ML20010A222
| ML20010A222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1981 |
| From: | Grotenhuis M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010A217 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8108110192 | |
| Download: ML20010A222 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND 1.ICENSING BOARD f
1 In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-250-SP FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY 50-251-SP (Amendments to Facility Operating (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating License to Permit Steam Generator Units 3 & 4)
Repairs)
AFFIDAVIT OF MARSHALL GR0TENHUIS REGARDING LICENSING BOARD ORDER REQUESTING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, DATED JULY 28, 1981 1, Marshall Grotenhuis, being duly sworn, state as follows:
1.
I am employed by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission as a Senior Project Manager in the Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
2.
On July 4,1981, a void was discovered by FPL in the concrete imediately below the equipment hatch barrel in the Unit 3 containment building. On July 10, 1981, the void was determined to be a reportable occurrence in accordance with license Technical Specification 6.9.2 a(9) (Attachment 1).
The void was found while a section of the steel sleeve at the equipment hatch was being replaced with a thicker section to facilitate handling equipment and large components during the steam generator repair effort consistent with the repair procedures outlined in Section 3.2.5(i) of the licensee's Steam Generator Repair Report (SGRR) (Attachment 2). Among other things, the replaced steam generator lower assemblies will be removed through this hatch and the new steam generator lower assemblies will be brought into containment through this hatch. The NRC was notified of this reportable occurrence by telephone to tne NRC Operations Center duty officer on July 10, 1981.
8108110192 810807 PDR ADOCK 05000250 G
.. 3.
On July 13, 1981, the notification was confirmed by a memo to Mr. J. P.
0'Reilly, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement (Attachment 3). This memo stated that an engineering evaluation of the matter was in progress and that the necessary repairs will be completed prior to the restart of Unit 3 and that the same area in Unit 4 will be
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inspected.
4.
On July 24, 1981, the reportable occurrence was further described in a Licensee Event Report (LER) 250-81-13 (Attachment 4). This LER confirmed that an engineering review was in progress to determine the me6 hod of repair and that a follow-up report will be issued upon ccmpletion.
5.
In an Order dated July 28, 1981, the Licensing Board directed the Staff to provide the Board with answers to the following five questions concerning this matter:
"1.
How was the void in the containment wall discovered?
2.
Did the discovery result from breaching of the containment wall, or in some other fashion?
3.
If the wall was breached, why was the Licensing Board not informed?
4.
Should the statements of Licensee in the SGRR be considered a commitment?
5.
What has been the role of the NRC Staff in this matter?"
In addition to the above explanation, the Staff responses to these questions are as follows:
i
1.
The void was discovered by FPL while alterations were being made at the equipment hatch in preparation for the steam generator repairs (see paragraph 2 above).
2.
The discovery did not result from breaching the containment wall.
The discovery occurred during preparatory work to reinforce the equipment hatch consistent with the procedures contained in Section 3.2.5 of the SGRR (see paragraph 2 above).
3.
The containment wall was not breached.
4.
The statements of the licensee in the SGRR regarding retention of containment integrity during repairs should be considered a commitment.
5.
The NRC Staff was notified of this matter and will assure that appropriate corrective action is taken. The actual Staff notifi-cation of this matter is as described in paragraphs 2-4 above.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II has lead responsibility for the resolution of this matter.
Region-II will evaluate the matter and the proposed solution.
If the proposed solution is acceptable the licensee will be allowed to implement it subject to the inspection of Region II. The Staff does not presently regard the discovered void as a serious or uncorrectable matter.
The Staff will assure that the void has been fully and safely repaired before Unit 3 returns to power.
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T.Krolenhuis Subscribed and sworn to before me this t'* day of August 1981.
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Notary Ptiblit/
/> I f My Commission expires:
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