ML20010E029

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Forwards Safety Evaluation of SEP Topic VIII-2,recommending Mods to Diesel Generator Protective Interlocks.Need to Implement Changes Will Be Determined During Integrated Safety Assessment
ML20010E029
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 08/28/1981
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Counsil W
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
References
TASK-08-02, TASK-8-2, TASK-RR LSO5-81-08-071, LSO5-81-8-71, NUDOCS 8109020345
Download: ML20010E029 (5)


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I August 28, 1981 Docket No. 50s213

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Mr. W. G. Counsil, VIce President I

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Dear Mr. Counsfl:

SU3 JECT: St.P TOPIC VIII-2, ONSITE EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEMS - DIESEL GENERATOR. SAFETY EVALUATION FOR HADDAM NECK The enclosed staff safety evaluation is based on contractor!s documents that have been made available to you previously. These documents support the findings of the staff safety evaluation of Topic VIII-2 and recommends modifications tothe diesel generator protective interlocks.

The need to actually implement these changes will be determined during the integrated safety assessmen'.. This topic assessment may Le revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria reiating to

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this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is co'r91eted.

Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

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m HADDAM NECK Dockst No. 50-213 Mr. W. G. Counsil cc Day, Berry 3 Howard Counselors at Law One Constitution Plaza Hartford, Connecticut 06103 Superintendent Haddam Neck Plant RF0 #1 Post Office Box 127E East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 Mr. Richard R. Laudenat Manager, Generation Facilities Licensing Northeast Utilities Service Company i

P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Russell Library 119 Broad Street Middletown, Connecticut 06457 Board of Selectmen Town Hall Haddam, Connecticut 06103 Connecticut Energy Agency ATTN: Assistant Director Research and Policy Development Department of Planning and Energy Policy 20 Grand Street Hartford, Connecticut 06106 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region I Office l

ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Resident Inspector Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Station c/o U. S. NRC East Haddam Post Office East Haddam, Connecticut 06423 A

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TOPIC: VIII-2, ONSITE EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEMS - DIESEL GENERATOR

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1.

I_ryoduction Diesel generators, which provide emergency standby power for safe reactor shutdown in the event of total loss of offsite power, have experienced a significant nexber of failures. The failures to date have been attributed to a variety of causes, including failure of the air startup, fuel oil, and combustion air systems.

In some instances, the malfunctions were due, to lockout. Th6 infonnation available to the control room operator to indicate the operational status of the diesel generator was imprecise and could lead to misinterpretation. This was caused by the sharing of a single annunciator station by alarms that indicate conditions that render a diesel generator unable to respond to an. automatic emergency start signal

nd alarms that only indicate a warning of abnormal, but no disabling, conditions. Another cause was the wording on an annunciator window which did not :;oecifically say that the diesel generator was inoperable (i.e.,

unable at the time to respond to an automatic emergency start signal) when in fact it was inoperable for that purpose. The review included the reliability, protective interlocks, fuel oil quality, and testing of diesel ger.e ators to assure that the diesel generator meets the avail-ability requirements for providing emergency standby power to the engineered safety features.

II.

Review Criteria d

T5e review criteria are presented for Section 8.3.1 in Table 8-1 of the Standard Review Plan.

III. Related Safety Topics and Interfaces The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of i

effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related Related topics and the subject matter are identified below.

topics.

Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.

III-12 Environmental Raalification VI-7.C.1 Independence of Onsite Power i

VIII-1.A Degraded Grid l

XVII Fuel Oil Quality Assurance There are no safety topics that are dependent in the'present topic informa-tion for their completion.

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Re_ view Guidelines The review guidelines arc presented in Section 8.3.1 of the Standard Review Plan.

V.

Evaluation with regard to annunciators was pursued as,a generic issue..

the concern The staff safety evaluation for Palisades concluded that in order to provide the operator with accurate, co'mplete and timely information pertinent to the status of the diesel generators, as required by IEEE Std. 279-1971, the following corrective actions are required:

Disabling and non-oisabling conditions, currently alarmed at a 1.

common annunciator st3 tion, should be separated and annunciated at separate annunciator points.

The wording on the annunciator for disabling conditions should 2.

specifically state that the diesel generator is unavailable for an automatic emergency start.

By a letter dated May 16, 1977 the licensee agreed to make suitable modifications to the anr}unciators.

f Also, as a result of the work done by the University of Dayton, a generic program for implementing most of the recommendations for re-liability enhancement that are contained in the University of Dayton This latter program will also reporr is being conducted by NRC.

determine the adequacy of the diesel generator testing program on a case-by-case basis and enforce any necessary char.ges.

The question of fuel oil' quality was addressed on a generic basis in The letters required that January 1980, by letters to all licensees.

The licensees include fuel oil in their Quality Assurance program.Until coinpletion Quality Assurance program is addressed in Topic XVII.

of Topic XVII, the periodic testing of the diesels is considered to be an adequate interim method for assuring acceptable quality in the fuel oil stored on site.

Beyond these efforts, EG8G Report 1003F, " Diesel Generators" presents a technical evaluation of the diesel generator protective interlocks and The load capability at Haddam Neck against present licensing cr iteria.

report notes that the diesel-generator over current, reverse power and loss of field protective trips are not bypassed during emergency oper-This is not in agreement with current NRC guidelines, ation.

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Conclusion The staff proposes that the diesel generator protective interlocks be brought into conformance with the Branch Technical Position ICSB-17 (PSB).

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