ML20024A635
| ML20024A635 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/18/1983 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2087, NUDOCS 8306210442 | |
| Download: ML20024A635 (28) | |
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U MINUTES OF THE JOINT MEETING 0F THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEES ON METAL COMPONENTS CERTIFIED COPY AND COMBINATION OF DYNAMIC LOADS ISSUED: May 18, 1983 g
MARCH 29, 1983 WASHINGTON, DC The ACRS Subcommittees on Metal Components and Combination of Dynamic Loads met on March 29, 1983, in Washington, D. C.
The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the reevaluation of the double-enced guillotine pipe break (DEGB) for Westinghouse pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants. There were no written or oral statements received or presented from members of the public at the meeting.
The Federal Register meeting notice, the attendee list, meeting schedule and list of handouts presented at the meeting are shown in Attachments 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. A set of handouts are on file in the ACRS office.
E. Igne was the Designated Federal Employee.
M. Bender, regarding the purpose of this meeting, stated in his opening remarks that it is unusual for the Committee to deal with an individual vendor's design when the subject matter is a generic one, because it may distort the total picture to attempt to determine whether the Staff's practices are satisfactory without considering all of the vendors jointly. But since most of the work has been focused on Westinghouse plants, there is no other alterna-tive at the present time.
If the results of the reevaluation turn out attractive for Westinghouse plants, it will then be advisable to look at the designs of the other NSSS vendors.
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Metal Comp./ Comb. of Dynamic Loads 2
Mar. 29, 1983 Mtg P. Shewmon stated that he would like to know the status of the study performed by Sandia on toughness of the support materials reported about 3-1/2 years ago.
The NRC Staff stated that the final report addressing the support toughness (Issue A-12) will be issued soon.
L. Shao, RES, presented a brief history of the evolutionary process regarding DEGB. DEGB was postulated in the design basis of the reactor coolant system (RCS) in order to evaluate ECCS performance and containment volume sizing.
The structural loads associated with the DEGB (blowdown loads) were later conbined with the earthquake loads for containment structural design.
Subsequently, components and equipment, paricularly canponent supports on RCS or primary loop were designed subject to the combined earthquake and DEGB loads.
Finally, asymmetric loads were included in the design of structures, components and equipment. This evolutionary process was not based on sound technical judgment or any value-impact evaluation.
L. Shao now feels that sufficient data exists for NRC to begin considering whether double-ended pipe break should be postulated for the primary loop of Westinghouse plants.
R. Bosnak, NRR, stated that MEB is responsible for the implementation of the pipe break criteria. He discussed the current position on this matter by reviewing the location of the postulated pipe breaks as required in GDC-4, SRP 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 and Reg. Guide 1.46.
Pipe breaks are postulated in high energy lines (P) 275 psig or T> 200 F) irrespective of their class.
Instan-taneous longitudinal and circumferential full flow areas are assumed according to a prescribed stress or fitting criteria. The consequences of the implementation of this current criteria result in massive and expensive pipe whip restraints, making s
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Mar. 29,1983 Mtg the performance of in-service inspection difficult because of the hazards of handling the heavy pipe whip restraint structures and prolonged exposure to the highly irradiated environment.
In addition, the high loads associated with the pipe break criteria often require the use of high strength materials with their inherent problems relating to stress corrcsion and toughness characteristics.
R. Bosnak stated that the revised pipe break position will be limited initially to PWR austenitic primary or main loops. When the solution of uncertainties regarding material properties and load definition Save been satisfactorily addressed, the criteria will be applied to other piping systems and other NSSS vendors. The technical basis of the revised position is from the deterministic fracture mechanics methodology performed by Westinghouse and NRC and the probabilistic study by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL).
A list of reference documents supporting the revised position were supplied to the Subcommittee.
In response to a question from P. Shewmon, R. Klecker stated that the suscepti-bility of thermal aging of cast stainless components (pipes and pump casing) were accounted for in the evaluations. Documentation on this matter was requested and will be sent to us soon.
W. Bamford, Westinghouse, stated that many of Westinghouse's primary coolant loops are fabricated of cast stainless steel. The elbows are virtually all fabricated from cast stainless steel material. A reduction in toughness of the cast stainless steel material occurs with time but it was stated that sufficient ductility still exists in the material so that its integrity is not significantly a f fected.
The revised position will eliminate the full flow area circumferential and longi-tudinal breaks and their consequences.
It would therefore eliminate the necessity of the pipe whip evaluation. According to R. Bosnak, pipe whip restraints already l
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Mar. 29, 1983 Mtg installed may be removed or not to be re-installed if the pipe whip restraints were removed during piping system in-service-inspection (ISI). Contair. ment and ECCS design remain unchanged.
M. Bender stated that this revised position is very similar to the German position.
D. Ward, inquired as to why the ECCS design basis should remain unchanged. He st'ated that the benefits in new plants would be profound if the current ECCS design basis would be relaxed. The Staff present at the meeting was not prepared to discuss this matter.
The revised position or criteria will require a leak-before-break evaluation using fracture mechanics methodology and the installation of a leak detection system.
In response to M. Bender's question, R. Bosnak stated that the revised criteria takes into account the worst seismic areas in the country and that the proposed criteria is applicable to all main coolant lines of Westinghouse designed plants.
Structure components and equipment will be designed for full environmental effects of jets from leakage cracks. The determination of the magnitude of the crack size is currently under review. Design of the supports for major components will have similar margins of safety as current plant design.
How this will be accomplished is still under review, although R. Bosnak stated that a 1/10th pipe flow area break may be used.
It was suggested by Z. Zudans that the position should include a statement that the quality assurance of the piping system installation be fully established. The Staff stated that it is an inherent part of the criteria. LOCA and SSE loads in PWR primary loops will be decoupled, because the earthquake loads do not directly cause LOCA. This conclusion is the result of the probabilistic study performed by LLNL.
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Mar. 29,1983 Mtg Foreign design practice in this area was discussed. Germany is the only country that does not use the DEGB criteria; they employ the leak-before-break concept and they decouple the LOCA and SSE loads.
In response to a question by H. Etherington, R. Bosnak stated that the LOCA load is much higher than the SSE loads and that with the elimination or reduction of the LOCA Load the anchor bolts will be less-loaded and lower-strength bolts may be used.
J. Richardson, RES, presented an overview of the load combination research program. He stated that the original objective was to evaluate the LOCA plus SSE load combinations. Later the objective was expanded to include the evaluation of DEGB probability. Zion plant was used for the initial detailed study, which resulted in a generalized study that included a large group of Westinghouse plants located east of the Rockies. The study supports the leak-before-break criteria with the benefits of eliminating the DEGB criteria and its con-sequences. He cited related foreign research performed at UK and Germany which supports the leak-before-break concept. A proposed follow-on research program to assess methods and technical bases for evaluating DEGB for CE and BWRs was presented.
C. K. Chou, LLNL, presented an overview of the reevaluation of the DEGB design requirements for reactor coolant loops of Westinghouse PWR plants. LLNL con-sidered the direct and indirect causes of DEGB. Direct causes are attributed to crack growth and fracture while the indirect causes are attributed to crane failure and component support failures.
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Mar. 29, 1983 Mtg l
H. H. Woo, LLNL, discussed the probabilty of direct DEGB for reactor coolant loops of Westinghouse PWR Plants. The results of the study indicate that the DEGB probability is 1.7 x 10~I3/ plant year and the leak probability is 1.0 x 10-7/ plant year.
Further sensitivity studies accounting for uncer-tainties in pipe crack geometry, loadings, seismic design and Westinghouse plants located east of the Rockies did not change the results significantly.
They concluded that direct DEGB is a very low probability event for Westinghouse s
reactor coolant loops and that the large differences in the leak and DEGB probabilities support the leak-before-break hypothesis for Westinghouse reactor coolant loops.
R. Campbell, LLNL, presented the evaluation of the probability of indirect DEGB for reactor coolant loops of Westinghouse PWR Plants.
Indirect DEGB probability caused by crane failure and component support failure is evaluated by considering seismic hazards, structural fragility and conditional DEGB proba-bility. The study indicates that the probability of direct DEGB is extremely low for Zion, about 4.1 x 10-10 plant / year and 3.5 x 10-7 plant / year for probability levels of DEGB of 10 and 90 per cent respectively. LLNL also studied the impact of differences in design and construction quality.
Only very signifi-cant deviations in design and constructica quality could substantially change the probability of DEGB.
Further stuJies of 46 Westinghouse plant sites east of the Rocky Mountains were made. The results indicate that the probabilities l
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Metal Comp./ Comb. of Dynamic Loads 7
Mar. 29, 1983 Mtg change about an order of magnitude higher than the Zion study, still a very unlikely event.
E. Johnson, Westinghouse, presented a brief summary of design and construction quality of Westinghouse plants.
He stated that Westinghouse is involved in all phases of design and construction quality. He stated that with the reactor coolant loop, Westinghouse has approximately 400 years of operating experience.
In reply to a question, he stated that no stress corrosion crack-ing, either internal or external, of the main coolant loop pipe was observed.
To provide further design verification, hot functional testing is performed for all plants where pipe thermal growth and system vibrations are some of the parameters observed.
E. Johnson, in response to a question, stated that snubbers and pipe supports in the reactor coolant loop have never been misplaced in the Westinghouse primary loop; it occurs in piping systems other than the primary loop.
M. Bender stated that the items listed below should be addressed by the Staff:
Inspection responsibilities of the utility and NSSS vendor.must be delineated in order to assure proper installation and fabrication adequacy.
The interaction of the balance-of-plant piping system affecting the reactor coolant system loads must be considered.
D. Landers, Teledyne Engineering Services, is a consultant to LLNL. He stated that, based on his review of LLNL study, he concluded that DEGB and longitudi'nal split should be eliminated as a licensing concern for Westinghouse plants located on either l
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Metal Comp./ Comb. of Dynamic Loads 8
Mar. 29, 1983 Mtg side of the Rocky Mountains. Longitudinal splits can be eliminated because the pipe bending moments which are the largest contributor causing circumfer-ential cracks have an insignificant impact on the longitudinal split. Fur-ther, pipe whip restraints should not be required and if already installed should be removed in order to ease 151 and increase piping system reliability.
In addition, large component supports should continue to have the same design margin they now have, which includes in its margin the DEGB loads.
R. Campbell spoke for Dr. Kennedy who was absent.
R. Campbell submitted a statement for Dr. Kennedy for the records. Mr. Campbell highlighted Dr. Kennedy's report by saying that DEGB is not a problem and should not be considered as a licensing basis.
C. K. Chou, LLNL, summarized the technical presentation of LLNL. He concluded that DEGB is a very unlikely event for a Westinghouse plant, and that the leak-before-break concept is valid.
In reply to a question, C. K. Chow stated that they will provide a list of parameters that have been considered in the evaluation. Expressing his own opinion, C. K. Chou stated that the probability of a direct DEGB west of the Rockies is just as unlikely as for plants east of the Rockies. Upper bound indirect DEGB is estimated to be about 10-5 per year. This number, he stated, is conservative. The bottom line is that DEGB should be eliminated for regulation consideration.
M. Bender stated that the question of site-specific evaluation must take into account the question of transmission of the seismic event from its source to i
the site.
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Mar. 29,1983 Mtg E. Rodabaugh presented a statement of the Peer Review Panel consisting of S. Bush, C. A. Cornell, and E. Rodabaugh. He stated that after the technical presentation by LLNL the prepared statement still stands.
In essence, the statement concludes that DEGB should not be postulated in reactor coolant loops of Westinghouse plants east of the Rockies.
In his opinion this con-clusion should also apply to plants west of the Rockies.
S. Bush, PNL, briefly voiced his personal opinion on this matter. Similar conclusions should be reached in other LWR plants even those with different piping materials. Also, the methodology presented for eastern plants should be applicable to western plants, and no surprises in the results are expected.
As one who initiated prcbabilistic studies to turbine missiles, S. Bush stated that too much should not be expected from probabilistic studies.
If the bottom line is a very, very low number and, even considering the substantial uncer-tainties of about 2 or 3 orders of magnitude, if you still are comfortable with the numbers, then you have learned something.
If a probabilistic study is performed correctly it may uncover some totally unexpected results never obtainable from a deterministic study; this is valuable. Deterministic and probabilistic studies complement one another, but using only a probabilistic study in a licensing sense is fraught with peril.
R. Brandon, Westinghouse, provided information regarding the design basis pipe rupture critera for Westinghouse reactor coolant loop piping. They concur with the statements that were presented earlier regarding the elimination of DEGB criteria.
One particular area not mentioned was the potential benefits to the piping system connected to the RCL if the DEGB criteria is eliminated. The amount of.
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Metal Comp./ Comb. of Dynamic loads 10 Mar. 29, 1983 Mtg manpower effort and component supports that are required for the connected piping system tc the RCL in order to accommodate the dynamic effects that result from having to assume a rupture in the primary loop are signifi-cantly reduced.
H. Etherington stated that looking at the extremely low probability numbers seems to indicate that the failure of the bolts of the closure is a much more probable event that could lead to a DEGB.
W. Bamford stated that, based on Westinghouse experience, bolt failures have been isolated and local in nature, and that failures as suggested by H. Etherington are insignificant based on experience.
H. Etherington agreed it is low but whether it is 10-3 or 10-6 is not known. Work in this area by the Staff is needed.
W. Bamford, Westinghouse, summarized the deterministic fracture mechanics analysis that has been done over the last ten years on reactor coolant piping 4
system. Actual material properties of piping for nearly all Westinghouse plants are available and have been used in the evaluation. Material data indicates that piping material is very tough. Weld metal properties are also available and indicate that they also are tough; the toughness value falls between the upper and lower bound of the base metal data.
Thermal aging was discussed.
W. Bamford stated that test data indicate that the base metal is more affected than the weld area. But, he stated, that there is no reason to believe that thermal aging degrades the material to the point where it is of concern. Test data indicates that even after thermal aging the ductility of the pipe is not significantly affected.
W. Bamford stated that a report on thermal aging will be sent to us.
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i Metal Comp / Comb. Dynamic Loads 11 Mar. 29,1983 Mtg M. Bender suggested that an independent group review the Westinghouse analysis and test data and confirm that the evaluation of thermal aging is indeed on a sound technical basis.
R. Klecker said that the methodology and test data were reviewed by NRC and found acceptable for use on the CRBR project. Still, M. Bender wants an independent review of this work.
M. Bender stated that he would like to see the matter of inspection of stain-less steel piping addressed with evidence presented in a way which can be examined. He further stated that it is "high time" that this matter is strengthened out.
S. Bernsen, representing the AIF Subcommittee on Load Combinations, presented the AIF position that was forwarded to H. Denton, NRR, on March 28, 1983. The letter states that DEGB criteria should be eliminated in the main loop and in other piping systems. There are about 200-400 pipe whip restraints in a typical plant. A few significant ones are located in the primary loop, but many of the most troublesome ones are in the other piping system. He stated that they are disappointed that little work has been given to the branch lines and in the balance-of-plant piping system where most of the pipe whip restraints are located.
The leak-before-break concept is a valid concept, proven by deterministic and probabilistic methods. Also determined is the fact that the seismic contribution to DEGB is small. The SSE plus LOCA loads should be decoupled for all piping systems.
He stated that if a larger safety margin for the component supports is needed, we should increase the safety factors, but not sneak it through the back door by adding some incredible pipe break load.
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r Metal Comp./ Comb. Dynamic Loads 12 Mar. 29,1983 Mtg S. Bernsen stated that it is inconsistent and irrational in the sense that we design structures to resist earthquakes and we do not assume they fail, but then we design piping to resist the same earthquake loadings and then assume that the I
pipe fails, although experience with operational piping systems indicates that it is probably the least likely component to fail. He further stated that about 150,000-200,000 man-hours of effort are involved in the engineering of associated pipe break problems--and cost about $20-40 million per unit.
M. Bender suggested that it would be useful if the AIF could propose a work program and its corres-ponding schedule.
T. Natan, Combustion Engineering, discussed the redefinition of design basis pipe breaks for a CE reactor coolant loop. The results of his presentation were similar to the Westinghouse evaluations. He agrees that DEGB should be eliminated as a design basis, and that the leak-before-break concept is valid. CE has provided data to LLNL to perform its probabilistic evaluation. Palos Verde was selected as a typical CE plant. The results are similar to Zion. Data on other CE plants will be provided to LLNL for a generic CE plant assessment.
M. Bender stated that the Staff needs to look at the leak detection process and to determine what the operator needs to know, and how the human element enters into his judgment if the piping system leaks.
Metal Comp./ Comb. Dynamic Loads 13 Mar. 29, 1983 Mtg W. Anderson, RES, provided a brief summary of the meeting. Highlights of his presentation are listed below:
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. It was hoped that, at this meeting, ACRS would approve the research program on the double-ended guillotine break problem.
. RES wants from the ACRS an early indication on the desirability of continuing with the future research program in this area, and that further research will continue with CE plants and expanded to include BVR plants.
. For the indirect LOCA case the design and construction errors were accounted for and it did not contribute greatly in the overall result.
. Documentation of the presentation today will be prepared and sent to us in about six months.
. Cooperation on this matter with the B&W Owners Group is needed.
. Corrosion problems must be accounted for in the evaluation of DEGB.
. The transcript of this meeting will be reviewed and responses to questions in our area of responsibility will be addressed.
In response to a question by P. Shewmon, W. Anderson stated that because of the current problems with large diameter pipe cracks in BWRs more research efforts should be provided to support the fixes or criteria that are being proposed by the industry or NRR.
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Metal Comp./ Comb. Dynamic Loads 14 Mar. 29, 1983 Mtg R. fiosnak, NRR, gave a brief summary, highlights of which are provided below:
. Based on the deterministic approach the proposed criteria on the elimination of DEGB is satisfactory for PWR austenitic main loops.
CE plants with "ferritic main loops will now be reviewed by NRR, although it is felt that similar conclusions will be reached.
. Margins of the supports should remain similar to current plant designs. He stated that there should be better ways of accomplishing this than by introducing a fictitious partial break area.
Comments of the Subcommittees and consultants are highlighted below:
',.. Z. Zudans: The work done by LLNL supported the findings that were evaluated on a deterministic basis. Action on this matter should be taken-immediately.
. T. Pickel: More work is needed so that all plants and piping systems will be applicable to, a generic DEGB criteria.
Pipe whip restraints should be removed if analysis so indicates.
. D. Ward. Evaluations into [the elimination of DEGB criteria are producing
'ceedible rasults. A cooperative effort between the industry and Staff is necessary to provide guidance on what piping system will produce the biggest payoff. The Staff should develop a long-range program for dealing with the design basis for the ECCS and containment design, which accounts for the elimination of DEGB.
H. Etherington: The program is going in the right direction. The safe end i
should be analyzed without the pipe whip restraints.
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. P. Shewmon: DEG3 for ferritic piping system has seemed incredible to me for a
' '16ng time; I would pe delighted if we could convince the, majority of' engineers i
that, indeed, this is true. We need to quantify the BWR' pipe degradation probl em.
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. M. Bender: The presentation today has been satisfactory. Having provided a method to evaluate the DEGB problem the Staff should be yilling to accept industry efforts to do the same without having to do,it itself. CE, BMI and BWR piping systerFanaly*,is'should be done in parallel and performed in a
<1 timely manne). Regulations' on this matter should be applicable to all plants s
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be permitted only during those portions ]
presentations by an4 hold discusalons ~
with represer.*atives of the Department. Act Exemption 4).To the extent,,...e of the meeting when a trans tis belag of Energy. NRC staff, their consultants, practicable, these closed asesions will kept, and questions may be d only 1 and other laterested persons,regarding, be held so en to mhlmE inconvenienc*
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any of theft censultants who may be '
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present,may exchange pre!!mina[y ~pl public attendance exceptfor those d's, Go cognizant Des ted Federal e.
.l Employee. Mr. Pa Boehnert (telephone 202/634-3287) between 8.15 am and 5 views regarding matters to be seastons during which the Subcommittee' considered during the balance of the finds it necessary to discuss progrietary j p.m.. EST.
l have determined. In accordance with meeting.
Information (Sunshine Act Exemption 4).
Subsection 20(d) of the Federal The Subcommittees will then hear One or more closed sessions may be /
Advisory Committee Act, that it may be presentations by and hold discussions necessary to discuss such information. -
necessary to close some portbne of this with representatives of the NRC Staff.
To the extent practicable, these closed their consultants, and other interested sessions will be held so as to minimize -
merting to protect proprietary information. He authority for such persons regarding this review.
Inconvenience to members of the public closure is Exemption (4) to the Sunshine Further information rcgsrding topics in attendance Act. 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4).
to be discussed.whether the meeting
%e agenda for subject meeting shall has been canceUed or rescheduled, the be as foUows:
Dated. Man.h 8.1983 Chairman's rbling on requests for the John C. Hoyle.
opportunity to present oral statements Thursday March 31.19sh2 00 pm Advisory Committee Managerr'ent Offscer.
and the time aUotted therefor can be Until the Conclusion of Business
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meeting. the Subcommittee, along with -
Safeguards; Subcommittees on Metal I have determined.in accordane with any ofits consultants who may be Components / Combination of Dynamic Present, will exchange preliminary i
d tte Act it may be views regarding metters to be
%e Combined ACRS Subcommittees necessary to close some portions of this considered during the balance of the cn Metal Components / Combination of meeting to protect proprietary meeting.
Dynamic Loads will hold a meeting on information.The authority for such ne Subcommittee will then hear Mzrch 29.1983. Room 1046.171711 closure is Exemption (4) to the Sunshine Street NW. Washington.DC.%e Act. 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(3). (4).
Presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the Public Subcommittees will review the Deted: March s.1983 Service Company of New Hampshire. '
rervaluation of double-ended gui!!otme I
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NRC Staff, their consultants, and other pipe break design requirements for Advisory comme.rece Manesement om.cer.
Westinghouse PWR plants. Notice of interested persons regarding this review, thi meeting was published February 23 In r
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eutlined in the Federal Register on Advisory Committee on Reactor Chairman's ruling on requests for the October 1.1982 (47 FR 43474). oral or Safeguards; Subcommittee on opportunity to present oral statements.
written statements may be presented by Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Units and the time allotted therefor can be i
members of the ublic, recordmgs wiU 1 and 2; Meeting obtained by a prepald telephone call to be permitted o during those portions cf the meeting en a transcript is being The ACRS Subcommittee on Seabrook the cognizant Designated Federal kept, and questions may be asked only Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 will P.mployee. Mr. Richard Malor (telephone by members of the Subcommittees, their hold a meeting on March 31 and Aprill.
202/634-1414) between a:15 an and consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring 1983 at the Ashworth By ne Sea. 295 5100 pm. EST.
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ta make oral statements should notify Ocean Blvd Hampton Beach.NH.no I have determined,in accordance with the Designated Federal Employee as far Subcommittee will visit the plant and Subsection 10(d) of the Federal J
in advance as practicable so that review the application of the Public Advisory Committee Act, that it may be
'r cppropriate arrangements can be made Service Company of New Hampshire for necessary to close portions of this
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meeting for such statements.
meeting was published February 23-proprietary information.He authority I for such closure is Exemption (4) to the
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o TENTATIVE AGENDA JOINT MEETING OF ACRS SUBCOMMITTEES ON HETAL COMPONENTS AND COMBINATION OF DYNAMIC LOADS MARCH 29,1983 WASHINGTON, DC
'].
Chairman's Opening Statement and Comments 8:30 - 8:40 a.m.
8:40 - 8:45 a.m.
"11.
NRC/RES Opening Remarks
- L. Shao 111. Executive Summary
- Proposed Position
- implications
- Recommendations and conclusions
'A i) y 8:45 - 4:05 a.m.
NRR J. Knight /R. Bosnak J -9:05 - 9:25 a.m.
6 RES J. Richardson IV. Load Combination Program Overview tc /. --9: 2 5 - 9:45 a.m.
C. Chou, LLNL g 4C V. Direct Double-Ended Guillotine Break (DEGB) Assessment
--9:45 - 10:35 a.m.
- Methodology, Validation and Results for the pilot plants
- Other Westinghouse plants
't!
H. Noo, LLNL 10:35 - 10:45 a.m.
BREAK V. a e'-10:45 - 41:45 a.m.
VI. Indirect DEGB Assessment
\\1 '. v.,
- Methodology, Validation and Results
- Other Westinghouse plants R. Kennedy, Structural Mechanics Associates g..
g.,9 3 V11. Design and Construction Quality Assurance
-11:45 - 12:15 p.m.
,r)
- Westinghouse 12 5')
17:15 4:15 p.m.
LUNCH f TTACH/u u / S m
w
2 Vill. LLNL Consultants Remarks 1:15 - 1:45 p.m.
- D. Landers, Teledyne Engineering Service
- R. Kennedy, StiA IX.
Summary and Conclusions of the Technical Presentations
-t-*5 - 1:50 p..m.
X.
Load Combination Program Peer Review Panel Remarks
-. ISO-2:30 p.m.
- E. Rodabaugh, Chairman
- C. Cornell, Member S. Bush, Member 7.
- XI. Westinghouse Technical Presentation 5
-2. ; 0 '-- 3:10 p.m.
- Westinghouse Staff X11. Atomic Industrial Forum Remarks
.-3:10 - 3:30 p.m.
- 5. Bernsen BREAK 3:30 - 3:40 p.m.
- , 53 X111.
Combustion Engineering Remarks 40 - 4:10 p.m.
- T. Natan X111.
NRC Staff Summary 4:10 - 4:20 p.m.
- RES and NRC Staff 6r a
p."y'
'4 :2'O
-e30 p.m.
XIV.
Subcommittee Caucus and b 1 ' ',
.j '.$ p Adj ournment
.(".'
- _q, r.)
..,.J l -),..
e d _LU rre a i :..s Ray Klecker and other t;RC Staff members will be avaibable during the NOTE:
meeting to discuss the deterministic methodology of DEGB and Staff conclusions if requested by the Subcommittee.
l
ATTACHMENT 4 LIST OF HANDOUTS JOINT MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEES ON METAL COMPONENTS AND COMBINATION OF DYNAMIC LOADS MARCH 29, 1983 WASHINGTON, DC l'
C 1.
Introduction, L. Shao, RES 2.
NRR Presentation, R. Bosnak',' NRR RB 3.
Load Combination Research Progrkar'J! Richardson, RES 4.
Reevaluation of DEGB, Design Requirebents for RCL of W PWR Plants, K-C. K. Chou, LLNL 5.
Estimated Probability of Direct'6EGB for RCL of W PWR plants, H. H. Woo, LLNL i
6.
Evaluation of Probability of-Indifddt DEGB for RCL of W PWR Plants,
- i. Ca R. Campbell, SMA 7.
nesign and Construction Quality,34.i dohnson, W 8.
Design / Construction Errors, D. L'fnWrs, Teledyne Engineering Services enst 9.
Consultant Statenent, L K-R. Kennedy, SMA
- 10. Summary and Conclusions, C. K' 6 %~li, LLNL
- 11. Statement of Peer Review Parldt,3.atBush, C. Cornell, E. Rodabaugh
- 12. Letter to Rodabaugh from C. de CoWiell, dated March 16, 1983
- 13. Design Basis Pipe Rupture CriteEff for W RCL Piping, R. Brandon, W 14.FractureAnalysis,W.Bamford,j
- 16. Exclusion on Fracture in Pipfngt of Pressure Boundary Part 1: Experimental Investigaffons and Their Interpretation, K. Kussmaul, et al.
Part 2: Application to the Print' dry Coolant Piping, G. Bartholome, et al.
[ Report presented to the Subcomr4fttee and Consultants by S. Bush]
ATTACHMENT'4 i
l s s i