ML20024B161
| ML20024B161 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1979 |
| From: | Taylor J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-6046, NUDOCS 8307070160 | |
| Download: ML20024B161 (40) | |
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Designations from the NRC Special Inquiry Group Deposition of James H.
Taylor, dated October 5, 1979:
7:12 - 8:10 9:23 - 10:8 11:1 - 11:22 12:18 - 13:2 15:24 - 17:9 18:13 - 19:16 20:16 - 23:21 24:20 - 25:16 27:18 - 29:12
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60:5 - 61:4 63:21 - 69:13 81:25 - 83:4 I
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.p b 3 That job involved production contrsi re sponsibilities, tool I
2l engineering, industrial engineering, maintenance.
It was a 3
broad spectrum of activities.
That lasted for about two years.:
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4i Then, in 1971, I returned to Lynchburg and was i
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responsible for,the next five, five and a half years for the 6
engineering support in connection with our German subsidiaries activities, Babcock-Brown-Bavarie.
l 7
ai And then in 1976, I was on a special assignment 9:'
for one year involving straightening out some problems we had i
10 '
with reactor coolant pumps on our current projects.
And then i
11 in 1977, in March of 1977, I became Licensing manager.
i 12 :
l j
Q okay.
13 !
I'd like t'e ask you seme questions concerning an 14 '
i incident that occurred at Davis-Besse in September of 1977, and, g
15 '
I'm particularly interested in trying to get at your knowledge 16 i; and understanding of that incident prior to the accident at 17 '
TMI.
18 l 1
Specifically, prior to March 2S, 1979, what i
19 '
knowledge did you have concerning an incident that occurred at 20 i Davis-Besse on September 24, 19777 4
21 A
My knowledge of ths.c incident was really rather 22 peripheral.
I was familiar with the fact that the incident had 23 occurred.
I read some of the meeting minutos and trip reports 24 !
that had ccme back frcm that incident.
I was aware of the
. m.ere n n in.
I general concern over the incident and the severity of the t
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2l I was also familiar with one of the initiators i
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being the pilot operated relief valve.
I knew that the pilot 1
4f operated relief valve that was used at the Davis-Besse plant l
3 was of a different type than had been used at some of the 6'
other plants.
7:
I never I don't think I -- I'm sure I did not l
i 8,
visited the site with regard to the Davis-Besse transient, and !
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I was not involved to my recollect.on ln any detailed discussion 10 of the transient until after TMI-2.
11 :
l Q
What was your organizational responsibility with
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i 12 i respect to Davis-Sesse?
I l-13 1 i
A The Davis-Besse plant at that time, of course, had i
1 14 their operating license',- and after the B&W plants received their w
15 l operating license the Licensing section then goes into a l
16 l supporting role with regard to support of the power plants r
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- 7 l
that are in operation.
And our key responsibility af ter thev 1
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beccme operational is in connection with preparation of re-19 j load reports.
And then, of course, if there are -- cur organ-l 20 l
ization would deal with problems that might come up in connec-l d
i'i tien with analytical difficulties that could be established in 1
22 :
a follow-on contract which might have some implications for an
'23 earlier contract, and in that sense we are the ones. who are i
24 -
l c..s,. a n.= n.n.in.l responsible for managing the safety concern procedure that we
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have in PG&E.
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O Why were you informed -- or why would you be provid--
2l ed the information that you were given concerning that incident?
A I really can' t say why I was provided that informa-i 4
tion.
I tried to stay abreast of what's happening en the I
i cperating plants, and I probably learned more about that l
i transient by asking questions than I really did anything else.
7 i
Q So was it more just a function of your own I
i 8'
I personal curiosity that you required that informat. ion?
3 9i A
Yes, as I recall.
j 10 The way the Licensing section is organized, I have 11 :
three units in the section, and one of-the units is designated !
i 12 1 i
j as the Operating Plant Licensing Unit.
And the man who is the i
13 '
supervisor of that unit, Mr. Kane, tries also to stay abreast j
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of the activities of tMW cperating plants.
And when something i q
l 15 l lika this happens he.tries to inquire.
And we were aware of l
16 !
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the evaluations that were going on from just a general stand-i e, i point, but we didn't have any repe ting responsibilities or 18 l l
anything of that nature.
19.
Q Did you have any review responsibility?
20 A
Wo.
I I
21 I
Q All right.
l i
22 i BY MR. FOLSOM:
r 23 '
Q Why, then, was this incident of particular interest:
24 to you?
l c.seeers meno,rm. inc..
A Well, it was just a severe transient, that's all.
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I try to be interested in any one of our plants that goes 2'
through a severe transient.
3' Q
Is this a frequent man.er for your concern?
A Not a transient of this s:.gnl:1cance, no.
When a plant -- there'have been, oh, I would say since 1974 a half a 6-dozen transienes that stick out in my mind as being significant.
1l A couple at Oconee, one at Davis-Besse, one at Rancho Seco.
8-But, no, I wouldn't classify it as frequent 9
BY MR. HEBDON:
8 10 Q
I'd like to ask you scme questiens concerning II I i
your' understanding of the scenario that developed at that I
12 -
j particular incident.
And as a point of reference I have on the,.
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wall over here a graf what was prepared by Mr. Leon Engle of 14 '!
the NRC Staff.
And its based on some reactimeter data that 2
he got at the site.following the Davis-Besse inciden*
i 16 ;
And on the graf he has plotted pressurizar level i
and reactor coolant temperature and pressure and saturation 18,
And he also has marked across the top scme of the pressure.
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milestones during the event.
20f You might want to take a mcment just to glance at j
that and familiarize yourself with it a little.
22 (Witness reviewing chart.)
I MR. EDGAR:
Off the record.
24 :
(Discussion off the record. )
a 8.cers, aeoomn.,y 23,'
MR. EEBDON:
Okay, le.'s eo back on the record.
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BY MR. HEBDON:
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O At the time of the incident when you were looking 3
i at the information, did you realize that steam formed in the.
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reactor coolant system during the transient?
5' A
No.
I don't think -- I think it was considerably 6:
after that that I perscnally was aware of that.
7' l
0 When did you personally become aware that steam had.
I 8I I
l formed in the reactor coolant system?
9 A
I really don't recall.
10 i
Q Was it before or after Three Mile Island?
11,
i A
Ch, no, it was before Three Mile Island, yes.
12 Q
Okay.
13 !
Initially did you reali:e that the steam formation.
l 14 l i
in the reactor coolant' system caused the pressurizar level to t
i 15 '
increase while the leak continued?
16 1 A
No.
17:
i Q
Did you become aware of that at any point in the t
IS '
future?
19 l A
I think the point where that -- it was.probably in 20 l connection with some of the discussions that took place, or 21 !
l probably in the reading, I believe, of Bert Dunn's memo, or a 22 '
t brief conversation that took place after that memo was written.
23,
Q So you didn't recognize that particular fact 24 '
o.s.o.,
n.conm. i=. I initially?
f 25 A
As contributing to the pressurizer level, I mean -
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n 1I' the voids in the system contributing to the rise in pressuriner; pb8 f
i-2L level?
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O Yes.
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A No, I don't believe so.
I I
5 l
Q Okay.
6 What significance would you have assigned to that j 7:
!. fact if you had noted it?
I 8!
A At that time?
i i
l 9:
i Q
Yes, prior to Three Mile Island.
j i
l 10 A
I really don't know.
Of course voids in the primary
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!i 11 system are undesirable under any circumstances.
I don't know. !
17 '
I i
It's really hard to separate as a result of all of the conversa-1 13 tions that have taken place in the last six months about this, l
14 :
it's hard to separate and say how I would have thought about it-q i
IS lI at that time.
1 16 1 i
Q Okay.
17 A
I don't know.
i O
Did you realize at any time that the operator l
secured high pressure injection before they had isolated the leak?
21 !
i A
Yes.
i 22 !
Q Okay.
23 l
At what point in time did you become aware of that?'
24 l i.
j A
I believe it was during some -- no, I take that l
e oma am,w s
23 ;
hack -- I believe I did.
I certainly realized it after I l
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Il pb9 received t.Se Bert Dunn memo.
But thinking back to 1977, I i
i 2l think I did, but I'm not sure.
s i
s 3
Q Okay.
l There'sbeenalittlebitofconfusionwithrespectl i
3 Dunn's memo and scme concerns that people in Mr. Karrashs to Mr.
6 group had because of the fact that the operator secured high 7
pressure injection twice during the incident.
He secured it 8-once at about four and a half minutes into the transient while l
9 the system pressure was approaching saturation pressure.
He j
1 10 'i then turned it on again out at about somewhere around 35 or 11 !
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40 minutes into the transient, and then turned it off again at t
l about 60 minutes.
i 13 l Were you aware that they had secured it twice?
I i
t 14 I
i A
No.
No, at'no time, really, until after T.MI was I,
9 i
I l
really aware that they had done it twice, and so I can say 16 1 l
definitely no.
I7 Q
Are you reasonably certain that the securing that la you recall being aware of was the first securing while the i
19 -llleak was still progressing, or was it the second one which was 20 j after the plant was in a fairly stable cendition?
l 21 A
I'm not reasonably certain, no.
I think that it I
22 '
was the first one, but I wouldn't say 100% for sure, i
23' i
, Q okay.
24 !
In the course of reviewing this incident did you
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give any consideration to what might have happened if the plant i
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15 r1i pbli je A
No.
I 2 !
O What was your first involvement with that particular 1
3 issue?
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A When I received the -- well, would you clarify
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what was my first involvement with that issue?
I'm not sure f
I understand that question.
Q Well, I believe you received the Dunn memo --
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A Yes, I did.
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Q
-- which, as I understand it, was addressed to you.
jo l l
A My point of uncertainty here only deals with having,'
11 !
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knowledge of the Davis-Sesse transient.
Of course that was 12 l very early. And if you're talking about what was my first 13 involvement with the issue of whether or not the operators 14 j I'
could use some additional instruction, then the answer to that e_
i 15 '
questic'n is when I received the Bert Dunn memo.
16 Q
Okay.
What I was particularly trying to get at was whetheb I
18 l you had any particular discussions with anyone --
l 19.
i A
No.
' 20 '
Q
-- talked to anyone or anything else about that 21 specific issue that's in the Dunn mamo?
o 22 ;
j A
No.
i 23 '
Q All right.
24
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New you received Mr. Dunn's memo.
Could you 25 !
i describe what transpired?
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A Well, as I recall, I t.lker' to Mr. Kane, who is i
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my unit manager in charge of the Operating Plant Licensing 4
Unit.
And I told him that I felt this was a matter which 4
4 i
required involvement of the Nuclear Service Section much more ci
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than it did the Licensing Section.
And I su,ggested that he i
6 talk to somebody in the Nuclear Service Section.
And the 7'
conversation really didn' t contain a lot more than that.
8:'
And then about a week later there was another 4
memo from Bert to me.
I did not talk to Sert, to my recollec
,i 9
i i
10 And the follow-up memoran--
tien, about that memo at that time.
1 11 l. dum indicated that things were going in th.e channel which I i
i 12 !
j believed was appropriate for them to go, which would lead to 13 l j
some clarifying operating instructions.
That was the February.
14 :
16th letter.
l 15 Q
Was that the end of your involvement with the issue {7 i
16 j A
Until after TMI, yes.
- 7 ;
i Q
So, then, basically you just received the first 18 '
memo, referred it to Mr. Kane, and then received a second 19.
j memo and felt that the issue was on its way to being resolved?
20 '
i A
Right.
i I
i 21 Q
Who would have been responsible for following up 1
i 1
22 ;
on the second memo that Mr. Dunn wrote to see that the actions 23 )
I were in fact carried out?
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Well, in rstrospect, I should have assumed that i
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responsibility, I think.
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Q Why is that?
b 2l A
Well, because the memo was directed to me, really.
3!
MR. EDGAR:
What about at the time?
n Al THE WITNESS:
At the time I felt that no follow-up.
i sl, was necessary because it appeared to =e as though the ICCS I
6 Analysic people and the Nuclear Service people had reached an I
7 l
agreement on a procedural clarification and operating instruc-f, I
8 i
tion and I didn't feel any further involvement was necessary
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on my part.
e 10 i
BY MR. FOLSOM:
i 11 -
l Q
Do you normally issue clarifications of operating 12 !
l instructions?
j A
Does Licens5.ng?
14 i
Q Yes.
is !
And that's why I asked my !
l A
No, that's not our job.
16 1 l
unit manager to put it into the channel where those kinds of 17 !
I instructions normally originate, which is the Nuclear i
18 Service Department.
And I felt that the thing which was 19 l i
required was just simply either a clarification or a reinforce-20 i ment of an operating instruction.
And I'vb told other people 21 '
l who have asked me this question, 'Why did you think along those:
1 22 lines', and I looked at the~ issue as not being one that 23 !
implied any basic design inadequacy or hardware inadequacy I
24 1". the plant, but rather one which involved operating instruc-
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25 tions.
And so that was the reasoning I used in suggesting that.
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I 9 i I
Q If a plant changes its operating instructions, I
are you alerted to that fact?
A t
A No.
i i
Q Do you beceme aware of it?
6' A
Not at all.
1 7'
Q Were you aware that Davis-Besse did alter their
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operating instructions --
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i 9i A
No.
t I
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i Q
-- before TMI?
t 11 1 i
l A
No, I was not aware of that until after TMI.
12 BY MR.'EISDON:
13 !
^
Q I get the impression frem what you said just a l
14 acment ago that you had'a feeling at least that a faulty or a s
i 15 I
less than adequate operating procedure was not as significant
.i 16 as a faulty design.
Is that a fair representation of your 4
17 thoughts at the time?
i la A
I don't think I made any ccmparison in my mind as 19 to which of these things is most significant.
I certain1v I
l would never agree that one is more important than the other.
21]
Misoperation of the plant can do every bit as much damage and i
21 be every bit as much a safety hazard as improper equipment 23 t' performance.
24,
But the perception, the thought process that I
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or had been viewed up until that time -- and I'm using safety I'
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concern in a broad sense, not the way we defined the preliminary 3
safety concern in our procedure -- the things that were logical i
- f and proper for people to direct to the Licensing Section for i
3 !
action because'of the way the regulations have been developed 6:
were those having to do with design, construction, hardware and analysis.
And the operating procedure issues, the l
7-l 81 licensing process itself has just not had a strong emphasis i
9' en operators and operating procedures.
e lo i And my primary involvement is in those activities i
11 '
j which are directly related to the licensing process.
And so i
12 !
it's no more complicated than that in my mind'.
13 q
okay.
J i
14 A
Sut I would'want to make sure that I don't leave 13 -
l the impression that I think operating procedure matters are j
16 f 8
unimportant.
They are very, very i=portant.
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I 17.
Q Did you have any feeling for why the memo was sent -
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18 !
to you?
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19 e l
l A
No, at the +4 me I didn' t.
Bert Jones has told me e
20 subsequent to TMI-2 why he sent the memo to me.
r 21 '
Q Excuse me, I think you mean 3ert Dunn.
A I mean Bert Dunn, yes, here in the same ECCS family.
I 23 ;
And it was that he felt this was an issue that he I
24 :
was trying to get some action on, and he felt that I could help:
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0 Why did he feel that you could help precipitate 2i 1
that action?
3'.
A I don't know.
Maybe I have a reputation for trying.
s' to make things happen, I don't know.
i I
Q Did you give any thought at all to the possibility 6
that he considered this to be a safety concern or almost a 7!
safety concern within the definition of your preliminary safety, u
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concern system?
A No, no, I did not.
10 '
BY MR. FOLSOM:
11 '
Q Let me ask i
12
A And I'll say again that t." 4 issue of whether this I
i 13 i I
was a safety concern in the sense that we use the word safety I
i 14 '
i concern in our procedure' just did not enter my mind at that i
15 f time.
14 l
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Q Did you relate the two Dunn memos to Davis-3 esse in.
17j any regard?
Did you see that as the origination of it?
18 A
Well, I think the memos said that.
19 '
KR. EDGAR:
We have them here, if you'd like to i
20 look at them.
21 '
MR. FOLSOM:
I just wanted to know if the witness 22 l was aware of that.
23
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THE WITNESS:
I've seen a lot of those memos since 24,
then, but I believe the memos said Davis-Besse in them, if I'm
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j not mistaken.
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(Document handed to the witness.)
1 2l THE WITNESS:
Yes, the direct concern here rose out of the Toledo inciden" i
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BY MR. FOLSOM:
i 3'
C The concern was what you recognized as a very 6;
significant transient.
7; A
Yes.
I hav.e to say that my original concern about l
8 the Davis-Sesse transient was more related -- well, I would i
l 91 have to say almost exclusively related to what had happened i
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.to the plant, and not the operating procedure aspects of it.
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And I think A*'-
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- air to say that until Davis -- or until ;
l 12 !
'l TMI there was a strong tendency to look at these incidents --
i 13 1
and I believe this is true of not cnly curselves but of the I
14 I' NRC Staff and others -.in terms of what had happened to the i
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1s equipment, was the equipment damaged in any way, was it ready 5
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16 1
to go or able to go back in service again, i
17 And I think that was the main thrust of my concern,,
18 lIwhether there were any safety implications in terms of the l
19 !
l possible effects on the equipment that had gone through this 20 I transient.
21 Q
In short, you didn't feel o3tthe operator himself as 22 -
a piece of equipment that could have a decided influence on 23 1 i
the plant?
24 "
A That was not - I don't think that was the primary ',
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1i BY MR. HEBDON:
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2I O
I'd like to get back to the safety concern cuestion 3
s just a little bit.
Al We've talked about the fact that you felt that the 5i s
Davis-Besse incident was one of the more significant incidents 6
that had occurred, and also in Mr. Dunn's memo he reaches a i
7; conclusion that core damage was quite possible,and perhaps I
8!
probable are the terms he used, if this incident occurred at I
9.
full power.
t Why was it decided with this type of rather strong 11 language this was not a safety concern?
12' i
A Whether or not this was a safety concern in the i
13 !
i sense that we use the word in our internal procedure and j
i 14 i policy was not a consci'ous decision.
That particular question !
15,
just did not enter my mind at the time I received that memo, i
16 l' l
and it didn't enter my mind until after TMI-2 until somebody l
17; i
started asking me questions about it.
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And I can only surmise why it did not enter my
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j mind, and that was the historical background on how this 20 -
l procedure had come into being, and the procedure that we have 21 !
is one which grew out of 10 CFR 50.55 (e) which is applicable 22 l1to plants with construction permits, and it emphasi:ed the i
23 '
l design and construction problems, and the same with 10 CFR 21,.
i 24. ' which evolved out of 10 CFR 50.55 (e) to cover more clearly n inq
..:. 3 ann i
25 ;
i those things which were outside the construction permit arena.
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I pbl9 And so operating procedural inadequacies or I. 2 !!
operating instruction inadequacies, I think it was while they 1
3 can create safety problems, I think we viewed -- at least I i
j viewed that process to be more applicable to things that 5
implied design and analysis inadequacies or errors.
6 Q
So then would it be fair to say that you didn't
.i l
feel at the time that inadequacies in ocerating procedures si met the or fell under the purview of Part 21?
9 A
At the time, I think so, yes.
i 10 Q
okay.
i 11 A
Now I obviously think about it different today, and!
j 12 i I
we have taken steps in our own house to modify the procedure l
13 :
s that we have to call. out very specifically to the people in the-1 14 q l
Engineering organizaticn' and the p.ople in the field that i
15,
cperating procedure errors, inadequacies or training inade-14 l l
quacies definitely are candidates for processing according to j
17; this system.
O But at this time the operating procedures were not 19 perceived as being included in the covarage of the prelirtinary 20 !
l safety concern system, for example?
1-21 Q
A Uh-huh.
22 l Q
Okay.
23.
MR. EDGAR:
Can we go off the record?
3 24
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(Discussion off the record.)
I 25 !
482 MR. EISDON:
Let's go back on the record.
i l
24 I
pb20 BY MR. HESDON:
I '
9, Q
Okay.
I 3-It's my understanding, then, that when you received l
i 4i j
the February 16th memo fou felt that the issue was essentially I
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resolved, is that correct?
6!
felt that it was on the way to being resolved in A
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an acceptable and proper way, yes.
s al i
Q Okay.
u 9'
l Did you feel that the procedural change that was i
10 i proposed by Mr. Dunn in his memo was an acceptable way of i
11 l colving the problem?
f Well, I'm not sure really how I thought about it at.l i
12 l
A 13 l; I have no recollection that I thought it was un-the time.
I 14 acceptable.
And it seems to me that the people who really
'2 i
15 were most able to make a judgment about, or most able to I
16 contribute to a proper solution had talked among themselves 17 I and had reached agreement.
'And I can only say that I had.no 18 l l
negative reaction to the prescription.
l 19 !l
- i Q
Okay.
20 i Okay, I'd like to go on and talk about a report 21 that's ecme to be known as the Michelson Report; and, again, 22 I j
we're trying to get at your involvement with that prior to 23 !
l the Three Mile Island accident.
24 !
..s,an a, conn. rne. l Prior to March 28, 1979, what knowledge did you 23 have of the Michelson Report?
i
.. =
_u
25 t
h pb21 A
Well, I knew the report had come in.
I had received g
28 I
I a copy or it.
I I
3 I was trying to think whether I had a copy of the 4'
letter and the report, but I had received a copy of the report..
S' I knew that it.was being bandled between the project manager 6-for the Selafonte project and the ECCS unit, and I of course 1
I.
knew that it dealt with a small break issue.
8 And I have a fellow in my organisation.who works i
i 9'
i in a different unit than the one t.at I mentioned earlier.
He 10 ;
I
' works at what we call the Generic Licensing Unit, a man by the f
11 j name of Henry Bailey, who is reasonably familiar with the ICCS l
I i
12 and small break issues.
And so I knew the report was in-house i
13 and I also knew that there were some other issues related to 14 1
small breaks going on,ih.the house at that time, particularly 1
15 i j
with regard to the operating plants.
14 '
s i
i What more do you want me to say?
17 Q
Did you give the report to Mr. Bailey?
j i
la j I believe yes, I recall passing a copy either of f
A 19 i
the report or a copy of the letter to him.
l Q
Do you know if he performed any review of that 21 I report?,
22 A
Yes, I believe he did.
j i
23 Q
Did he give you any indication of what his observa '
24 i tions or ccaments were as. a result of that review?
s e.,a n mri. ine. I 25,
A I believe he gave some feedback to me through his i
l I'
27 pb23 Il MR. EDGAR:
Thep've already been male available.
i 2l MR. HESDON:
Let's go off the record for a moment.
l t
3 (Discussion off the record.)
i i
.t '
MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
S'j BY MR. HEBDON:
i 3
6 i
Q So then was it your feeling then that the issue 7 !
was going to be handled between the Project Management group 8i i
I and the ECCS group?
e l
9l A
Yes.
10 1 Q
Okay.
l 11 1 A
It was -- I have to say that my impression at the j
12' ti=a was that it was primarily a 205 fuel assembly plant issue I
13 that had been raised by.the TVA project, and that due to higher' 14 priority work we had some problems that we were trying to i
I IS resolve on the operating plants with regard to small breaks t
l at that same time, that it was going to be taken care of in
.i i
17 due time.
j g l-Q Okay.
19 !
Now there's also an issue that's somewhat related i
20l to the Michelson Report associated with some questions that 21 Mr. Ebersole of the ACRS asked as part of the ACRS review of e
22 '
the Pebble Springs application.
23.
l Prior to March 28, 1979, what knowledge did you i
24 !
have concerning the questions raised by Mr. Ebersole of the n.,,,n,,,, i w 0
l l
ACRS concerning Pebble Springs?
j 1
--.--- - l e-
~r
28
,/
I
=b24 A
Well, I attended some of those meetings.
I can't y
recall exactly which ones I attended.
But I remember the 3!
I questions that he prepared, and I'm not sure exactly which l
therel
- l meeting it was that he first rais.d tr 2se questions.
But 5
l were a whole list of questions that we go t through the Portland',
i i
6 General Electric project.
They came frem -- as I recall it 7.'
went from the ACRS to the Staff and then from the Staff to Sli i
the Applicant and then came to us, and we supplied information 9lI for a number of those questions.
And that was in the fall of 10 ;
1977 -- the fall of '77 or the first part of
'78.
i i
11 Q
Were you involved with the preparation of the s
I 12 I
responses to those questions?
l
.A Well, involved as -- yes, I was responsible for 13 14 the part that went out-frem B&W in the context that I'm the 2
IS '
manager of the Licensing section.
I did not personally review i
16 l them, but they were reviewed by one of my people and by his i
17 supervisor prior to them being transmitted back to Portland.
l 18 Q
One of the questions in that group that's been of 19 j
particular interest is question number six, which is related 20 ;
i to this issue of small break LOCAs.
21 Part of that question -- there are several questions f
22 included number that number.
There's a question related to i
23 how the operator will interpret pressurizar level.
I 24 Do you recall focusing on that particular question l
a.swww n in, inc 25 j
i at all?
1
~
29 t
i l
I 9b25 A
No, not at that time.
I've been asked about that 2
a number of times since the TMI incident, by Prof. Carbon 3'
and Dr. Okrent from the ACP.S, and in digging into that l
question a little bit we just did not focus on pressurizer c.
level.
I 6-c2 As a matter of fact, our answer did not address 7!
that part of the question, and it wasn't until af terwards that ;
t 8{
I really understood the background behind the question.
And i
as I now understand it--and as we sometimes do, we try to i
10 answer the questien as we interpret the question.
So there 1
i' 11 was not a focus on pressurizar level on that part of the j
12 question at all.
L I3 !
Q Do you recall that during the review of the 14 I
response by the people within your organization, did anyone 1
15 raise the issue of 'part of this question isn't answered'?
i 16 '
i A
I don't recall any discussion on that, no.
i l
7 Q
Okay.
la l Do you recall making any connection between the i
19 !
questions that were asked at Pebble Springs and the Michelson 20 '
Report, which was received later on?
l i
21 A
No.
It was not until after that.
I did attend the' 22 ACRS meeting at which these questions were discussed in a broad,
i 23 sense.
There were a total of 26 of them, and I don't know how l
24 j many of them we participated in or provided input to.
3ut I i
swera m.o mn. inc.I 25 i
do recall very clearly that the information that had been l
l i
e
l 31 1
I pb27 Q
Do you recall c discussion about the fact tha t the 2
operators would be expected to be trained concerning this 1
3' i
particular problem on the simulator and then a counter-l
- l argument by Mr. Ebersole that the simulator would not simulate i
5 this particular response with respect to pressurizer level?
i I
i 1
A Vaguely, yeah.
l l
Q Not in the course of your discussions with the ACRS 4
8f on an issue such as this, do you recall what came of this issue j i
9-with respect to how the simulator would simulate this particular i
10 '
' event?
11.
l l
A No.
i Do you recall if, when you returned, there was any l 12 1 i
l Q
13 discussion with the simulator people as to whether or not the 14 simulator would accurately simulate, and if not, whether it 15 needed to be changed?
16 I
~
I didn't have any discussions with them on that A
I 17 '
subject, and I don't know whether anybody else did or not.
j i
18 in the course of your general business of Q
- Now, i
t s
19 i l
working with the ACRS, for example, if an issue such as this i
20 '
came up where somebody raises an issue that possibly the i.
21 simulator doesn't accurately simulate a particular type of
'2 l transient, is there any systemmatic way in which this sort of i
23,
information would be sent back to the simulator people?
I i
24.
s.o o a. mn. rne. l A
Normally what would happen is that there would 25 !
be some action items coming out of the meeting.
Usually when l
i l
e e
L
-?-
t.'
37 l
- b33 rocm, is it'not?
i-2 i
A Oh, yes.
i I
O And semebody has to understand the gauges in the
~
\\
f l
control room.
s A
Yes, sir.
~~L 6
Q Would either Mr. Michelson's concerns or the
.'j question six in the Pebble Springs packet that went to the i
i 8
ACRS, or that was considered by ACRS have made any difference 9
l in what B&W viewed as proper operator respense?
10 A
I'm still not sure I understand the question, i
11 i l
l IF B&W is concerned about an issue then we i
12.!
l certainly would try to have it make a difference.
i 13 l I think the question that Mr. Ebersole asked -- and 14 I'd just like to try to' characterize fir. Ebersole.
I have a 2
l 15 ?
great deal of respect for him.
He's a good engineer.
And I id l l
think he raises good questions.
17 At the same time I have been in many ACRS meetings
- with Mr. Ebersole, and I personally find his questiens very 18.'
19 !
difficult to understand at times because they are long ques-20 f tions which sometimes involve a number of questiens all wrapped:
21 1 I
up into one.
And also they involve not infrequently some I
22 l admonishments.
f 23 'l But I have the utmost respr:t for him.
But many
)
24 i i,, I times we have to interpret what we think his questions =ean,
.s,em, n, i
I 23 8 l
and I think the question that was asked there, that number six I
i r
..w.,.
- * * * * * * * * ~
I
3S I'
)
I questien seemed to our people, from talking to them after-the-pu.s n
fact, to be focused on heat transfer removal primarily on the secondary side of the steam generator.
But I think that the 4i attitude that existed, at least up until the time the Kelly i
C!
=emos and the Bert Dunn memos started coming out, the attitude 6
that I believe existed was that pressurizer level was an 7
indication of adequate inventory in the reactor coolant I
I 3 !
system.
9 O
So that there was a pensibility of the operator
=isinterpreting it?
{
10 '!
11 A
Well, as we look back on it, yes, certainly, j
i I
12 Q
Exactly.
i i
13 l I
New what I'm driving at is had you had a fine ear I
14 l for what cuestion six fn hindsight is considered to =ean, a
15 !
I would it have made any difference?
j l
16 i,
A Well, if we had done small break calculations to 17 l I
the extent that we have done them now, and with particular i,
la reference to small breaks at the top of the pressurizer, we i
19.! would have prebably viewed that in a different way.
But small 20 '
breaks to my' recollection were not pin-pointed as to their i
i
/
21
,i location in the system except in terms of things like icoking 22 l at them in the pump discharge, the pump suction and so on.
23 i But this idea of presscri:er level not serving i
(^T t
(_/
24 i as an accurate indication of reactor coolant system inventory
..e,ce,.
amm,. ene. !
25 !
had not come out of any of our small break work entil much l
i
,m.
- * ~ ~ ~ -
4.<
, 4.,, -- m.
-y -..
39 t\\ i
// \\'
fy'i g,g V
later.
pb35 2(
MR. FOLSOM:
Okay.
Shall we take a break, then?
4 MR. EEBDON:
Yes.
C' (Recess.)
6 MR. EEBDON:
Okay, are we ready to resume?
Let's 7
t go ahead and go back. cn the record.
a!
Let's go off the record for a minute.
(Discussion off the record. )
f 9
10 MR. EEBDON:
Okay, let's go.
We'll try this again.
l 11 BY MR. EEBDON:
l i
i 12 i Q
I'd like to ask you some questions concerning what's I
13 l l
ccme to be known as the Cresswell investigatien.
i i
14.
Do you recahl having any contact with a Mr. James t
I 15 Cresswell of I&E Region III?
16 I A
Pardon me.
I wonder if we could go back?
I want
'G :'.
l to just clarify something on the previous answer.
I didn't i.
18 !
l know if we were going to continue che.arlier conversation or 19 -
not.
20 ;
Q No.
21 l
A In terms of the -- I didn' t want to leave the 22 1 l
wrong impression about the questien of interpretation er 23 l operator interpretation of pressurizer level.
I don't know
($)
24 i
m n,,,f exactly how I said it, but I don' t want to leave the ippression 2~* ! that there was a popular attitude or popular feeling or i
i oceampe,*. eap a.
e
- 1. 3 l
Jg.,
j y
e.
56 I
O >es2 sisnificane --
2 I A
Yes.
~
3 Q
-- this was one of them, as well as Davis-5 esse?
i I
A Yes.
S:
Q All right.
6
~
Now as a resu;; c: i. hts particular incident a letter was seat out to a number of the utilities concerning af this Rancho Jeco incident.
Why was that letter sent?
i 9!
i MR. EDGAR:
Do we have the letter?
i l
MR. HEBDON:
Let's go off the record for a minute.
11 i 1
(Discussion off the record. )
12 '!
MR. HIBDON:
Okay, let's go back en the record.
13 f For the raccrd, I have here a letter dated August i
i 14 i 9, 1978, frcm Sabcock and Wilcox to Mr. T.
D. Murray.
This 15 i l
j particular one is associated with Davis-Besse.
Mr. Murray is 14 'j the superintendent at Davis-Besse.
And the subject is the 17 I SMUD rapid cooldewn transient.
18 l (Document handed to the witness.)
19 l 1
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
20 l
In response to your question, it was -- the purpose; 21i of the letter was to communicate to the other customers what 22 had happened as we understcod it at Rancho Seco and to provide
.3i them sema precautionary advice in case they were to experience
~
i 24
,E..u2 namn inc.'
the same type,of thint at their plant.
731 l
MR. HE3 DON:
Okay.
I 3
e
.._-.-_.?.
- e...
60 i
l
'jb56 MR. Hr?DCN:
Davis-Besse?
2>
MR. EDGAR:
Yes.
3' MR. HESDON:
August 9, 1978.
l I
4' BY MR. F.E 3 D C N :
O I'd like to go on and ask you some more general 6
questions concerning how plant procedures and technical 7
specifications are handled.
I realize that your answers will i
i be just based on ycur understanding of the system and not the i
9' official company policy or anything of that order.
8 10 l
Specifically, who in B&W organizationally is 11 1 responsible for preparing plant operation procedures?
i t
12 '
A Nuclear Service, Custe er Services Department.
These are the draft procedures that are prepared.
f' 12 #'
I la i
Q okay.
2 1
1.5,
i i
Is your. group involved in that at all?
l 16 i A
No.
?
I'7 Q
Who in B&W is responsible for preparing technical 18 i
specifications?
19 -
A Well, the technical speci'ications actually 2 0 ', originate -- the content of those technical,specificatiens 21 i is defined by the Staff, by the NRC Staff.
And we, B&W, 22 ! provide input to those technical specifications in the form 2 '
of sa.fety linits and so on, and in regard to the Licensing
)
24
. in '
section's role it is to pull these together, whether they ccme,
..s,..,:e n.,,
25 I
frem safety Analysis, ICCS, Fuel Engineering, or what have you..
I i
e f
....,,........,...mu
,w
57 "3
1.'
(:s pb57 So our role is'one of an information coordination
.i 2"
role.
And then we have the responsibility for providing a
, c complete package to the customers, who in turn submit it as
~
a part of the safety analysis report.
C
~l Q
How does your group factor operational infor=acion and operational experience into this work?
7 A
cur group?
i Q
Yes.
9.
~
A It does not, t
10 !
Q So then in the course of pulling these together 11 i you don't make any effort to see if the various sections 12 l reflect recent operating experience?
l i
A lio, we don't, no.
i 14 l
Q co you kney 1f anyone does?
1 l
15 ;
A I don't know.
I don' t believe they do.
,i 16 i l
Q okay.
P 17i Who is responsible for seeing that the technical j
18 j
specifications are consistent with the draft operating proca-19 :l i
dures?
e t
20 J A
The utility.
i 21 '
Q Does B&W have any involve aan: with that at all?
j 22,
A Now wait a minute.
Let me go back a minute.
I 23 '
When ycu said draft operating procedures --
g 24 II Q
Yes.
a <ca never er,. see.,
25 j
-- I believe that the draft operating procedures l
A I
e I
.s,
-M F %,-
.**'O'**
e 63 l
I i
()pbs9 requested by the utilities, it would be handled for the = cst il 2 !.
I part by Nuclear Service and probably in most cases it would be
~
done in the field by people who are familiar with the B&W ai j
operating procedures, but would be under contract to the 5
customer.
6; In other words, we would be providing people to 7
i do a job for him, and in that sente th y would not be carry-3:
ing out,a B&W responsibility, per se, but they would be B&W f
9 people doing the job for the customer.
10 Q
So, then, do I understand your perception to be 11 '
then that that isn't a S&W responsibility?
l 12 l' A
That's correct, it's my perception.
l' 13 !
I Q
Okay.
l 14 A
Unless required by the customer.
43 Q
Were you aware that the Davis-sesse small break 16 procedure was revised to include a precautien designed ec 17 ;
i prevent premature securing of high pressure injection?
i 18 -'
A I became aware of that within the past few =enths.
l 19 '
I learned about it -- actually I learned about it in an NRC 20 ;
3.241 i
meeting with Davis-Besse.
21.
I Q
Let me make an observation that you may want to I 22 l f
comment upon.
It seems a little strange that the utility is 23 making changes to procedures without the knowledge of the (3) 24 '
wi, ing!
designer, particularly since there appears to have been some
- o. semi n.
2 ~.
i concern within B&W about the type of change, the specific type
.I
't U.
~ _.,.
n
~.. - -
n.
64 j
i
/S.
1
:b60 of change about securing high pressure injection as a result s
f l*
the concern that was raised separately within S&W.
j of 3.
Does that seem to you to be a rather unusual 4~
way to decide hcw to operate a plant?
c A
Standing back and looking at the whole thing in
~
S.l perspective, i:'s not strange to me.
And by that I mean I 7
can understand very easily hcw that could happen. Whether or 8
not that's a desirable thing to do is a completely different i
9, issue.
And we very strongly feel now that it's highly 10 desirable to close the loop between the operators and the a
11 analysts and the desigr.ers, mui we have a program now that i
12,
we're undertaking to do that.
And I think this will lead to i
i 13 '
a lot greater involvement in the future.
We're now doing this.
I i
14 with regard to this most recent transient at Davis-Besse in
,c i
i 15 which the pressuri er level was 1 st.
And I think this will i
I 16 !
I tie a much tighter knot between the utilities and the NFS 17 i i
j designer in the future.
)
18,
But looking back and saying was it strange that e
19 ;
we had people worried about a concern here and people worried 2p!
about a concern over'here in a different organi:ation and 21 we're not talking to each other, that's not strange to me 22 under the circumstances at the time.
23!
l Q
Do you have any feeling for why that loop wasn't l
($)
- 24 '
closed before the accident at Three. Mile Island?
..s.cm a.eer,n, ine..
t 23 !
1 A
Yes, I have a feeling as to why it was not closed.
j i
b j
-,a4,-
$.J
_m.-_._-._
m
..m..._
65
)
/
j i
-s j,
(1):b61 I think part of it was due to the fact that there was not a J-2 ill' great deal of emphasis within the lice.tcing process and I don't!
3 think there was a lot of emphasis from a contractual point of view on the operators' role and the operators' activities.
S' In.the business cenmunity we have a contract to 6
fulfill and we focus attention on that.
We also have I 7'.
believe a very strong safety ccnscience, and I think there has 8
been a real preoccupatien within the design and licensing of 9 i the plants with the machine and not the =an, and with low 10 :
. probability events and not the things that were actually i
11 happening.
And that's what we now perceive needs to be changed.
i 13 And we also. perceive a need now to get involved 14 !
in things which are outs.ide of our scope of supply in order z
15,
l to understand more clearly the things that affect our scope I
Id l of supply.
And so, yeah, I think there are probably a number i
17 '
j of things which have not prcmoted tightening the knot between 18 '
the operator and the designer until TMI-2.
i 19 l Q
okay.
l 20 :
l I'd like to go on and ask you some questions 21 '
concerning your involvement with the post-TMI effort, and 22 !
l particularly about the first 12 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following the 23 ~
accident.
(])
24 !
First of all, would you describe your involvement
..,e..a a n... ine..
1 25 l with the TMI task force that was for=ed on March 2Sth, 19797 l
i 4
-u
-.m-
_. ~ - - - -
a s-,.~--
66 f
/ i 9 I
i'
<3 i
V :b62 A
My boss, Don Ecy, called me some time early that
- 6
,,1 morning and said that there had been an incident at TMI-2 and tnat there was going to be a briefing to pass on what
~
4>
information we had, and I've forgotten exactly the time at t
which this briefing was to take place.
So throughout that
~
6 day I was in and out of the area which is located upstairs 7:
which had been designated as the communications center for a
TMI-2.
9 And I have to say that frcm the standpoint of my j
10 '
i day co day responsibilities, I di61't ' lave a clear role in i
11 I
l that particular activity except that I was a section manager i
12 i
in the Engineering Department, and this obviously involved u
13 t and would involve considerable interface with the Regulatory 14 !
i Ccmmission.
I.
l 2
i i
i l
13 '
l And it was a safety matter, and that I believe 16 l was why Don Rey, my boss, asked me to participate in the 3
17'I activities that day and to try to stay aware of what was going i
is !
I was not a direct party to, but did listen to many of
[l cn.
19 ij the conversations that day, and many more in the days there-20 l after.
21 Q
Approximately when was the discussicn that you l
22 !
first had with Mr. Roy?
i 23; i
A I believe it was p'robably between eight c' clock h
24
.,,% l and eight-thirty tha; morning.
\\,
,.1,e m, a,w.
l 25 ;
C Okay.
I J
8 e
g
- W m
4
m m_m._
67
/
i
-! ) -" '
11 When was the briefing that you referred to?
u
, :l 4 I' A
As I recall, it was around nine o' clock.
3 Q
Okay.
4 i
A It was within an hour or so of that first centac.
C-Q All right.
~
6 In the course of that initial discussicn with
~
Mr. Roy, what was your perception of the status of the plan:?
/
I I
A When you talk about the initial discussion, are 9.
you talking about the briefing session?
10 Q
Both, actually, since they occurred fairly close I
11 together in time.
i 12 ':
1 A
Well, the initial discussion was. extremely brief.
13 i l
It was that the -- it was just a couple of pieces of inferma-I 14 )i tion about reactor coola.nt system parameters and the fact 2
I 15 i
that there had been a general emergency declared, or a site 16 j
emergency declared at Three Mile Island site, and that was 17 i about all that -- and just 'come to this briefing session',
i The briefing session was a little bit more infer =a -
19 '
tion, but not a whole lot more.
And, again, that talked about--
20 I believe talked about reactor coolant pump conditiens and I 21 believe the message was passed on that the reactor coolant 1
22 l pumps had been turned off, and that the radiation level was 23 I
high in the containment.
I believe there were scme ccnditions
()I I
24.
about pressure and temperature, and as I recall the pressure l
scr., aarmi. ra i
25 '
was down but the temperature was also down at that time, l
f i
.. =.
.: ::e
- m... w.
w
L..
- -e
~~
~
68
[
s >
~
'pb64 the reactor coolant system time, but it was very sketchy 2
informaticn.
3 Q
Was there any discussion of the status of the 4:1 hot leg temperatures?
5 A
Not that I recall.
6l Q
Was there any discussion of the status of the 7.$
j high pressure injection system?
3' A
I don't think so.
I don't recall any.
9 Q
At this initial meeting was it ycur perceptien 10 that the feeling here at B&W was that they've had an incident, 11 they're in a reasonably safe condition and we need te get 12 :
started on figuring out what needs to be done to recover'; er I
13 : was the perceptien more one of they've had an incident and t
i 14 ;
they're still in trouble and we need to try and get the plant i
15 into a safe condition?
I 16 'L A
I think it was more the latter.
The thing that 17.'
was -- the mest prevalent feeling that I sensed was that we 1
18 L really need more information.
We just dcn't have encugh 19 '
information to decide what to do.
And it was very clear that 20 -
we needed to have p'eople get informatien as quickly as possible:.
21 i i
And I can recall that there was a decision made to s
i 22 dispatch scme people to the site that morning.
But I think 23 these = cst prevalent feeling was we're just in the dark.
l
($)
24 i n, rg Q
Well, with this lack of information, what was the
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i basis for your cenclusion that the plant wasn't in a safe t
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h 69
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2-A I'm not sure I personally had a conclusion that the plant was not in a safe condition at that tima.
O'he fact
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that the site emergency had been declared was certainly a f
t piece of information which I think people respected, and the
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6 fact that the radiation level was reported to be high was of 7:
concern.
a-Sut I don't think until later on in the day there 9-was a goed solid feeling aside from the fact that it was a 10 real sense of urgency frcm the communication that we had had 11 ;
with our man at the site that the plant was necessarily in an 12 '
unsafe cendition.
I think it was probably after lunch when 13,
the real impact of the thing began to sink in.
(
1.t j Q
Would you go on, then, with your discussion of i
3
.i 15 3 j
your involvement with the incident?
What happened following id i
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the nine o' clock briefing?
17 ;
A Well, as I recall, the most significan step tha 18 '
was taken was to get pacple moving teward the site, get reme 19 '
people -- and I think it was Joe Kelly and Scb Winks and 20 another man or two up there, because we felt that we were t
21.
unable during the latter portion of the morning to get in touch with them.
And so the mest pressing need was for i
23' information.
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a.nwu n.comn. ice.:
And we particularly felt we needed to have g~e l information that could cnly be obtained by a significant 1
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O Do you recall the content of the message or r
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information that informed you that the PORV was stuck open as 3
to time or duration?
i 4.
A No.
Again, it's hard to separate what we learned n
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'afterwards frcm what we learned early.
No, I don't recall 6 '
when we first heard about the PORV being opened; whether that t
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was at the time at which we learned how long it was before I
8 8
they closed the blocked valve, I don't recall.
9 MR. EEEDON:
Okay.
10 i
BY MR. EE3 DON:
11 Q
I'd like to ask you some questions that tre sc=e-l S
12 ~
what more general in nature.
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13 '
In your opinien what is meant by the term an '
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"unreviewed safety question"7 i
1 15 ;
A It's a condition or a combination of circumstances 16 l; I
which have net been icoked at within the safety analysis for a i
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given site.
I 18 i
MR. EDGAR:
I'd like to go off the record for a 19..
- l mcment.
20 '.t (Discussion off the record.)
l l'l 21 :
(Recess.)
I 22 !
l MR. EE5 DON:
Okay, we're ready to resume.
Let's 23 I go back on the raccrd.
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24 l BY MR. EE3 DON:
..,w., ammn, inc. ;
ul In your cpinion, what issues er problems should be Q
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b submitted to the NRC for review?
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A You're asking for this opinion as I think today?
3 O
No, I think more in the feelings that existed 4
prior to TMI.
5 A
Well, it's very clear by law as to what we have to 6
do with regard to, for example, the discovery of an error in i
7 '.
cur ECCS calculations.
In that pr: tic'ilar regard we are 8',
obligated, if we were to discover an error that led to a j
9-variation in heat clad temperature of more than 20 degrees, to 10 l
i tell the NRC about it.
i 4
11 ;
i O
How about in other areas not directly related to 4
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t the ECCS analysis?
j A
We have reascnably clear direction as to what our i
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14 obligations are under mither 10 CTR 21 or 10 CFR 50.55 (e).
q i ~c If we were to discover outside the ECCS analysis an error in i
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another accident analysis, Appendix K covers ECCS calculation 17i j
require =ents pretty specifically.
The things, the accidents,
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1 33 j
the transients which are non-ECCS related I feel we're obligat--
19 '
ed to tell them about anything that we wculd find either in a I
20 i
hardware or analysis area that would take us outside the i
l 21 'i boundaries of the safety analysis report and the assumptions e
r 22 !
that had been made in that analysis.
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231 If we had determined that there were some assu=p-()
24 i tions that were no longer valid -- control rod drop time or
..,en,a m,
, &c.
l 25 what have you, or the -- well, those are some examples, i
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1' So crimarily I.think the obligations that we have ob79 1
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clearly under those regulations that I mentioned and things 3
that would invalidate the safety analysis that served as the I
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basis for the plant's license.
i
--3 O
In the reviewes that are performed that you're i
6-involved with, does anyone assess what would happen if the 7l operator took incorrect action during a transient?
l l
a'.
A I don't think so.
I think correct operator l
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9 actions outs'ide the single failure criteria -- I.?ean outside 10 -
those operator actions that =ight be covered by the single I
11 :
failure criteria, the normal assumption is that the operator 1
i 12 i does what was assumed in that analysis.
If he's succesed to I
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open the suction valve frcm the voided water storsga tank or te,
switch over frem the supp to the voided water -- horated wauer ;
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storage tank or vice versa, it's assumed that he does that.
16 l j
Q Is there any thought giver to --
17 s'.
A Pardon me a minute.
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One of the big points of discussien that has i
i 19 i occurred over the years is not whether he does the correct i
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thing or the incorrect thing, but there has been a let of I
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discussion about how valid the assumption of his timing is.
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22 l' Q
- Okay, a
23 i There's been a lot of debate en the questien of l
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24 the operator doing sc=ething he's supposed to do or not doing 2.=,cem am mn w.
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1 scmething that he's supposed to do.
But has there ever been t
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