ML20024A537
| ML20024A537 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1983 |
| From: | Aftergood S, Dupont D, Hirsch D, Kaku M, Kohn R, Norton B, Plotkin S, Pulido M COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024A493 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8306170417 | |
| Download: ML20024A537 (23) | |
Text
_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _
PA NE L -
CORE DISRUPTION AND REIATED ACCIDENTS Seismic Damage
- 1. Se Hawley study states that the consequences of a core-crushing accident "would be some multiple of the consequences of the fuel-l=M11ng accident" analysed in the study. (p.26). As damage to a single bundle in a severe core-crushing accident induced hr collapse of the N11 ding above onto the core in a major earthquake would be substantially greater than the damage induced in a fuel-handling accident to a single bundle.
Furthermore, one must presume most, if not all of the fuel bundles in a core-crushing accident would be similarly affected. At minimum, then, the consequences would be twenty times as great for a core-crushing incident as for Hawley's assumed fuel hM14ng incident. *
- 2. Earthauske-induced structural dammae is often accompanied hr fire.
In this case, the structural damage could expose the core interior to more air than might be availalbe were the core intact, =div propagation of fire even easier.
- 3. Se history of tie-bolt failures for the fuel sad the m e pried finding from the vibration tests of reactivity oscillations due to the severely undermoderated current configuration, particularly with regards coolant channels that are half the optimum width, creates potential for reactivity surges due to bowing or other plate and bundle spacing changes induced by the seismic shock. An earthquake could also readily cause a large negative worth sample to be removed from the core region rapidly, without time for intervention of the control blades to compensate, resulting in a power excursion. (one particularly worrisomescenario would be a large negative worth sample in an irradiation port, the sample being in liquid form in a container which is squeezed or shattered by the compressive forces in the earthquake, rapidly expelling the contents from the core region. In addition to effecting a positive reactivity insertion, if the liquid were a solvent, the reactivity-induced temperature rise could ignite the material.) A seismic jolt could jerk a control blade out of the core, or cause a large object to impact the drive mechanism outside the core, perhaps initiating an excursion.
- 4. Se Argonaut reactor is severely undermoderated. Se University of Washington's Argonaut reactor zepris that just a small change in the gap between fuel bundles can cause a significant change in reactivity.
(see Exhibit C-III-1). At UCLA, it has been determined in addition that the narrow plate spacing within the bundles creates an " extremely undermoderated" situation so that any incident which caused an increase in that plate
- Se Staff attempts to make some comparison to guillotine-type breaks in the fuel. First of all, the fuel is unlikely to shatter in clean, guillotine-type cuts. Se jagged exposed surfaces will have substantially ,
more surface area exposed, and therefore result in greater fission product release, than the theorised clean cuts. S e fission product release rate from jagged surfaces will not be substantially slower. But more importantly, the assumption of a more three clean cuts per plate in a severe seismically-induced core-crushing incident is questionable. It is unrealistic to assert that the damage that a severe cen-a.shing accident, as from a major earth-quake which collapsed the building above the reactor onto the reactor core, would produce the same or even less damage than that which could result from a fuel-handling accident to a single bundle.
8306170417 830614 PDR ADOCK 05000142
- T_- - . - . - - . - - - - -
spacing couM erente a positive reactivity affect. (see hhiMt C-III-2).
Earthquake vibration tests revealed power oscillations caused by the fact that an increase inplate spacing can amount to a positive reactivity in-sortion. (see Exhibit C-III-3). ( he misleading nature of the reference in the Application to the vibration tests is especially serious, not only J because it obscures this potential positive reactivity effect, but because the information, if not so obscured, makes clear that the assertion elsewhere in the Application that the reactor is optimally moderated so that any j seissioally-induced or other rearrangensat of the core or fuel would deeresse reactivity is simply not correct.) )
- 5. As a result of vibration test.s on the reactor, it uns determined that
> reactivity oscillations were detected, traced to the fact that the remator is substantially undermoderated with its presamt plate spacing. 21s !
- would be significant boomune core distortions, for example, those created in an earthquake or an otherwise non-destructive power excursion involving rapid steam formation and unter expulsion, could potentially have the equivalent of increasing plate spacing and thus amount to positive reactivity insertion. Furthermore, an undermoderated core presents the possi Mlity of power exeursion through increased moderation being introduced. h Hawley review indicated that up to 18 5Ak/k extra remotivity could result fromcatastrophieasahanicalrearrangementand/orfloodingofthecore
- l (p.27),butconcludedthatsuchperfectrearrangementorcompleteflooding uns not credible. However, with 18.55 available. far less than perfect rearrangement or complete flooding is necessary for a disastrous power excursion, which all the analyses wouM appear to accept as occurring at least with a 3% insertion, if not considerably less. Thus, flooding from the shield tank, a heavy unter tank, broken pipes above the reactor, or the failure of a nearby upstrema reservoir conM result in a substantial pos-itive reactivity insertion, as could the use of unter to fight a reactor i fire.
- 6. Se machine room above the reacter contains numerous mater sources and piping systems. D ese pose the potential of leaking directly onto the reactor below, creating an avenue for flooding of the remotor from a pipe break above. Dese pipes have leaked in the past, fleeding the reactor facility and daanging the control panel and related remotor instransatation.
(see USA Daily Bruin article, ExhiMt 0-III-4). Placement of plumbing systems above the reactor seems a poor choice from a safety standpoint.
(see p.233 of 1965 operating log,. attached, for heavy unter leak incident.)
l 7. Se history of control blade difficulties also presents problems.
The vibration tests indicato that seismically-induced core-shifting can pin the drive mechanisms. Se results were delayed from the vibration tests, but those teste sinalated very small accelerations compared to .
what can be expected in a realistic earthquake. Pinning of control blades, jamming of the dump valve can aske reactor shutdown impossible, perhaps with' operation at a power level far in excess of the design level which can result in enough decay heat, once the unter is boiled off, to result in fuel molting. (Note that Cort concluded that aslting could occur simply from seismically-induced blockage of cooling for a 500 ku Argonaut. Note also that the temperature rise for a 100 kw Argonaut couM produce fuel ignition and/ortriggerWignerenergyrelease.)
8 Severe core disruption couM occur from initiating events other than an earthquake. For example, the manna of shutdoun in a poner excursion,
l rapid expulsion of unter, generates substantial pressure pulses capable of substantial alterations to the core configuration, even in a power escursion l that does not reach the molting temperature of the fuel. If the excursion were very severe, shield blocks weighing several tons could be thrown in the airs the many-ton SL-1 remoter vessel itself uma lifted to the ceiling during that excursion, shearing piping as it went.
Fuel Handling Aeoidents
- 9. Hawley assumes a 2 7% release of gaseous fission products from a fuel bundle involved in a handling sooident. Other than inadequate demonstration that only those fission products one recoil-distamos from the exposed surface could be released, the estimate seems reasonable. ;
10 The Staff appears to assert that its censultant is in error in his estimate and that the true amount of damage to a bundle in a fuel handling sooident would be 1/24 of what their consultant calculated.
In the absence of empiriosi data from astumi crushing tests on fuel -
like UCIA's, that assertion is unsupportable and non-conservative. We have commented above on the problems in assuming three guillotine outs rather than extensive fracturing, splintering, gouging, or shattering of the thin plates.
- 11. UCIA asserts that only the outer surfaos of the two outer plates (the equivalent of daanse to one of the eleven plates in the bundle) oculd be daanged in a severe fuel bandling nooident. That seems unreasonable, particularly for an insident, for example, in which a ten-ton shield t block uns dropped on the bundle, which is composed of thin plates rigidly .
I bolted. In its design basis fuel- handling sooident, UCIA further assamos t that the fuel has cooled down 21 days before the sooident, an unreasonable assumption. Revies of UCIA's operating records indientes ooomsions when fuel was removed from the core only a few days after shutdown (e.g.,
, see p. 215 of the 1965 Operating Log for 4/1-5/65: also, p.455-6, 1963 l Operating Lose p. 144-5, 1964 operating Logs p.4 4 -8, 1964 Logs all attached).
i 12 UCIA, in addition to a==nming only one of the eleven plates is damaged !
and that its inventory has decayed for three weeks first, also assumes that the fission product release is diluted by 14,000 cubic feet per minute of air as the release is exhausted out the ventilation stack. However, the exhaust system is tied in with radiation monitors to shut down upon a high radiation reading (Application III/4-7), so the dilution assumption is incorreet. ,
- 13. 41y one form of fuel bandling sooident has been analysed in each case, moreover, that of mechanioni daanse to the fuel plates. Other kinds of fuel W14== socidents that need to be aseeemed include direct radiation exposure, critionlity sooidente, and contamination incidents during pre-paration for shipasst. l
- 14. Radiation Use Committee minutes for December 22, 1977, at page 2, (Enhibit C-I-5) assert that a more four seconds of exposure to a person ,
i near a fuel omsk would result in a reportable incident, and a few minutes ,
for a lethal dose, should the shielding slip. 1he result of a fuel-handling socident, be it in the reactor roca or in unrestricted areas during i
__ . _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . . - __ .. _...._._.,_-._.-__ ..-_._-__ ,__---- ...._ _, ,- - - -__ ~-
l transfer for shipment oculd thus be more aignificant in terms of direct exposure than release of fission products. (See photos of fuel transfer location in public ares, attached to D. Hirsoh testimony to the California Highuay Platrol about the June 1980 shipment incident. Further, note the umanalysed potential for public exposure in a fuel bandling ina11ont in which fuel prepared for transfer has been accidentally contaminated by a leakingradiationsource.)
- 15. In addition to in-remotor reactivity accidents, possession of the roguested amounts of HEU pose potentials for out-of-reactor criticality accidents. This is particularly true in connection with a facility that additionally has had two subaritical facilities, with fuel (in addition to the HEU in the reactor and in storage) and a large guantity (many harrels) of heavy mater and graphite for experimental uses. Experiments:
have already boom performed at the facility with fuel bundles in water pools outside the reactors extensive experiments were performed a W =r spacing for fuel bundles and determining reactivity effects. More creative experiments can be assumed as the basic reactor phy3ies experiments that can be done with such a reactor have>been exhausteid. With poor =dninistrative controls, experiments by students involving the fuel without proper prior review or supervision could be dangerous.
Other Fuel FInilures
- 16. The analyses done to date have not addressed the potential for '
4 localised fuel molting during operation should some coolant channel (s) he blocked, due to bowing of fuel plates or other blockage of the channel.
Nor has there been an analysis of the history of fuel failures for this kind of fuel. UGA has had such " leaky" fuel (see operating log entry for4/29/63). MTR-type fuel has had problems related to distortion of plates and subsequent blocking of flow channels, due in part to the tendency of the thin plates to cause an unbalanced hydrostatic pressure in the coolant channels. (See the Technolony of Nuclear Reactor Safety, vol. 2, p. 87). Other similar plates have failed due to poor process control in assembly, or melted as a result of restriction of coolant flow by debris from a gasket (ibid., p. 94).
gnclusion
- 17. As indicated by Mr Hawley in his report, the effects of a core-crushing incident would be some multiple of the effects he has estimated for a fuel handling accident. In our view that multiple is approximately-twenty, for severe mechanical damage without large fire, Vigner energy release, or power excursion being triggered. However, there are numerous mechanisms whereby such core disruption could lead to those additional events, in which case the fission product relemee would be substantially larger.
- 18. Various fuel handling accidents not addressed in the current analyses--
involving direct exposure, criticality accident, or external contamination, for example, during preparation for shipping- could produce substantial 1
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-5 '
exposures. And the potential for other fuel failures needs to be reviewed, particularly through examination of experience with similar fuel elsewhere.
- 19. The UCIA reactor is not inherently protected against nochanical damage. If its fuel is daanged, a radiologically significant portion of the gaseous fission products can escape. If fire or power excursion or Wigner rolesse or some combination is initiated by core disruption, considerably more of the inventory could be released.
CORB DISRUPTION AND REIATED ACCIDENTS Exhibit List Exhibit Number Description C-III-l letk,11/2/81, Univ. of Washington to NRC C-III-2 abstract of thesis by J.A.Vitti C-III-3 excerpts from thesis by R.L. Rudman on krthquake-Induced Vibrations C-III-4 UCIA Daily Bruin article on water leak, 11/21/79 C-III-5 1963 Operating Los excerpts C-III-6
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1964 Operating Log excerpts C-III-7 1965 OP erating Log excerpts C-III-8 Testimony of D. Hirsch before California Highuay PatroD
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Exhibit C-III-l paga 1 of 2 l
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON .
SEATTLE WASHINGTON 90195 College of Engineering Department of Nuclear Engineering Nuclear Reactor Laboratory, FD-10 2 November 1981 Director
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission /[p 'Tr r h Washington, D.C. 20555 .,,,
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Dear Sir:
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p/ , Re: Docket Nof ,50-139 ,/-
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- License h-736. . % .9 41 l . :;,' '
In accordance with Section K:1 of the Technical SpecItteations for the University of Washington Nuclear Reactor this letter is being transmitted.
Section K:1 requires a telephone call within one working day to Region V office and a written report in ten days to the Director of Reactor Licensing.
This item is for abnormal occurrences as defined in Section J:3 and specifi-cally J:3:b, an uncontrolled or unanticipated change in reactivity.
m As defined in J:3:b we may have an unanticipated reactivity change al-though the explanation seems logical.
In sumary, during September and October of this year we changed the fuel-box gaskets. This required removal of tha fuel, core graphite and the fuel boxes. During rearsembly the fuel elements were returned to the same boxes and positions they occupied originally.
, On October 23, 1981 the reactor was taken critical and the excess re-activity was calculated to be 1.052% Ak/k. On October 27 and 29'the calcu-
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( laced excess reactivities were 1.046% Ak/k and 1.055% Ak/k. These values i were then compared with original measurements and conditions (no samples).
On August 18 and 21 the excess reactivity was 1.182% Ak/k and 1.64% Ak/.k.
The net change as a result of the unloading and reloading the fuel is there-fore approximately -0.12% Ak/k.
l, Earlier experiments show that a change in the ens 11 gap between fuel bundles can cause a change in reactivity. Data taken during the original start-up of the reactor in April 1961 shows a reactivity difference between,
- 1. all fuel bundles wedged toward the central graphite island (minimum spacing between bundles) and 2. the maximum gap between fuel bundles to be 0.54% Ak/k.
In the U. of W. reactor, fuel bundles are separated at the top by an aluminum wedge which maintains maximum separation in one direction at the top of the fuel box However, there is no positive separation at the bottom except the boltsi[thebundleswhichgiveaminimumseparationof0.25inchbetween QQ j
OhKo og *~~ con Hall, BF-10 / Telephone: (206) 543-2754 i PD l
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Director Division of Reactor Licensing 2 November 1981 Page Two.
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plates on adjacent bundles. The marimum separation between outside plates from adjacent bundles could be 0.55 inch. In the other direction the fuel bundles are separated by a plate support at the bottom of the bundles.
With the wedges in place at the top of the bundles, the bundles are forced to the edge of'the box and maintained there. This prevents the bundles from rovenant within the boxes. From prior operating experience there is no evidence to indicate any movement of the bundles once the wedges at the top are in place.
There are other possibilities to explain this reactivity change. One is that there could be some water in the graphite, which we do not believe is the case. The second is a neutron absorber in the primary water and we do not g think this is the casa either. The primary water was retained in the dump tank and the specific resistivity is about 106 ohn-cm (same as prior operating condition).
The change in reactivity can be accounted for by the possible difference in the positioning of the fuel bundles at the bottom in that they may be closer together in some cases than before. We believe that this is the reason for the unanticipated reactivity change and feel that our operations will be essentially
__ unaffected by the small change.
Another observation should be mentioned. As a result of the water spill in December 1979 we found some corrosion on thq outside of the fuel boxes be-tween the aluminum boxes and graphite moderator interfaces where water made contact. This corrosion is the result of a water-graphite-alumin m reaction.
Some minor pitting was observed on the outside of the boxes dering cleaning; however, none of the boxes showed any evidence of leaking during a static-head leak-test prior to re-installation. ,
fS We called Region V on October,23, 1981 and will be meeting soon with the U University of Washington Safety Mvisory Committee, s
Sincerely yours,
.N W,( -
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W.S. Chalk Director WSC:st l cc: Region V ,
s l Safety Mvisory Committee s k
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Exhibit C-III-2 page 1 of 2
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The primary objective of this thesis is to find the plate j, ; .
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spacing of the fuel elements of the uranium vater close-packed
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lattice in the Engineering :inclear Reactor that would optimize i l.VI. R'.
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.2e The analyais is made in two ways; experinentally, utilizing 3. ~M r - -
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{4,.j {J I 'e the Engineering .';uclear Reactor, and with Aim-5, a =ultiregion, 1;
t multigroup diffusion equatior. nuclear reactor code prograz::ed in * , "l .
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4[ The experimental analysis consists of two phases. The first 1
' 4, phase involves the variation of spacing of the fuel plates of a - 3 x.,.4, g j[ ,;1%.it on 4 [, s particul.u- fuel bundle in the ;eactor. ***
The second is the calibra- . . ;f'C.s;.pj*'
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,l tion of the re;;ulat.ing rod so thot changea in i ts poaltion, resul t- ,. . l Y
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ini; fro; variation of the specing, could be interpreted in ter:ns of reactivity.
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%.'. l Using this inform.ation, the maxircum reactivity ;L y F change is evaluat d and that plate spacin;; is daterzined that would 4 r s .: 'j reault in minitu;n critical c..:s.
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computer analyses, it is concluded: -
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- 1. The present 0.137" spacing of the fuel plates in the Engin- f f. GC
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4 lattice in an extrezcly under:r.oderated condition. I 4/l5h
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- 2. A plate spacing of approximately 0.290" would yield the , f.i.(1] $,
'.'A'?/'M \YA minimum critical caso for the uranium water cloce-packed f.pfg.; d .
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lattice in the Engineering : uclear Reactor. ?.Pdhi NI5Yh,'
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA i
Los Angeles
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lIi Simulation of Earthquake-Induced Vibrations j in a UCLA Reactor Fuel Bundle 'i I
r A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the {
requirements for the degree Master of Science l in Engineering l I s
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5 Richard Lee Rudman l m
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Committee in charge: -
Professor Craig B. Smith, Chairman !
g Professor Ralph B. Matthiesen Professor Robert B. Andrews
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control blades one through three are completely withdrawn j. l
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from the core and regulation of the power level is [ . ). j>lI(, .
i achieved by moving control blade.four. Since the shaker d! l induced motion was horizontal and in a direction perpen- { $
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dicular to the control blade shaft it would be necessary I
U N for the force of the horizontal motion, acting on the center of gravity of the control blade, to be sufficiently N. W p'
' i C' r large to raise the blade up in order to produce a higher ,; f ,,
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power level. However, for a 100 kW run approximately 80% 4 p!..j r of the regulating blade remains in the core and a very 'y
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,j:U, . f' large vertical component of horizontal force would be re- R. $
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quired to lift it from this position. Because of the f 5,, I magnitude of this force it is felt that blade motion is
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not a reasonable explanation for the observed power os-Nl . (O cillation. Q[
n jj' i r The last possible explanation is that vibration Y:{!
b$!$ Q induced changes in the fuel bundle configuration are p[gj N !
responsible for the power variation. Vitti(1) has shown s. .,[ !
i hide that increasing the space between adjacent fuel plates siff' N Y results'in a positive reactivity change. The moderator -I.g!
,o i f,
gap between adjoining fuel plates is approximately one-t The present $q '
half of the optimum moderating distance. sp; plate spacing is a nominal 0.137 in. while the spacing required for optimum neutron thermalization was experi-
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mentally determined by Vitti to be 0.290 in. Neutrons : g, ;
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that are produced in one fuel plate are insufficiently .lg 1Di E!f f
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fuel plate and the probability of fission is decreased. !. l
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As the plate spacing is increased the neutron energy ,j s '
decreases due to greater moderation and the fission rate increases. Since the plates are secured only at their .
6 tops and bottoms and the direction of the reactor motion o l b during the shake test was perpendicular to the plane of , ,
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the plates it is possible that vibration-induced plate ,, j f p
gap changes could produce an oscillating flux level. .;,.,.
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. 0, 1.2 The Approach
,t a The purpose of this work is to predict reactor g! ( f.
power oscillations based on a study of the vibration , , -
!1 i t, l characteristics of a dummy fuel bundle. Three variables
~M g must~be defined in order to estimate the magnitude of , ,!.i
. ;% l the power change: (1) the change in the plate gap di- ',t..)g
- . ,4 mension that occurs when the bundle is being vibrated at f l its resonance frequency, (2) the dependence of reactivity !f;;D
- p. ,,. s on the plate gap dimension, and finally, (3) the manner ' lI: f q l in which a sinusoidally varying reactivity is coupled to [ [gij_ Q. .
u, reactor power. N M, 4[
gap i l.3 Puel Plate and Bundle Description
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The fuel loading of the UCLA reactor consists of i? .
3 r i:: ll 264 plates, with each plate containing 13 grams of highly l
0 :,9 - I enriched U-235. A typical plate is shown in Figure 1.1.
The dummy fuel plates used in the vibration tests are I./l
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Reactor 1 shut down !
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by water dama. gem.Ir 1
the but leak - d on - -afternoon :
- Friday I $ .
By Mary Astadour19n
, Office and told them to do it ,
- ?, ! shut off the water valve, because seest wrn" he did not know how. Ilut he ;
A water leak developed in the control rooni of the' Bocker. , go,go, to check and see if they i
.llall nuclear reactor over the weekend, causing extesvive '
did, the caller said. -
> damage to the main control panel, and [endering the reactor
, i f' Ashbaugh denies this. "Two i inoperable for a week or more. .' , people from Physical Plant '
'An anonymous phone caller toki the'pruin about the leaka.', - 3 came Friday morning and said -
which started Friday in the de lonized water tan'k , arid riipitily .
@' that they wouki take care of the sincapacitated the control room butJpid'not releape,any
- I ' it wasjust a few drops at .*
radioactive water, q. ' Q. leak the time.* he said. Ashbaugh Reactor supervisor Chuck Ashbaugh confirmcd the regi&rt't ! . ' believes the major leak began '
Tuesday. Ashbaueh explained that two' weeks ago.th'e' mal'n. ' ; % over the weekend when the '
water pipe in the School of Engineering broke. A' temp 6tary . is reactor was 'not in operation pipe was installed but not depressurized: ? .'.#.
.t 'iT and when none of the reactor "This increase in pressure causid the spachine that tudkes 'i . personnel was present. "The .,
l purified water for the reactorto leak," Ashbaugh said. He alsoY I- custodian found it and told the ,
explained that this water is used for experinwnts and"doesn't l custodian su'pervisor, who
- belong to the reactor." , ,,. . called Physica,I Plant," Ash-The damage, according to Ashbegagh, s hot perious."So'me! N
' baugh said.
of the instrutnents got wet and wc*ro Jrping them out? he , Ashbaugh said he would said, adding,"We don't thinl[ Jhat anything got burned out,
- [
i Just wet. .
Ashbaugh believes it will cos r p; QofEnergy allow the damage the Druin in the Nuclearto take pictures Laboratory. Ilowever,
' labor, to get the reactor ing operat,t again. about, $500, primarily fo.
I DeanTomCollinsof theSchool The an6nymous caller blamed the darnagg on Ashbaugh. . .
.of Engineering refused to allow carelessness. The caller reported that Ashbaugh discovered a Brum photographer to do so.
(Cotilinued on Page ll) "You can clarify the incident" said Collins,"but I don't think
.you need any pictures." -
O O O t
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