ML20024C639

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Discusses Part Rept Re Potential for Loss of Ground within Ni/Rps Detection.Corrective Actions Described in Encl, 177 FA Plants Nuclear Instrumentation/Reactor Protection Sys Ground Problem Discussion & Recommended Test Scheme
ML20024C639
Person / Time
Site: Crane, Davis Besse  
Issue date: 03/07/1978
From: Janis J
BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
To: Potts W
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
References
REF-PT21-83, TASK-*, TASK-03, TASK-3, TASK-GB GPU-2037, NUDOCS 8307120915
Download: ML20024C639 (22)


Text

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%,c.= ion 6&h.=at Babcock &Wilcox P.O. Box 1260.1.ynchburg Va. 24505 gg. 7. )

p Telephone:(804) 384-5111 f

l March 7, 1978 Mr. W. E. Potts Manager, Licensing l

Metropolitan Edison Company l

P. O. Box 542 Reading, PA 19603 Three Mile Island Nuclear Station - Unit 1

Subject:

Substantial Safety Hazard Report

Dear Mr. Potts:

84W has completed an evaluation of a possible safety concern with regard

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to the loss of ground wit.hin the NI/RPS and has determined that this condition is reportable to the NRC in accordance with -10CFR21 as a sub-stantial safety hazard for all 177 FA plants. The attached report,

" Evaluation of RPS Ground Concern," is transmitted for your information and to assist you in reporting this matter to the NRC. B&W plans to notify the NRC of this generic concern prior to 12:00 noon on March 9, 1978.

The recommended corrective action is described in detail in "177 FA Plants NI/RPS Ground Problem Discussion and Recommended Test Scheme" which is also attached for your use.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please notify us insediately.

Very truly yours,.

k J. T. Janis Service Man.ger J7J:NF At tsch::ents 88 cc: w/sttachments J. C. lierbein b ino R. M. Klingaman "q

L. L. Lawyer y

C~T.,P. Miller G.

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EVALUATION OF RPS y

CROUNDISC CONCERN This report documents the evaluation of a concern wherein it was postu-lated that a loss of ground could cause the NI/RPS to fail to perform its The purpose of this report is to document the backg$ound intended function.

and reasoning 'that led to the conclusion that this occurrence constitutes a substantial safety hazard as defined by 10 CFR 21.

l Identification The preliminary safety concern proposes the following hypothesis:

A Nuclear Instrumentation / Reactor Protection System (NI/RPS) channel may experience a loss of ground to its instrument common without the loss of Given this condition, a single postulated failure in ground being evident.

one channel can leave the Reactor Protection System in an unanalyzed condition.

The concern exists for those plants that utilize gro$nd as an active retura padh.

For B&W, the'af fected plants are:

Oconee 1, 2, 3 THI 1, 2

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ANO-1 Rancho Seco Davis Desse 1 crystal River 3

}iidland 1, 2 The concern is not applicable to our 145 or our 205 FA plants.

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Annivsis of Occurrence The concern was discovered while investigating the Davir Besce ground A review of the RPS indicated that locs of ground will not cause a system.

channel trin,.as uns previo::aly assumed. Therefore, the notential exists To our knouledge, loss of cruund to eccur without beine de trcred.

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EV4UATION OF RPS GROUNDING CONCERN current operating procedures do not call for periodic ground continuity'-

If a subsequent fault is imposed upon the system, then more than checks.

one channel might be adversely affected.

A detailed analysis of the event is not possible by B&W, because the individual ground systems vary from plant to plant and B&W does not know

However, what ground continuity checks individual utilities may perform.

a preliminary review indicates that without additional information to the contrary, this concern represents a substantial safety hazard as defined by h

hential for a loss of safety

, by 10 CFR 21 since the concern has t e p function to the extent that there could be a major reduction in the degree of protection for a licensed facility, if ground is lost and another fault occurs.

It should be pointed out, however, that loss-of-ground on the NI/RPS is believed to be a very improbable occurrence because of the mul.tiple ground circuits which exist; e.g. each channel connected to the ground bus, each In addition, cabinet interconnected through multiple bolted joints, etc.

loss-of-ground by itself will not prevent the RPS from tripping.

t Corrective Action It is recormended that utilities institute a periodic test of the NI/RPS I

f to assure that IE pround has not been lost.

A sunrested frequency is once _

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a nonth and a sur.cestEd test method is attached.

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%i r. c::r.cern is r. ; rrc'.'.e as a Nhrts.tf a] f.s fe'.y Had un defined by 10 CPR 21 for ELU 177 FA plants.

It does not aficet'145 FA and 205 FA plants thich utilize nPS-II,

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177 FA PLANT NI/RPS GROLHD PROBLDI DISCUSSION e

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'I. J i, IMITATION This report and its recommendations are limited to the Babcock and Wilcox 880 system Nucicar Instrumentation / Reactor Protection System (NI/RPS) as applied to the B&W 177 FA NSS.

2.0 PURPOSE

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The purpose of this report is three-fold:

2.1 To. explain a potential probica that exists'in the unlikely event of loss of connection of the plant ground system to one or more NI/RPS channel instrument consons.

2.2 To recommend, to the operators of 177 FA p1' ants, expansion of the. rou, tine -

NI/RPS test program to include checks designed to ensure the connection of the NI/RPS instrument common 3round to the plant ground system.

2.3 To explain the basic philosophy of a ground. connection test scheme.

that can be adopted by the operators of 177 FA plants to check the ground connection.

3.0 THE PROBLDI The purpose of this section is to prevent an analysis which will serve to illustrate the effects of loss of ground to instrument common. The analysis addresses a plant containing dual grcund-systems:

(1) instrument ground and (2) station ground.

It is recognized that ground systems and methods vary from plant to plant. The data and analysis methods contained herein

.should serve to assist the individual plant operator in the assessment

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of the particular plant ground system and the impact of loss of ground connection.

Ff gure 1 illustrates the method of conveying trip signals between redundent channels of the NT/RPS.

Each channci contains a -15 V power supply whose r.

po itive tetainal is ref erenced to the instru::.ent co:.:aon 1[t that chanaci.

P.ach channel containn.four relays--KF, KC, KH, and KJ.

The function of i

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t these relays is to sense the trip state of the redundant channels of the Each channel conthins a channel trip relay KE which is energized NI/RPS.

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while the channci is not tripped. Therefore, contacts KE are closed and Relays KF, KG, }GI, and KJ in cach channel ahe, open to convey a trip.

' herefore, normally energized when all channels are in a non-tripped t

If the relay KE in a channel de-energizes (trips), a relay in state.

The normal 'urrent path of relays c

each channel will be de-energized.

KF, KG, K11, and KJ involves the ground system outside the NI/RPS cabinets.

This ground dependency is depicted by the heavy arrows on Figure 1 which illustrate the path whereby KG1 is normally" energized by the Channel A This is typical of the power supply through a KE contact in (hannel B.

paths involved for all interchannel relays.

31 Loss of Ground to a' Channel The purpose of this section is to analyze the effects.of. loss of.

Q connection of the plant ground to the instrument common of one NI/RPS channel.

3.1.1 Simplified Circuit. Figure 2 is a simplified drawing of the interchannel trip arrangement u 2 der the conditions where the instrument common to instrument ground connection to.one channel is lost or disconnected. Here the channels are identified as W, X, Y, and 2, rather than A, B, C, and D.

This allows this one figure to illustrate all combinations of loss of ground.

In this equivalent circuit normally:

Relays KWX, ITY, and KWZ are in parallel with a total I

A.

resistance equivalent to the value of one-third the value of the res N ec of one relay coil.

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Pever supp1f er X, Y, and Z arc in parallci hy virtue of B.

zero potential dif ferenca between their ner,ative terminals.

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In view of 3.1.1..B above, relays KXW, KW, cnd KZW cro

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C.

in parallel with a total resistance equal to one-third Q

the value of the resistance of one relay coil.

  • 3.1.2 Elcetrical Equivalent Circuit.

Figure 3 is an electric,a1 equivalent circuit of Figure 2 taking into account the It should be noted that conclusions of 3.1.1.A, B, and C.

the equivalent circuit is a bridge, where the voltage A to B ~

is determined by the degree of balance existing in the bridge.

i It is obvious that the potential A to 3 cannot be predicted due to the tolerance of power supply potentials Q,0.65% V) and relay coil resistance Q 10% ohms).

  • The potential A to B is calculated in SecticIn 4.0 in several cases for illustration Inasmuch as the output potential of bridge circuits purposes.

. is a ratio phenomenon, the engineer can take great liberties in the assumptions and still achieve accurate results.

The purpose Effects on Interchannel Trip Relay Arrangement.

3.1.3 of this section is to analyze the effects of the loss of ground to the instrument common bus of a, single channel on the interchannel trip relay arrangement illustrated in Figure 1.

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As explained in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, the equivalent The circuit utilized for this analysis is shown in Figure 3.

reader will recognize the equivalent circuit as a bridge where the voltage A to B is dependent upon the degree of balance of the bridge which is determined by the balance of the, power supplies and equality of the resistance of the relay coils l

making up the equivalent r

.f stances Roi and Re2' I f one noner:u that both power

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supply potentials are equal and that all relay coil

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potential A to B is zero' and so A and B ari cicetrically the same point.

The system should not realize.that the nround at A has been lost.

Unbalanced Systed. There are an infinite number of 3.1.3.2 combinations of values whereby the system can be unbalanced with an attendant number if values of potential between A and B.

.iince relay coil tolerance is much looser than power supply regulation, this section analyzes for effects of relay coil resistance variation. Unbalance in power supply

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voltages would have similar but smaller effects.

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that one relay coil resistance is in error ten percent.

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' 3. 2 Conclusions rr.trarotation of the data and an=17 sis methods of Sections 3

0 and 3.13.2 can lead to the following conclusions relative to loss of ground to an NI/RPS channel.

A.

Loss of Ground Connectio_n

.(a) May not be self. annunciating (b) May not be disclosed during roui.ine NI/RPS testing (c) Does not, in itself, negate the ability of the NI/RPS to perform its protective function Due to Conclusion A, a channel may lose instrument commen ground

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During-t posture for an extended period of time.

and remain in t this time:

'(a) the instrument comon in the faulted channel is not fixe sta' tion ground potential by a low chmic resistance Erhile:

O (b) the instrument comons of the remaining ebannels are fixed at station ground potential by low'chmic resistance; therefore:

(c) the potential between the instrum.ent comon in the faulted cha5.nel and the instrument commons in' the remaining channels is normally fixed by bridge balance conditions--see Figure 3--

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t and:

(d) the potential at the instrument comon of the faulted channel can be forced to abnormal values by the introduction of foreign l

fault voltage sources.

C.

Sine,le Failure Given the foregoing conclusions, it is possibic to postulate singic failures in a channel (which has lost ground to its instrumen ce=:acn) whic.h t.my have unaccep::nL2e circ: cts on the redundant I

channels.

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0 A significant examp1'c is the hot short of' primary power to the O

instrument com=on of the affected channe1.

t 4.0 TEST P1111OSOPW Conclusion C of Section 3.2 makes it imperative that operators of 177 FA plants examine their ground system /NI/RPS interface to confirm whether the single failure potentital exists in their installation.

If the answer is in the affirmative, s' test program m st be instituted.

The objective of the test program would be to move the loss of ground out of the undetectable region to a detectable failure and thereby minimize the single failure threat,(section 3.2.C).

The purpose cp this' section is to exaiina the theory involved in a proposed test method. There is no intent to imply that the method proposed here

.is necessarily the only or best method that can be devised.

In addition, O

tho m;thod may not find acca,tance.im or de,ractica1 in a11,1 ants for a variety of reasons including variations in plant grounding methodology.

It is hoped, however, that the methods discussed may assist the user in the development of methods that best suit the installation.

4.1 Ground check with Ground System Intact Figure 4 is a duplicate of Figure 2 but with all grounds intact and a test DVM connected.' Figure 2 is explained in earlier sections of

'this report. The analysis is presented'in Figura 6A.

KWX, KW, KWZ, 51 S2, 53, and WPS reside in the channel under test.

I The DVH neg.itive lead is connected to the negative fifteen volt DC bus of the channel under test while a screw terminal is avnilabic to which the DW1 positive lead is connected.

Consultation of the NI/T.?S.che:/-2L;cs will casily ider.:;fy th2 connect.fon. points invulc<..

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1 of voltage to which the power supply is ' set to regulate ( 215 volts DC).

In the routine of testing channel W, switches 51, '.2, and 53 opened

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are to confirm the ability of channel W to respond to a trip generated by channels X, Y, and 2.

A trip of channels X, Y, and 2 is normally signaled by opening contacts T1, T2, and T3, respectively.

Were one to observe the reading of the DWi while opening and closing S1, 52, and S3, no change in the indicated value would be noted in as such as the DW1 is indicating,th5 output voltage of channel W power supply. No change in the DWi reading upon opening and closing S1, S2, and S3 indicates a connection from the NI/RPS instrument common to 0

the plant ground system.

4.2 Cround Check with Channel W Ground Open Figure 5 illustrates the same circuit' as Figure 4 except that the channel W instrument conimon ground is completely open. The analysis is presented in-Figure 63.

The digital voltmeter is connected as befcre.

Inasmuch as the channel W instrument common is no longer connected to ground, the DW1 is now indicating the voltage across the parallel combination of D.% KWY, and KWZ rather than the output of the W power Refer to Figure 3--the DW1 is now measuring the voltage' supply.

% Rc2 and E cs E, the voltmeter will indicate l

2 across Rey.

Since Rc1 O'

appror.inatt.ly fif teen volts. Were the circuit perfectly bslanced, it would indicate power supply potentini.

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~ Rifer to Figure 5 cud open 51 thereby interrupting the currcnt

h through }NX.

Refer tp Figure 3, Rey is now the equivalent value of two relays in parallel while Re2 is the equivalent value of three relays in parallel.

Re1 135 ohms while S1 is open and' 90 ohms while Si is closed Re2 = 90 ohms.

Ratio and proportion calculations yield an indicated DVM value of 18 volts DC while S1 is open and 15 volts while si is closed.

NOTE: Refer to Section 4.1-with the ground system intact, no change in the DVH indication was expected while 51 was opened and closed.

With the Channel W ground path open, a delta voltage of 3 volts would be observed visile'S1 is opened and closed.

A significant chan'ge in DVM

  • indicated value is therefore indicative c'f an open ground fault.

4.3 Cround Check with Channel U Cround Containing Some Resistance Inasmuch as some or all NI/RPS channels have many ties between their instrument commons and the plant ground system (main connection, cable shields, cabinet mounting bolts), this section will analyze to determine the expected delta voltage on opening and closing S1 with some resistance between the channel W instrument common and, plant ground.

Analysis is presented in. Figures GC, 6D, and 6E to demonstrate the expected change in DVM indication when the channel U ground path

.contains 2,1, and 0.5 ohms, respectively. Opening and closing S1 produces a change in indication of approximately 100 millivolts when ground path resistance is two ohms, approximately 50 millivolts for a ground iiath resistance of one ohn, and approximately 5 millivolts when ground path resistance is one tenth of one ohm.

.O Fros the forer.oing, the proposed test nerhod ueuld appear to be abic to discern small changes in grnund path resistance.

5.0 TI:ST rigc. nt A :n iti:co:!.*!cinATIO.:S i

- -- - J " !-

'LSR_JDDl_jf)LOs,Wuhrac20tc and innt itutc

d tGst pr:grca which will, en o periodic basis, verify the cen tection of Q

the instrument common bus in each NI/RPS channel to the plant ground It is further recommended that the operator develop thd program system.

based on the methods described and analyzed in Section 4 or, utilizing this data, institute a program of the operator's an devising.

We, further, recommend the following:

5'.1 Frequency We understand that a NI/RPS channel is tested each week on a rotational basis with each channel being subjected to test every four weeks.

We recommend that the ground test be integrated into the test routine of each chann'e1..This vill verify. ground continuity, of each channel, every four v'eeks.

Data extracted from IEEE-500 indicates that.there are approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for a link consisting of a copper h.

. seven open failures per,10 ch ductor terminated at each end.

Since each of the four NI/RPS channels is provided with a ground link, there are possibly twenty-eight open failures per 106 hours0.00123 days <br />0.0294 hours <br />1.752645e-4 weeks <br />4.0333e-5 months <br /> or approximately one per four years. For

' his reason, test intervals of greater than once a month would not t

  • be prudent.

5.2 tench Mark Testing Refer to Section 4.3--the proposed test scheme is sensitive to i

small changcc in ground link resistance.

In addition, the case presented

  • in Figure 6A will not be attainable due to ground land res,istance.

That is, with the ground system normal, some delta E may be noted.as 51 is opened and closed.

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Airo, sin.c c:her ground pathn may exist due to cignal return linen, chicids, etc., the case presented in Figure CB etay not be attainabic.

i That is, with the primary ground path open, a delta E icss than threc

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volts may be noted as S1 is.' opened and closed.

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  • O For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that an initini test be conducted on each NI/RPS channel to establish a bench prk

' for future tests.

A.

Prepara for test (connect DVM, etc.)

3.

Note the DW indication with 51 in its normal position (S1 s

l is spring loaded in normal position)

Operate Si to the open position.' The DVM indicated value should C.

tammin essentially the same as in B'above.

Note: The readings attained in B and C will be essentially equal if the ground path resistance approaches zero ohms.

If the delta E step B-to C As appreciable, the ground' system will have to be inspected to ascertain that it is normal.

D.

Record the valus obtained-in step C.

Note:

If the succeeding h

. steps are completed successfully, the delta E step B to C will

, serve as the future bench mark minimum values.

E.

Disconnect the primary ground path. With S'1 in its normal l

position, the DVM indication should be essentia11y'the same as that obtained in B above.

i F.

Operate Si to the open position and note the DVM indicated value. The delta E step E to F should be appreciably larger than that obtained in step D.

The larger delta E obtained in this step, after primary ground was disconnected, verifies that the ground was coepicte and intact during stcps A, B, C, and D.

C.

Reconnect the primary gr.ound..

nepeat rreps A, B, C, and D and note that the recorded values are n,

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repented.

This step ensures that the pritaary ground was reconnected.

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With Si in its normal position, note the DVM indicated value.

C.

With S1 in its open position, note the DVM indicated value.

D.

Note the delta E step B to C.

Compare to the bench mark delta E step 5.2.D--if these are approximately equal, the primary ground is intact. If the delta E appr'oaches the value obtained

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in steps 5.2.F a possible ground fault exists.

Investigation and possible repairs will be required to resolve and correct the problem.

4 E.

After any corrective action to.the ground system, steps A through D should be repeated e

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