ML20024C425
| ML20024C425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1983 |
| From: | GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-02, TASK-06, TASK-2, TASK-6, TASK-GB GPU-2348, NUDOCS 8307120615 | |
| Download: ML20024C425 (8) | |
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MR. KoL3:
You are asking to the S. D. OF N. Y.
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- he knows?
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..i MR. S E L T Z E P.:
- Yes, f
W Was it your understanding that the i
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Davis-Besse operators had also ignored procedures y
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that they had when they terminated high pressure
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!6 8 I' injection at the time
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that pressurizer water level
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9 was first rising?
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no, 'I don't kno< that.
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You have never looked into that?
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No.
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Q At some point in time, you were put in iM r.;.
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14 charge of the ATOG program, right?
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Yes.
g'l would you define in charge?
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16 Q
What did you mean when you said yes?
W 17 A
I was project engineer for the technical 4
[ manager of the program.
IS 19 Q
one of the objectives that you j
e 20 outl'ined for the ATOG program was to simplify the
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21 procedures for operating nuclear plants, is that oOby 22 right?
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MR. KOLB:
Just so we can be clear, l
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because his position is a position in
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relation to others.
When you say you outlined, S
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1 Kelly 226 2
are you talking about the company or Mr. Kelly q,
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3 personally or both?
What do you mean exactly?
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4 MR. SELTZER:
J.J.
Kelly.
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(Record read by. the reporter.)
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Yes.
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Q You recognized, didn't you, that before l
8 the Three Mile Island accident, the procedures
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that the plants had were proce.dures that had been 10 drafted with the assistance and participation of i
8 11 B&W, isn't that right?
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You are talking about the j
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13 pro.cedures as a wh o l e.?_ _ Yon _a r.e. n o t talking.
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14 about every single procedure, I
am I right?
15 MR. SELTZER:
The operating procedures, 16 the emergency procedures, the abnormal transient 17 procedures which the B&W designed plants i
18 were working with, i
i 19 A
We supplied them with draft material to j
20 write those procedures, yes.
I 21 Q
And B&W in sone cases supplied engineers 22 pursuant to contract to assist the utilities in 23 completing the drafts of those procedures, isn't l
24 that right?
I don't mean in every case, but you i
25 are familiar with the fact that some utilities did i
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Kelly 227 i
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't pay for additional engineering services from B&W l :,,Ee i.
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3 to complete the draft-of their procedures, t
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A Yes.
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Q You have..oted in your ATOG work that i
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the proc 2dures that h.d been drafted before 7
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the Three Mile Island accident tended to r2 quire l
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9f the operators to identify what the upset event was
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i f f hu 10 in crder to find the emergency procedures with
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wh i ch t ::, respond to the upset event, isn't th a t b
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A yes.
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You believed that that was unduly
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cumbersome, didn't you?
That it should be simplified?
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- NQ 16.
h MR. KOLB:
There are two questions there.
re.
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17 bl One is unduly cumbersome, and another should
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it be simplified.
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Let's take them in pieces.
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You reccgnized as the h
technical director 21 f
of the ATOG program i
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'before he could turn I, @,
to the emergency procedure to
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24 deal with the upset was unduly cumbersome, didn' t you?
p 25 A
I thought it was cumbersome.
My hesitation is l:
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t ll xelly 228 i!
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I don't know what that means.
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Q You thought it was unnecessarily f ll i
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cumbersome, didn't you?
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Yes.
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Q You felt that the procedures could be Nl ji f !!
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simplified so it would be easier for the operators 4
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to make the appropriate operating response to a
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f transient?
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10 A
That'was at the time a desired objective.
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.didn't know a t the :ime that it could be done.
That
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was an objective to try to do something like that.
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Why did you think that was desirable?
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Anything that could be done to assist the 15 operator or make his task any easier would have to -
l 16 be an improvement.
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What you were saying was desirable as 3
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I 18 the director of the technical side of the abnormal l
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19 transient operating guidelines program was that j
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a 21 symptoms of the upset event in order to know what i
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22 the correct emergency response was, isn't that true?
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A That was a desired objective, yes.
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Would you take a look at the famous j
i 25 J.J.
Kelly November 1,
1977 guidelines. GPU Exhibit 76.
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Kelly 229
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You stat.+3 about two-thirds of the way I
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3 down "I recommend the following guidelines be s
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sent."
Do you see that?
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Yes.
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You had two guidelines for the conditions 6
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7 under which an operator could appropriately decide i
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8 whether to terminate or bypass high pressure t
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injection, right?
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Yes.
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High pressure injection is a system i:
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Yes.
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So it doesn't require any operator action i
jl 15 to actuate high pressure injection, right?
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Right.
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When reactor coolant system pressure F
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4 21 A
Right.
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What is that pressure at the time you I
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23 were wri ting your famous memo?
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In some of our plants, it was 1600 pou~nds, l
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t t, 25 and in scse of our plcats it was 1500 pounds.
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Kelly 230 I
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You have two prescriptions here or 3
guidelines on when i
I an operator could terminate high 1
4 pressure injection, right?-
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- Yes, well --
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Q The first one says 7
A The first one is not a prescription on when I
8 he could stop it.
It is an admonition to not
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stop l
9 it under given circumstances.
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Never interfere with its t
actuation, in 11 fact, right?
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Yes.
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Q So that it is only the second guideline I
14 which tells the operator when he could terminate 15 following its autor.atic actuation?
i 16 A
Yes.
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'Under your second guideline which you I
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recommended be sent, and I take it sent means sent 19 to all operators of Bsw plants?
Is that what you
,I 20 meant by sent?
i N f 21 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking him whether i
22 he mesnt that B&W I ii should send it directly to j
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23 oparators?
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i MR. SELTZER:
No.
Just that it should I
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be supplied to those who operate B&W plants, b
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Kelly 231 f
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Operate doesn't nean the I
3 operator i'n the ;ontrol room.
It means in j
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4 the general sense of supervision or running j
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the plant.
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MR. SELT"ER:
Let him.tell us what he l
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7 meant instead of you and I.
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8 MR. KOLB Ask him that question.
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Q To.whom did you recommend these be-sent?
10 Whor were you thinkin; of when you said you recommend 11 they me sent?
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A If they were requir.ed, I intended they be to our operating plants.
13 sent L-i I
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14 Q
So that they would get into the hands 15 of the people that operate the plants?
16 A
Yes.
I 17 Q
You said that iter $ b is the only guideline
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18 that you were recomr.ending be sene and given to l
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19 the people who operate the plants that would tell I
l them when they could properly shut off high pressure 29 21 injection, right?
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Yes.
a
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Am I cc rect there is nothing in b that i,
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requires the operators to identify what the source t
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of the upset event or transient is, is that correct?
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That's corr ct.
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In or.!cr to follow your guideline b, I
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all the operators have to do is know the high 5
pressure inj ection has automatically actuated and I
6 then proceed to watch for the three conjunctive l
7 signals that you have listed there, is that right?
8 A
Yes.
9.
Q By ccnjunctive, I*mean they are three 10 [
conditions which all have to be met, right?
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11 A
Yes.
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In nany ways your guideline b is like I
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the si=plified pracedures that you were proposing lit d
14 be developed when you were director of the technical side of the ATOG program, isn't that right?
h 15 I
I 16 j
A The current ATOG recommendation is different, l
17 but insofar as they are both a symptom type, yes.
18 Q
Sert Dunn's rebruary 16, 1978 guidelines i'
19 are also sympton type guidelines, aren't they, of 20 the simplified form you said was desirable when you f
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21 were head of the ATOG program?
p 22 A
Yes, in that respect, that's right.
Q Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, 23 j,
I Scw had never cccmunicated to the operating utilities l;
24 l-p ro c e du res for handling high pressure injection which y
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