Text

Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,revising Tech Specs to Reflect Editorial &/Or Administrative Changes to Make Unit 1 Tech Specs Consistent W/Unit 2 Tech Specs & BWR/4 STS
	ML20012B696
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	03/02/1990
From:	Hairston W; GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20012B697	List: ML20012B696; ML20012B698;
References
	HL-838, NUDOCS 9003160129
	Download: ML20012B696 (26)
	v • d • e

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Gwg a Power compard 333 he:tmon! Amnue

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Atlanta. Gmg a 333D!1 hphane 434 L26 31D5

~Ma+ng A:tdres 40 inenest, Center Patway Post O!!ce Box 1P95 D,rrmnywn Atatwna 3SPDI Tdtiphone ?05 fMi 6581

>:vu!*ertvoc:cym W. G. Hsirstoa, lll Senior V.ce Pragtern Nove* Operatwo HL-838 0419V March 2, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C. 20555 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Gentlemen:

-In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, as required by 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1), Georgia Power Company (GPC) hereby proposes changes to the Plant Hatch - Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS),

Appendix A to Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5.

Most of the enclosed proposed changes are consistent with the NRC's previous approval of the standard language referencing 10 CFR 50.55a(g)

(reference Amendment 119, approved December 23, 1985). However, in lieu of simply referencing 10 CFR 50.55a(g), which would incorporate the additional requirements of ASME Section XI, GPC has taken the -approach of patterning the proposed changes after the requirements of the current BNR/4 Standard Technical Specifications (STS). This approach results in some Unit 1 proposed requirements being more restrictive and others less restrictive than they are currently. Although some of the STS requirements may be less restrictive than the existing TS, it should be noted that the normal- testing required by ASME Section .XI is significantly more comprehensive. Therefore, by referencing ASME Section XI, a reliable testing program is still assured.

The remainder of the proposed changes are editorial and/or administrative in nature to make the Unit 1 TS consistent with the Unit 2

. TS and the BHR/4 STS.

Enclosure 1 provides the detailed descriptions of the proposed changes and the circumstances necessitating the change request.

9003160129 900302 T PDR ADOCK OfX)00321 E P PNV j l

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Georgia Power d l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

, March 2, 1990 ,

! l Page Two Enclosure 2 details the basis for our determination that the proposed ,

changes do not involve significant hazards considerations. >

Enclosure 3 provides page change instructions for incorporating the

proposed changes into the TS. The prcposed changed pages for Unit I and Unit 2 follow Enclosure 3. i

, To allow time for procedure revisions and orderly incorporation into copies of the TS,' GPC requests the proposed amendment, once approved by

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the NRC, be issued with an effective date to be no later than 60 days from the date of issuance of the amendment.

In accordance to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this letter and all applicable enclosures will be sent to Mr. J. L. Ledbetter of the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources.

Mr. H. G. Hairston, III states he is Senior Vice President of Georgia Power Company and is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Georgia Power Company, and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

GEORGIA P0HER COMPANY By: Id.M N7 M _AL H. G. Hairston, III 1

Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of Ar/auttu 1990, d ,

JlAwo(L Notary /Public 37h M 00

.EfEd.5310tmPif,fSOfc.15 la HGH/CRP/1g

Enclosures:

1. Basis for Change Request

2. 10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation

3. Page Change Instructions c: (See next page.)

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Georgia Power d U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 2, 1990 Page Three c: Georoia Power Cogany Mr. H. C. Nix, General Manager - Nuclear Plant Mr. J. D. Heidt, Manager Engineering and Licensing - Hatch GO-NORMS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C.

Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Reaion II Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. J. E. Henning, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch State of Georgia Mr. J. L. Ledbetter, Commissioner - Department of Natural Resources l

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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1, 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST F PROPOSED CHANGE 1:

This proposed change to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS)

(specifically, Specification 3.6.J.3) allows a 24-hour period of time to meet the requirements for single-loop operation (SLO) before entering the 12-hour shutdown limiting conditions for operation (LCOs).

Basis for ProDosed Change 1:

The request to allow a 24-hour period of time to meet the requirements for SLO before entering the 12-hour shutdown LCO makes the Unit I requirements for extended SLO consistent with the Unit 2 requirements. The 24-hour time period was approved by the NRC on June 10, 1987, in Amendment 77 to the Unit 2 TS (specifically, Specification 3.4.1.1). Inclusion of the same 24-hour time period in Unit 1 Specification 3.6.J.3 was inadvertently omitted from the Request to Revise Technical Specifications, dated June 20, 1986. This proposed change to allow a 24-hour time period is also consistent with the BHR/4 Standard Technical Specifications. The 24-hour' time period is mainly to allow time to adjust the flow-biased average power range monitor rod block and the simulated thermal power range monitor to account for minor changes in the core flow to drive flow relationship in SLO versus two-loop operation.

Prior to approval of continuous SLO, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS allowed operation - with a single pump for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months without taking any compensatory measures (an analyzed condition). The proposed change also allows for changes in thermal limits administration (i.e., critical power ratio). Without the 24-hour time period, operation with one pump immediately-puts Unit 1 in a 12-hour shutdown LCO.

Based on review of our June 20, 1986, submittal and Unit 2 Amendment 77, operation in the single-loop configuration for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months without compensatory actions will not result in the recirculation system being operated in a configuration not previously analyzed.

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) l 1

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: ;

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SIEIFICATIONS BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUESI l PROPOSED CHANGE 2:

This proposed change to the Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.2 (specifically, Note "b" to Tables 3.2-2, 3.2-3, 3.2-4, 3.2-5, and 3.2-6) allows placing an '

inoperable channel of a required Core and Containment Cooling System (CCCS) subsystem in the tripped condition or declaring the associated CCCS inoperable within I hour. This proposed change also requires the associated CCCS to be declared inoperable within I hour if the required number of operable channels cannot be met for both trip systems.

Basis for ProDosed Change 2: 5 The request to revise Note "b" to Tables 3.2-2, 3.2-3, 3.2-4, 3.2-5, and 3.2-6 would make the Unit i requirements for operating required CCCS subsystems with inoperable channels in the trip systems consistent with LCO requirements for Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation in Unit 2 ;

Technical Specifications 3/4.3.3 and 3/4.3.4, respectively. Further, the LCO in Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.5 (Core and Containment Cooling Systems) assures the operability of CCCS subsystems under all conditions for which this cooling capability is required. Also, by maintaining the minimum number of operable channels on at least one trip system with the other system placed I in the tripped condition, the single failure criterion as defined in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, will still be satisfied.

PROPOSED CHANGE 3:

This )roposed change to the Unit 1 TS adds information to the definition of Surve111ance Requirements (Specification 1.0, Definition JJ) to indicate performance of a surveillance requirement within the specified surveillance

-interval constitutes compliance with the operability requirement for an LCO.

In addition, the proposed change also changes Specification 4.1.A by deleting ,

the requirement to functionally test other Reactor Protection System channels that monitor the same variable before the trin system containing the failed ,

channel is tripped.

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l ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) 1 RE0 VEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: ;

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ,

BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST l Basis for ProDosed Chanae 3:

This proposed change allows Unit 1 to take credit for the normal periodic !

surveillance as 'a demonstration of operability and availability of the 1 redundant components and subsystems. Further, the proposed change is j consistent with the Unit 2 TS and the BHR/4 approved STS. The request to 1 eliminate the requirement to perform additional surveillance requirements on 1 redundant components and subsystems of associated components determined to be i inoperable eliminates unnecessary challenges to redundant components and j subsystems. As written, the surveillance requirement may introduce i unnecessary wear and tear due to operating the components in excess of the :

l normally scheduled surveillances, e 1

PROPOSED CHANGE 4:

The proposed amendment to the Unit 1 TS deletes the requirement to perform additional surveillances when it is determined the associated redundant components and/or subsystems have been found to be inoperable. Specific specifications and changes are as follows:

e Specification 4.4.B - Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability of redundant Standby Liquid Control System components when an associated component is found to be inoperable, o Specification 4.5.A.2 - Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability i of the other Core Spray (CS) loop and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) l System Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode when it is determined I. one CS loop is inoperable.

7 e Specification 4.5.B.2.a .

Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability of the remaining LPCI pumps, associated flow paths, and the CS System when one LPCI pump is inoperable.

l i e Specification 4.5.B.2.b -

Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability of all active components of the remaining LPCI subsystem and '

the CS System when one LPCI subsystem is inoperable.

I e Specification 4.5.C.2 - Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability of the remaining active components of both RHR service water subsystems when one RHR service water pump is inoperable.

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) l

' REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: i MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l i BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST j e Specification 4.5.C.3 - Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability I of the remaining operable RHR service water subsystems when two RHR l service water pumps are inoperable. !

e Specification 4.5.D.2 - Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability ,

of the ADS actuation logic, the RCIC System, the RHR System LPCI mode, -l and the CS System when the HPCI System is inoperable, o Specification 4.5.E.2 - Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability of the HPCI System when the RCIC System is inoperable. !

i e Specification 4.5.F.2 - Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability ;

of the HPCI System and the actuation logic of the other Automatic :

Depressurization System (ADS) valves when it is determined one- of the seven ADS valves is incapable of automatic operation.

e Specification 4.5.G - Delete the requirement to demonstrate operability of all the components in the RHR System LPCI mode and containment cooling r mode connected to the operable diesel generator when it is determined one ;

of the standby diesel generators is inoperable. t e Specifications 4.5.J.2.b, 4.5.J .2.c 4.5.J 2.d . 4.5.J.2.e - Delete the requirements to demonstrate operability of various Plant Service Hater 1 (PSW) components and systems when it is determined associated redundant ;

PSH components and/or systems are inoperable. >

e Bases for Specification 3.5.A.2 - Revise the wording to indicate additional surveillance is not required to be performed when CS ,

components are inoperable. The change also provides additional information indicating the operability and availability of redundant components and subsystems of the CS System and the RHR System are ;

demonstrated in Specifications 4.5 A. 4.5.B. 4.5.H. and 4.6.K.

.P e Bases for Specification 3.5.B.2 -

Revise the wording to indicate t-additional surveillance is not required to be performed when LPCI components are inoperable. The change also provides additional information indicating the operability and availability of redundant components and subsystems of the LPCI mode and the CS System are l

devonstrated in Specifications 4.5. A. 4.5 B. 4.5.H. and 4.6.K.

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: o - c ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) I l

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS * -

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST !

e Bases for Specification 3.5.D.2 - Revise the wording to indicate I additional surveillance is not required to be performed when HPCI components are inoperable. The change also provides additional information indicating the operability and availability of redundant components and subsystems of the CS System, LPCI System, RCIC System, and ADS are demonstrated in Specifications 4.5. A. 4.5.B. 4.5.E. 4.5.F. 4.5.H.

and 4.6.K.

e Bases for Specification 3.5.E.2 - Revise the wording to indicate ,

additional surveillance is not required to be performed when RCIC components are inoperable. The change also provides additional r information indicating the operability and availability of redundant components and subsystems of the HPCI System are demonstrated in i Specifications 4.5.0, 4.5.H. and 4.6.K.

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i. e Bases for Specification 3.5.F.2 -

Revise the wording to indicate additional surveillance is not required to be performed when ADS components are inoperable. The change also provides additional i information indicating the operability and availability of redundant components and subsystems of HPCI and ADS are demonstrated in .

Specifications 4.5.0, 4.5.F. 4.5.H. and 4.6 K.

e Bases for Specification 3.5.J/4.5.J - The change provides additional ;

information indicating the operability and availability of redundant i components and subsystems of the PSH System are demonstrated in Specifications 4.5.J and 4.6.K.

flasis for Proposed Change 4:

The request to eliminate the requirement to perform additional surveillance requirements on redundant ~ components and subsystems of associated components that are determined to be inoperable will reduce unnecessary challenges to and testing of the redundant components and subsystems. As written, the surveillance requirements introduce unnecessary wear and tear due to operating the components in excess of the normally scheduled surveillances. '

The proposed change allows the unit to take credit for the normal periodic surveillances as a demonstration of operability and availability of the -

redundant components and subsystems. Further, the proposed amendments are consistent with the Unit 2 TS and the BWR/4 STS. It should be noted that, except . for RCIC System testing, the proposed surveillance requirements are those normally performed in accordance with ASME Section XI, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g). It should also be noted that the normal testing required by ASME Section XI is significantly more comprehensive than the present 0419V HL-838 El-5

E I i ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) i REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIOMS BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST f testing requirements identified in the existing TS. Therefore, the STS approach can be judged to be an equivalent or more reliable testing program.

The RCIC System is not currently in the ASME Section XI inservice testing program for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2. However, existing Technical Specification 4.5.E.1.c requires pump flow tests every 3 and 18 months, and :

provides adequate assurance the RCIC system is operable. Therefore, additional testing is not required when redundant components are inoperable. '

PROPOSED CHANGE 5:

This proposed change to the Unit 1 TS (specifically, Item 4 of Table 3.2-8) '

changes the required operable channels per trip system from "2" to "1" and revises the " Remarks" section to indicate a trip signal will result in -

actuation of the Main Control Room Environmental Control System (MCRECS) in the control room pressurization mode and not the isolation mode. Also, in Table 4.2-8, Logic System functional Test (LSFT) 5 has been cianged to read "MCRECS Control Room Pressurization Mode Actuation." In Table 4.2-8, LSFT 6 ,

which requires " recirculation of control room air through filter trains," is also proposed to be deleted. The revised LSFT 5 now covers the scope of this test so that LSFT 6 is no longer necessary.

Basis for Procosed Change 5:

The installed design only has a total of two channels, and there is only one per trip system. Based on the Design Bases for Control Room Intake Radiation :

Monitors (Specification 3.2.H.4) and the MCRECS (Specification 3.12), two i radiation monitors are provided to initiate pressurization of the main '

control room. Two instrument channels are arranged in a one upscale and two downscale trip logic. In this mode, the normal control room exhaust fan is stopped and outside air is taken in through one of the charcoai filters to pressurize the control room with respect to the surroundings. The safety trip is the upscale trip which the specification should reflect. The Bases to this specification clearly reflect this design.

Based on the Design Bases information, these changes can be classified as ,

administrative / editorial-type corrections in that they make minor corrections to reflect current and correct information. This amendment is also consistent with the changes made to Table 3.2-8 and Design Bases Section 3.2

in Amendment 51 which was approved on April 6,1978. These changes were inadvertently omitted when Table 3.2-8 was revised at that time.

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l ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

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REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANCES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST The changes to the LSFTs in Table 4.2-8 are also administrative, since .

deletion of the automatic isolation mode of the MCRECS was accomplished in Amendment 156 which was approved on September 12, 1988.

EROPOSED CHANGE 6:

This proposed change to the Unit 1 TS deletes individual surveillance requirements for. pumps and valves, and changes testing frequencies, post-maintenance testing requirements in accordance with testing required by ASME Section XI pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g). Specific specifications and changes are as follows:

e Specification 4.5.A.1 - Delete existing Surveillance Requirements 4.5.A.I.c (Monthly Pump Operability) and 4.5.A.1.d (Monthly Motor-0perated Valve Operability), and add proposed Surveillance Requirement 4.5.A.1.c to verify valve lineups once per 31 days, o Specification 4.5.B.1.a - Change the frequency of the test from "once per 5 years" to "once per 10 years."

e Specification 4.5 B.1 - Delete existing Surveillance Requirements 4.5 B.1.d (Monthly Pump Operability) and 4.5.B.1.e (Monthly Motor-Operated Valve Operability), and add proposed Surveillance Requirement 4.5.B.l.d to verify valve lineups once per 31 days.

e Specification 4.5.C.1 - Delete existing Surveillance Requirement 4.5.C.1.a (once per 3 months pump and valve operability), and proposed add Surveillance Requirement 4.5.C.1.a to verify valve lineup every 31 days, o Specification 4.5.C.1 - Delete the requirement to perform a pump capacity test after pump maintenance.

e Specification 4.5.D.1 -

Delete existing Surveillance Requirements 4.5.0.1.d (Monthly Pump Operability) and 4.5.D.1.e (Monthly-Motor Operated Valve Operability Surveillance Requirement), and add proposed Surveillance Requirement 4.5.0.1.d to verify proper valve lineup every 31 days, o Specification 4.5.E.1 -

Delete existing Surveillance Requirements '

4.5.E.1.d (Monthly Pump Operability) and 4.5.E.1.e (Monthly Motor-Operated Valve Operability Surveillance Requirement), and add proposed Surveillance Requirement 4.5.E.1.d to verify proper valve lineup every 31 days.

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

i MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST Basis for Prooosed Change 6:

The deletion of individual surveillance requirements for pumps and valves, and changes to test frequency and post-maintenance testing requirements are allowed due to the inservice testing provisions of Specifications 3.6.K and 4.6.K. I.ese specifications require inservice inspection / testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves per Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code, pursuant- to 10 CFR 50.55a(g). It should be noted that the proposed surveillance requirements are only those normally performed in accordance with ASME Section XI. The normal testing required by ASME Section XI is significantly more comprehensive than the present testing requirements identified in the existing TS.

The RCIC System has been removed from the Plant Hatch ASME Section XI inservice testing program. However, existing TS 4.5.E.1.c, which requires a pump flow test every 3 and every 18 months, provides adequate assurance the RCIC System will be available when required. The proposed Unit 1 Technical Specification is also consistent with existing Unit 2 TS requirements.

For the RHR, CS, RHR service water, HPCI, and RCIC Systems, monthly requirements to verify proper valve lineup have been added. These new proposed requirements are similar to existing Unit 2 TS requirements and the BHR/4 STS.

PROPOSED CHANGE 7:

This proposed change to the Unit 1 TS makes revisions that are purely editorial in nature. Specific administrative changes made for clarity are as follows:

e Specification 4.1, Table 4.1 Delete the requirement for " Reactor Pressure Permissive " Amendment 103, the basic function of these instruments listed in Table 4.1-1 was deleted from Specification 2.1.A.S. This function required an automatic scram on MSIV closure when

-the reactor was in the startup/ hot standby mode, and the pressure was above 1045 psig. Since the high-pressure scram is operable for all modes ,

of operation, this reactor permissive scram was not required. However, in Amendment 103, the requirement to perform the surveillance was not deleted from Table 4.1-1. This change corrects an inadvertent omission, 1 is administrative in nature, and has no impact on plant operations or safety.

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! ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST e Specification 4.5.B.I.c - Clarify that the discharge against which the test must be performed is ".... a system head corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of at least 20 psig." Clarifying what discharge pressure is being considered will eliminate any confusion that may arise over the point of pressure reasurement.

e Specification 3.5.C.I.b - Add the word "or" at the end of the section.

e Specification 3.5.D.I.a - Change "1 " to "(1)" and "2." to "(2)" to make the section numbering consistent with other sections, e Specification 3.5.D.2 - Clarify what is meant by " adequate reactor steLm pressure." The proposed change reads as follows: "

... pressure is adequate (i.e., reactor pressure is such that the required steam pressure is maintained at the turbine for the duration of the test) to perform the tests." This change will eliminate any possible confusion as to when the 12-hour limitation must start, e Specification 4.5.F.1 - Indent subsections 4.5.F.1.a and 4.5.F.1.b to make the section formatilng consistent with other sections, e Specification 3.5.1 - Change the second "3.5.I.1" to "3.5.I.2" to correct a typographical error, o Specification 4.5.H.2 - Af ter the word " inoperable," add a comma (,) to correct a typographical error, e S)ecification 4.5.H.1 - Change the time from when the high point vents of tie Core Spray and LPCI Systems must be checked from "Every month prior to the testing of the LPCI and core spray systems," to "Every month, the discharge piping of the LPCI and core spray systems. .." This is an editorial-type change to accommodate the changes made to delete monthly l

surveillance requirements of valves and pumps in the Core Spray and LPCI Systems.

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e Bases for Specificatio1 3.5.H - Change wording in the Bases to reflect the editorial changes necessary to accommodate- changes made to delete monthly surveillance requirements of valves and pumps in the Core Spray and LPCI Systems.

o Specification 6.4.2 -

Revise this specification to show who is responsible for each aspect of fire protection. This change is administrative in nature and clarifies the responsibilities for fire protection within the Plant Hatch management organization.

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued)

RE0 VEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASIS FOR CHANGE REOUEST e Specification 5.4 of the Unit i Environmental Technical Specifications -

Delete the words " effective August 1,1983, through December 5,1987" at the end of the first paragraph. This change eliminates the need to periodically revise the Environmental Technical Specifications when the effective dates of the NPDES permit change. Since Plant Hatch is required to maintain a current NPDES permit, deleting the effective dates is administrative in nature and has no impact on plant operation or safety.

Basis for Proposed Change 7:

l- This proposed change is purely editorial in nature. Specific administrative

! changes made for clarity have no impact on plant operations or safety.

PROPOSED CHANGL8:

This proposed change to the Unit 1 TS (specifically, Specifications 3.5.J.2.b. 3.5.J.2.c. 3.5.J.2.d and 3.5.J.2.e) deletes any reference to the diesel generators having to be operable. In addition, information will be l added to require the other Plant Service Water (PSH) components to be operable. .

Basis for Proposed Change B:

The TS for the PSH System should address the operability of the other PSH components. Diesel Generator operability is addressed in Specification 3/4.9 (Auxiliary Electrical Systems). This change will have no impact on plant operation or safety, because operability of PSH components will still be required. In cases where operability might be affected, the PSH pumps can be realigned to provide diesel cooling water. The changes being proposed are consistent with the Plant Hatch Unit 2 TS and the BHR/4 STS.

PROPOSED CHANGE 9:

This proposed change to the Unit 1 TS (specifically, Specifications 4.5.D.1.b and 4.5.E.1.c) clarifies where the pressure of the steam supply is to be 2 measured for testing the HPCI and RCIC Systems and also specifies a range of pressures that must be adhered to for the test performance.

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continueo)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS I BASIS FOR CHANGE RE00EST

Basis for Prop.01ed Change 9:

i This proposed change eliminates possible confusion as to the pressure to tre ,

measured. The change also clearly states the acceptable range of pressure for test performance consistent with the FSAR. This proposed change is consistent with the Unit 2 TS and the BWR/4 STS. i PROPOSED CHANGE 10: f This proposed change to the Unit 2 TS makes revisions that are purely :

editorial in nature. Specific administrative changes made for clarity are as -

follows: ,

e Specification 3.8.2.5 - In Specifications 3.8.2.5.a. 3.8.2.5.b. and ;

3.8.2.5.c. change the word " Circuit" to " Breaker." The change is a correction of terminology and has no impact on the breaker function, e Specification 3.8.2.5 - In Specification 3.8.2.5.c, change "26" to "28" and "32" to "34." This change is due to a renumbering of breakers within i distribution panels to provide a consistent breaker numbering scheme throughout the plant. There were no physical hardware changes or changes in breaker function; only breaker numbers were changed.

e Table 3.8.P.6 For Type 4 breakers, correct the cable numbers actually powered by the circuits which require primary containment penetration conductor overcurrent protection. No physical plant changes were made.

l e Specification 6.4.2 - Revise the specification to show who is responsible for each aspect of fire protection. This change clarifies the responsibilities for fire protection within the Plant Hatch management organization, e Specification 5.4 of the Unit 2 Environm9ntal Technical Specifications - ,

Delete the words " effective August 1. IS83, through December 5,1987" at the end of the first paragraph. This change eliminates the need to periodically revise the Environmental Technical Specifications when the effective dates of the NPDES permit change. Plant Hatch is required to maintain a current NPDES permit at til times.

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ENCLOSURE 1 (Continued) l REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: l MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

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BASIS FOR CHANGE RE00EST l i

e Specifications 3.5.1 and 3.7.3 - In ACTION B, clarify what is adequate reactor steam pressure. The proposed change reads as follows:

"... pressure is adequate (i.e., reactor pressure is such that the required steam pressure is maintained at the turbine for the duration of the test) to perform this test." This change eliminates any possible 1 confusion as to when the 12-hour limitation must start. Also, in Specification 3.5.1.a. the acronym "HPCI" has been substituted for "high l pressure coolant injection." j e Specification 4.6.6.5.1.a -

Add the word " isolation" after " ...each '

18 inch drywell and suppression chamber." I r. Amendment 58, a new !

subsection (3/4.6.6.5.1) was added to the TS however, the word ;

" isolation" was inadvertently omitted.

Basis for ProDosed Change 10: I This proposed change is purely editorial in nature. Specific administrative changes made for clarity have no impact on plant operation or safety. No physical changes to the plant are involved. ,

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ENCLOSURE 2 PLANT HATCH - UNITS 1 & 2 I NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 )

OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57, NPF-5 J REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l JO CFR 50.92 EVALUATION i l

PROPOSED CHANGE 1:

As discussed in the basis for the change request, this proposed revision to the Unit i Technical Specifications (TS) (specifically, Specification 3.6.3.3) allows a 24-hour period of time to meet the requirements for '

single-loop operation before entering the 12-hour shutdown LCO. ;

Hasts for Proposed Chance 1:

See Enclosure 1 for a detailed description of the safety basis for the proposed change. Babed on Enclosure 1 the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. This change does 'not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident, previously evaluated, because only operation of the recirculation system and equipment in a mode that has been previously analyzed is allowed. It should also te noted that, prior to approval of continuous SLO, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical .

Specifications allowed operation with a single pump for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months '

without taking any compensatory measures. This change is consistent with r the BHR/4 STS. t

2. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different kind from any previously analyzed, because no new modes of ,

plant operation are introduced, and no new accident types can result.

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change, because safety analysis assumptions are not affected in any way. This change to the specification requirement is consistent with the Unit 2 TS approved in Amendment 77.

PROPOSED CHANGE _2:

As discussed in the basis for the change request, the proposed revision to Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.2 (specifically, Note "b" to Tables 3.2-2,

3.2-3, 3.2-4, 3.2-5, and 3.2-6) allows an inoperable channel of a required ;

CCCS subsystem to be placed in the tripped condition without declaring the associated CCCS subsystem inoperable, provided at least one trip system is maintained with the minimum number of channels operable.

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ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued) f REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

t lilSCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ,

10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION Basis for ProDosed Chance 2:

See Enclosure i for a detailed description of the safety basis for the proposed change. Based on Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be drawn: .

1. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or ,

the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. However, due to ,

the inoperable channel being placed in the tripped condition, there could ;

be a slight increase in the probability of a challenge to a safety system ,

due to a spurious trip. This will be minimized, since plant personnel will take all necessary actions to restore the inoperable channel as soon as practical. Also, the Limiting Conditions for Operation in Unit 1 '

Technical Specification 3.5 assure the operability of CCCS subsystems under all conditions for which these cooling capabilities are required. -

2. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because no new modes of :

plant operation are introduced and no physical modifications to plant design are being made.

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change. Based on a review of Unit 1 FSAR Section 4.7 (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System), Section 6.0. (Core Standby Cooling Systems), and Section 7.4 (Core Standby Cooling Systems Control and Instrumentation), placing one inoperable channel of one tri) system in the tripped condition will not significantly reduce any marg n of safety. No single control failure will prevent the combined cooling systems from providing the core with adequate cooling.

PROPOSED CHANGE 3:

As discussed in the basis for the change request, this proposed revision to the Unit 1 TS eliminates the requirement to perform additional surveillance requirements on redundant components and subsystems of associated components determined to be inoperable.

Basis for Prooosed CLsnae 3:

See Enclosure 1 for a detailed description of the safety basis for the proposed change. Based on Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be drawn: ,

0419V HL-838 E2-2

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L ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS: !

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS [

i w

10 CFR 50.9? EVALUATION ;

1. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequence of an accident previously evaluated, because equipment i operation is not affected, only testing requirements. . Deleting additional surveillance requirements due to inoperable components and !

L subsystems eliminates unnecessary challenges to the redundant components ,

and subsystems associated with the inoperable components. In addition, .

the normal periodic scheduled surveillance requirements will continue to !

demonstrate operability and availability of redundant components and ,

subsystems. :

! 2. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of i l accident from any previously evaluated, because no new modes of plant '

operation are introduced and no physical modifications to plant design are being made.

i 3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change, because :

safety analysis assumptions are not affected in any way. This proposed l

change is consistent with the STS for system operations with inoperable :

components.

120EQSED CHANGE J:

As discussed in the basis for the change request, the proposed revision to '

the Unit 1 TS (see Enclosure 1 for specific specifications) deletes the ;

requirement to perform additional surveillances when associated redundant !

components and/or subsystems have been found to be inoperable.

Basis for Proposed Changt 4:

See Enclosure 1 for a detailed description of the safety basis for the proposed change. Based on Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be ;

drawn:

1. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because equipment operation is not affected, only testing requirements. The proposed amendment reduces unnecessary challenges to redundant components, thus resulting in unnecessary wear and tear due to operating the components in excess of the normally scheduled surveillances. The only applicable surveillance requirements are those normally performed in accordance with ASME Section XI, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a.

0419V HL-838 E2-3

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ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued) !

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l

l 10_CER 50.92 EVALUATION !

2. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different- kind from any previously analyzed, because equipment >

operation is not affected. Thus, no new modes of plant operation are introduced, and no new modes of failure are created.

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced as a result of this -

change, because equipment operability is adequately assured by inservice +

inspection / testing in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements, ,

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a. ,

PROPOSED CHANGE 5:

As discussed in the basis for the change request, the proposed revision to Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.2, (specifically, Table 3.2-8) changes the t required operable channels per trip system from "2" to "1" and revises the

" Remarks" section to indicate a trip signal will result in actuation of the MCRECS in the control room pressurization mode and not the isolation mode for Item 4. LSFT 5 has been changed to read "MCRECS Control Room Pressurization :

Mode Actuation." LSFT 6 has been deleted.

Basis for Pronosed Chanae 5:

See Enclosure 1 for a detailed description of the safety basis for the proposed change. Based on Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or ,

consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The change reflects i current design and does not alter a previously evaluated accident in any way. The Technical Specifications Bases and the FSAR clearly indicate the required operable channels should be "1" rather than "2". In Table 3.2-8, the change in wording of LSFT 5 from the Control Room Isolation s Modo is acceptable, since that mode of operation has been previously deleted from the plant design per Amendment 156 to the Plant Hatch Unit 1 TS. In addition, the deletion of LSFT 6 from Table 4.2-8 is also administrative, since it is now covered within the scope of LSFT 5.

2. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because equipment operation is not affected. Thus, no new modes of failure are created.

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change, because safety analysis assumptions are not affected in any way. The change is administrative in nature.

0419V HL-838 E2-4

i ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS :

1 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION PROPOSED CHANGE 6:

As discussed in the basis for the change request, the proposed revision to the Unit i TS (see Enclosure i for specific specifications) deletes .

individual surveillance requirements for pumps and valves, and changes ;

testing frequencies and post-maintenance testing requirements for equipment '

that is normally tested / inspected in accordance with ASME Section XI, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a.

Basis for ProDosed Chanae 6:

See Enclosure 1 for a detailed description of the safety basis for the proposed change. Based on Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be drawn: '

l. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because equipment operation is not affected, only testing requirements.

The only applicable surveillance requirements are those normally performed in accordance with ASME Section XI, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a.

For the RCIC System, exit, ting Unit 1 Specification 4.5.E.1.c requires a pump flow test every 3 months.

2. This change does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different kind from any previously analyzed, because ecuipment operation is not affected. Thus, no new modes of plant operation are introduced, and no new modes of failure are created.

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change, because equipment operability is adequately assured by inservice inspection /

testing in accordance with ASME Section XI testing requirements, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a. In addition, valve lineups are assured due to the addition of a monthly surveillance to verify the valves are in their '

proper position.

s PROPOSED CHANGE 7:

The proposed revision to the Unit 1 TS makes changes that are purely editorial in nature. Specific administrative changes made for clarity are identified in Enclosure 1.

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ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued) !

\

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS * ~

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION !

Basis for ProDosed Change 7:

See Enclosure 1 for a detailed description of the safety basis for the l proposed changes. Based on Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be drawn: '

l. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because the chhage is administrative or editorial in nature and will not alter in any way a previously evaluated accident.

2. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because equipment operation is not affected. Thus, no new modes of failure are created.

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change, because these safety analysis assumptions or equipment performance are not affected in any way.

PROPOSED CHANGE 8:

As discussed in the basis for the change request, the proposed revision to the Unit 1 TS (specifically, Specifications 3.5.J.2.b 3.5.J.2.c, 3.5.J.2.d, and 3.5.J.2.e) deletes any reference to the diesel generator having to be operable. In addition, information to require the other Plant Service Hater (PSW) components to be operable is included.

Basis for ProDosed Change 8:

See Enclosure 1 for a detailed description of the safety basis for the proposed change. Based on Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be 1 drawn:

1. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Diesel generator '

operability is assured by Specification 3/4.9, and PSH component operability is assured by Specification 3.5.J.2.

0419V HL-838 E2-6

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i ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l 10 CFR 50.92 EVALUATION l

1 l

2. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of i accident from any accident previously evaluated, because equipment i operation is not affected. Thus, no new mode of failure is created. !

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change, because 4 safety analysis assumptions are not affected in any way. Therefore, i since equipment performance or safety analysis assumptions are not (

changed, margins of safety will not be significantly reduced.

P10EOSED CHANGE 9:

As discussed in the basis for the change request, the proposed ravision to i the Unit 1 TS (specifically, Specifications 4.5.D.1.b and 4.5.E.1.b) i clarifies where the pressure of the steam supply is to be measured and would '

also specify a range of pressure that must be adhered to for performance of ,

the test.

l Basis for ProDosed Chanae 9:

See Enclosure i for a detailed description of the safety basis for the ;

proposed change. Based Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be drawn: r

1. This change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or .

consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because- the change clarifies Technical Specifications information which is already provided

in the FSAR. This change will not alter a previously evaluated accident in any way.

2. This change does not create the possibility cf a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because equipment '

operation is not affected. The change only clarifies information presented in Technical Specifications to assure equipment is operated properly; thus, no new modes of failure are created.

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change, because safety analysis assumptions are not affected in any way, and the performance of the equipment assumed in safety analysis is not affected.

l 0419V HL-838 E2-7 L

l ENCLOSURE 2 (Continued)

REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLAN(QUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 10_CFR 50.92 EVALUATION :

PROPOSED CHANGE 10: 1 1

As discussed in the basis for the change request, the proposed amendment to the Unit 2 TS makes changes that are purely editorial in nature. Specific

administrative changes made for clarity are identified in Enclosure 1.

Basis for Pronnsed Change 10:

See Enclosure 1 for a detailed description of the safety basis for the-proposed change. Based Enclosure 1, the following conclusions can be drawn: l

1. The change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because the change was made for clarity and is administrative in nature. The changes will not alter a previously evaluated accident in any way.

2. This change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident' from any accident previously evaluated, because equipment operation is not affected. Thus, no new mode of failure is created.

3. Margins of safety are not significantly reduced by this change, because safety analysis assumptions are not affected in sny way. ;

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ENCLOSURE 3 PLANT HATCH'- UNITS l', 2 NRC DOCKETS 50-321, 50-366 OPERATING LICENSES OPR-57, NPF-5 REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

-MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGE CHANGE' INSTRUCTIONS The proposed.. changes- to the . Plant Hatch Units 'I and 2 Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating Licenses' DPR-57 and NPF-5) will be incorporated as follows:

-Remove Pace.. Insert Paae Unit 1: 1.0-6 1.0-6 3.1-1 3.1-1 3.1-8 3.1-8 3.2-7 .3.2-7 3.2-9a 3.2-9a-3.2-10 3.2-10 3.2-13 3.2-13 3.2-14 3.2-14 3.2-18 3.2-18 3.2-44 3.2-44 3.4-2 3.4-2 3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-2 3.5-2 a.5-3 3.5-3 3.5-4 3.5-4 3.5-S' 3.5-5 3.5-6 3.5-6 3.5-7 3.5-7 3.5-8 3.5-8 3.5-9 3.5-9 3.5-10 3.5-10 3.5-10a -

3.5-11 3.5-11 3.5-12 3.5-12 3.5-13 3.5-13 g^L 3.5-14 3.5-14 3.5 3.5-15 3.5-17 3.5-17 3.5-18 3.5-18 3.5-19 3.5-19 3.5-21 3.5-21 3.6-9c 3.6-9c 6-6 6-6 5-3 5-3 0419V NL-838 E3-1

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b ENCLOSURE 3 (continued)- .

a REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGE CHANGE INSTRUCTIONS i Remove Pagg F%gn_ Rug Unit 2: 3/4 5-1 3/4 S.1 3/4 6-46 3/4 6-46 3/4 7-9 3/4 7-9 '

3/4 8-17 3/4 8-17 3/4 8-?' 3/4 8-21 6-S 6-5 5-3 5-3 P

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. _ _ _ - - _ _ s-. _ . . - - - . . _ _ . . _ - . - _ - . - . . - - . - - ._

a 4 . .v 1 ,

I GG. Simulated Automatic Actuation - Simulated automatic actuation means-applying a simulated signal to the sensor to actuate the circuit in question.

/

HH. Start & Hot Standby Mode - The reactor is in the Start & Hot Standby- l Mode when the Mode Switch is in the START & HOT STANDBY position.

In this mode the reactor protection system is energized with IRM ;

and APRM (Start & Hot Standby Mode) neutron monitoring system trips and control rod withdrawal inter-locks in service. -

II. Surveillance Freauency - Periodic surveillance tests, checks, calibrations, and examinations shall be performed within the specified surveillance intervals. These intervals may be adjusted plus or minus 25%. The operating cycle interval is defined as 18 months. In the case where the elapsed interval has exceeded 100%

of the specified interval, the next surveillance interval shall commence at the end of the original specified interval.

JJ. Surveillance Reauirements - The surveillance requirements are E

requirements established to ensure that the LCO stated in Section 3 i of these Technical Specifications are met. Performance of a e survoillance requirement within the specified surveillance interval shall constitute compliance with the operability requirement for an .

LCO.- Surveillance' requirements are not required on systems or :

parts of systems that are not required to be operable or are tripped. If tests are missed on parts not required to be operable or :re tripped, then they shall be performed prior to returning the l system to an operable status.

l:

KK. Total Peakina Factor (TPF) - The total peaking factor is the highest product-of radial, axial, and local peaking factors simultaneously ,

j-operative at any segment of fuel rod.

L LL. Transition Boilina - Transition boiling is the boiling that occurs l between nucleate and film boiling. . Transition boiling is manifested-by an unstable fuel cladding surface temperature, rising suddenly as steam blanketing of the heat transfer surface occurs, then dropping as the steam blanket is swept away by the coolant flow,_then rising again.

i I

I HATCH - UNIT 1 1.0-6 Proposed TS/0316q/305-152 h

ML20012B696

Text

Enclosures:

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