ML20011D330
| ML20011D330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1989 |
| From: | Powers D, Spitzberg D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011D329 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-89-22, NUDOCS 8912260171 | |
| Download: ML20011D330 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000267/1989022
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APPENDIX A
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U.S. NUCLEAP. REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-267/89-22
Operating License: DPR-34
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Docket:
50-267
Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)
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P.O. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201-0840
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Facility Name:
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)
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Inspection At: Weld. County, Platteville, Colorado
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Inspection Conducted:
November 14-16, 1989
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Inspector:
I.
[41
/2-/Z- 81
Dr. D. B. Spitzt;grg/Fr.efgency Preparedness
Date
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Analyst (NRC Team Lelater)
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Accompanying
Personnel:
P. W. Michaud, Resident Inspector
E. M. Podolak, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, NRR
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'F. L. McManus, Comex Corporation
Approved:
d'M
Dr. D. A. Powers, Chief, Security and
Date
Emergency Preparedness Section
Inspection Summary
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Inspection' Conducted November 14-16, 1989 (Report 50-267/89-22)
' Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance
and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan and
procedures.
The inspection team observed activities in the control room (CR),
technical' support center (TSC), forward command post (FCP), and personnel
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control center (PCC) during the exercise.
Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified.
Three exercise weaknesses were identified by the inspection team
(paragraphs 4, 7, and 8). Weaknesses identified included the diversion of key
CR personnel from direct reactor evaluation and control activities, failure of
emergency response teams to follow adequate health physics practices, and
8912260171'891218
'PDRc ADOCK 05000267-
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inadequacy of_the plant public address system's audibility in certain onsite
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Generally, the licensee's response to the exercise is considered to be
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excellent and assures.an emergency preparedness program _that is adequate to
protect the health and safety of.the public.' _All. staff performed well
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throughout;the exercise. ' Responsibilities for decision making were clearly.
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defined, and almost all actions were performed in accordance with approved
procedures.
In general,-communications were effective and timely.
The-
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111censee's self-critique-identified weaknesses and involved the participation
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'of higher management,
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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- A. C. Crawford, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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- C. H. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production and Station Manager
- J. K. Eggebroton, Manager, Technical Projects
- M. E. Deniston, Superintendent of Operations
- P. F. Tomlinson, Manager, Quality Assurance Division
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- H. L. Brey, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Resource Management Division-
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- 0. J. Clayton, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- H. O'Hagan, Manager, Dafueling/ Decommissioning
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- J. P. Hak, Superintendent of Maintenance
- D. W. Evans, Manager, Operationt,/ Maintenance
- F. J. Borst, Manager, Training and Support
- T. E. Schleiger, Superintendent, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- L.
R.' Sutton, Supervisor, QA Auditing
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- R. Millison, Senior Technical Services Engineering Technician
Other
- R. E.~Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. E. Butner, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, South Texas Project
- W. Jacobi, Colorado Department of Health
- R. Dukart, Adams County Emergency Preparedness
- J. Everett, Colorado Disaster Emergency Services
- P. Hatiker, Observer, State-Emergency Operation Center
- R. Hatter, Director of Disaster Emergency Services
- J. Truly,= Director of Disaster Emergency Services
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
The inspector also held discussions with other station and corporate
personnel in the areas of security, health physics, operations, training
and emergency response.
2.
Followup ~on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
(Closed) Deficiency (267/8518-09):
Inadequate training to prepare first
aid, search and. rescue responders to properly decontaminate injured and
contaminated persons.
The inspector observed the response of emergency
personnel to two contaminated individuals.
One, a severe injury victim,
had the contamination surrounding the injury properly assessed prior to
transporting to the medical facility.
Decontamination was not attempted
on this individual due to the severity of the injury.
A second
contaminated victim was observed to have been promptly and properly
decontaminated by emergency responders.
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(Closed) Deficiency (267/8719-04):
Failure of emergency responders to
properly characterize and indicate contamination levels on injury victims
in accordance with Procedure RERP-MEP.
The inspector reviewed
Procedure RERP-MEP (Revision 21), which had been revised to make the une
of contamination tags on the victim optiona?.
The handling of a
contaminated injury victim was observed during the 1989 exercise, and it
was determined that surveys of the victim. properly characterized the
levels of contamination of the victim in accordance with RERP-MEP.
(Closed) Exercise Weakness (267/8822-01):
Failure of the CR staff to
complete notification messages properly.
The inspector observed the
completion of notification forms during the course of the 1989 exercise
and determined that all notification messages and forms were completed
properly.
(Closed) Exercise Weakness (267/8822-02):
Procedure RERP EP-CLASS, " Event
and Emergency Classification Overview," did not contain emergency action
levels (EALs) for a notice of unusual event (NOVE) on loss of electrical
power consistent with NUREG 0654, Appendix 1.
The inspector reviewed
EP-CLASS, Issue 7, dated July 26, 1989, and found that it now contains the
appropriate EAL classification for a NOVE on a loss of offsite or onsite
AC power.
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(Closed) Exercise Weakness (267/8822-03):
Inadequacies in
Procedure RERP-CR, " Implementing Procedure-Control Room," in notification
formats and timely communication of event information.
The inspector
reviewed-Issue 12 of Procedure RERP-CR dated July 26, 1989, and determined
that instructions for proper event notifications and communications of
events including radiological releases is included in Attachment B.
(Closed) Exercise Weakness (267/8822-04):
The staff at the PCC did not
maintain continuous radiation exposure records of in plant teams.
The
inspector reviewed the PCC accountability records maintained on
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Checklist 8 of RERP, " Implementing Procedure." Dosimetry entries were
properly maintained for dispatched and returning emergency teams.
3.
Program Areas Inspected
.The inspection team observed licensee activities in the CR, TSC, PCC, and
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FCP during the exercise.
The PCC and FCP are equivalent to the operations
support center and the emergency operations facility, respectively, both
referenced in NUREG-0654 and 0696.
The inspection team also observed
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emergency response organization staffing, facility activation, detection,
classification, and operational assessment, notifications of licensee
personnel, and offsite agencies, formulation of protective action
recommendations, offsite dose assessment, in plant corrective actions,
security / accountability activities, and recovery operations.
Inspection
findings are documented in the following paragraphs.
There were various deficiencies identified during the course of the
exercise; however, none of the observed deficiencies were of the
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significance as defined in 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii).
Each of the observed
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deficiencies has been characterized as an exercise weakness according to
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10 CFR 50, Appendix E.IV.F.5.
An exercise weakness is a finding that a
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licensee's demonstrated level of preparedness could have precluded
effective implementation of.the emergency pr%acedness plan in the event
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of an actual emergency.
It is a finding that needs licensee corrective-
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4.
Control Room' (82301)(1)
The inspection team observed and evaluated the CR staff as they performed
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. tasks in response to the exercise.
These tasks included detection and
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classification of_ events, analysis of plant conditions and corrective
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actions, protective action decision making, notifications, implementation
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of protective actions, dose assessment, post-accident sampling, and
environmental monitoring.
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- The CR staff performed well throughout the exercise.
Responsibilities for
decision making were clearly defined and actions were performed in
accordance with approved procedures.
Communications within the CR were
good throughout the exercise.
Habitability was verified promptly and
frequently by health physics personnel.
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Classification of events were made appropriately by the CR staff. 'The
inspector noted, however, that early into the scenario following the
reactor trip at 0808, both the shift technical advisor (STA) and the
senior reactor operator (SRO) were involved in activities other than the
analysis and evaluation of reactor plant conditions.
The STA was filling
out the reactor safety situation report and the SR0 was filling out the
notification of NOVE' form and making the notification calls to the state
and county.
During a 10 to 15 minute period,_these key CR personnel were
diverted from direct evaluation and control of reactor plant conditions.
The diversion early in the emergency of both the STA and SR0 from
activities involving evaluation, analysis, and control of reactor
emergency conditions is considered an exercise weakness.(267/8922-01).
The_CR staff correctly used EALs to determine protective action
recommendations.
Event conditions were consistently examined against the
highest EALS, moving to lower EALs until the events were properly
classified.
The inspector noted that CR staff promptly entered into the
appropriate emergency procedures and adhered to them well.
Control room
personnel did not, however, review or second check use of flow charts or
emergency procedures in order to protect against errors made by the user.
As~an improvement item, the licensee should task CR personnel to
independently verify use and location within critical emergency
procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
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5.
Technical Support Center (82301)(2)
The inspection team observed and evaluated the TSC staff as they performed
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tasks in response to the exercise.
These tasks included activation of the
TSC -accident assessment and classification, dose assessment, protective
action decision making, notifications, implementation of protective
actions, technical support to the CR, post-accident sampling, and
environmental monitoring.
The TSC team appeared well trained and performed very well during the
exercise.
Technical assessment of plant conditions and trending of
parameters were accomplished in an effective and timely manner by TSC
engineering personnel.
Communications to the CR, PCC, and FCP were
effective and TSC briefings were frequent and informative.
The inspector
also observed that TSC habitability was checked every 15 to 20 minutes.
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Status boards were maintained and updated rapidly with data points logged
very close to scenario time.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
6.
Forward Command Post (82301)(3)
.The inspection team observed and evaluated the FCP staff as they performed
tasks in response to the exercise.
These tasks included activation of the
FCP, accident assessment and classification, offsite dose assessment,
protective action decision making, notifications, implementation of
protective actions, and interaction with state-and local officials.
Activation of the FCP was timely, and player performance was of a competent
and professional nature.
Communications and coordination with the state
and county government representatives were excellent.
Classification of
the general emergency and use of the appropriate protective action
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recommendations were observed to have been appropriate.
No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
7.
Personnel Control Center (82301)(4)
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The inspection team observed and evaluated the PCC staff as they performed
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tasks in response to the exercise.
The tasks included activation of the
PCC, personnel staffing, and support to the CR, TSC, and FCP.
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The inspector observed the assembly and briefing of emergency
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repair / rescue teams and followed the teams into the reactor building to
observe their activities during the exercise.
In two instances the
inspector noted inadequate health physics practices exhibited by the
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response teams as follows:
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Failure to use proper contamination control during medical treatment
of the containated injury victim.
An emergency team member was
observed assisting an emergency medical technician dress and
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stabilize a wound known to be contaminated without using protective
gloves, which had been brought to the scene for that purpose.
Use of
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appropriate protective clothing when treating contaminated injury
victims is specified in Procedure MEP-FSV, Section 8.4.1-8;4.2.
Improper use of respiratory protection equipment.
An equipment
operator exiting the reactor building at Level 7.was observed to have
improperly donned the full facepiece of his self-contained breathing
apparatus.
The facepiece was worn such that his head coverir.g passed
between the sealing surface of the mask and his head, preventing an
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adequate seal.
This is a prohibited practice according to
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ANSI Z88.2, " Practice for Respiratory Protection," - 1980,
Section 7.3.4.
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The failure of emergency response teams to adhere to proper health physics
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practices is considered an exercise weakness (267/8922-02).
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No violations or deviations were identified in this program area.
8.
Security and Accountability (82301)(8)
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The inspection team observed certain elements of the personnel
accountability practices and emergency facility security during the
exercise.
The inspector observed a site communication problem that impacted onsite
accountability.
The announcements of emergency conditions,
classifications, protective actions, and the status of any radiological
release were communicated to onsite personnel via the plant public address
system.. These announcements and alani.s were not audible in the resident
inspector's office nor in the main warehouse, both within the protected
area. .This was noted to have impaired the rapid evacuation and
accountability of site personnel.
The inadequate volume or coverage of the plant public address system was
identified.as an exercise weakness (267/8922-03).
No violations or deviations were identified in the program area.
9.
Licensee Self-Critique
The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's self-critique for the
exercise.
The inspector determined that the process of self-critique involved
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adequate staffing and resources and involved the participation of higher
management.
The licensee identified five weaknesses as summarized below:
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Media-relations personnel seemed unfamiliar with the draft / final
process of press release approval.
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Contamination control practices were weak among first responders to a'
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contaminated injury victim.
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Ineffective communications between the TSC, CR, and PCC resulted in a
delay in dispatching an emergency medical technician to the medical
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A response team entered the-reactor building to simulate dressing out
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without proper protective clothing and without authorization by a.
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controller.
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The performance of the plant public address system-was inadequate.
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The inspectors noted that the licensee was able to properly identify and
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characterize a number of exercise weaknesses and that several coincide
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The licensee's critique included
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preliminary proposed corrective actions for identified weaknesses and
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improvement items.
No violations or deviation were identified in this program area.
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Exit Interview
The inspection team met with the resident inspectors and licensee
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representatives indicated in paragraph 1 on November 16, 1989, and
summarized the scope and. findings of the inspection as presented in this-
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report.
The' licensee acknowledged their understanding of weaknesses and
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agreed to examine them to find root causes in order to take adequate
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corrective measures.. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of
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the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the
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inspection.
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