC)
T:C-2 PORC Chairman TIC-1 PORC Chairman File: 02.0016.0007 0001.02 62.0016.0003.0053 l
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