ML20010B948

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Final Deficiency Rept Re Revised Inadequate Instructions for Essential Raw Cooling Water Preoperational Test,Initially Reported on 810504.Instructions Will Be Closely Reviewed Before Approving Preoperational Test Instruction
ML20010B948
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah 
Issue date: 08/10/1981
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8108180522
Download: ML20010B948 (2)


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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Stre t,Tgr II

}\\ hb August 10, 1981

<o SQRD-50-328/81-42 A

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5 AUG(71981[S Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement EP.Q U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g

Region II - Suite 3100

..q 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 p

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR FLANT UNIT 2 - REVISED ERCW PREOPERATIONAL TEST INSTRUCTIONS INEDEQUATE - SQRD-50-328/81 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NaC-0IE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on May 4, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR SQN NEB 8129 Our first interim report was submitted on July 7, 1981. Enclosed is our final report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITI M

L. M. Mills,Manar,er Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:

Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 PF-1 li, {

0108180522 810010 PDR ADOCK 05000328 An Equal Opportunity Employer

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ENCLOSURE SEQ'J0YAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 REVISED ERCW PREOPERATIONAL TEST INSTRUCTIONS INADEQUATE SQRD-50-328/81-42 10 CFR 50.55(e)

FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency The Preoperational Test Instruction TVA-18C for the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System Flow Balance did not provide steps to ensure adequate documentation and cont 'ol of the throttle valve positions. When tests simulating various plant operating modes were performed, the throttle valve positions were supposed to be documented, and no valve position change was to be made that would adversely affect the flow distribution.

The test data sheets had locations for recording throttle valve positions.

l However, during the conduct of the test, the throttle valve positions were not always recorded, and in some instances, the throttle valves were closed to a more restrictive position than they had been set at in the previous test.

When the tests were concluded, some of the valves were apparently left in a position which adversely affected the flow balr.nce distribution established in the earlier tests. No record was made to varify that the valves were placed in the proper throttling position at tha completion of the test.

At the conclusion of the test, the throttle valves were to be tagged and the throttle position marked on the tags per the requirements of the preoperational test scoping document TVA-1G. section 5.2.3.1.

The valves were not tagged as required.

Safety Implications If the throttle valves had been left in the positions they were indicated to be in at the conclusion of the test, the ERCW System may not have been in a satisfactory condition to provide adequate flows to all the equipment required for various combinations of plant operating modes. Therefore, some of the safety feature components may not have been able to perform their required safety functions.

Corrective Action TVA has reviewed the throttle valvs positions that were documented in the test data package and identified those that were unacceptable.

TVA is determining the throttle valve positions for those valves for which-no documentation or inaccurate documentation was provided. TVA is tagging the throttle valves as required by the scoping document referenced above.

In the future, TVA will review the preoperational test instructions more closely to ensure that all the requirements of the test scoping' document have been incorporated before approving a preoperatior.al test instruction.

All work on this nonconformance will be completed before initial criticality.

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