ML20010J673
| ML20010J673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1981 |
| From: | Hovey G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | Snyder B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR LL2-81-0227, LL2-81-227, NUDOCS 8110060335 | |
| Download: ML20010J673 (10) | |
Text
v Metropolitan Edison Company Post Office Box 480 II L
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Writer's Direct Dial Number September 30, 1981 LL2-81-0227 g'
g TMI Program Office O-6 C/
Attn: Dr. Bernard J. Snyder, Program Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission pk
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-7 Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2 to Operatina License No. DPR-73 Docket No. 50-320 Control of Heavy Loads
References:
(1) Letter Bernard J. Snyder (NRC) to Gale Hovey (GPU)
Dated February 27, 1981 (2) Letter G. K. Hovey (GPU) to Bernard J. Snyder (NRC)
Dated August 27, 1981 Attached is GPU's response to the NRC's Generic Letter (Ref.1) requesting information on the control of heavy loads. As described in Reference 2, this response covers requested information only during the phase of operation prior to defueling. The remaining information requested for this phase of operation will be submitted by the requested, November 27,1981, date. Also, as outlined in Reference 2, the response for control of heavy loads during the defueling phase and possibly the operation phase will be submitted later.
The consequences and safeguards related to a potential Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS) liner drop have been reported in the Technical Evaluation Report for the SDS. The consequences and safeguards related to a potential drop of an EPICOR II liner have been reported in NUREG 0591.
Sincerely, l/
~
G. K. Hovey Vice-President and l
Director, TMI-2 i
GKH:sws:ml cc:
L. H. Barrett, Deputy Program Director O
Mt l 8110060'335 810930 PDR ADOCK 05000320 P
PDR metropohtan Edison Company is a Member of the General Pubhc Utities System
WNTROL OF HEAVY LOADS 2.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1, identifies several general guidelines related to the design and operation of overhead load-handling systest in the areas where spent fuel is stored, in the vicinity of the reactor core, and in other areas of the plant where a load drop could result in damage to equipment required for safe shutdown er decay heat removal.
Information provided in response to this section should identify the extent of potentially hazardous load-handling operations at a site and the extent of conformance to appropriate load-handling guidarce.
2.1(1)
Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis).
Response
The overhead handling systems in the Fuel Handling Building and the Chemical Cleaning Building were reviewed to determine if a loao drop from any system in these areas would cause a situation of safety concern.
In addition to the criteria given (" Damage to any System Required for Plant Shutdown or Decay Heat Removal"), radiological release was also considered in the review.
There are two overhead handling systems from which a load drop could result in a safety concern and they are:
(1) 20 ton monorail hoist in the Chemical Cleaning Building (2) Fuel Fundling Crane located in the Fuel Handling Building.
The systems on which a load could potentially impact are:
(1) EPIQ)R II (2) Standby Pressure Control (SPC)
(3) Tank Farm (4) Submerged Demineralizer System (SDS)
Although it does not transfer loads over any safety system, the 20 ton monorail hoist in the Chemical Cleaning Building Handles loads over the EPICOR II system. A drop of a heavy load from the 20 ton mencrail hoist could result in a potential radiological release either from damage to the EPICOR II system or from damage to the load itself, if it were an EPIWR liner.
The overhead handling system in the Fuel Handling Building is a 110 ton Whiting crane with an additional 15 ton auxiliary hook and two monorail hoists rated at 5 tons and 3 tons. A load drop from this crane could potentially impact the SPC, the Tank Farm, or the SDS. Again, even though the Tank Farm and the SDS are not safety systems, damage from a drop of a heavy load could have radiological consequences. Damage to the SPC could have an impact on Reactor Coolant Pressure Control. Procedures are in place to deal with these potential situations.
There are no other overhead handling systems in the Fuel Handling Building or the Chemical Cleaning Building from which a load drop would effect any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal or have any potential radiological consequences.
2.1(2)
Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspectic,n that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or core decay heat removal.
Response
There are no systems in the Fuel Handling Building or the Chemical Cleaning Building which have been excluded from review due to physical location relative to any equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal or damage which could result in radiological consequences.
7 1(3)
With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in the centainment and the spent-fuel-pool area and those load-handling systems identified in 2.1-1, above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1.
The following specific information should be included in your reply:
Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the locatior.s a.
of safe load paths, spent fuel, and safety related equipment.
Response
The safe load paths and the potentially impacted equipment for heavy loads handled by the 20 ton monorail hoist in the Chemical Cleaning Building and the Fuel Handling Crane are identified in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. In addition to the safe load paths identified in Figures 1 and 2, there are restrictions on the height to which loads may be lifted.
The measures to ensure the loads remain within the horizontal and vertical envelopes are given in the response to 2.1(3)b.
a :
b.
A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if e /, for deviation from these paths.
Response
The 20 ton monorail hoist is limited by physical design to only one path of operation. The travel of the hoist along the monorail is limited to the safe zone by mechanical stops. Vertical lifting limitations on the EPICOR liners, lead transfer bell and lead shield are accomplished by mechanical stops.
All horizontal movements of the Fuel Handling Crane and Auxiliary Holst are administrative 1y controlled to be within the safe zone. Vertical lifts are limited by mechanical design of the lifting devices.
All procedures which limit movement of either of the overhead handling systems were developed to limit exposure of important equipment to overhead loads but also take into account personnel access to areas where loads are traversing.
In order to prevent lifting SDS liners and EPICOR II liners higher than required, physical. stops have been ircorporated in the Spent Vessel Handling Tool (used to lift spent SDS liners) and the Chemical Cleaning Building Holst (used to lift EPICOR II liners).
c.
A tabulation of heavy loads to be hsndled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.l(2).
Fuel Handling Building Designated Load Est. Wat.
Liftino Device Written Procedure Shipping Cask 23,000 lb.
110 ton hoist YES a) with 2 endless slings & 2 shackles (for underwater) b) with 2 slings &
2 shackles (in FW)
Sand Filter 1,470 lb.
15 ton hoist YES with Spent Vessel Handling Tool IX Vessel 445 lb. empty 15 ton hoist YES 1,000 lb. full with Spent Vessel Handling Tool., -
_ Chemical _C_ leaning Building Designated L_ cad
.Est_. Wat.
.L_i_ftina _Devi_c_e Wri_t_ ten _ Proc.ed_u_re Transfer Bell 32,500 lb.
20 ton hoist YES w/3 point sling 4 x 4 Liner 1,500 lb.
20 ton hoist YES (ALC-F-1) with transfer bell 4 x 4 Liner 1,500 lb.
20 ton hoist YES (ALC-K-1) with transfer bell 6 x 6 Liner 8,000 lb.
20 ton hoist YES (ALC-K-2) with 2 point sling Lead Shield 1,600 lb.
20 ton hoist YES with transfer bell d.
Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.13-c, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as stpplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.1(5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.
_ Response Fu_e1 Ha_ndlino Buij. ding Two stainless steel slings will be utilized for lifting the SDS shipping cask into and out of the "B" Fuel Pool. Each of these slings has been proofloaded to 64,000 pounds and will be attached to the cask by a shackle rated at 24,000 pounds with a design safety factor of five. The SDS cask and liner weighs approximately 22,300 pounds.
The anticipated loading on each sling and shackle assembly will be half of that amount, or 11,150 pounds.
Two shorter steel slings will be utilized for transporting the SDS cask from poolside to the truckbay located on the 303' level. These slings are rated for 40,000 pounds.
They will be attached to the cask by shackles rated at i.
24,000 pounds with a design safety factor of five. Again, the anticipated load on each sling and shackle assembly is 11,150 pounds.
The SDS Spent vessel Handling tool will handle radioactive liners underwater only. This tool has been load-tested to 1600 pounds and has been su, application only.
tool is a specially designed long-handled tool for this The bjected to stringent testirg with non-radioactive resin liners. Aside from potential load dr;p of an underwater SOS liner, another consideration is that of the potential for a liner to " hang-up" on equipment as it is lifted. For this reason a load cell is coupled to the vessel tendling Tool to insure that the crane, while lifting a liner, encounters no other resistance-against-lifting than that of the liner weight.
01emical C_1_ean_ino.Bui_1_d_ing The low level 6' x 6' liners which weigh 8000 pounds are transferred to the truck mounted shipping cask using 2 legged slings. These slings are rated at 22,000 pounds.
In addition to the proof test by the manufacturer, these slings are proof tested once each year.
The more radioactive 4' x 4' liners are transferred to the truck mounted shipping casks using a lead bell and shield. Within the lead bell is a liftirs rod mechanism which actually holds the 4' x 4' liners and lead shield.
The transfer bell lifting device is a 3 legged sling designed for 40,000 pounds with a safety factor of five.
The bell, liner and shield have a combined weight of 35,600 pounds. The lifting rod which holds the liner ano lead shield (combined weight of 3,100 pounds) was also designed with a safety factor of five and proof tested to 150% of design load.
e.
Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2 has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. hhere any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.
Re sponse This standard is being invoked. Procedures are presently implemented or are in the review and approval cycle.
No exceptions have been taken.
f.
Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances whare specific compliance with these standards is not provided.
Response
The Fuel Handlirg Building Crane was designed to the "tectric Overhead Crane Institute (EOCI) Specification No. 61 for class "A" indoor service. EOCI specification No. 61 was the equivalent of CMAA specification No. 70 at the time of the crane design (1968).
This crane also meets the regu3stions of cranes, booms and hoist 5 as stated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry.
-5_
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1 The Chemical Cleaning Building hoist complies with the app 1hable specifications of the Hoist Manufacturer's Institute rather than the two 4
specifications stipulated in 3.f.
These latter two specifications are written for overhead cranes and are not applicable to the Chemical Cleaning Building's hoist. Structural steel supporting the hoist is designed to American Institute of Steel Construction specifications.
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