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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20028F3931983-01-19019 January 1983 Ro:On 821220,reactor Trip Circuit Breaker a Failed to Trip When Trip Signal Initiated.Caused by Sticking Undervoltage Relay.Relay Replaced.Contacts Cleaned ML20039F6081981-12-28028 December 1981 Ro:On 811228,review of Info Re Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program Revealed Calculational Error in Analyses Used to Update Heatup & Cooldown Curves.Unrevised Tech Spec Figures 3.1-1 & 3.1-2 Remain Conservative ML20038B5001981-12-0303 December 1981 Ro:On 811201,pressurizer Block Valves Found to Not Meet Design Specs of Closing Against Design Pressure.Caused by Undersized Motor Operator Which Will Not Develop Sufficient Torque to Shut Block Valve ML20038C7961981-12-0202 December 1981 Ro:On 811201,discovered Pressurizer Block Valves Did Not Meet Design Spec in That They May Not Close Against Design Pressure.Caused by Undersized Limitorque Operator Model SMB-000-5 ML20009H6891981-07-30030 July 1981 Nonroutine 30-day Rept:On 810623,fire Door 5 Opened to Relieve Excessive Heat from Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room. Heat Caused by Backleakage Combined W/Hot Temp & Lack of Ventilation.Repairs Scheduled for Fall Refueling Outage ML20009H5771981-07-22022 July 1981 Ro:On 810608,fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seals Found in Nonconformance W/Approved Configuration Requirements. Deficiencies Occurred During Mod 445-N Implementation.Seals Will Be Repaired During Refueling Outage ML19341B2741981-01-15015 January 1981 Ro:On 810114,both Channels of Heat Trace for Both Boric Acid Transfer Pumps Determined Inoperable in Violation of Tech Spec 3.2.3.C.Caused by Misleading Step in Procedure for Taking Pump Out of Svc ML18004B9871979-08-30030 August 1979 Ro:On 790829,svc Water Booster Pump a Tripped When Svc Water Booster Pump B Was Stopped,In Violation of Tech Specs 3.3.4.1.a.Power Reduction Initiated & Svc Water Booster Pumps Returned to Svc ML19317D4681973-05-0101 May 1973 Ro:On 730423,water Spill from Refueling Water Storage Tank to Storm Drainage Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedures & Personnel Error.Plant Mgt Will Review Methods & Have Cautioned Operators to Exercise Extreme Caution 1983-01-19
[Table view] Category:LER)
MONTHYEARML20028F3931983-01-19019 January 1983 Ro:On 821220,reactor Trip Circuit Breaker a Failed to Trip When Trip Signal Initiated.Caused by Sticking Undervoltage Relay.Relay Replaced.Contacts Cleaned ML20039F6081981-12-28028 December 1981 Ro:On 811228,review of Info Re Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program Revealed Calculational Error in Analyses Used to Update Heatup & Cooldown Curves.Unrevised Tech Spec Figures 3.1-1 & 3.1-2 Remain Conservative ML20038B5001981-12-0303 December 1981 Ro:On 811201,pressurizer Block Valves Found to Not Meet Design Specs of Closing Against Design Pressure.Caused by Undersized Motor Operator Which Will Not Develop Sufficient Torque to Shut Block Valve ML20038C7961981-12-0202 December 1981 Ro:On 811201,discovered Pressurizer Block Valves Did Not Meet Design Spec in That They May Not Close Against Design Pressure.Caused by Undersized Limitorque Operator Model SMB-000-5 ML20009H6891981-07-30030 July 1981 Nonroutine 30-day Rept:On 810623,fire Door 5 Opened to Relieve Excessive Heat from Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room. Heat Caused by Backleakage Combined W/Hot Temp & Lack of Ventilation.Repairs Scheduled for Fall Refueling Outage ML20009H5771981-07-22022 July 1981 Ro:On 810608,fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seals Found in Nonconformance W/Approved Configuration Requirements. Deficiencies Occurred During Mod 445-N Implementation.Seals Will Be Repaired During Refueling Outage ML19341B2741981-01-15015 January 1981 Ro:On 810114,both Channels of Heat Trace for Both Boric Acid Transfer Pumps Determined Inoperable in Violation of Tech Spec 3.2.3.C.Caused by Misleading Step in Procedure for Taking Pump Out of Svc ML18004B9871979-08-30030 August 1979 Ro:On 790829,svc Water Booster Pump a Tripped When Svc Water Booster Pump B Was Stopped,In Violation of Tech Specs 3.3.4.1.a.Power Reduction Initiated & Svc Water Booster Pumps Returned to Svc ML19317D4681973-05-0101 May 1973 Ro:On 730423,water Spill from Refueling Water Storage Tank to Storm Drainage Sys.Caused by Inadequate Procedures & Personnel Error.Plant Mgt Will Review Methods & Have Cautioned Operators to Exercise Extreme Caution 1983-01-19
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers RA-97-0258, LER 97-S12-00:on 971119,discovered Uncompensated Security Zone.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Members of Security Force.Provided Event Info to Security Shift Personnel & Changed Practice Re Zone Review1997-12-19019 December 1997 LER 97-S12-00:on 971119,discovered Uncompensated Security Zone.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Members of Security Force.Provided Event Info to Security Shift Personnel & Changed Practice Re Zone Review ML20211M6491997-10-0808 October 1997 Addenda 1 to Part 21 Rept Re Weldments on Opposed Piston & Coltec-Pielstick Emergency stand-by Diesel gen-set lube-oil & Jacket Water Piping Sys.Revised List of Potentially Affected Utils to Include Asterisked Utils,Submitted ML20217Q2751997-06-30030 June 1997 CP&L Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Period 970101-0630 ML14183A6951995-09-18018 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Approving Relocation of Technical Support Ctr ML20059H7721994-01-17017 January 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Virginia Power Notifying Fairbands Morse Via Failure Analysis Rept NESML-Q-058 of Defective Air Start Distributor cam,16104412 ML17352A8691993-05-31031 May 1993 Technical Rept, Assessment of Aging Degradation of Civil/ Structural Features at Selected Operating Nuclear Power Plants. ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20118B4391992-09-11011 September 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Degradation in Abb Type 27N Undervoltage Relays Used in Electrical Switchgear.Recommends That Users Review Applications Requiring Exposures Greater than 1E03 Rads TID W/Time Delay Function Option ML20079H1571991-09-30030 September 1991 Nonproprietary Evaluation of Revised Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Procedure,Hb Robinson Unit 2 ML20086T2951991-06-14014 June 1991 Rev 1 to EQ Documentation Package Eqdp 36.0, Boston Insulated Wire Cable ML20086T2861991-03-0808 March 1991 Rev 1 to EQ Documentation Package Eqdp 11.1, Dekoron Instrumentation Cables ML20086T2561991-03-0808 March 1991 Rev 1 to EQ Documentation Package 10.0, Continental Shielded Instrument Cable ML20065K6961990-10-31031 October 1990 Mechanical Licensing Rept for Hb Robinson High Thermal Performance Fuel Assemblies ML20065K6971990-10-31031 October 1990 Thermal Hydraulic Compatibility Analysis of Anf High Thermal Performance Fuel for Hb Robinson,Unit 2 ML20005G6831990-01-0505 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Installation Instructions for Grommet Use Range for Patel Conduit Seal P/N 841206.Conduit Seals in Environ Qualification Applications Inspected for Proper Wire Use Range & Grommets Replaced ML20247E0701989-07-20020 July 1989 Info Rept:On 890717-0804,fire Penetration Seals Will Be Removed from Svc to Allow Access for Ventilation Sys Mod. Addl Fire Barrier Penetrations Will Be Made in Wall Between RHR Pump Pit & Fuel Handling Bldg,Per Tech Spec 3.14.7.2 ML20246E9111989-03-31031 March 1989 PDC-3:Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corp Power Distribution Control for PWRs & Application of PDC-3 to Hb Robinson Unit 2 ML20245H0821989-01-25025 January 1989 Criticality Safety Analysis of Hb Robinson Spent Fuel Pool W/4.2% Nominal Enrichment Fuel Assemblies ML20205T0551988-10-31031 October 1988 Responses to NRC Questions on RTD Bypass Elimination Licensing Rept ML20147E2371988-02-29029 February 1988 1987 Annual Rept - Primary Coolant Iodine Spikes ML20147B1971987-12-31031 December 1987 1987 Annual Rept - Primary Safety & Relief Valve Challenges ML20236K7731987-10-31031 October 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1987 ML20235W3781987-09-30030 September 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1987 ML20238E2741987-08-31031 August 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1987 ML20235H3151987-06-30030 June 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1987 ML17261A5301987-06-18018 June 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Util Failure to Comply W/Component Containment Isolation Licensing Commitment If Proposed Mods to Component Cooling Water Sys Instituted.Utils Advised to Evaluate Containment Isolation Sys ML20214W3241987-05-31031 May 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1987 ML20214R5101987-04-30030 April 1987 Rev 1 to Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1987,correcting Operation Statistics & Shutdown Experience Due to Mathematical Errors ML20215L4941987-04-30030 April 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1987 ML20206F3561987-03-31031 March 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1987 ML20210B4141987-03-31031 March 1987 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1987 ML20205F6021987-03-23023 March 1987 Special Rept:On 870302,noble Gas Effluent Monitor for Main Steam Line B Declared Inoperable & Svc Not Returned Until 870312.Caused by Defective Detector.Detector Replaced.High Voltage for Detector Adjusted & Sys Operation Checked ML20212P3101987-02-28028 February 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1987 ML20214Q7891987-01-31031 January 1987 Cycle 12,SAR ML20210R6341987-01-31031 January 1987 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1987 ML20207M2451986-12-31031 December 1986 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1986 L-18-120, Rev 0 to Supplemental Info in Support of Conservatisms in Criticality Analysis Performed for Hb Robinson Isfsi1986-12-18018 December 1986 Rev 0 to Supplemental Info in Support of Conservatisms in Criticality Analysis Performed for Hb Robinson Isfsi ML20215C7911986-11-30030 November 1986 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1986 ML20213F3121986-10-31031 October 1986 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1986 ML20215G1081986-09-30030 September 1986 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1986 ML20215F0361986-09-29029 September 1986 Special Rept:On 860902,during Cold Shutdown,Pressurizer PORV Lifted Twice to Prevent Overpressurization.Caused by Inadvertent Action by Unit Operators.Operations Personnel Counseled Re Importance of Breaker Position Indicators ML20211C0641986-09-0909 September 1986 Rev 0 to Final Rept Criticality Safety Analysis Hb Robinson Spent Fuel Storage Racks (Unpoisoned,Low Density) W/4.2% Enriched 15x15 Fuel Assemblies ML20211C0491986-09-0202 September 1986 Rev 0 to Final Rept Criticality Safety Analysis Hb Robinson New Fuel Storage Vault W/4.2% Enriched 15x15 Fuel Assemblies ML20212F5321986-07-31031 July 1986 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1986 ML20203D0221986-07-14014 July 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Air Monitoring Sys Probes Exhibiting Blue Tip Rather than Normal White Tip & Insensitive to Chlorine. Caused by Improper Handling/Storage.Advisory Bulletin Encl. Item Not Reportable Per Part 21 ML20202G3371986-06-30030 June 1986 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1986 ML20211B5601986-05-31031 May 1986 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1986 ML20197D2651986-04-30030 April 1986 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1986 1999-09-22
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W ,id (no n4wnelQ 1ra:.m.ac;.w u -ny.m H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT Post Office Box 790 Hartsville, South Carolina 29550 JUL 2 % 13iH Rooinson File No: 2-0-4-a-9 Serial:RSEP/81-1151 ff b ./,%
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Q h U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j ,
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]3 Region II, Suite 3100 -
101 Marietta Street T p Q$ Ng, i Atlanta, Georgia 30303 6, g*g# 3 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 4 '
g, s DOCKET NO. 50-261 @
LICENSE NO. DPR-23 N @
THIRTY DAY SPECIAL REPORT - FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION FIRE SEALS
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) submits the following thirty day special report as required by Technical Specifications (TS) 3.14.7.2.c.
This specification requires that a special report be prepared if an in-l operable fire barrier penetration seal is not restored to an operable l condition within seven days. As of June 18, 1981, H. B. Robinson Unit l No. 2 (HBR2) has had five fire barrier penetration seals in a degraded state, and therefore inoperable, for more than seven days. The required backup fire detectors have been verified operable which satisfies the compensatory action required by TS 3.14.7.2. The following is a descrip-tion of the status of these five penetration seals. ,
Background
On May 15, 1981, NRC issued Amendment No. 57 to License No. DPR-23. This amendment updated the fire protection Technical Specifications to include operability and testing requirements for new fire protection systems and p included a 7 day inoperability requirement for fire barrier penetration ,
seals which was not in the previous Technical Specifications. At this time HBR2 was shutdown for a steam generator inspection outag,e.
On June 11, 1981, the unit went critical, and the seven day inoperability period described in TS 3.14.7.2 for the above seals began. On June 18, 1981, CP&L was required to submit this report pursuant to TS 6.9.3.g within the next 30 days. This report is being submitted beyond this 30 day period due to an administrative delay. This delay was discussed with Mr. C. Julian of Region II on July 20, 1981.
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, g . 4-Letter to Mr. James P. O'Reilly Serial:RSEP/81-ll51 Page 2 Event During a Control Room habitability inspection on June 8, 1981, while the plant was shutdown, five of eighteen fire barrier penetration seals in the Control Room floor were identified as not satisfying the approved configuration requirements of Maintenance Instruction 12, " Repair of Cable Penetrations". Specifically two problems were noted: 1) In two penetrations, FP-30 and FP-31, the open ends of conduits penetrating the seals were filled with Kao-wool mineral wool fiber material instead of the required BISCO Silicon RTV foam, and 2) In three cable tray penetra-tions, FP-33, 37 and 38, only one h-inch Marinite-I board was bolted to the bottom of these floor penetrations as a backing to the Kao-wool seal instead of the required two -inch Marinite-I boards. These deficiencies apparently occurred during Modification 445-N implementation and were not identified during the post modification inspections.
The small open end conduit penetrations through cable tray penetration seals are unique to the Control Room. Modification 445-N did not ad-dress filling these conduits with BISCO Silicon RTV foam because the modification did not treat these conduit penetratiocs within the cable tray penetrations separately from the cable tray penetrations themselves.
Following the completion of Modification 445-N, CP&L initiated an inspec-tion of conduit penetrations throughout the plant for review of the proper sealing configuration. The two Control Room conduit penetrations in question were inadvertently omitted from this list as they were considered pert of the cable tray penetrations. All conduit penetration seals other than the two omitted from the list did meet the configuration requirements of MI-12.
The small clearances between the cable trays and the Control Room cable tray penetrations prevented the installation of the additional h-inch Marinite-I boards to FP-33, 37 and 38. A preliminary review *of plant cabJe trays indicates that this situation does not exist elsewhere in the plant.
Because the five fire barrier penetration seals are located in Control Room cabinets it would be difficult to effect repairs without possibly compromising the control circuits for safe shutdown equipment. As a result, the earliest possible date for repaire is during the next scheduled refueling outage in late 1981. Operation in the interium with the five fire barrier penetration seals inoperable will not constitute a safety hazard far the following reasons:
- 1. The seals in their current configuration are nearly degraded and do provide a fire barrier.
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Letter to Mr. James P. O'Reilly Serial:RSEP/81-1151 Page 3
- 2. Penetration Seals FP-30 and FP-31 are small conduits between the Control Room and the old Unit No. 1 Cable Spread Room.
Fire detection in both rooms is operable and should provide early warning of fires in these zenes.
- 3. Penetration Seals FP-33, FP-37 and FP-38 are located between
- the Unit No. 2 Cable Spread Room and the NIS cabinets and RTGB in the Control Room. Fire detection in these areas is operable and should provide early warning of a fire. In addition, the Cable Spread Room contains a HALON 1301 Suppres-sion System. All cables in the Cable Spread Room are coated with Intumastic 285 flame retardant material which would pre-vent the spread of any fire along cables in this zone. Thase factors, combined with the fact that there are almost no fixed or transient combustibles in the Cable Spread Room make it highly unlikely that a fire could occur of sufficient magnitude to reach the existing seals and create a significant hazard to safe shutdown capabilities.
HBR2 will repair the five fire barrier penetration sealc during the next y refueling outage, and will thereby be in full compliance with TS 3.14.7.2 1
before achieving criticality at the end of the 1981 refueling outage.
If you have any questions, please contact me or my staff.
. Very truly yours, R.-B. Starkey, Jr.
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, General Manager l
H.B.RobinsonS.E.P1put
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