ML20010H340

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Submits Results of Radiograph Exams of Flued Head Type Penetrations in Response to IE Bulletin 80-08, Exam of Containment Liner Penetration Welds. Provides Justification for Not Performing Exams on Certain Unit 2 Penetrations
ML20010H340
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  
Issue date: 08/10/1981
From: Beckham J
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
IEB-80-08, IEB-80-8, NUDOCS 8109240361
Download: ML20010H340 (3)


Text

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Georgia Power

    1. N"U" J. T. Beckham, Jr.

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REFERENCE:

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U. S. !!uclear Regulatory Comission RII: JPG Q to Q Offict of Inspection and Enforcement ty (A Region II - Suite 3100 50-321/50-3fi6 Q pa {7 101 flarietta Street, HU I&E Bulletin,.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 80-08 6" '

QR ATTEllTION: f1r. James P. O'Reill.v s

GF" '. ellen:

'ri ng an inspection conducted by Mr. Lee Zajac of your staff on 7r 28 1980, Hatch plant nanagement connitted to an attempt to

_ph the flued head type penetrations which are the subject of concern or I3E Bulletin 80-08, "Exanination of Containment Liner Penetration Welds,"

issued August 7,

1980.

Radiography was to be undertaken during the respective maintenance / refueling outages for each unit as stated in our letter to you dated November 3,1980.

The following are the results of the radiograph examinations which were perfomed and the justifications for not perfoming radiography on the remaining penetrations:

1.

The following Unit 2 penetrations were radiographed:

X8 - Primary Steam Condensate Drainage X11 - HPCI X17 - RPV Head Spray X42 - Standby Liquid Control No rejectable indications were observed.

2.

The following Unit 2 penetrations were not radiographed:

X7A, B, C, & D - Prinary Steam g

X9A, B - Feedwater 5

X10 - RCIC X12 - RHR Suction X13A, B - RilR Return X14 - RUCU X36 - CRD Return X16A, B - Core Spray 3.

Justifications for not perfoming radiography on the above-listed Unit 2 penetrations are as follows:

i 8109240361 810810 PDR ADOCK 05000321 G

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Georgia Power b U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II August 10, 1921 Page Two a.

Penetrations X10 - RCIC and X14-RWCU had radiography perfomed on then during construction with no rejectable indications.

Since the unit has been in service a relatively short tine, the need to radiograph these penetrations again was not considered necessary.

b.

Penetration X36 - CRD Return was a spare penetration which has been capped due to the renoval of the CRD Return line.

c.

Penetrations X7A, B, C, & D - Primary Stean and X13, B -

RHR Return would require radiography using Cobalt 60.

An in-depth study was perfomed at Georgia Power's request by Atlanta Testing and Engineering Conpany, the fim contracted to perfom radiographic services, to detemim the feasibility of using Cobalt 60 30 perfom the inspections.

It was detemined that the use of Cobalt 60 at 100 curies would result in the loss of the required sensitivity to detect the type indications which were of concern in the bulletin.

Furthemore, it would require the evacuation of all personnel within a 900 ft. area to naintain a 2 nr/hr linit as required by state and federal regulations.

Based on this infomation, it was decided that this method was too hazardous, and even if personnel safety was not considered, the results would likely be non-conclusive due to the loss of sensitivity using Cobalt 60.

d.

Penetrations X9A, B - Feeduater and X12 - RHR Suction could have been radiographed using Iridiun 192 (IR192).

Again using the results of the radiography fim's study, it was decided not to perfom radiography on these penetrations.

The study concluded that using IR192 to perfom this activity would require film exposure times in excess of 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> or 12 ten-t,ur nan-days per weld.

It is our opinion that the excessive tine required is sufficient justification for not perfoming radiography on those penetrations.

The two basic reasons for these excessive film exposure times are the presence of water in the piping, which due to plant conditions could not be drained, and the thickness of the naterial which would have had to be overcone to get to the subject weld.

e.

An attempt was nade to radiograph penetration X16A - Core Spray.

After several hours of exposure no significant results had been obtained.

Georgia Power d U. S. !!uclear Regulatory Connission Office of Inspection and Enforcenent Region II August 10, 1981 Dage Three Sinilar information as discussed in itens 3b, c, d, and e above applies to Unit 1 with the exception of penetrations X17 and X42.

Those particular penetrations had been radiographed duri ng construction; however, it was decided that since the unit had been in service for a longer period of time thar Unit 2,

it would be beneficial to radiograph these penetrations to deternine if any problems had occurred since initial startup.

No rejectable indications were observed.

Radiographic exposures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 flued head type penetrations which were exanined during the respective naintenance/ refueling outages are available for review at the plant site, along with letters fron Atlanta Testing and Engineering Company explaining the source naterial and fila exposure time for those penetrations not radiographed.

The actions we have talan and the justifications given meet the intent of I&E Bulletin 80-08 and should require no further action by us.

If you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office.

Very truly yours, J. T. Beckhan, Jr.

JAE/nb xc: Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcenent U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission 1!ashi ngton, D. C.

20555 Director of the Division of Operating Reactors, Office of fluclear Reactor P.egulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission liashington, D. C.

20555 Director, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection U. S. Iluclear Regulatory Comission liashington, D. C.

20555

11. flanry R. F. Rogers, III

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