ML20024B479
| ML20024B479 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane, Rancho Seco  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1973 |
| From: | Mcbride A BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | Jonathan Brown, Karrasch B, Lesniak L BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-06, TASK-6, TASK-GB GPU-2705, NUDOCS 8307090004 | |
| Download: ML20024B479 (2) | |
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THE BASCOCX & WILCOX COM?ANY p' r 4 N Cnos' P0hER GENERATION GROUP Ob Distributton 8*
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Fros A.F. McBride. System Require =ents (22f.0) ses ass.s Cust.
i SML*D and other 177 F.A. Contracts File No.
s, or Ref, ESTAS Actuation of Auxi11ary Feedvater Following LOCA's October 17 1973 l vu. s,....
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DISTRIBUTION TM Mg* gr-L.M. Lesniak L.R. Carcin
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to U sr1 'f~e Cr m.lG b W gg.c,.e.$he 9dkn r vheving the SMUD FSAR har discovered a discrepaacy between our ECCS requirements for auxiliary feedvater and the qualification of instru-A mentation assu=ed to function to meet these requirements. The AEC cce=ents referring to the SMUD FSAR are given in Attach =ent 1.
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ce=ments and to establish a B&W design pos'icion on auxiliary feedvatar To resolve the AEC's M
system instru=entatics design for 177 F.A. plants, a meeting vill be held on Q,
October 23, Conference Room A at 1805 P.M.
k f The problem referred to above concerns the ECCS requirement that auxiliary i
feedvater injection be initiated to the steam generators folleving small
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LOCA's.
The ICS, which usually initiates the auxiliary feedvater equip =ent, is neither seismically qualified nor does it meet the require =ents of IEEE-279 as required by 10CTR50 for essential safety functions.
1 Afthough the AEC mentions manual initiation of auxiliary feedvater, ECCS analysis personnel, in informal conversations, did not feel that manual initiation of I
auxiliary feedvarer 15 minutes af ter a LOCA vould be adequate to achieve a safe condition of the reactor coolant systen. Since autecatic initiation vill probably be required, it is reco== ended that the auxiliary feedvater injection be initiated by the existing ESTAS based on a 1600 psig RCS pressure or 4 paig i
RB signals.
Since mais feedvater isolation is also required following a LOCA (acd following steam line breaks), it is reco=sended that the main feedvater
. isolation valves also ha closed by the ESTAS based on 1600 psig RCS pressure 3
or 4 psig RB pressure signals.
CONFIDENTIA 8307090004 731017 yn l
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Distribution october 17, 1973 Page # 2 It is hoped that at the meeting of October 23, the above design or a more suitable alternate can be agreed upon as a B&W standard for all 177 T.A. plants. The following groups are requested to prepara to discuss the questions, listed below:
1.
ECCS Analysis a) Is manual actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system suitable for post,-LOCA protection?
1 b) Are the 1600,pois RCS pressure and 4 psig R3 pressure signals suitable for initiating aux-iliary feedvater flow?
5 c) is the continuous flow of one of the two aux-111ary feedvater pumps sufficient for post-10CA protection?
2.
Safety Analysis and Control Analysis: Would the operation of the systen, as described above, severe *y affect the pro-cedures which sitigate the effects of other accidents or transients? Tor instance, should the main steam isolation valves be closed to assure steam to the auxiliary feedvater pump turbine?
3.
C&I Engineering: What changes to the ESPAS would be required to in-plement the above design? Approxi=ataly what additional costs would be incurred?
4.' Project Management: Would our custo=srs or their AE's object to the design changes as suggested?
5.
All:
Is there other equip =ent or instrumentation insufficiently qualified for its safety function? Should the equipnent design be uprated at this time?
ATMcB:cep As<.,
CONRDENTIAL COUNSEL ONLY G4gg&.a.z
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