ML20010H220
| ML20010H220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/22/1981 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| References | |
| TASK-06-07.C1, TASK-6-7.C1, TASK-RR LSO5-81-09-056, LSO5-81-9-56, NUDOCS 8109240229 | |
| Download: ML20010H220 (3) | |
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September 22, 1981
. "n Docket No. 50-409
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A Mr. Frank Linder W..
General Manager C
Dairyland Power Cooperative T h,(!sS 2615 East Avenue South h^
Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601 A
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Dear Mr. Linder:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC VI-7.C.1, APPENDIX X - ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL (EI&C) RE-REVIEWS - LACROSSE The encloied staff safety evaluation is based on a contractor's document that has been made available to you previously. This document supports the findings of the staff safety evaluation of Topic VI-7.C.1 and recommends modifications to the ac power transfer switch controls.
The need to actually implement these changes will be determined during the integrated safety assessment. This safety evaluation may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Sincerely, i
l Dtnnis M. Crutchfield, Chief l
Operating Reactors Branch f5 Division of Licensin2 pt
Enclosure:
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SEP Topic VI-7.C.1
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TOPIC:
VI-7.C.1 APPENDIX X - ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL (El&C) RE-REVIEWS I.
INTRODUCTION During the Appendix K reviews of some facilities initially considered, a detailed EI&C review was not performed.
Accordingly, we intended to re-review the modified ECCS of these facilities to confirm that it is designed to meet the most limiting single failure. Several types of failure were considered ae. candidates for designation as the most limiting. Becausti of the scope of the other SEP topics, it was decided that, for the purpose of this study (and to reduce replication of effort on other SEP topics), the loss of a single ac or dc onsite power system was the most limiting failure. Accordingly, this topic was limited to an evaluation of the independence netween the onsite power sys tems.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA The review criteria are presented in Section 2 of EG&G Report 0839F, " Independence of Redundant Onsite Power Systems."
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid dupli-cation of effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics. The related topics and the subject matter are identified below. Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.
VI-4 Bypass and Reset of Engineered Safety Features (B-24)
VI-7.A.3 ECCS Actuation System VI-7.B ESF Switchover from Injection to Recirculation VI-7. C.2 Failure Mode Analysis-ECC5 VI-7.D Long Term Cooling Passive ruilures (e.g., flooding)
'/ -10.A Testing of Reactor Protection Systems i
VII-1.A Reactor Trip System Isolation VII-3 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown VIII-2 Onsite Emergency Power Systems VIII-3 Emergency de Power Systems VIII-4 Electrical Penetrations I X-6 Fire Protection The conclusion that suitable isolation devices are provided is a basic assumption for Topics VI-7.C.2 and VII-3.
I r IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3 of Report 0839F,
" Independence of Redundant Onsite Power Systems."
V.
EVALUATION As noted in Report 0839F, " Independence of Redundant Onsite Power Systems," the separation between redundant systems is compromised by the onsite power system.
In two cases the design of the Lacrosse onsite ac power systems allow the manual connection of redundant load groups without interlocks to prevent paralleling of redundant ac sources. This does not comply with the staff recommendations included in R.G.
1,6, The review of referenced information and drawings indicates that, with the above exceptions, the Lacrosse onsite ac and de redundant power sources and their distribution systems comply with the single failure criteria as outlined in R.G.1.6.
VI.
CONCLUSION As a result of our review of our contractor's work the staff concludes that the subject dc onsite systems satisfy all of the review criteria and are, therefore, acceptable.
We also conclude that the controls for breakers 452 TBA, 452 TBB, and the breakers for the feeds for the 120 VAC Non-interruptable bus should be modified to prevent paralleling of the redundant onsite sources.
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