ML20012E938

Amend 155 to License DPR-59,removing Requirements for Rod Sequence Control Sys from Tech Specs & Modifying Specs Associated W/Rod Worth Minimizer

ML20012E938
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	03/29/1990
From:	Capra R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20012E939	List: ML20012E938 ML20012E940
References
NUDOCS 9004090127
Download: ML20012E938 (21)

Text

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p NUCLE AR CECULATORY COMMISSION s

I wAswmotow. o. c. mu i

j POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK DOCKET N0. 50-333 JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l

AMFNDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE q

Amendment No.155 License No. DPR-59

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f 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found thatt A.

The application for amendment by Power Authority of the $ tate of New York (the licensee) dated July 24,1989, complies with the

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standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set i

forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; l

i' B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of tie Act, and the rules and regulations of j

the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized t,y this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and (ii) that such activities will be and safety of the public,ith the Comission's regulations; conducted in compliance w I

D.

ne issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the publict and l

{'

E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements i

have been satisfied.

l 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical l

Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License i

No. DPR-59 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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.(7) Technical Specifications f

i The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.155, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall l

operate the facility in accordance with the Technical l

$pecifications, t

3.

This license avendment is effective as of the date of its issuance t

to be implenented within 30 days.

l FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, Q.. L 8k 4

Robert A. Capra, Dir tor l

Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - I/11 Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation

Attachment:

f Changes to the Technical l

Specifications Date of Issuance: March 29, 1990 i

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I ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.155 j

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59 l

DOCKET NO. 50-333 i

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Revise Appendix A as follows:

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.Recove Pages Insert Pages 88 88 89 89 894 j

90 90 j

91 91 i

92 92 93 93 93a 94 94

)

95 95 i

96 96 97 97 i

98 98 99 99 99a 100 100 101 101 102 102 103 103 l

104 104 187 187 l

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mro vonn 6. sms

. Power Authority of the State of New York Jakes Ao Fit Patrict Nuclear Power Plant o '

cet i

Mr. Gerald C. Goldstein i

Assistant General Counsel Ms. Donna Ross i

Power Authority of the State New York State Energy Office of New York

' 2 Empire State F14aa l

1633 Broadway 16th Floor l

New York, New York 20019 Albany, New York 12223 i

Resident Inspector's Office Re U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission U.gional Administrator, Region i S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Post Office Box 136 47S Allendale Road Lycomhg, New York 13093 i

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Mr. William Fernande2 Resident Manager Mr. A. K14Usman James A. Fit 2 Patrick Nuclear Senior Vice President - Appraisal

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Power Plant and Compliance Services Post Office Box 41 Power Authority cv the State 1

of New York Lycoming, New York 13093 1633 Broadway i

New York, New York 10019 Mr. J. A. Gray, Jr.

l Director Nuclear Licensing - BWR Mr. George Wilverding, Manager Power Authority of the State Nuclear Safety Evaluation of New York Power Authority of the State 123 Main Street of New York 123 Main Street White Plains, New York 10601 White Plains, New York 10601 i

Supervisor Mr. R. E. Beedle

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Town of Scriba R. D. #4 Vice President Nuclear Support i

Oswego, New York 13126 Power Authority of the State i

of New York 123 Main Street i

tir. J. P. Bayne, President White Plains New York 10601 i

Power Authority of the State of New York i

1633 Broadway Mr. S. 5 i f le New York, New York 10019 Vice Prucent Nuclear Engineering Power Authority of the State of New York i

tir. Richard Patch 123 Main Street i

Quality Assurance Superintendent White Plains, New York 10601 James A. Fit 2 Patrick Nuclear i

Power Plant Post Office Box 41 Mr. William Jostger, Vice President Lycoming, New York 13093 Operations and Maintenance l

i Power Authority of the State i

of New York Charlie Donaldsen, Esquire 123 Main Straet Assistant Attorney General e ite lain <, New York 10601 New York Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, New York 10271 i

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JAFIFP 33 UMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 43 SURVBl.I.ANCE REQUIREhENT 33 REACTWITYCONTROL 43 REACTWiTYCONTROL WW ApplicabElly:

Apphes to the operamonsi enk m of the Control Rod System.

Applies to me surveMance requwements of the Control Rod System.

l Obrective:

Obrecewe-To assure the absty of the Control Rod System to control reactMty.

To venYy the ability of me Cortrol Rod System to conkel reecevily.

l Sf=dric4&c Specmcatort A.

Reactivity Unwtahons A.

Reactwity Umitatons l

rd t margo-coreloading 1.

ReeceMiy meryn-coreloading l

1 1.

i A sulfioent number of control emds shall be operable so Sullioent control rods sher be withdraum foBouang a that the core could be made subcntecel in the most refueling outage when core aftershons were performed to i

reactrye condibons dunng the operahng cycle with the demonstrate with a maryn of 0.38 percent ak/k me com

.i uc@ control rod fully withdrawn and aN other operable con be made subtribcel at any time in me subsequent fuel controlrods fullyinserted.

cyde with he analyticepy desemuned strongest operatie mnerat rod swy withdrawn and as amor operatse rods sely inserted.

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i AnisnCaisent No. 155 IE I

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ee-t-DW w-w ew=wew *N ew--r's ww m--r-Nww-N---

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3AA (conrd) 4AA (contd) l 2.

Reactmty marga. inoperable conkd rods 2.

Reeckwity margin - inopendde conkel rods a.

Corfrol rods which cannot be moved with control a.

Each portally or fuey wiendrawn operaldo control rod rod drive pressure shall be considered inoperable. N sheE be enerosed one notch at least once each l

a partiaNy or fuNy withdrawn control rod drive cannot wook when oponeng above 30 percent power. In be moved w:th drive or scram pressure, the reactor the event power operabon is contnuing with tuse or shall be brought *.: the Cold Shutdown condCon more inoperable control rods, tiis test sher be i

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within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and shaR not be restarted unless (1) performed at least once each day, when operahng

'nwestigahon has shown that the rmen of the failure above 30 percent power.

nd a W W W h h W b.

The scram dedierge volume drain and went valves i

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• sher be verified open at least once por 31 days derewested as e by Speciscamon l

(these vesves may be cioned intermateney sur teenne underadmnustamme contros).

t it irwesbgebon shows that the rua of contml rod c.

The status of tie preneure and level storms for endt

%ya W W % aN2 accumusator sher be chodsed once per wealt i cannot be ruled out, the reactor sher not l

be restarted until the allected control rod drive has d.

When it is initiepy detemuned tiet a control rod is been replaced or repared.

irP of normal inserton, an allempt to My j

insert the control rod shen be mode. N the contml rod cannot be fuDy inserted, shutdown margin test shes be made to demonstrase under this condbon l

that Wie core con be made subcritcal for any reeckwity conston during Die remainder at sie openong cycle wan the analyticesy determined, twghest worth control rod capable of withdrawal, luky withdrawn, and as other control rods capra or i

inserton fuBy inserted. N W 33A1 and 4.3A1 are met, reactor stark, may proceed.

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Airmidnent No. f,jf,1A,155

Jappspp 33.A2 (cont'd) 4.3A2(conr4 b.

The coreal rod drectional control vefwes for e.

The scram dochsge volume dain and went values ir operable control rods shen be doormed shen be fuB4 ravel cyded si leest once per quarter to elecincesy.

venW that the vesmes does in ines then 30 secanes c.

coned rods whh scram tmes greater then those and to assure proper vefwe skole and o@

permitted by Spacecasen 3.3.C.3 are inoperable, l

but if they can be inserted whh contrd rod 4two pressure they need not be daarmed electricapy.

d.

Contrd rods with inoperable accunudsants or thoes whose posliion cannot be poemwely determned shen be consideredinoperable.

e.

Inoperable control rods sher be pooltioned such met Specmcation 33.A.1 is met. In adsten, dunng reactor power operation, no more then one cared rod in any 5 X 5 array may be inoperable (at least 4 operable cared rods must seperase any 2 l

inoperable ones). K 1his W cannot be met 1

the reactor shen not be started, or N at power, the reactor shaN be brought to a cold andten wilhm 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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I' Amendment No. K.17. W, 153 so i

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JAFIFP h

33 (cont'o) 43 (cont *4 B.

Control Rods B.

ControlRods l;

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l 1.

Each control rod shen be coupled to its drive or 1.

The coupling integrity sheE be vertBod for each wipufreun 4

l completely inserted and the control rod direchoned control contrairod as foemus-l l

valves disarmed electncaNy. This requrement does not apply in the refuel condton when the reactor is vented.

a.

When a rod is withdrawn me first time after endt i

l-Two control rod dnwes may be removed as long as refueling outage or after memeenance, cheerwe l

Specificeon 3.3A1 is met.

discomlbie response of me nuclear inalrumentaton.

l However, for inibal rods when response is not discomitdo, mWW enordeing of these votts aner the reactor is above 20 percent power shes be performed to verify instrumentmon response.

i b.

When the rod is sdy wahdrawn the aret sme aster each refueling odege or after mentenance, cheerve that the drive does not go to me overtravel poeRion.

j c.

During each refuesng outage and aster each control rod me.ntenance, choorve that the elve does not go to me overtravelposition.

i 2.

The control rod drive housing support system shes be

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2.

The control rod drive housing support system shan be in inspected aner.::::.Q and the resuNs et the

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place during reactor power operation or when the reactor inspechon recorded.

l coolant system is pressunzed above atmospheric pressure with fuel in the reactor vessel, unless all control rods are fullyinserted and SW73.3A1 is met.

1 Amendment No./134,155 91 1

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JAFMPP l

3.3.B (cont'd) 43.B (conrd) l l

3.

$vhenever the reactor is boiow 10% rated thermal power, 3.

The cepetility W Wie Rod VWbrei tenanlear to property fu1M l

e Rod WWbrth Miramizer (RWM) shen be operable except its functon shen be demonstrated by tie following checho:

as follows:

a.

During starte, prior to tie start d control rod a.

Should the RWM become inoperable dunng a weihdrawel:

reactor startup aner the first twelve control rods have been withdrawn, or dunng a reactor shutdown, (1)

The correctness W Wie RWWM program control rod movement may conhnue pronded that a ooquence shen be vertEed.

l The RWM computer on Ene deyicade test operator, or rear *w engmoer independeney verlHes

-w M shes ta =- ~c~-

that the control rods are bemg posiboned in

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accordance with tie RWM prograft sequence.

(3)

Proper annurw4mamri d ihe selecIlon arver of at l

b.

Should the RWM be inoperable before a startup is md' e one

-eequen a m

W E'"E I

i begun, or become inoperable during the withdrawal d the srst twelve canird rods, the startup may (4)

The rod block func50n of the RWM shes be i

conhnue pronded that a raar*w engneer demonstrated by wipidrawing an ausgs-mdependency verines shot the controi rods are bemg sequence cannot rod no more than to the poseboned in accordance with the RWM program block point, ten reinsertug Wie sutiect rod.

sequence. Aner twelve control rods have been fusy 3

withdrawn, startup may mnemus in accordance witi b.

Dunng simmen=n, prior to asteining 10% rated power j

SpeG.cid;cs 3.3.83.a above.

dunng rod inserton, except by sorarvt i.

(1)

The correctness of the RWM proyam

)i sequence shen be vermied.

j The RWM cornputer on Ene degnoelic test shen be armeefupy performed.

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Argdr&d No. %+ 155 i

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3.3B (cor(d) 43.B (cont'4 4.

Control rods sher not be withdrawn for stark, or during 4.

Prior to coreal rod wipidrawal for starty or & ring refueling unless at least two source range channels have refueling, ver!fy tiet at least two source range diennels an. observed count rate equal to or greater 9:en twee hows an cheerved count rate at at least Wees counts per l

course per second eecept as permitted by W second emospt as permilted by W 3.1022 and l

3.102.3 and 3.10B.4.

3.10 2.4.

5.

Dunng operaton with limitmg control rod pattems, as 5.

When a Emilmg control red postem exists, art instrument l

determoed by the reactor engmoer, edher:

func5anel test of tie f4BM shen be performed prior to wnhdressiet the deoipisted tod(s).

a.

Both Feu diennels sher be operable, or b.

Control rod withdrawei sher be blociend, or c.

The operatog power wel sher be limited so the MCPR win remen above the Safety Umit aeoummg a sogle error that reoGts in complete withdrawal of any smgie operable corealrod.

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ate-4Ts4 No. M,;W,g6,p6, p$,155 M

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3.3 (cont'd) 43 (cont *4 I

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C.

Scram inserton Twnes C.

Scram inserton Twnes l

1.

The average scram inserton time, based on the de-1.

AAer each refueEng odege, as operstde rods sher be energization of the scram pilot volve solenods as time scram time tested trom the lusy wensraum poollion with l

zero, of all operable control rods in the reactor power the nucieer system pressure above 950 poig W cperation condbon shaR be no grosser thart saturation temperature). This teseng shes be completed l

l Control Rod Ag Scram pri r t esmeedng p wr. Dunng af scram time i

Mch W h Twne teshng belour 10% power, h M shes be operalde.

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Observed (seconds) 46 0.338 38 0.923 24 1.992 04 3.554 i

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4 Amendment No. f!I,155 95

J4FNPP 33.C (cont'd) 43.C (cont'd) 2.

The average of it'.e scram inserbor: twnes for the three 2.

At 16-week intervals,10 percent of tie operaole control fastest operable control rods of aR groups of four control rod dnwes shen be scram tened above 950 poig.

tods in a hvo-by-two array shall be no greater thart Whenever such scram time measurements are mode, an bW6-ControlIbd Average Scram that proper coMroi rod per rmance is bemg I

Notch Poseon insertion T'ane l

Observed (SecciW 3.

Ali control rods shaR be determned operable once each 38 24 2.112 p% cycle W W h scarn W g

g volume draun and went valves operable when the scram test ineaded by placmg the mode switch in tie l

3.

The maximum scram insertson time for 90 percent SHUTDOWN position is portormed as requwed by Tdile nserbon of any operable control rod shall not exceed 7.00 4.1-1 and by verNying that the drain and went vafres-sec.

a.

Close in less that 30 seconds after receipt ci a signef l

for controlrods to scram,and l

b.

Open when wie scrum signal is reset or sie scram l

diedierge irstrument volume trip is bypnamarf 1

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l Amendment No. 49,pf,76,06.155 96

_,. _. _ _ _. _ _ _ _... _ _ _. ~ -.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _... _ _ _. _ _ _ _. - - -

d r

N 33 (corfd) 43 (corfd)

Reactnnty Ar6TA D.

D.

Pdd Anomaries

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i The Isact iti equivalent of to difference between the actual Dunng the Startup test program and startup Sollemng refueling critical rod configurabon and the expected configuration dunng adagse the cribcal rod conEgurabons wiE be corgered to me power operation shall not exceed 1 percent a k. N this limit is expected configuramons at selected operstng contstons. These exceeded, the reactor wW be shut down untR the cause has been w wbse, wiR be used as base data for.Mf; montoring

&b6AW and correchve achons have been taken as dunng **=wywwt power opershon throughout the fusi cyde.

w + iate.

At spectic power operamng condihons. the crocal rod D

E.

K Specircations 33.C and D above cannot be met, an orderfy shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold W

i condition within N hr.

wiR be made etleast every fus powerM E

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1 Amendmerd No.155 l

97

e JAreapp

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33 and 43 BASES A.

ht:ff Limitetson The value of v,in unlis d % A k/k. is tie amourt tsy whch the conr reecWuity, in the most reactve coniSton 1.

The requrements for the Control Rod Dnve System have at any time in tio sWisequent opendng cyde,-is been idensied by evaluenng the need for reecevity calculated to be greater then at me ame or the convoi via convoi rod movement over the fue spectum deme,ewanon. Y, mondom, is me desence between i

d piimt conditons and events. As discussed in the ceiculated weius of meomum core reactney dunng subsecton 3.6 of the FSAR, the Control Rod System the operahng cyde and me eminds art beginnegcNNe a

l dessgn is iniended to provide suscient conwo ce core core rence ny. The value or v must be ponieve or more reactmty so that the core could be made subtribcel wiIh and must be detemned for each fuel cyde.

the hW rod fuBy withdrawn. This reeckwity The demonstraton is portormed witt a ca1 trol red which

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charactarishc has been a besse ameumphon in the as c@W to be tie strongest rod. In determining tiis l

mW of plant performance. Compiiance with this

=n i strongest rod, R is assumed met every Suas requrement can be demonokated convenieney only og mmtsly of the same type has idenEcol meterlef the time of inibal fuel ioedng or refueEng. Therefore, me propertes. In me actual core, however, me contoi ces j

l comonalration must be such that R wit apply to the entre metensi properties very uttun aSowed manutetturing i

subsequent fuel cycle. The demonstrabon sheE be tolerances, and tie strongest rod is determined by a l

Weed with the rearew core in me cx3fd, menorWree c mtsnemanat mexfinon and wis show that me reactor is subc.itical by r:t leest R + 038 %a k/k with the ord,i "; detemuned

..rongest control rod fully vnihdrawn.

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Amendment No. 155 98

.---.,,--,-.--_-,%-m

. _, -, -. <,w

-y%-w.,

-w,.-e%

.em-,--.,.----m+

,ww..

w~,.--w-,w,.m-.,y%e,.e,-,,,

,%+.--w,

l wisee 33 and 43 BASES (cont *d)

U the control ape geometry and local Ig. Therefore, an i n mme men one conbei tod W a M addihonal magn is included in te shutdown mergn test to account for the fact that the rod used for me demonstration (the analytically strongest) is not Also N demoge wipun me control rod dive machernem l

necessarily the.e4 rod in the core. Studies have and in perbcular, ancks in drive wilemet houangs, l

been made wtuch compare expenmental enticals with cannot be ruled oW. men a genanc petdorn allochng a calculated entcals. These studies have shown that number d dnves cannot be ruled ed. Circumferenhef actual enbcais can be predicted within a gwen tolerance cracks resulkng from stress m intergranuier i

band. For gadolirma cores the addibonel mergn requwed conocen home occuned in me coGet houang of dnues at i

due to contros cell material manuloctunng tolerances and several BNRs. This type et crat$ sng could occasr in a calculabonal uncertantees has expenmentaNy been number of drlwes and N me petics propagated unE i

I determined to be 0.38% ok. When mis addisonef mergn severance of Wie collet houang onzuned, spam could

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i is demonstrated, R assures met Wie reactruity control be prevented in tie affected rods. Umibng Wie pened at i

j requwementis met.

operabon wlm a potenbeSy severed coEst houang wE amoure tiet the reactor wE not be operated wlm a larg.

7 gg numoer or rods wah sened cossa housnes.

Speedicahon 33.A.2 requwes tiet a rod be taken out of serwce if it cannot be moved with drive pressure. N the B.

ControlRods rod is fully inserted, it is in a safe pombon of maximum i

contnbubon to shutdown reecenty. w n is in a non.suny 1.

controt rod drop accidents as discussed in the FSAR can l

l inserted poseon, that posabon shes be consstent with seed to sipiecent core esmage. w coupsng inleyny is the shutdown reactuty limstaban stated in Specificabon maintaned, the poestnuty of a rod drop accN9ent is 33.A.1. This assures that the core can be shut down d elimneted.The overtravel 1

aR twnes with the remarung contros rods assuming the i

strongest operable control rod does not insert.

i Amendment No. fj, 155 5

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JM MPP 33 and43 BASES (cor(4 3.

The Rod wann nen.niser enWag essences me onsor w cared rod meneemd and ineenkm to be apivalent to poseon saature provides a poseve dux* as only the Sanhed Peshon Wuhtamed Sequence (BPWS$.

uncoupled dnves may mach this positon. Neutron These secpanoes an estehnehad such met en eo, d inewumentenon response to rod movement prowdes a wenticahon fut me rod is fogowing its dnve. Absence of any inesquence conkoi ved from me fuBy insened poemon to the poemon W me onrew rod et wcnes not such response to drive movement could indicate an cause me veector to sustom a power ecurson soeuhng uncoupled conditon. Rod paseon ir% is requwed in a peak fuel snpuhy in excess of 3D cel/gm. An l

for proper function of me Rod Wbrth hEnwnizer (RWaq.

• "'hPF *' 8'0 **'/8" * b" 8h* 8' "h*

2.

The conted rod % w sestrices wie outumerd

" b O "M-l movement of a conIrd rod to less tien 3 in. In tie

• F'"*

" # P""DI' 73,,,,,,,,,, 39,,,,7f,3 Q,,Y,,,

extremely remoto event of a housing tenure. The amount

• W

"escsway which could be added by mis senes amount of rod vnihdrawal, which is less then a normal angle vnthdrawes increment, wlE not contribute to any damage to the Pnmary cooient system. The deogn basis is in performing me funceon descreed abose, me RAmd is I

given in =*=arann 3.82 of #w FSAR, and to safety not requwed to irnpose any seenzmans et core power evaluebon is gwen in =*=ar+an 3.8.4. This support is levels in emoons of 10% of voted, testenal in Wie cated I

not requesd N me Ramrent f% dant System is at roterences shouw put R is impoestie to susch lW atmosphenc pressurs once Store wodd then be no colones por gram in se event of a corW sad dop drmng force to rapuSy elect a drive housing.

I occurring at power groeter men 10%, sogensees of me AdcthoneNy, Wie support is not required N af cantrd rods rod panem. This is wue sor es normes and abnomial are funy inserted and w an are y* shutdown mergn penoms includng moes which monimho the ineutlues with one control rod adhdrawn has been demonstrated, controirod moren.

since the reactor would remain suberiscal even in the event of w@ ejechon of the strongest control rod.

t Amendment No. 30,135 100

JAFMPP 33 and 43 BASES (cont'd) l At power levels belour 10% of rated, abnormal control rod h ievel for automshe cutout d me RWM W is h i

M D"#

by steem flow and is manusBy set above 10% of rated posuer to concem relative to the 280 casones per gram drop simit. in ini" forinstrumeit error.

l rangs,. the RWM constrains the control rod sequence and pattems to those whdi involve only acceptable rod worms.

Funchonsi tesemg of me RWM prior to me start of control rod [!

i weihdrawal at startup, and prior to enaning 10% rated mermai

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The Rod Worth Minmzer provides automatic supervision to rod h 6 % % W m assure that out-of-sequence control rods wiH not be wilhdrawn reliebie operadon and h he protzebERy W Wie rod drop or inserted; i.e, it limits operator deviance from planned j

withdrawal sequences. It serves as a backup to procedural l

i control of control rod sequences whch limit me maamum 4.

The Source Range Monitor M System performs no j

reactrvity of control rods. Normal RWM program aborts do not automebc safety system functori; i.e, it has no scram function.

conshtute an inoperable condemn if the RWM can be it does provide me operator wth a veuel indcedon of neutron i

i reinitiahzed. In the event that Wie Rod Worth tenmzer is out of level. The consequences of reactively accedents are functions of i

service, a second licensed reactor operecor, licensed sener the inibal neutron Sun. The %_

.-.; of at least 3 coures per i

i operator or reactor engmeer can manusBy fuNul me control rod sec. aneures that any transent, should it occur, begins at or l

4 l

pattern cxmformance functons of this system.

above Sie 'allief vesue of 10 of rated posuer used in See Below 10% of rated power, the RWM forces actierence to acceptable rod panems. Above 10% of rated power, no I

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constraint on rod panem is requesd to amourc that rod drop d '"' 'P88 "' P'avidsd as j

I accident consequences are acceptable. conhos rod pestem i

constraints above 10% d reded power are imposed by power l

l dstnbution regurements as specified in Sechons 3.1.B. 3.5.H, 1

and 3.5J of these Technical Specdicahons.

f i

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9 101

JAFMPP 33 and 4.3 BASES (cont *d)

I 5.

The Rod Block Monsor PEM) is desgned to =%iir; C.

Scan hTsmes prevent fuel damage in me event of erroneous rod wNhdramai The Control Rod system is desguted to teing Wie seactor from locebons of high power density dunng higi power level subertucei at a rate test enoupi to present tual damage; i.e., to Opeidicii. Two channels are provided, and one at these may prevent me RACPR tram becoming less men me Sately Undt.

be bypassed trom me coneone for maintenance and/w teoung.

scram insermon time test cenerie or secmon sac.1 wem used Tripp g of one of me channels wis block erroneous rod to generate vie generte scram reachuty cunre shouun 'm w&4.awal soon enoupi to pmvent fuel damage.

NEDE-20011-F.A. This genonc curve was used in analyse of ThL. ystem backs up the operator who wiIhdraws control rods non-guesouritation tranesents b determine M M i

ac-., $ sng to wnnen sequences. The W reelnctons wem Thomfore, me mquimd protecton is provided.

one channel out et serwce C.cdi aneure met suoi d&T.8p will not occur due to rod wlmdrawei errors when viis The numerias vetues assigned to tie specfEed scram 1

cordtion exists.

performance are bened on Wie analyas et date frorn cher i

A lim tog control rod pemem is a panem whdi results in the Mswim contalrod hme esmo asmoes onM.

core bemg on a thermal hydrauEc limit (i.e., MCPR limes as The - W scram Emes weten me Embs, tai shown in spooEcemon 3.1.8). Dunng use of audi pettoms, it is agnlEcang longer men Wie average, shondd be vioused as an y

j judged that testeg of tie M System prlw to witidrawal of ir% of a systemenc protdem wet contrei rod tMusa, such rods to aneure its operabEity wtB aneure Wist improper withdraw does not occur. It is wie responobility of me Ramrew N the riumber of tMuss enhedung sucft scram 9mes

+

essomeds @ tie sommatifinumberofinoperalde rods.

Eng;r.s to ident#y these limiting penoms and me despisted rods other when Wie pettoms are initeEy N or as tiey

),

develop due to the occurrence of inoperable control rods iri other then limitmg pattems.

l 4

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I Amendment No.1(, tti,2f,30, n d 56, diff 155 i

102 j

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JAFlePP 33 and 43 BASES (cont'd) i i

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m e e - -, m e t,a nese,. s. 2,o rn o e. e asowed between a neutron sensor reachmg the scran Dunng each Spel cyde, ascess operaBue resceulty vertes as pont and me start or moton of the control rods. This is Suel depletes and as any bumshie poleon in supplementary adequase and conservatwo when compared lo the typices coreal is bumed. The magnaude et this aceas reecSuty may time deioy of about 210 meec estmated from the scram be infened from me critcal rod coregurabon. As fuel burmy test resuks. Approsametely 90 mooc of each of these progresses, anomalous behenar in me emosos reactisey may intervals result from the sensor and the circuit deisy. At be detected by cornperison of me cel5 cal rod panum at this poet, the scram pilot valve soienced degnergzes selected bene states to the pedicted rod inventory at that state.

Approsametely 120 meec later, control rod mobon is Pessor cporating bene con Shns provide me rnout sensiese esemated to =+=8y begn. However, 200 mese is and drocSy interpretsbio date reissue to core reeceuey.

cceservabwWy aneumed for this #me interval in the Furthemme, uomg power operaung beso comsgens permts transient analys:s arvs this is aseo ir=*=*=< in me sequent roecewayconvertsons.

asowebie scram inserton ames at & 33.c.

l The time to degnergize the scram pilot value solenced is amoures met a corriperison wE be made betore me core D

reecevity change exceeds 1% Ak. Deviagens in core seatSuty

-,,..er t -

,re, sire g.

The scram ames generated at each resussng outage and sessummon. one percent rencouny sma is consieged seen since dunng operamon when compared to scram smes an inserton or me resceany Ireo the case wowd not Imed to generated dunng proepershonal tests demonstrate that transsents % domiy, consens of 9,e seasser system.

the corsai rod drive scram 9uncnon has not deteriorated.

l In addihon, each instance when control rods are scram bmed dunng operahon or reactor inps, indindual evaluebons shas tm performed to insure Inst cormai rod scram hmes have not deteriorated.

Amendment No. fs,155 103

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4m 3.7 BASES -

A. Primarv Containment i

The integnty d the pin. coy cordamment and operation d the Erreguncy Core Cooling Systems in combmahon limit the.

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- offsite doses to values less than those specified in 10 CFR 100 '

~

in the event d a break in the Reactor Coolant System P'pe'ng.

chamber water volume must absorb the ananciatari decay and l

Thus, contamrner intcyty is required wiumever the potenhal stuctwal sensible hear h die reacta coolant W for violabon d the Reactor Coolant System integnty exists.

blowdown trom 1,020 psig.

Concam about such a violabon exists wi ae= the reactor is cntcal and above ch,(=f wM pressure. An exception to the Smce all W the gases in the drywell are purged into the t

l I

reouirement to mantam primary containment si4mf4y is pressure suppression champer air space dunng a loss d allowed durmg ccre loading and dunng low power physics coolant accident, the presswa resulbng frorn isolhermal testing when ready access to the reactor vessel is required.

compression plus the vapor pressure d the liquid must not There will be no presswe on the system at this time, which will asscoed 56 psig, the suppression chamber design pressure.

greatly reduce the chances d a pipe break. The reactor may The design volume d the suppression chamber (wasor and air) be taken entical dusing this_ period, however, restncuve was obtamed by considenng that the totsi volume d reecler operating procndures and operabon d the RWM in ecolant to be condensed is discharged to the suppresoson eccwdc=xm with Spmn.Edion 3.3.8.3 minimize the probability chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to me d an accident occumng. Procedwes in conjunchon with the suppression chamber (Section 54 Roc: 'Vorth Minimizer Technical Specificahons limit individual control worth such that the drop of any in-sequence control rod 1

.vould not iesult in a peak fuel enthalpy greater than 280 mior es/gm. In the unlike:y-avent that an excursion did occur, the reactor building and Standby Gas Treatment System, which shall tie ormisse dunng this time, offers a sufficient barrier to keep offsite doses well within 10 CFR 100.

l Amendment No. )4,155 187

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