ML20010F446

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Affidavit Supporting Applicants Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 7C.Cracking Has Not Been Reported in BWR Core Spray Nozzles.Prof Qualfications Encl.Related Correspondence
ML20010F446
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  
Issue date: 08/28/1981
From: Lemaire J
ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8109100212
Download: ML20010F446 (4)


Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA s

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATUMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

""J 1 C ' LEONDrxc-In the Matter of PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LICHT COMPANY

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AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH C. LEMAIRE SEp IN SUPPORT OF

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9 Joseph C. Lemaire, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says:

1.

I am Manager, Plant Component Behavior Analysis, General Electric Ccmpany ("GE") and give this affidavit in support of Applicants' Motion For Summary Disposition of Contention 7C.

I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and believe them to be true and correct.

A summary of my professional qualifications and experience is attached as Exhibit "A" hereto.

2.

Contention 7C states that:

"The nuclear steam supply system of Susquehanna 1 and 2 contains numerous generic design deficiencies, some of which may never be resolvable, and which, when reviewed together, render a picture of an ur. safe nuclear installation which may never be safe enough to operate.

Specifically:

... BWR core spray nozzles occassionally crack, a problem which reduces their effectiveness".

3.

The BWR core spray system for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ("Susquehanna") consists of a number of distinct com-ponents, as illustrated schematically in Figure 1.

Externri piping delivers high pressure core spray water upon demand to the pressure vessel. The transition between the piping and the vessel is made by means of a safe end_ welded directly to the reactor pressura vessel core spray nozzle. The safe end contains an internal weld to a thermal sleeve which is welded to the inter al core spray line.

This internal core h.b[kOO!k00

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spray line delivers core spray water to tha core spray sparge which provides uniform distribution of the core spray cooling w:t:r over the reactor core. The entire system is duplicated by means of a recundant and separate loop which contains the same components.

j 4.

No cracking of core spray nozzles has ever been reported to General Electric Co., nor is GE aware of any such cracking.

Cracking of these nozzles would not be expected in view of the relatively low cyclic thermal stresses in these nozzles and the successful overall performance of core spray nozzles throughout four hundred reactor years of service.

Similar successful performance is expected at Susquehanna.

5.

Other portions of the core spray system have experienced a low frequency of cracking in operating BWR's.

External core spray line cracking has occurred in BWR's using high carbon type 304 stainless steel. The cracking in these cases was intergranular stress corrosion cracUng (IGSCC), associated with sensitization in a weld heat affected Since Susquehanna uses carbon limited (g.030 w%) Type 304 zone.

stainless steel in the external core spray lines, cracking would not be expected as stated in my Affidtvit in Support of Summary Disposition of Contention 7B.

6.

Type 304 stainless steel core spray safe ends have I

experienced IGSCC similar to piping in weld heat affected zones or away from weld ragions when sensitized by oressure vessel pst weld heat treatment. At Susquehanna Alloy 600 is used in the core spray safe ends and thermal sleeves rather than type 304 stainless steel.

Alloy 600 is more resistant to IGSCC and has never been repcrted to have cracked in core spray system safe ends or thermal sleeves of similar design.

7.

Interior to the reactor pressure vessel, cracking has been verified in internal core spray sygtem piping of one operating reactor which utilized high carbon Type 304 stainless steel.

The cracking in this case was IGSCC, associated with sensitization in a weld heat affected zone and was very similar to tne external core spray line cracking discussed above.

Since Susquehanna uses Type 304L stainless steel in the internal core spray lines, cracking would not be expected as stated in my Affidavit in support of Summary Disposition of Contention 78.

8.

Core spray sparger cracking has been reported in three operating reactors using higher carbon ( >.040 w%) (Type 304) stainBss steel.

Cracks are reported inside and outside of weld heat affected

zenes in these cas:s.

Since the sparger cracking has not resulted in loos 2 parts, NRC has approved continued op: ration of th;sa reactors with spargers in this condition. The core spray spargers at Susquehanna are low carbon (apprcximately.020 w%) Type 304L stainless steel, which is known to resist the sensitization-related mechanism of cracking due to its low carbon content.

9.

In sumary, cracking has not been reported in BWR core spray nozzles.

Infrequent cracking has occurred in other portions of the core spray system, but only in materials substantially different from those used at Susquehanna.

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Sworn to and Subscribed Before Me This M 17 Day of Act,qfE 1981 a

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BIOGRAPHICAL ' SKETCH - JOSEPH C. LEMAIRE Joseph C. Lemaire is currently manager of Plant Component Behavior Analysis, a raterials research component within the Nuclear Engineering Division of l

General Electric Company.

He has been responsible for metallurqical failure analysis and environmental qualification of plant stioctural materials, in-cluding nuclear grade materials, at GE.

Prior to joining General Electric in 1975, Mr. Lemaire was a nuclear propulsion metallurgist with the U.S. Energy Research and Development Agency, where he supervised nuclear fuel development activities. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Denver (1970), a tbster of Science in Metallurgical Engineer-ing from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1971), and a Master of Business Administration from Santa Clara University (1979).

He is a renher of the American Society of Metals (ASM) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS),

and has published recent papers on the subject of corrosion technology at the ASM Metals and Welding Conferences and in Corrosion.

EXHIBIT A 4

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