ML20024B185
| ML20024B185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1980 |
| From: | Mehler B METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-10, TASK-GB GPU-6060A, NUDOCS 8307070245 | |
| Download: ML20024B185 (25) | |
Text
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.T g rgRy ggg ne Ms.
3I n r} to 1
This is Christopher.
The date is March 27, 1980.
The time is 10:08 a.m.
This is Keith Christopher and I am an investigator with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission assigned to Region 1, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
This morning we are located in trailer No. 5 at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Site Office at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station.
We are here this morning to conduct an interview of Brian Mehler who is an employee of Metropolitan Edison Company at the Three Mile Island j
site.
At this time I would like the other individuals i
in the room to identify themselves and identify their positions:
l Tim Martin, Section Chief, Reactor Project Section 3, 1
Region 1, USNRC 4
John F. Wilson, Attorney for Metropolitan Edison Company i
Christopher:
As a matter of record before we turned on 4
l the tape we discussed with Brian the memorandum prepared i
by this office.
This memor.andum goes into the purpose and scope of the investigation and to some degree the i
{
rights of the individual being interviewed.
On the.last j
page there are several questions.which you responded to i
in the affirmative and for purposes of the record I would like to get your response to those on tape.
l Number 1 is Do you understand,the above-addressed two-l page memo?
"4 8307070245 000327 PDR ADOCK 05000289 1
T HOL
v Brian Mehler:
Yes.
il Christopher:
OK.
The second question is Do we have permission to tape this interview?
Brian Mehler:
Yes.
Christopher:
OK.
And lastly, Do you want a copy of i
this tape?
i Brian Mehler:
Yes.
Christopher:
OK.
For the record we'll get you the I
transcript as soon as it can be made available and get it out to you.
OK.
And Mr. Martin will initiate his questions.
Tim Martin:
Brian, I have three areas that I'd like to pursue questions in that were raised by Mr. Hartman as concerns; the first one is related to estimated critical position.
Let me read what is said in the transcript of R. Rosen and Mr. Hartman.
"I remember this one particular incident.
I was making the start-up and I went critical less than a half-a-percent from where it should have gone and when we went critical.
I immediately took the rods and inserted the rods.
As soon as I inserted the rods the shift super-visor told me What are you doing?
I said 2
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we went critical'28 percant.
I estimated critical position was 68.
My minus a half-a-percent position was 32.
I went critical 4 percent too,early and to me there's something wrong."
Now the reporter says:
"In testimony given to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigators Hartman states that he was told to con-tinue the plant start-up even though it would viola.te the procedures.
He told the NRC investigators they redid the numbers and somehow they fudged them.
And why did they do it?" Do you have any comment?
Brian Mehler:
I don't know the specific incident he's talking about.
Tim Martin:
Let me provide some clarification, in our interviews with Mr. Hartman he indicates that it was a plant start-up, that he believes it occurred either in the April to May '78 area or possibly in November of '78.
It was one of the few start-ups that he was the RO on the panel that Mr.
Hoyt and Mr. Ray Buer(?) were also in L
the control room and that as he was with-drawing rods he got an alana, he looked up, l-l 3
l
F-1 he had a rod out inhibit, he had a 3 DPM or 2 DPM - he couldn't remember which -
start-up rate since he was critical below the half-a-percent delta K over K below the ECP it was his understanding that the procedure required him to do certain things, he says that he started to do those things by inserting the rods, that - and I think his quote was "No, no, take it to one,"
and then he subsequently said that he was forced to continue the start-up to ten to the minus eight and settle out for the check of the ECP.
Do you have any comments on that?
Brian Mehler:
I have no comment because I'm not, I don't remember the incident to be truthful with you.
Tim Martin:
Have you ever been on a start-up where the critical position fell below the ECP allowable band?
Brian Mehler:
No.
Tim Martin:
What is the requirement of the procedure 1
if that had occurred?
Brian Mehler:
The requirement of the procedure is insert j
rod until you are 1 percent suberitical, l
4 r-
f i
Q:
Brian, it is a swo'In statement that he is stating that this incident did happen so when you say that you don't remember that it happened, do you think if it did happen that you would have remembered that incident with him?
Brian Mehler:
I'm quite sure I would have remembered that particular incident if he'd had a 3 DPM start-up rate.
Q:
And you said.you did not work with Harold E
Hartman - ?
Brian Mehler:
I normally worked with him.
I had been on shift already with him..
Q:
OK, if you're satisfied, that'.s all I wanttotalkabout,thatone./,Ihlhenext i
area is concerning the reactor; core or i
reactor coolant system inventory in that f
Mr. Hartman states that in the latter months of plant operation it became increasingly difficult to get acceptable leak rates and I think he focussed in on the unidentified leak rate, the 1 GPM.
He says that there was a lot of competition between shifts and each was camaraderie, esprit de corps, whatever you want to
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4 call it, and that no shift really wanted to be the shift that forced the plant off the line because they couldn't get an acceptable leak rate.
He felt pressure, he says other operators felt pressure, and in fact each man, each shift, had their techniques for getting acceptable ones.
Specifically he states he did the following, in some cases he increased the pressure in the make-up tank which he says sometimes gave him a good leak rate, in other cases he said he actually added water while they were running the test and in another case he says that they misstated the millivolt reading on the RCDT that was put into the computer.
These things he said he did, he says other people had those and other techniques, bo you have any comment on this?
Brian Mehler: I can't tell you if he did them or not.
I didn 't.
You know, we have, on the leak rate we went on the plant and identified leakage as safe because you are allowed to do that by the procedure and subtract that amount of leakage from the unknown leakage and that's documented and signed, you know as 6
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I far as him, I do'know that pressure in the make-up tank will affect the leak rate.
Them guys doing that or adding water to it is, that's a no-no.
You know, I'm not aware that they did it.
Q:
Help me a little bit.
I don'.t understand how increasing the pressure in the make-up tank affects the inventory.
Brian Mehler:
I just know that if you increase the pressure it would somehow make the make-up tank level to the computer change.
What mechanism I do not know.
Normally we didn't.
Normally, when you.ran a leak rate.you ran it for an hour, you tried to hold the plant in stable condition without changing any other parameters.
I can't answer for what he did.
Q:
Are you aware of anybody -fudging these leak rate calculations?
Brian Mehler:
No, I'm not aware that anyone fudged the leak rate calculations.
Q:
Was there.any pressure on the operators to fudge leak rates?
Brian Mehler:
No.
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l Q:
Let me refer again to a statement that is I
in the transcript.
OK, in this particular transcript and I'll kinda read it in sequence here.
First is Hartman, "There I
were certain things we could do to make it less than one gallon per minute."
Reporter says, What did you do?"
f Hartman says, "There were certain things, I
f like something simple like adding hydrogen f
to the make-up tank, it's a gas to prevent oxidation in the coolant pipes."
Reporter: "Did you fix the statistics?"
Hartman:
"I didn't do it very often.
I did it only if I was watched very closely and was told that I had to have one by six in the morning.
It was a dire situation.
f I avoided it."
And he continues on, but I
it's clear to anybody that hears this k
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i thing that he feels he's under pressure i
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and that somebody is watching over his
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shoulder to make sure he gets a good one, l
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an acceptable one.
Do you have any i
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comments on that?
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i Brian Mahler:
I don't think anyone pressured him into i
ever getting a good one.
[ illegible] He 8
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may have felt pressure, you know, but I don't think it was exerted on him from 4
above, you know.
I know I never exerted i
that type of pressure on anyone.
You
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know, that's against me.
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0 OK, let's continue.
When you ran a computer program a'nd you got an unacceptable leak rate, what did,you do with it?
Brian Mehler:
We used to run another.one.
0:
Why?
Brian Mahler:
Because, you know, just like anything, the first one could be. bad because there could have been something in the plant 4
that was unstable at that time,,that s
could have,just made it just a shade over y
a gallon.
Q:
Were you required to make a determination i
that there was a rational cause for invalidating that leak rate?
Brian Mehler:
No.
1 Q:
Did that, strike,you as, funny that you get i
an unacceptable leak rate and continue operation?
Brian Mahler:
You know, if you got a leak rate that said you had a ten gallon a minute leak rate and l;.
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i I-l you looked at your make-up tank and you didn't see a big decrease you know it i
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wasn't correct.
It was obvious that, you know, then you got to assume that somewhere
]b the temperature changed or something s
happened in your drain tank which caused it to be erroneous and you ran another one.
Q:
We've been told that leak rate tests that failed, their records were crumpled up and thrown in the trashcan.
Is that true?
Brian Mehler:
Yeah.
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Q:
Would this include those that you really couldn't have a valid reason for throwing
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them out, that they were greater than 1 GPM
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and you had a gut feeling that it couldn't
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i be there?
Brian Mehler:
I would say yes.
Q:
OK, I am going to try to go through an educational process here again.
This, I think is the tech spec we're referring to, 3452 or 62 and particularly the 1 GPM leakage and my question to you is, given that the computer program has generated an indicated leak greater than 1 GPM and that you cannot rationalize why it is invalid, 1
10
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why are you not immediately kicked into
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the action statement?
Brian Mehler:
You would be but you can run another leak rate, you can go on determining if you have any identifiable leakage --
i Q:
But you are still in the action statement at that point and if you do not find something within six hours you've got to go down, you've got to do what it says here.
Is that correct?
Brian Mahler:
That's what it;says, yes, that's correct.
Q:
Now, is that what was done?
Brian Mehler:
We've always got a good one within that time period.
Q:
Oh, I see.
OK.
So, in actuality, we didn't have 72thours to get a good one, once we had a bad one that we could not logically invalidate we immediately went into the action statement and if within the six hours we didn't get an acceptable one we went down.-
Brian Mehler:
I know when we didn't get a good leak rate we went on and tried to determine known leakage and measure it'and determine the amount of it and document it and add to it 11
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the known leakage'which would be subtracted
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from the unknown leakage, develop a good
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i leak rate less,than one. -
Q:
OK, Keith, do.you have any other questions --?
L Brian Mehler:
You know and I'm quite sure if you go back to the leak rate you'll find my procedure told you where the leakage is from, how much it was and names of who found it and who justified it and that's in the record.
A Q:
I had wanted to go back to an area that maybe I was a little confused on - you mentioned that you were never aware of any time where they added to the make-up tank.
Brian Mehler:
Yes.
Q:
But you are aware that that added to the make-up tank affects the --
Brian Mehler:
Definitely it would.
Q:
Is that from experience of adding to the make-up tank in your own capacity or just from what, your previods-knowredge."of the system?
Brian Mehler You're talking about the hydrogen make-up?
Q:
Yes.
j Brian Mahler:
That's from previous knowledge, that I've l
l seen it happen.
l l
12
0:
Would you have se'en it added to the make-up systed?
Brian Mehler:
Adding hydrogen to the make-up tank will change the leakage out of the make-up tank, in other words, it will probably make it smaller.
Q:
OK.
Brian Mehler:
It's been a long time.
0:
OK.
One more question in the area of the leak rate.
I've lost my tra'in of thought.
OK.
Just leave that for the moment and I'll come back to it.
The next area I would like to talk about is the handling of safety concerns.
Mr. Hartman has indicated, others have indicated that he surfaced a number of safety concerns which he has expressed to his supervision, among them he mentioned the leak rate tests, the following of procedures by other operators, the emergency feed water surveillance test that they kept having to change the reference values, the ECP problem that we talked about earlier today, the lack of compliance of operators with procedures and NRC regulations, he indicated that this was communicated to his supervision orally 13
J and in most cases he couldn't identify where specific corrective action had been taken.
Have you ever been on the receiving end'of a concern from Mr.
Hartman?
And if so, what action did you take?
Brian Mehler:
I was on the receiving and of one of his problems when he complained about all the alarms going off in the computer during the start-up phase of the program which at that point you're going to have a lot of alarms because they aren't set yet, you know we went through the same problem in nit 1, and it's something you gotta live with until, you know, they're all adjusted properly and he became a little overwrought because of it and said that he don't have to put up with this kind of stuff, to get him a relief and I proceeded to get him a relief and then after he figured out that I was not gonna back down from his threat, he backed, said that OK, don't call me one, I'll stay.
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Q:
[ illegible)
The' interpretation that was laid to that was that he was at that point being threatened with being fired.
Was that accurate?
Brian Mehler:
No.
L Q:
OK, I'm getting that as interpretation.
Did you recall making a comment to him that, something to the effect that if you want a relief you may as well get your lunch bucket and go out the north gate?
Brian Mehler:
[ Negative sound.)
Q:
You don't remember saying that to him?
Brian Mehler:
No, I didn't'say that to him.
I told him that if-it's that bad I'will get you relieved and if you, I think if you talk to Mr. Hoyt you'll find out that he was on the telephone calling CRO's to come in to relieve him at that time when he decided that from then on he don't need, in fact I think if you checked I instructed Ray Gould to relieve-him o'; the panel so he wouldn't be under the pressure.
Q:
I guess this is a personal opinion question I'm asking, it appears just from going i
15 a
through these things and listing from what everyone has said that there was a certain conflict between you and Harold Hartman.
Was it a perso.nality thing or just a working conflict that may have affected the 4
way perceptions of activities were handled or what?
Brian Mehler:
I don't know if Harold had conflict with me l
or not, you know, he can make that statement one way or the other.
I had no conflict with Harold, I treated all the CRO's the way I treated every one of them, the same way.
You know, if he had problems I would have tried to adjust to them accordingly and, just the way I would with any other CRO, and if, you know, if he became unstable I would have removed him.
You know, if it was i
Harold Hartman or whether it was, I don't l
care who it was.
You know, just because, I don't care who would ha~ve said get me a l
relief, I would have got him a relief.
t Because he's telling me that at that particular l
time he's not capable of handling it.
Q:
OK.
Going back to the questions in regards to the safety concerns.
You did not have that 16
s much contact with Harold Hartman because he was normally not on your shift, right?
Brian Mehler:
That's correct.
I think ' only had contact with him maybe, I think I was on shift with him'for one period of time, maybe for a' week.
Q:
Did you feel, you~know', looking~back over
~
all, that there was a pt:Llem with your operators not' coming forward to you to give you information about what they believed were problems because they were afraid they would'be categorized as a complainer'or woul'd be'in jeopardy of
~
th'eir good standing if'they brought to your attention complaints?
Brian Mehler:
No.
.Q:
Was it common for your people ~'to come forward to you'in your other shifts about complaints?
Brian Mehler:
Yes.
You know, if they had any complaints they, you'probably ask people that were on my shift in Unit 2, that they have voiced their complaints.to me.
0:
Were many of their~ complaints similar to l
what Harold Hartman's complaints were?
17
Brian Mehler:
No.
I don't think they had nearly as many complaints as Harold Hartman.
Q:
Was Harold's job in jeopardy because he was a complainer?
Brian Mehler:
I would say not.
Q:
OK.
I remembered my one question from the leak rate area.
We had previously, or you had previously made a statement and I can go back and look at the records to see that, how these leak rates were found to be acceptable.
Unfortunately, you also told me that the ones that y'all didn't feel were acceptable you tossed out.
How am I going to find out if-they were actually acceptable or if there was some real rationale for tossing them?
I guess my point is in the future please don't throw out those records unless you have a valid reason, you know, or can provide a mechanism because the tech spec says --
Brian Mehler:
I think you'll find some that showed an unidentifiable leakage greater than 1 percent, you know, when we did discover -
the actual leakage and identifiable that i
spec [ illegible] with a justification.
18
Q:
The NRC has no problem if you have a valid reason for invalidating the thing, the tech specs are specifically written, the plant must. be stable for the tech specs to apply, with the plant stable the leak rate must be such and such.
OK?
We recognize in,an unstable condition, it's almost impossible to do a calculation, we also recognize there are other things which can affect the leak rate and make it invalid.
In those cases an explanation, a very quick explanation, the plant.is in an up-power transient or whatever, this.is an invalid leak. rate, starting again, beautiful, you know, that item is closed.
But you can see how we are now open to an allegation and you don't have support, you, the comoany have no support.for your position and~we have no way of proving either side of the argument.,
Brian Mehler:
I understand that exactly.
Q:
And I guess the other issue.that I wanted to make sure we were talking the same words, i
once you do,have a leak rate,which you cannot 1
invalidate through some logic that happens to I,
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exceed that limit, you are immediately kicked into the action statement, you do not have the rest of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> since the last good one because of the way the bases is written for the whole surveillance program which says that nothing in, I think it was tech spec 403, nothing in here implies that you can use old data to invalidate a new piece of information which you've just got, the newest piece of information, unless you can invalidate it, is the one you believe, believe your indication unless proven otherwise, and just because the surveillance period hasn't ended that newest piece of information is the one you must believe unless you have proof-positive that that's invalid, and I want to make sure that everyone under-i stands that and that's.what the NRC l
condones, not the other thing.
OK.
l t
Q:
I have one other question that I wanted to
\\
bring up to you for confirmation.
In trying i
to determine the circumstances and the 20 c, -
i events that led'up to Harold Hartman's resignation or termination as you would call it, do you, did you have any involvement in the process of that termination?
Brian Mehler:
Harold Hartman, and I don't know which particular day it was that they came back from the, simulator, it was like during the accident, you know, it was very irrational over at the observation center which I don't know if it's documented or.not and he made a lot of statements and he was in a very incoherent condition and he resigned immediately there.
Q:
Were you at the observation center?
1 Brian Mehler:
I was;not.
This was all hearsay coming down, and, you know, I can't.say-I've talked to individuals that were there.
Then I think he.came back to. work three days later after,.you know, the major portion of the crisis.was over and wanted to resume his job after he'd already resigned, and that don't go well with me, and I voiced my opinion on that.
21
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Q:
OK.
Who did you' voice that to, to him or?
Brian Mehler:
No, to my immediate supervisor in Unit 2 which was Floyd at the time.
Q:
Had he submitted a written termination notice at that time?
Brian Mehler:
I couldn't tell you that.
Q:
Do you recall if you asked him to submit his written termination?
Brian Mehler:
I did not talk to Harold Hartman previous to the 28th or after the 28th, in fact I haven't spoken to the man since he was down at Lynchburg the week of the 28th.
Q:
OK, I just wanted to clarify that issue.
Just one other thing that I've got to do here, I think I neglected at the
~
beginning of the interview just to outline 3
basically what your background is.
- Brian, if you would, would you basically state just for the record what your position here is at Metropolitan Edison.
Brian Mehler:
My position at Metropolitan Edison is shift supervisor.
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l Q:
OK.
How long have you been a shift supervisor?
Brian Mehler:
I have been a shift supervisor since --
Q:
An approximate date will do.
Brian Mehler It's April but I'm trying to think of the year.
Is it two years ago.
It's
- April,
'78..
Have:to be
'78.
Q:
And during those periods you intermittently had Harold Hartman under your supervision on a shif.t?
Brian Mehler:
Yes, intermittently.
Q:
But he was not part of your-regular crew?
Brian Mehler:
He was not part of my normal shift.
Harold Hartman was an AO in Unit 1 and I had contact with him also over there.
Q:
OK.
I just wanted to clarify that because I didn't at the beginning.
Is there anything else at this point that you would like to bring out, to voice your concern
-about in regards to the allegations made by Harold Hartman, anything that has come up in this --interview that concerns you or anything else that's not germaine to this particular issue, in relation to the things that you'd like to bring up to us?
. r, 23 1
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.-e, Brian Mehler:
I'm very concerned about the ECP, you know I wish they could show me the ECP, the log entry where he went critical --
Q:
You referring to the specific incident --?
Brian Mehler:
Yes, you know, and whether I was there?
Because according to him, I was.
And to my knowledge, I cannot remember, I do remember an incident where we were at zero power and we were supposedly increasing,at 3 percent an hour by maneuvering rate and after two hours we were still at zero percent power and Mr.
Hartman and I had words over that.
Q:
This was the one about the excessive alarms in the overhead --
Brian Mehler:
No, the excessive alarms was previous to that.
And by'the time the shift was over, we'd gotten relieved and we were still at zero percent power but I don't know if that's the same date that he's referring to we went critical or not because I don't, I cannot remember we went critical that day on our shift.
Q:
Do you know of any way that we could research or find any record indication 24
of this allegatio'n he's making with regard to the ECP?
Brian Mehler:
The only thing, there is a record in the log which [ illegible) put your critical data down and with the procedure that you took it critical the ECP is stapled to it which is signed by one of the CRO's and one of the SRO's, you know, and if I was there my signature should be on it.
Q:
OK, I have nothing further.
Q:
Anything else Brian that you would like to lay out to us at this time about anything.
Brian Mehler:
No, not really.
Q:
John, any comments?
Q:
No.
Q:
OK, at this time we will terminate the interview, the time is 10:38 and I will reiterate that we will provide you with a transcript and a copy, you want a copy of the tape or a transcript?
Brian Mehler:
The transcript would be fine.
Q:
OK, we'll ensure that you get a copy as you request.
Thank you.
l 25
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%)n,jya This is Christopher.
The date is March 27, 1980.
The time is 10:08 a.m.
This is Keith Christopher and I am an investigator with.the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission assigned.to Region 1, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.
This morning we are located in trailer No. 5.at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Site Office at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station.
We are here this morning to conduct an interview of Brian Mehler who is an employee of Metropolitan Edison Company. at the.Three Mile Island site.
At this time I would like the other -individuals in the room to identify themselves and identify their positions:
Tim Martin, Section Chief, Reactor Project Section 3, Region 1, USNRC John F. Wilson, Attorney for Metropolitan Edison Company Christopher:
As a matter of record before we turned on the tape we discussed with Brian the memorandum prepared by this office.
This memorandum goes into the purpose and scope of the investigation and to some degree the rights of the individual being interviewed.
On the,last page there are several questions which you responded,,to in the affirmative and for purposes of the record I would like to get your response to those on tape.
Number 1 is Do you understand,the above-addressed two-page memo?.
1
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l Brian Mehler:
Yes.
Christopher:
OK.
The second question is Do we have permission to tape this interview?
Brian Mehler:
Yes.
Christopher:
OK.
And lastly, Do you want a copy of this tape?
Brian Mehler:
Yes.
Christopher:
OK.
For the record we'll get you the transcript as soon as it can be made available and get it out to you.
OK.
And Mr. Martin will initiate his questions.
Tim Martin:
Brian, I have three areas that I'd like to pursue questions in that were raised by Mr. Hartman as concerns; the first one is related to estimated critical position.
Let me read what is said in the transcript of R. Rosen and Mr. Hartman.
"I remember this one particular incident.
I was making the start-up and I went critical less than a half-a-percent from where it should have gone and when we went critical.
I immediately took the rods and inserted the rods.
As soon as I inserted the rods the shift super-visor told me What are you doing?
I said 2
m
i' we went critical'28 percent.
I estimated critical position was 68.
My minus a half-a-percent position was 32.
I went critical 4 percent too,early and to me there's something. wrong."
Now the re,po,rter says:
"In testimony given to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission investigators Hartman states that he was told to con-tinue the plant start-up even though it would viola.te the procedures..
He told the NRC investigators they redid the numbers and somehow they fudged them.
And why did they do it?" Do. you have any comment?
Brian Mehler:
I don't know the specific incident he's talking about.
Tim Martin:
Let me provide some clarification, in our interviews with Mr. Hartman he indicates that it was a plant start-up, that he believes it occurred either ip the April to May '78 area or possibly in November of '78.
It was one of the few start-ups that he was the RO on the panel that,Mr.
Hoyt and Mr. Ray Buer(?) were also in the co,ntrol, room [and that,as je,was with-drawing rods,he got an alarm,.he looked up,
..)
3
A he had a rod out inhibit, he had a 3 DPM or 2 DPM - he couldn't remember which -
start-up rate since he was critical below the half-a-percent delta K over K below the ECP it was his understanding that the procedure required him to do certain things, he says that he started to do those things by inserting the rods, that - and I think his quote was "No, no, take it to one,"
and then he-subsequently said that he was forced to continue the start-up to ten to the minus eight and settle out for the
~~
check of the ECP.
Do you have any comments en that?
Brian Mehler:
I have no comment because I'm not, I don't remember the incident to be truthful with you.
Tim Martin:
Have you ever been on a start-up where the critical position fell below the ECP l
allowable band?
l 1
Brian Mehler:
No.
l Tim Martin What is the requirement of the procedure if that had occurred?
Brian Mahler:
The requirement of the procedure is insert rod until you are 1 percent subcritical.
4
J 0:
Brian, it is a swo'rn statement that he is stating that this incident did happen so when you say that you don't remember that it happened, do you think if it did happen that you would have. remembered that I
incident with him?
Brian Mahler:
I'm quite sure I would have remembered that particular incident if he'd had a 3 DPM start-up rate.
Q:' And you said.you did not work with Harold Hartman
,7 Brian Mehler:
I normally worked with him.
I had been on shift already with him.
Q:
OK, if you're satisfied, that'.s all I, want.totalkaboutthatone./Thenext l
area is concerning the reactor, core or reactor coolant system inventory in that Mr. Hartman states that in the,latter f
months of plant operation it became increasingly difficult to get acceptable leak rates and I think he focussed in on i
the unidentified leak rate, the 1 GPM.
J l
He says that there was a lot of competition 1
between shifts and each was camaraderie, esprit de corps, whatever you want to D
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call it, and that no shift really wanted to be the shift that forced the plant off the line because they couldn't get an acceptable leak rate.
He felt pressure, i
he says other operators felt precsure, l
and in fact each man, each shift, had their techniques for getting acceptable ones.
Specifically he states he did the following,
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in some cases he increased the pressure in the make-up tank which he says sometimes gave him a good leak rate, in other cases he said he actually added water while they b~
were running the test and in another case he says that they misstated the millivolt reading on the RCDT that was put into the
~
computer.
These things he said he did, he says other people had those and other techniques.
bo you have any comment on this?
Brian Mehler: I can't tell you if he did them or not.
I didn 't.
You know, we have, on the leak rate we went on the plant and identified leakage as safe because you are allowed to do that by the procedure and subtract that amount of leakage from the unknown leakage and that's documented and signed, you know as 6
4.
far as him, I.do 'know that pressure in the make-up tank will affect the leak rate.
Them guys doing that or adding water to it is, that's a no-no.
You know, I'm not aware that they did it.
i Q:
Help me a.little bit.
I don't understand how increasing the pressure in the make-up tank affects the inventory.
Brian Mehler:
I just know that if you increase the
~
pressure it.would somehow make the make-up tank. level to the computer change.
What mechanism I.do not know.
Normally we didn't.
Normally, when.you.ran a leak rate you ran it for an hour, you tried to hold the plant in stable condition without changing.any other parameters.
I-can't answer for what he did.
Q:
Are you aware of anybody fudging these leak rate calculations?
Brian Mehler No, I'm not aware that anyone fudged.the leak rate-calculations.
Q:
Was there.any pressure on the. operators to fudge leak rates?
Brian Mahlers No.
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Q:
Let me refer again to a statement that is in the transcript.
OK, in this particular transcript and I'll kinda read it in sequence here.
First is Hartman, "There were certain things we could do to make it less than one gallon per minute "
Reporter says, "What did you do?"
i 1
Hartman says, "There were certain things, I
like something simple like adding hydrogen l
to the make-up tank, it's a gas to prevent oxidation in the coolant pipes."
Reporter: "Did you fix the statistics?"
Hartman:
"I didn't do it very often.
I did it only if I was watched very closely and was told that I had to have one by six in the morning.
It was a dire situation.
I avoided it."
And he continues on, but it's clear to anybody diat hears this thing that he feels he's under pressure and that somebody is watching over his I
shoulder to make sure he gets a good one, g
an acceptable one.
Do you have any comments on that?
Brian Mahlers I don't think anyone pressured him into
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ever getting a good,one.
[ illegible] He 8
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l may have felt pressure, you know, but I don't think it was exerted on him from i
r above, you.know.
I know I never exerted that type of p'ressure on anyone.
You
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know, that's against me.
)_......_..._..let's continue.
When you ran a computer Q:
OK, program a'nd you got an unacceptable leak rate, what did.you do with it?
Brian Mehler:
We used to run another.one.
Q':
Why?
Brian Mahler:
Because, you know, just like anything, the first one could be bad because there could have been something in the plant I
that was unstable at that time, that s
could have.just made it just,a shade over y
a gallon.
Q:
Were you required to make a determination that there was a rational cause for invalidating that leak rate?
.3, Brian Mehler No.
Q:
Did that strike you as, funny pat yog get an unacceptable leak _ rate and, continue operation?
Brian Mahler You.know, if you got a leak rate that said you had a ten gallon a' minute leak rate and 9
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you looked at your make-up tank and you didn't see a big decrease you know it wasn't correct.
It was obvious that, you know, then you got to assume that somewhere the temperature changed or something x
happened in your drain tank which caused it to be erroneous and you ran another one.
Q:
We've been told that leak rate tests that failed, their records were crumpled up and thrown in the trashcan.
Is that true?
Brian Mahler:
Yeah.
i Q:
Would this include those that you really I
couldn't have a valid reason for throwing i
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them out, that they were greater than 1 GPM and you had a gut feeling that it couldn't I
be there?
Brian Mehler:
I would say yes.
~,
Q:
OK, I am going to try to go through an educational process here again.
This, I think is the tech spec we're referring to, 3452 or 62 and particularly the 1 GPM leakage and my question to you is, given that the computer program has generated an indicated leak greater than 1 GPM and that you cannot rationalize why it is invalid, 10 1.
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I why are you not immediately kicked into the action statement?
Brian Mehler:
You would be but you can run another leak rate, you can go on determining'if you have any identifiable leakage --
Q:
But you are still in the' action statement at that point and if you do not find something within six hours you've got to go down, you've got to do what it says here.
Is that correct?
i Brian Mahler:
That's what it says, yes, that's correct.
Q:
Now, is that what was done?
~
Brian Mehler:
We've always got a good one within that time period.
Q:
Oh, I see.
OK.
So, in actuality, we didn't have 72: hours to get a good one, once we had a bad one that we could not logically invalidate we immediately went into the action statement and if within the six hours we didn't get an acceptable I
one we went down.-
Brian Mahlers I know when we didn't get a good leak rate we went on and tried to determine known leakage and measure it and determine the amount of it and document it and add to it 11 l
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the known leakage'which would be subtracted from the unknown leakage, develop a good leak rate less than one.
I Q:
OK, Keith, do you have any other questions
--?
l Brian Mehler:
You know and I'm quite sure if you go back to the leak rate you'll find my procedure i
told you where the leakage is from, how much it was and names of who found it and who justified it and that's in the record.
t Q:
5 had wanted to go back to an area that maybe I was a little confused on - you mentioned that you were never aware of any time where they added to the make-up tank.
Brian Mehler:
Yes.
Q:
But you are aware that that added to the make-up tank affects the --
Brian Mehler:
Definitely it would.
Q:
Is that from experience of adding to the make-up tank in your own capacity or just
)
from what, your previods-knowfedge: of the system?
Brian Mehler:
You're talking about the hydrogen make-up?
Q:
Yes.
Brian Mahler:
That's from previous knowledge, that I've seen it happen.
12 9
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Q:
Would you have se'en it added to the make-up J
systed?
Brian Mehler Adding hy,drogen to the make-up tank will change the leakage out of the make-up tank, in other words, it will probably make it smaller.
l Q:
ox.
Brian Mehler:
It's been a long time.
.Q:
OK.
One more question,in the area of the leak rate.
I've lost my tra'in of thought.
OK.
Just leave that for the moment and I'll come back to it.
The next area I would like to talk about is the handling of safety concerns.
Mr. Hartman has indicated, others have indicated that he, surfaced a number of safety concerns which he has expressed to his supervision, among them he mentioned the leak rate tests, the following of procedures by other operators, the emergency feed water surveillance test that they kept having to change the reference values, the ECP problem that we talked about earlier today, the lack of compliance of operators with procedures and NRC regulations, he indicated that this was communicated to his supervision orally 13
i and in most cases he couldn't identify where specific corrective action had been taken.
Have you ever been on the
[
receiving end'of a concern from Mr.
Hartman?
And if so, what action did you take?
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Brian Mehler:
I was on the receiving and of one of his problems when he complained about all the alarms going off in the computer during the start-up phase of the program which at that point you're going to have a lot of alarms because they aren't set yet, you know we went through the same problem in Unit 1, and it's something you gotta live with until, you know, they're all adjusted properly and he became a little overwrought because of it and said thah he don't have to put up with this kind of stuff, to get him a relief and I proceeded to get him a relief and then after he figured out that I was not gonna back down from his threat, he backed, said that OK, don't call me one, I'll stay.
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Q:
[ illegible]
The' interpretation that was laid to that was that he was at that point being threatened with being fired.
Was that accurate?
Brian Mahler:
No.
Q:
OK, I'm getting that as interpretation.
Did you recall making a comment to him 3
that, something to the effect that if you want a relief you may as well get your lunch. bucket and go out the north gate?
Brian Mehler:
[ Negative sound.)
0:
You don't remember saying that to him?
Brian Mehler:
No, I didn't say that to him.
I told him that if it's that bad I will get'you relieved and if.you, I think if you; talk to Mr. Hoyt you'll find out that.he was on the telephone calling CRO's to come in to' relieve him at that time when he decided that from then on he don't need, in fact I think if you checked I instructed Ray Gould to relieve him on the panel so he wouldn't be under the pressure.
Q:
I guess this is a personal opinion question I'm_asking, it appears just from going 9
15
through these things and listing from what everyone has said that there was a certain 2
conflict between you and Harold Hartman.
Was it a perso,nality thing or just a working conflict that may have affected the way perceptions of activities were handled or what?
Brian Mehler:
I don't know if Harold had conflict with me or not, you know, he can make that statement one way or the other.
I had'no conflict with Harold, I treated all the CRO's the way I treated every one of them, the same way.
You know, if he had problems I would have tried to adjust to them accordingly and, just the way I would with any othar CRO, and if, you know, if he became unstable I would have removed him.
You know, if it was Harold Hartman or whether it was, I don't care who it was.
You know, just because, I don't care who would have said get me a i
relief, I would have got him a relief.
Because he's telling me'^that at that particular time he's not capable of handling it.
Q:
OK.
Going back to the questions in regards to the safety concerns.
You did not have that Y
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much contact with Harold Hartman because he was normally not on your shift, right?
1 Brian Mehler:
That's correct.
I think I only had l
contact with him maybe, I think I was on shift with him for one period of time, maybe for a' week.
Q:
Did you fuel, you know', looki'ng back'over all, that there was a problem with your operators not coming forward to you to give you information about what they believed'were problems because they were afraid they'would~be categori'ed as a z
complainer'or would be'in jeopardy'of~
their good standing if'they brought to your attention complaints?
Brian Mehler:
No.
Q:
Was it common for your people"to come forward to ypu'in your other shifts about complaints?
Brian Mehler:
Yes.
You know, if they had any complaints they, you'probably'ask people that were on my shift in Unit 2, that they have voiced their complaints.to me.'
Q:
Were many of their' complaints similar to what Harold Hartman's colaplaints were?
17
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O Brian Mehler:
No.
I don't think they had nearly as l
l many complaints as Harold Hartman.
[
Q:
Was Harold's job in jeopardy because he was a complainer?
l 1
Brian Mehler:
I would say not.
Q:
OK.
I remembered my one question from the leak rate area.
We had previously, or you had previously made a statement and I can go back and look at the records to see that, how these leak rates were found to be acceptable.
Unfortunately, you also told me that the ones that y'all didn't feel were acceptable you tossed out.
How am I going to find out if they were actually acceptable or if there was some real rationale for tossing them?
I guess my point is in the future please don't throw out those 4
records unless you have a valid reason, you know, or can provide a mechanism because the tech spec says --
Brian Mehler:
I think you'll find some that showed an unidentifiable leakage greater than 1 percent, you know, when we did discover -
the actual leakage and identifiable that
~
spec [ illegible] with a justification.
18 i
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v Q:
The NRC has no problem if you have a valid reason for invalidating the thing, the tech specs are specifically written, the plant must be stable for the tech specs to apply, with the plant stable the leak rate must be such and such.
OK?
We recognize in,an unstable condition, it's almost impossible to do a, calculation, we also recognize there are other things which can affect the leak rate.and make it invalid.
In those cases an explanation, a very quick explanation, the plant is in an up-power transient or whatever, this.is an invalid leak rate, starting again, beautiful, you know, that item is closed.
But you can see,how we are now open to an allegation and you don't have support, you, the company have no support for your position and we have no way of proving either side of the argument.,
Brian Mehler:
I understand that exactly.
Q:
And I guess the other issue that I wanted.to make sure we were talking the same words, once ypu,do have a leak rate: which you cannot invalidate through some logic that happens to 19
exceed that limit, you are immediately kicked into the action statement, you do not have the rest of the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> j
since the last good one because of the I
4 way the bases is written for the whole surveillance program which says that nothing in, I think it was tech spec 403, nothing in here implies that you i
can use old data to invalidate a new piece of information which you've just got, the newest' piece of information, unless you can invalidate it, is the one you believe, believe your indication unless proven otherwise, and just because the surveillance period hasn't ended that newest piece of information is the one you must believe unless you have proof-positive that that's invalid, and I want to make sure that everyone under-stands that and that's what the NRC condones, not the other thing.
OK.
Q:
I have one other question that I wanted to bring up to you for confirmation.
In try$ng to determine the circumstances and the n
20 n--
_.. ~ ~.. _.,,
. w events that led'up to Harold Hartman's resignation or termination as you would call it, do you,.did you have any involvement in the process of-that termination?
Brian Mehler:
Harold Hartman, and I don't know which particular day it was that they came back from the, simulator, it was like during the accident, you know,.it was very irrational over at the observation center which I don't know if it's documented or.not and he made a lot of statements and he was in a very incoherent condition and he resigned immediately there.
Q:
Were you at the observation center?
Brian Mehler:
I.was not.
This was all hearsay coming down, and, you know, I.can't.say-I've talked to individuals that were there.
Then I think he.came back to.. work three days later after, you know, the major portion of the crisis.was over and wanted to-resume his job after he'd already resigned, and that don't go well with me, and I voiced my opinion on that.
- 1.
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21
Q:
OK.
Who did you' voice that to, to him or?
Brian Mehler:
No, to my immediate supervisor in Unit 2 which was Floyd at the time.
Q:
Had he submitted a written termination notice at that time?
Brian Mehler:
I couldn't tell you that.
Q:
Do you recall if you asked him to submit his written termination?
Brian Mehler:
I did not talk to Harold Hartman previous to the 28th or after the 28th, in fact I haven't spoken to the man since he was down at Lynchburg the week
~~
of the 28th.
Q:
OK, I just wanted to clarify that issue.
Just one other thing that I've got to do here, I think I neglected at the beginning of the interview just to outline basically what your background is.
- Brian, if you would, would you basically state just for the record what your position here is at Metropolitan Edison.
Brian Mehler:
My position at Metropolitan Edison is shift supervisor.
9 e
- 3 22 9
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Q:
OK.
How long h' ave you been a shift supervisor?
Brian Mahler:
I have been a shift supervisor since --
Q:
An approximate date will do.
Brian Mehler:
It's April but I'm trying to think of the year.
Is it two years ago.
It's April, ' 78. - Have-to be '78.
Q:
And during those periods you intermittently had Harold Hartman under your supervision on a shif.t?
Brian Mehler:
Yes, intermittently.
Q:
But he was not part of your regular crew?
Brian Mehler:
He was not part of my normal shift.
Harold Hartman was an AO in Unit 1 and I had contact with him also over there.
Q:
OK.
I just wanted to clarify that because I didn't at the beginning.
Is there anything else at this point that you would like to bring out, to voice *your concern about in regards to the allegations made by Harold Hartman, anything that has come up in this-interview that concerns you or anything else that's not germaine to this particular issue, in relation-to the things that you'd like to bring up to us?
J 23
4
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l Brian Mehler:
I'm very concerned about the ECP, you know I wish they could show me the ECP, the log entry where he went critical --
Q:
You referring to the specific incident --?
Brian Mehler:
Yes, you know, and whether I was there?
Because according to him, I was.
And to my knowledge, I cannot remember, I do remember an incident where we were at zero power and we were supposedly increasing,at 3 percent an hour by maneuvering rate and after two hours we were still at zero percent power and Mr.
Hartman and I had words over that.
Q:
This was the one about the excessive alarms in the overhead --
Brian Mehler:
No, the excessive alarms was previous to that.
And by'the time the shift was over, we'd gotten relieved and we were still at zero percent power but I don't know if that's the same date that he's referring to we went critical or not because I don't, I cannot remember we went critical that day on our shift.
Q:
Do you know of any way that we could research or find any. record indication 24
L.
- 9 of this allegatio'n he's making with regard to the ECP?
Brian Mehler:
The only thing, there is a record in the log which [ illegible) put your critical data down and with the procedure that you took it critical the ECP is stapled to it which is signed by one of the CRO's and one of the SRO's, you know, and if I was there my signature should be on it.
Q:
OK, I have nothing further.
Q:
Anything else Brian that you would like to lay out to us at this time about anything.
Brian Mehler:
No, not really.
Q:
John, any comments?
Q:
No.
0:
OK, at this time we will terminate the interview, the time is 10:38 and I will reiterate that we will provide you with a transcript and a copy, you want a copy of the tape or a transcript?
Brian Mehler:
The transcript would be fine.
Q:.
OK, we'll ensure that you get a copy as you request.
Thank you.
N.
25
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