ML20012B946
| ML20012B946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1983 |
| From: | Burch R NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012B886 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-89-192 NUDOCS 9003190201 | |
| Download: ML20012B946 (19) | |
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l REPORT OF INQUIRY
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0FFICE OF ORIGIN:
01:RII Atlanta.
FILE NO. Q2-83-008/04-83-002 4
1 DATE OF INQUIRY:
02/14/83 (Initial)
STATUS: CLOSED 04/01/83 (Final) i 24,f
.r t ai PREPARED BY:
Robert. Burch DATE PREPARED: 03/31/83 4:
SUBJECT:
.TRANSAMERICA-DELAVAL ENGINE AND COMPRESSOR DIVISION: ALLEGED USE OF
't-NON-CERTIFIED MATERIALS IN THE MANUFACTURE GF NUCLEAR PLANT EQUIPMENT
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On February 14,_1983, a copy of a Results of Interview with a Confidential Source -
was provided to 01:RIV regarding subject matter. On March 1, 1983, a corrected f
copy of - this. Results of Interview was provided. Af ter reviewed by Region IV Vendor Inspection Branch personnel 01:RII was requested to interview sources Dan CADY, Dick S0DERHOLM and Dick BOYER who are identified in the kesults of Inter onfidential Source.
' n isclosed 50DERHOL is residing s.
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ntil October 1983 Interviews various sources disc oseo that an ntery with BOYER, a' De aval QC/QA of ficial, at ~ this ' time would be premature based upon allegations he falsified a
QC/QA training records and a QE audit report at Transamerica-Delaval. 01:RIV was apprised and= concurred in the decision to hold the interview of BOYER in abeyance until a determination is made regarding pursuit of these allegations.
.y' Interviews of' Allen Elvys NANCE, Daniel R.
CADY, James W.
NORTHRUP and M. J. " Jim" HILL were conducted.
Except for the aforementioned allegations reported by NANCE and HILL regarding the falsification of QC/QA and QE training i
certifications and an audit report, it appears that all other items can be 4
properly. addressed through a technical. inspection. Please keep 01:RII apprised
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P ATTACHMENTS
- (1) Results of Interview with Allen E. NANCE on 3/21/83 (2) Results of Interview with Daniel R.' CADY on 3/22/83 (3)- Results of Interview with James W. NORTHRUP on 3/22/83 (4) Results of Interview with Maurice J. HILL on 3/23/83 (5) _ Handwritten memo, HILL to BOYER dtd.9/4/82 (See NANCE Interview)
(6) Delaval memo, BOYER to Training File dtd 3/15/82 (See NANCE Interview) t (7) Delaval memo, BOYER to Distribution otd 8/4/82 (See NANCE Interview) i e
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k.y' RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH tm F(822
- 21.0 23, 1983, E 0F E,
MAURICE JAMES HILL DN MARCH 0
,,,.,s AS PRFPARED BY RDBERT H. BURCH fELD OffEE.,
On March 23,1983,- Maurice James HILL, Supervisor, Foundry Quality Control, NDE gM~ 510 T4D)
Level :III, ~. Transamerica, Delaval ngine and pres ion hA n akla Californi as nterv ewed at the N
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'i office by mnvestigators obert H.
urch and ames Y. Vorse.
l HILL aAised that he 'h'as been employed with TA-D since July 1973. He said he began as a. journeyman inspector and was subsequently promoted through the positions of lead inspector, special projects quality control liaison and quality
-l engineer to his present position of Quality Control (QC) Supervisor in the TA-D j
1 Foundry facility. He advised that all of his employment background, professional training and job experience is in the Quality Control and Quality Assurance u
(QC/QA) areas. HILL explained the evolution of the nuclear code QC/QA program at
..TA-D from its inception to its present day status. He advised that some of l
TA-D's early nuclear code and standards (ASME and ASTM) interpretations i
L apparently differed from those of the nuclear power customers and the NRC. He L
said an example of TA-D interpreting the code and standards differently from the
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customer is the situation with the diesel generator skid at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power. Station (CPNSP), operated by Texas Utilities Generating Company at l
Glen Rose, Texas.
He said that at one time TA-D shipped the diesel generator i
assembly (generator, skid, components) to customers partially disassembled as was y
I the case with the diesel generator shipped to CPNPS. He stated TA-D builds these l
diesel generators for nuclear plants as a source of emergency power and he j
i' described them ac RV-12s and RV-16s. He said one auxiliary component of the.
generator is the skid mechanism which functions to secure piping, fillers, heat
. exchangers, pumps, strainers and other. components used in the operation of the 1,;
generator.
HILL seid that initially TA-D did not interpret the code and standards to require the skid and component supports to be fabricated from ASME Class III rated steel. He said that TA-D used a ASTM rated steel to construct the CPNPS generator skid ~and component supports which were built in late 1978 or early 1979.
He explained that ASTM (A code rated) and ASME '(SA code rated) materials are essentially the same except that ASTM material is not " pedigree"-
l and does not require traceability. HILL said that as a result of a Brown and 1
Root Company inspection, an NRC Resident Inspector at CPNPS viewing the assembly
. of the diesel unit, questioned the construction of the skid and component-support
. structure and the code rating of the steel used in its fabrication. He said he
. researched records at TA-D and found that the diesel engine skid and. component support structure in question at the CPNPS was f abricated with ASTM. rated i
material c rather than ASME material.
He reiterated that at the time this W
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particular diesel unit was f abricated TA-D did not interpret the code to require L
use of ASME Class 111 material and that ASTM material was appropriate for that L
application..He also stated that TA-D's interpretation of the customer's contract did not require ASME Class 111 to be used in the fabrication of the skid and component supports for the CPNPS diesel unit. HILL advised that this 6-M L m8;.
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2 i4 situation has been discussed with NRC personnel and licensee officials at the-C CPNPS. He said that TA-D now considers the skid and component. supports a code item because it has been clarified as such by' regulations.
HILL advised that he considers the traceability and accountabt11ty (document control) of code rated material entirely adequate at TA-D.
He'said that TA-D a
records system for " Class 111" materials is such that it-provides a " trail" for I,
material used in production from the supplier to the recipient of the finish'ed if product.
HILL advised that all code related material records are filed separately from commercial customer records and that these records can be
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retrieved as required by the customer or the NRC. HILL stated that because of these stringent controls and record keeping procedures he is unaware of any instances, since his employment with TA-D, in which non-code rated materials were used on jobs requiring the use of code rated material. He reiterated that prior to the existence of Section 111, NCA-3800, TA-D performed emergency diesel engine unit fabrication contracts for nuclear power plants and at the time these units were built material rated under NCA-3700 was used. He said after NCA-3800 came into existence no "backfitting" of these prior units was performed or required.
HILL advised that, in his opinion, the accountability and control of scrap material at TA-D is adequate. He said he is unaware of any instances in which "non-coded" material has been used to perform code work. He stated that when a code number is cut from a piece of material in the construction or fabrication of a component the burner is supposed to transfer this number to the remaining piece of material. HILL advised that every piece of material received in the " code shop" must have a heat number on it.
He said if a piece of material without a heat - number is received in the code shop it is immediately rejected by an 1-inspector and forwarded to the "commerical shop." HILL stated that to the best of his knowledge QA/QC inspectors are very careful to see that this is done.
HILL advised that QC inspectors are present when materials are received at or transferred within TA-0. He said it is the inspector's responsibility'to ensure
'E that shipments have proper documentation and that the heat numbers on the material received matches this documentation. He advised that he is not aware of any current problems involving material receipt and documentation, however, there was a period of time when these controls were not as rigid as they-seem to be at the present itme.
HILL emphtsized that these controls are, in his opinion, entirely adequate to ensure that all required procedures are being observed.
HILL' volunteered that most of the QA/QC welding inspectors are qualified to perform the duties to which they are assigned. He stated that, in his opinion, the Quality Engineer (QE) Manager, Lonnie MILLS has, not rpceived the proper experience or training in QE work to function as a supervis6r of this program.
(y HILL also advised that, in his opinion, R. E. BOYER is not qualified either by experience or training to serve as the manager of QA/QC functions. He said BOYER is an engineer by profession and is more production oriented than he is quality e
'E conscious. He said BOYER's philosophy is one of "if the product works get it to the customer." HILL'ste.ted BOYER looks upon QE personnel as a "necessary evil" in the production process. He said BOYER is an excellent engineer but leaves much to be desired as a QA/QC manager, i
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c HILL advised that he knew personally of. two instances in which BOYER ' certified t
TA-D employees as QA program auditors without requiring the education and experience referenced in ANSI /ASME N45.2.23-1878 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
He identified Lance BLOCK and Howard WONG as the two TA-D individuals who were.
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improperly certi.fie rent TA-D employee W
=e and WONG works for HILL advised he observed BOYER prep re and sign a memorandum about m which stated that t
both BLOCK and WONG had part,1cipated in a QA training session during a specific time period. HILL stated he knew this was incorrect because either BLOCK or WONG
,f was out of town and the other engaged in a special program during this time frame. He said BOYER placed a copy of this memorandum in the TA-D training files and also provided copies to BLOCK and WONG. He stated that to his knowledge this memorandum still remains in the TA-D training files. Hill advised that although he is not certain of it, he is reasonably sure BOYER wrote a similar memorandum about the same time for Lonnie MILLS, the current QE manager at TA-D. He advised that neither BLOCK, WONG or MILLS received the training that BOYER certified in writing they had completed. HILL advised that BOYER interprets the QA auditor qualification requirements in 10 CFR 50 and ANSI /ASME N45.2.23-1978 "as it suits his needs" and according to what is economically feasible and good for business.
He advised that B0YER has made the statement to him on a number of occasions that the QE people "think too much" and not in a realistic manner. He said that BOYER has expressed the view that QA/QC and QE functions hinder production and if a product f unctions this f act alone should be sufficient. HILL advised that the only really qualified auditor through training and experience was Allen NANCE and he was forced-into rf.tirement because he was uncompromising in his stand on quality procedures and standards. He said NANCE was trained in and worked for the aircraf t industry before coming to TA-D and the aircraf t industry is noted for its stringent QA/QC procedures and practices.
HILL advised that TA-D employee R. A. PRATT is also certified as an auditor to audit QE functions. He said he is personally aware that PRATT signed an audit report which stated an audit was performed when in f act no audit was conducted.
HILL said this was a deliberate falsification of the ruth since the QE audit was t
never performed although an audit report was prepared. HILL advised that the purpose of this audit was to determine and document whether Quality Engineers were fcilowing procedures and practices outlined in the QE manual. HILL stated that he suspects BOYER actually "made up" the audit report and it was signed by PRATT. He said the basis for this suspicion is the fact that PRATT was away from the plant on another assignment during the dates of this audit. He said this incident occurred about mid-1982. He advised that this was an " internal" audit and audits of this type should always be conducted by someone outside of the department being audited as required by regulations. HILL said that in his opinion, BOYER is violating 10 CFR 50 by allowing this practitt to occur.
HILL next addressed the qualifications of welders employed in the " fab shop" at TA-D.
He stated that to the best of his knowledge all welders are properly certified in the particular procedures to which they are assigned. He.said a welding inspector is assigned-in the " code shop" at all times on all shifts and this individual continually inspect welds to make certain welders are properly certified.
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,.i, a HILL did cite one QC problem in the machine shop. He stated that TA-D empicyee Kenneth KROPF is a QC Supervisor in this location and he is neither certified nor qualified to hold this position. He said KROPF is a friend of BOYER and BOYER r
placed him in this position for the purpose of expediting production. HILL said i
that as the QC Supervisor, KROPF has the authority and often uses it to overrule or reverse decisions made by QC and QE inspectors. HILL said KROPF did not pass his recertification requirements yet he is overruling inspectors when they reject inferior work. He said one example of this particular situation is KROPF's dver i
ruling inspectors who have rejected work based upon NDE testing results. HILL j
advised this occurs more than occasionally in the " code shop" and it is affecting the quality of the work " going out the door." HILL advised that KROPF consults with engineers on QA and QE matters and these individuals often influence his l
decisions to overrule inspectors.
He said this close association with the engineers has caused the inspectors to lose respect for KROPF and has caused mora'le problems in the quality program. HILL said he believes top management has exerted a lot of pressure on BOYER and he in turn has pressured KROPF to get the product (diesel engine and component parts) "out the door" and to " increase the cash flow,"
HILL advised that another problem at TA-D is the chain of management and organizational structure.
He said, for example, he is a QE supervisors but is assigned to and answers directly to the Foundry Manager who is in production, i
HILL stated he should be working directly for BOYER since BOYER is. the QA/QC manager. He said B0YER always tells everyone, including the NRC, that-he works for him (BOYER); however, this is not true since the Foundry Manager always prepares his (HILL's) performance evaluation. HILL opined that there is very little independence and freedom in the QA/QC and QE process at TA-D because the 4
manager is a production oriented individual who has no regard for quality and because production personnel supervise the quality supervisors. HILL said BOYER i
uses harassment techniques if he cannot get quality inspectors and auditors to agree with him. He cited the forced retirement of QE inspector Al NANCE as an example of harassment. He said that NANCE refused to ship components to TVA's Bellefonte Nuclear' Power Plant in Scottsboro, Alabama due to the lack of complete q.
documentation from the vendor. He said NANCE refused to ship without complete documentation and BOYER took exception to his (NANCE) refusal to ship. He said BOYER arbitrarily rescinded his auditor certification and told him he could either retire or be laid of f through a Reduction-in-Force.
.J HILL commented regarding~ fasteners used by TA-D for attaching components to the diesel engine skid. He said that TA-D probably used a non-code fastener when materials used to fabricate skid and engine components were certified under NCA-3700. He said since NCA-3800 has come into existence he is reasonably certain that only code fasteners have been used. HILL advited he is not familiar with TA-D's current supplier of metallic fasteners.
HILL advised that weld rod control procedures at TA-D are adequate. He said a NRC inspector made some inquiries regarding this procedure during the last audit approximately six months ago. He said TA-D has implemented and is using a better system of issuing, collecting and controlling rods since the NRC inspection. He said only certified and properly purged weld rods are used in the code fab shop p
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use there or in plant maintenance.
HILL was asked 'to provide a signed, sworn statement regarding the alleged falsification by BOYER of training and certification records for inspectors and/or auditors and the alleged falsification of an audit report by BOYER signed by PRATT. He advised that if he was not currently employed by TA-D he would provide a signed, sworn statement, however, he is fearful of company repristi resulting in loss of his job if TA-D learns he has provided this documentation.
HILL said he declined to provide a signed statement due to this fear of losing his job. Additionally, HILL asked that he not be contacted on the job if the NRC pursued the false records allegation unless it was an " incidental" contact as if he had never been interviewed on a prior occasion.
END 0F RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH MAURICE JAMES HILL ON MARCH 23, 1983.
b Robert H. Burch, Investigator M
James Y. V6rse, Investigator 1
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f[.orgGN RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH JAMES WILLIAM NORTHRUP
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ON MARCH 22, 1983, AS PREPARED BY OfflCEOFL
[!j'i f i.0 ROBERT H. BURCH fa0OfFL j
b On March 22 198 James William NORTHR at as interviewed n his residenc by Investigators Robert H. Burch an ames Vo rte.
- 0 NORTHRUP stMed he was em eyed by Transamerica, Inc., Delaval Engine and i
Compressor Division (TA-D), 550 85th Avenue, Oakland, California from May 1,1978 to April 27, 1980. He advised he was terminated from TA-D due to a permanent medical disability. He said he was first employed as a Floor Supervisor in the "ASME III" weld shop, also known as the Nuclear Weld Shop. He stated he also oi worked in the Commerical Weld Shop. He advised that his responsibilities and duties in the ASME III area included controls (Engine and Panel) fabrication, the i
machine shop, assembly and sub-assembly areas, the paint shop and the shipping shop. He said that in April 1979 he transferred to the Industrial Engineering Department as a Senior Manuf acturing Engineer but was still involved with diesel engine components which were made under contract for use in nuclear power plants.
NORTHRUP volunteered that he is aware of the current NRC 1
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. v.in. T D inasmuch as he has spoken with former TA-D employees {%"' jy,M.Q'.Q'
//h Eric CONSTERDINE and Bill THIRY concerning this matter.
o NORTHRUP recalled that while he was employed at TA-D, there were problems involving documentation of incoming material used in the fabrication of " skids" for diesel engines manufactured for use by nuclear power plants to operate equipment during emergency safe shutdown conditions. He stated that material source and control documents were sometimes lost, misplaced or did not accompany incoming shipments of sheet steel. He said at other times these documents were either intentionally destroyed or ruined beyond use by being left with the material and exposed to the rain and weather. NORTHRUP advised that because of lost, misplaced or destroyed shipment receipt documentation he ' suspects that 1:
" heat certification numbers" were stamped onto uncertified sheet steel used to fabricate code items. He said he could not prove that this was done; however, i-because of TA-D's efforts to conserve material and utilize scrap it is very likely this practice occurred. He stated that, in his opinion, TA-D had neither an ef fective material receiving or scrap material control program. NORTHRUP said he suspects that in some instances code " heat numbers" have been stamped onto
- J-non-nuclear grade scrap steel and subsequently used in the fabrication of diesel engine skids. He advised he could not provide any solid proof regarding use of noncertified scrap steel in this manner; however, in his opinion this was done for finanical reasons. NORTHRUp advised that often there was no Quality Control inspector to meet incoming shipments and to ensure that the material matched the documentation or, that in the case of sheet steel, the heat numbers matched those 4
noted on the suppliers shipping document. NORTHRUP advised that this occurred on a regular basis during the two years he was employed and was especially prevalent during the swing or evening shift. He said the Quality Control (QC) Department was at that time headed by Ed DEAN and staffed with persons who had previously performed welding duties but were converted to QC personnel. NORTHRUP continued that during his early employment with TA-D their QC Department "lef t much to be j
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desired" and there was " careless disregard" for controls and documentation, especially during the swing or second shif t.
He advised that in his opinion,-the
" code section" (ASME III) swing shift QC employees were poorly supervised.and there was not much management of material flow and control. He said that the QC inspectors were union members and in his opinion, they of ten acted in an
. arbitrary and capricious manner with regard to acceptance of work performed by certain welders.
NORTHRUP advised that an area of concern to him in the QC program was the weld rod accounting and control procedures. He said procedures for checking out weld rods to-welders, check in procedures, accounting procedures for weld rods and weld rod baking and purging procedures were very lax during his employment'at TA-D. He advised that TA-D had only one oven for baking, purging and holding-weld rods.
He advised that of ten it was difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether returned unused weld rods had been properly purged of moisture before reissuance because of TA-D control procedures. He stated that the quality of the weld rod control system is directly related to the welding quality since improperly purged weld rods could cause " hydrogen embrittlement." NORTHRUP advised he wrote a lengthy letter to management personnel. expressing this concern and recommending a two oven system; however, when he terminated from TA-D, the weld shop was still using a one oven system. He said he had since heard through former associates that the NRC has expressed some concern regarding TA-D's weld rod control and accountability system. He advised that although he was unable to provide proof, he strongly suspected that non-code or improperly purged welding rods were used to fabricate code items such as the diesel skids and certain welds on piping.
NORTHRUP advised that he believes a large number of welds performed on the diesel engine-skids were completed by utilizing improper procedures. Again, he advised that he could not provide proof of this but he based his opinion solely on his work experience and personal knowledge of weld techniques and procedures at TA-0.
He stated that TA-D certifies its own welders and he is of-the opinion that some i
welders were not properly certified or quelified to perform the procedures required. NORTHRUP said he is also of the opinion some welders were " paper" certified only and had never performed training or test welds to earn their certification.
NORTHRUP advised that he is aware that TA-D shortened diesel engine test times on some occasions. He said that if a diesel had run for a period of time on the test stand and was shutdown due to a malfunctioning part, it was not uncommon to repair or replace the malfunctioning part and conduct no further tests under power. NORTHRUP advised that it is his opinion an engine should be tested for the full time required af ter a part or component has been
- replaced. He said there were a large number of test stand failures, mostly involving " wrist pins" and that when these pins were replaced the engines were either not run again on the test stand or were run an insufficient amount of time or power to properly test the particular er.gine.
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r, NORTHRUP advised-that he is of the opinion that the " bearing shells".in the i
diesel engines manufactured for use in nuclear plants will need replacing soon after they are exposed to use. He clarified that the bearing shell plating process was very poorly conducted by Vic, last name unknown, the TA-0 employee assigned to this duty. He said this was a very undesirable assignment due to the strong odors of the chemicals involved in this process. He advised that Vic was
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a disgruntled employee who had no regard for the coating process. He stated t;his process involved dipping, in proper sequence, the bearing shells into various vats of chemicals, acids and liquids. He said Vic occasionally failed to dip the-bearing shells in all of the vats, thus by passing-some of the steps in the coating process. NORTHRUP advised that Vic told him he had by passed some steps in the coating process because of the undesirable working conditions. NORTHRUP stated that these bearing shells carry the load of the crankshaf t in the RV-12 and RV-16 diesel engines. He said that the "short cuts" in the dipping process occurred in -1979 and 1980- and involved engines that were shipped to nuclear customers.
NORTHRUP advised that TA-D management of ten put pressure on production and QC personnel to get the work "out of the door." He said that management had little regard for the QC program and their main emphasis was to ship the finished product to the customer.
NORTHRUP stated that in summary there was "too much management control" in the QC program and also "too much union influence." He said these two factors were the main causes for the ineffective QC program at TA-D during the time he worked there.
NORTHRUP continued that there was very little documented control over the fasteners used by TA-D to fabricate code items. He said that although he could not document'his suspicions, he believed that TA-D could have easily substituted ASME certified fasteners with cheaper noncertified fasteners. He said fasteners documentation and controls were inadequate for tracing fasteners to the-suppliers. NORTHRUP also expressed a concern that the torquing procedures.for code-item fasteners were inadequate when he was employed there. He said there was no way of calibrating torque wrenches and there was no QC inspection proce-dures for torguing f asteners during this time.
NORTHRUP also commented that in his opinion, the NDE test procedures were inadequate at TA-D. He stated that as he recalled, only " pressure testing" was
'used to test the quality of piping welds. He said that the quality of piping
' welds was an area of concern to him when he was employed at TA-D.
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emphasized that it has been almost three years since he was employed at TA-D and
. advised that situations-may have changed during this period of time. He stated he was never aware of any record being intentionally f alsified at TA-D. He said the only records he considers "made up" were supplier shipp*ing documents for materials which were prepared to replace lost documents. NORTHRUP' claimed no knowledge of falsified Quality Assurance, Quality Control or Quality Engineering
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- Tra'ining and certification documents for personnel-assigned to these duties at-i TA-D He-advised that current TA-D employee Jim HILL could possibly ' provide l
information.regarding the training and certification of QC personnel'.
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- END OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH JAMES WILLIAM NORTHRUP DN MARCH 22, 1983.
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James Y. V6rse, Investigator G
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L Im FEB 22 fy 2;00 RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH DANIEL ROY CADY h: -
ON MARCH 22, 1983 AS PREPARED BY ROBERT H. BURCH [g[ CiIWE51lWlE fa0OfI'.CE.fEC!T
J On March 22, 1983, Daniel Roy CADY, Engineering Supervisor, Bechtel Group, Inc.,
Research and Eng eering. 50 e Str P.O.
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Concord, California office by nyestigators ober Burch and James Y. Vorse.
CADY advised that he was employed with Transamerica, Inc., Delaval Engine and i.
Compressor Division (TA-D), 550 85th Avenue, Oakland, California, from October L
1974 to May 1981. He explained that he was assigned as a NDE '.evel 111 Quality lF Control (QC) Supervisor f rom October 1974 to late 1979 and as the Quality Engineer (QE) manager until May 1981. He said he terminated because he was not pleased with the progress of the QC/QA program af ter it was placed under the
_ I supervision of R. E. BOYER. CADY advised he devoted the first two years of his employment with TA-D to putting together all of the code program quality proce-dures.
He said this period was an evolutionary process during which he implemented the requirements of the various quality standards, regulations and procedures allowing TA-D to become fully certified as a nuclear Class 111 vendor.
i CADY advised that TA-D began receiving contracts about 1976-1977 for construction
{I of diesel engine units used in nuclear plants as a source of emergency power. He advised that these engines and components, including skids, were initially i
shipped to nuclear customers in a partially disassembled condition, however, they were later shipped by rail fully assembled.
I CADY commented on the adequacy of the material control and accountability systems at TA-D. He stated there were some initial problems early in the development of.
quality programs at TA-D leading to nuclear certification. He said he does not recall serious problems regarding. material control and accountability from the
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quality standpoint, He pointed out that the evolution of the nuclear code I.
standards required readjustments by TA-D; however, the firm attempted to comply with all of the standards and regulations in effect at any given time. CADY was I'
particularly complimentary towards Ed DEAN who was the QC/QA manager at TA-D
'1' until about mid-1980 when he was replaced by R. E. BOYER. He advised that B0YER was a mechanical engineer by profession with limited knowledge and experience in
[
the QC/QA programs.
CADY reiterated that he is not aware of any problems with material receipt, control and accountability. He said inspectors were careful to match documents with the correct material and to ensure that only code rated materials,were used on nuclear projects. He stated code material documents were filed separately from non-code material documents and they could be easily retrieved as necessary.
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He said purchase order numbers were stamped onto materials and the purchase order number became the control mechanism since documents were filed by this number.
b CADY advised that to his knowledge, complete document packages accompanied all incoming material shipments and this documentation remained with the material 3-/
through forming, bending and f abrication of the skid.
He said the QC/QA inspectors were careful to perform this task in a very diligent manner. CADY stated if there was ever a question of the correct identity of a piece of 4
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1 material, such as a heat number, it was sent to the commercial " fab" shop to be used in a non-code job.
CADY advised.all-materials and components used by TA-D in the production of the
- 'I-diesel engine units came from vendors with "N" certifications. He said at one time TA-D sent inspectors to the vendor sites to verify traceability of materials and components before the material was shipped to TA-D. He said these inspectors also confirmed that TA-D's suppliers were conforming to the code and/or contr'act i
requirements for the particular utility customer.
CADY advised that in his I
opinion, the QC/QA programs at TA-D were entirely satisfactory once the systems-were implemented and operational, i
j CADY advised that the QC/QA programs began to change somewhat after BOYER became 3
the manager. He said some inspectors had problems with BOYER and his philosophy i
of quality.
He' said-BOYER felt a need to reduce frequency of inspections at l
vendor sites. He stated BOYER's idea of " source inspections" and " test witness-ing" was that these functions could be performed af ter the components and materials were received at TA-D.
CADY said this created some morale, as well as, logistic problems and definitely had an adverse effect on quality. He clarified-that the customer was always consulted and arrangements for site inspections by the customer were made before " source inspections" and " test witnessing" was
- waived by BOYER.
CADY advised that when faulty components were discovered through the inspection and testing process at TA-D, they were returned to the supplier-rather than being sent to the customer. CADY advised that he terminated employment at-TA-D because it was becoming apparent that management did not want to support a first class quality program. He said he felt he could no longer be ef fective as a QE manager under these conditions.
I
_ CADY stated that about early 1980 there was a complete turnover in the organiza-tion of the purchasing department.
He said that prior to this reorganization, purchasing and quality enjoyed a very good working relationship. He said there was-a spirit of cooperation prior to the turnover which did not exist afterward.
4 He said the former purchasing manager Lonnie MILLS was replaced by a man named BORZA who brought in his own people to run purchasing. He said that BORZA's people do not knew the code requirements well and consequently the buyers became alienated from the new purchasino eersonne He said some buyers left on their own accord and others, like were "put aside" in favor of BORZA M.
" sponsored" personnel.
CA reiterate there were-a lot of personality j;
conflicts during this time, not only between purchasing and QC/QA personnel but between BOYER and BORZA and BOYER and the quality personnel. He said BOYER had i
no respect for the QE personnel and as a result attempted to minimile their 1.
influence as f ar as holding up shipments were concerned. He said BOYER would side with BORZA when QE personnel f ailed to pass a purcUsing department L 7~
procedure or issue and he (BOYER) continually declined to support his quality l
personnel in a dispute. CADY advised that he suspects BOYER was receiving "a lot-of heat" from production management to get the work "out the door." He said l__ ]
BOYER in turn was putt,ing a lot of pressure on the QE personnel to " increase cash flow" and make shipments to customers.
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CADY advised that in spite of all the management problems, conflicting quality philosophies and organizational and personality conflicts he believes that all diesel engine units built during his tenure with TA-D are of good quality. He l
.said he is confident these units will function operationally and that they will perform as designed. CADY stated he was not aware of any other problems or improprieties at TA-D during the time he was employed there.
END OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH DANIEL ROY CADY ON MARCH 22, 1983.
A liobert H. BFch71nvestigator 4
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'4 RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH ALLEN ELVYS NANCE ON MARCH 21, 1983 AS PREPARED BY ROBERT H. BURCH 07FCE CiINVESil%1CN:
FIELD EfflCr f.EGEN r On March 21,1 Allen Elvys NANCE etired alit ineer in ctor/ auditor, b
esiding at was nterv ewe t his residene by nyestigators Robert H.
and sames rse. NANCE adv ed he was empi ed at Transamerica, Inc.,
Delaval Engine and Compressor Division (TA-D), 550 85th Avenue, Oakland, California from May 1972 to December 31, 1982 when he was placed on involuntary retirement. He advised that during his tenure with TA-D he served as final assembly inspector, as a quality analyst and as a quality engineer performing inspections and audit functions.
NANCE advised that he first worked for Edwin G. DEAN, Quality Control / Quality Assurance (QC/QA) manager at TA-D and DEAN implemented many effective QA/QC procedures during his period of employment. He said that upon DEAN's departure in 1980 R. E. BOYER became the QC/QA manager and he continues to function in this capacity. He said prior to BOYER's elevation to his present position by Plant Manager Doug MARTINI, he (BOYER) was a mechanical engineer in _the Product Engineering Department at TA-D.
NANCE advised that operational and personality problems developed in the QC/QA program when BOYER became manager. He advised that BOYER was not committed to the quality program and lacked both training and experience-in this field. NANCE described BOYER as a very devious individual who '
had no regard for the personnel assigned in the quality program. He said BOYER is the reason some excellent TA-D quality program people decided to seek employment elsewhere. He identified Dan CADY, former TA-D QE manager as one such person who terminated rather than face continuous harassment and intimidation from BOYER. NANCE advised that BOYER also forced him into retirement because he would not " knuckle under" to BOYER's demands to " buy off" on inferior procedures and methods at TA-D.
S.
NANCE stated that one of the first changes BOYER made when he became QC/QA manager was to waive " source inspections" and " test witnessing" of components and materials at vendor facilities. He described " source inspections" as an inspec-tion-activity at the vendor facility by a TA-D inspector to insure fabrication of a component is in accordance with drawings and specifications. He described
" test witnessing" as a procedure to ascertain that a particular component actually functions in accordance with the specifications. He said both of these procedures were previously performed at the vendors facility by TA-D inspectors.
NANCE advised that these two functions related to components f abricated to code specifications for use in the operation of the diesel engines used in nuclear power plants. He identified these components to include such items as filters, generators, pumps, strainers, piping, structural steel for " skid" frame, water stand piping, starting air receivers, starting air dryers, starting air compressors, lube oil and jacket water pumps, fuel oil pumps and storage tanks.
He advised that all of these components are part of the auxiliary skid and are covered under the ASME Level 111 code requirements. NANCE advised that he first became disenchanted with BOYER when he discontinued " source inspections" and
" test witnessing" at the vendor sites. He said that vendors were able to ship Q,.
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items that were untest'ed, _not inspected, and possibly inferior components to those used by TA-D in the manufacture of the diesel engine units. NANCE stated that the only customers for these diesel units were nuclear power plants. He recalls these units were shipped to plants Perry, Bellefonte, Catawba, Shoreham.
-San Onofre and Waterford. He said he is concerned that these units,_ if ever put c
into emergency use for safe shutdown of a plant, could experience some problems I
with. components from the various vendors that were not inspected or tested. Se I
advised that the waiver of " source inspections" and " test witnessing" by BOYER is a contractural violation by TA-D since the customer has agreed contracturally to-pay for this service as it was a part of their proposal. He said the proposal commitments became a part of' the specifications of the contract between TA-D and the customer. NANCE stated that the documents to the customer reflect that the
" source inspections" and " test witnessing" requirements were waived by BOYER who NANCE said personally alerted them to this before shipment of the unit.
NANCE said he attempted to convince BOYER.that these procedures shoul? not be waived, however, BOYER overruled this appeal and most other decisions he (NANCE) made.
NANCE advised - that BOYER waived these procedures because of company financial problems and his total lack of f amiliarity with and concern about QC/QA procedures.
NANCE expressed concern that BOYER is stymieing the freedom and independence of QC/QA and QE personnel at TA-D.
He said BOYER had reorganized quality program personnel to report to. production supervisors.
He cited the placing of QC supervisor Jim HILL under the supervision of the Foundry Manager (Production) as:
^
an example of BOYER's attempts to minimize the presence and. impact of QC/QA program decisions and to limit the independence and freedom of these individuals as allowed and -required under 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
NANCE provided a hand written memorandum from HILL to BOYER and others expr'essing his (HILL's) concern that he was reporting to the Foundry Manager. He said these kinds of organi-zational arrangements at TA-D have' weakened the effectiveness of the QC/QA and QE programs, created morale problems and placed inspectors / auditors in a compro-mising position.
NANCE-advised he was " cut out" of the correspondence and internal communications process when he objected to some of BOYER's tactics and methods. He said BOYER h
refused to recertify him as an auditor in November 1982 because of a personal vendetta and not because he (NANCE) lacked proper experience and ability to conduct audits. He said BOYER also rated him "below standard" on the September 1982 Performance Review because of his (BOYER's) desire to " build a file" to justify. forcing him to retire or to terminate him if he did not accept retire-ment.
NANCE claimed that BOYER showed favoritism to certain individuals and i
actually violated all QC/QA regulations by certifying auditprs as having been trained when in fact they did not receive any training. He said that the term I
" auditing" is a process used at TA-D to confirm whether the company is manu-facturing to. the requirements and specifications set forth in manuals and procedures documents.
He said these manuals and procedures have the prior l
approval of the customer before the contract is awarded. He said auditors are certified by the company in accordance with the provisions and requirements of l
ANSI /ASME N45.2.23-1978 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
NANCE said BOYER has violated the requirements of both of these documents inasmuch as he has certified in 1.
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e writing that his." favorite" QC/QA personnel have completed training when in fact i
they have never been enrolled in the training they supposedly completed. NANCE identified current employees Richard PRATT, Lonnie MILLS and former employee Howard WONG as personnel who were certified by BOYER that they had received the required training. NANCE said he could not prove the training was not actually received at another time but he is certain these individuals were assigned to g.
other duties when BOYER certified in writing they were trained. He provided
~l copies of a March 15, 1982 memorandum from BOYER to Training File and an*
August 4,1982 memorandum from BOYER to " Distribution" (including WONG and MILLS) a reflecting enrollment in or completion of training by these individuals. NANCE stated he believes that PRATT has received only one hour of training but said he could not prove that this was true. He said in the cases of MILLS and WONG, he does not believe they received any of the training listed on.their memorandums.
NANCE advised he is unaware of any instances where non-code material.;as used to build skids for diesel units. He said the purchasing department inspectors'would 1.
have " raised a flag" if this practice was occurring. He did state that the purchasing department is using inexperienced and non qualified personnel to review purchase' orders. He said the purchase order reviewers are supposed to c.
ensure that the proper drawings and specifications accompany the material and they are not performing this service.
He said he is unaware of any problems involving accountability / traceability of materials used in the manufacture of the
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E skids and stated component vendors always, but not necessarily in a timely I
manner, provide proper documentation with the components they supply. NANCE.
disclaimed any knowledge of non-code fasteners being used to fabricate the diesel unit skids. He further stated he was not aware of any other improper practices-at TA-D regarding the fabrication of diesel enoine units'for use by nuclear power (0 l
plants. Due to NANCE's he was not-requested l: -
to prov de.a sworn statement regarding his allegat on o training records falsifications END OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEWS WITH ALLEN ELVYS NANCE ON MARCH 21, 1983.
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