ML20012B913
| ML20012B913 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1990 |
| From: | Collins S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9003190157 | |
| Download: ML20012B913 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES -
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NUCLEAR' RESULATORY COMMISSION 5$
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REGloN IV-
' 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 1000 l
' ARLINGTON. TEXAS 70011 MAR -91990 y
H Docket: STN 50-482 p
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
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- ATTN
- - Bart D.. Withers y
President and Chief Executive-Officer j
P.O. Box 411L-
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Burlington, Kansas 66839 Gentlemen:
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SUBJECT:
INVESTIGATION. CASE N0. 4-88-024 (B&B PROMATEC CORPORATION)
NRC is;providing Wolf. Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC), a copy. of
-the'synopsic' from Report of Investigation 4-88-024 prepared by NRC's Office'of Investigations (01)..
'As the synopsis indicates, the purpose of this investigation was to determine'-
whether officials of either B&B Promatec Corporation, Houston, Texas, or Kansas. Gas.& Electric (KG&E) had knowingly and intentionally failed to notify NRC'of-defective silicone foam fire barrier: sealant in 1984 and 1985 at the
' Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station (WCNGS)-nuclear power plant.
Th'e' investigation, which..was. initiated in September 1988 and completed in
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December-1989, disclosed no evidence that BlB or KG&E personnel were aware of a
'i specific problems'in 1984 and 1985 that should have caused a-report to be filed with NRC-in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).
NRC notes =that problems t
with this sealant material were' discovered in 1987 and that defective = seals were' repaired.
-NRC considers this matter closed.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," 10 CFR Part 2, a copy of this ~1etter<. and'its enclosure will be placed.in the NRC's Public Document Room.
Sincerely, rector--
Division of Reactor Projects
. Enc 1'osure: - As '. stated cc:
(seenextpage)
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. R. D. Martin.
Resident Inspector.
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L-DRS D.-V. Pickett, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-D-18) i}
. G.;F. Sanborn L.~J. Callan?
- S JJ. Collins
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-B&B Promatec Corporation l
P.O. Box _4672 Houston, Texas 77210 Wolf Creek Nuclear ' Operating Corp.
ATTN: Gary = Boyer, Plant Manager P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839.
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- Shaw,: Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge ATTN: Jay Silberg,.Esq.
1800 M-Street. NW
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i WashingtoniD.C.-20036
. Public Service Comission.
- ATTN: _ Chris-R. Rogers, P.E..
- Manager, Electric Department
.P.O.' Box 360:
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission ATTN: - Regional Administrator,: Region III 799 Roosevelt Road-Glen Ellyn,. Illinois 60137-
,g Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
m 1 ATTN:. Otto Maynard, Manager.
- Regulatory Services
'P.0' Box-411.
.Burlington, Kansas 66839 Kansas _ Corporation Comission l ATTN:.-Robert Elliot, Chief Engineer Utilities Division 4th Floor - State Office: Building Topeka, Kansas 66612-1571 Office of'the Governor State.of Kansas
. Topeka, Kansas.66612 1
Attorney. General.
1st' Floor - The Statehouse Topeka, Kansas - 66612 Chairman, Coffey County Comission Coffey County Courthouse Burlington, Kansas 66839 l
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Kansas Department of Health and Environment-Bureau of Air. Quality & Radiation Control.
' ATTN: Gerald' Allen, Public 1
xHealth Physicist Division of Environment Forbes Field Building.321 Topeka, Kansas 66620
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~
l ATTN:- Senior Resident. Inspector P.O. Box-311-
-Burlington;! Kansas 66839
'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:t. Regional Administrator. Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza-Drive, Suite 1000
' Arlington ; Texas 76011 q
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Enclosure s
SYN 0DSIS On September 29, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC), Office of Investigations (01), Region IV, initiated an investigation to determine if company officials at B&B Promatec Corporation (B&B), Houston, Texas, and/or Wolf Creek Huclear Generating Station (WCNGS)-knowingly and intentionally failed to notify the NRC of defective silicone foam fire barrier penetration seals in 1984 and 1985.
In May 1987, B&B submitten a 10 CFR, part 21 report to'the NRC which stated that some silicone foam fire barrier penetration seals installed by B&B at WCNGS did not meet minimum specifications. During replacement of damaged fire resistant boards, WCNGS personnel found voids, shrinkage, ano lack of fill in approximately 25 percent of the seals.
The OI investigation revealed that both B&B and Kansas Gas & Electric (KG8E) became aware in 1983 of a similar problem in the silicone seals at Callaway nuclear power plant, WCNGS' sister plant, also installed by B&B. However, a different method of installation, a two stage daming process, was utilized at WCNGS. Following the discovery of the problem at Callaway, two seal reinspections were conducted by B&B at WCNGS. The results of the first of these were rejected by KG&E as too limiteo and indicative of a potential-problem similar to that encountered at Callaway. The scope of the reinspection was expanded and the second reinspection led B&B to conclude that there was a less than.2 percent rejection rate of these seals due to shrinkage and voids. KG&E accepted the results of this reinspection ano concluded that the problem at WCNGS was minor and not indicative of that found at Callaway.
The O! investigation determined that the problem with the seals uncovered at
-WCNGS is a generic one, inherent both in the material and in the cable tie inspection method utilized at the. time of the installation of the seals. The silicone material shrinks and expands depending on temperature variances and is difficult to install to ensure a complete fill, even utilizing the stage damming method of installation. The cable tie inspection method is an inaccurate one and could not possibly reveal all voids or gaps or lack of fill in the seals.-
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KG&E was aware from the time of the initial installation of the seals that the cable tie method of inspection was utilizeo by B&B. This was the acceptable
' method of inspection used by all sealing contractors at the time. Although KG&E was aware of Callaway's problems, and they were questioned by an American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) inspector and by the NRC regarding the adequacy of this inspection methoo, they took no steps to change to a visual inspection of the seals.
This investigation disclosed no evidence that KG&E or B&B personnel were aware of specific problems at WCNGS and willfully failed to not1fy the NRC per 10CFR,Part50.55(e).
There is a potential for similar problems at any nuclear plant that utilized silicone foam seals and the cable tie method of inspecticn, regardless of the installer.
Case No. 4-88-024 1