ML20009G832

Forwards Paper Re Facility Security to Be Presented at 810729 Licensing Hearing

ML20009G832
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	07/27/1981
From:	Moucka B AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8108050114
Download: ML20009G832 (9)

Text

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D0CXET MUUJ.E3 ag p0D,& UTL FAC.c g . 36iJ"4

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission '/[ g Mr. Hendrie, Chaiman C D Mashington, D.C. 20555 0 43g31*= t4 D C $,s.T;rjSNyc sh'!

Dear Chaiman H.ndrie:

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The enclosed paper will be presented and subnitted fhk, record at the July 29, 1981 public hearings on the San Onofre Nuclear' Generating Station licensing of units two and three to be held at San Clemente High School.

I thought you should have a copy for your attention.

Brian P. Moucka 28222 Stonehouse Rd.

Lake Elsinore, Ca. 92330 (71h) 67h-6576 c.c. SCE SDG&E Si ~

EC '/ 4 Governor Brown

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Department of Defense q, ,.

Commander, Camp Pendleton e :G L. A.~ Times #j ,

p Mother Jones Magazine I New Age Magazine KPFK Radio gol 5

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THE VULNERABILITI 0F THE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TO ACTS OF 4.d ') /

SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM N ,

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A MIDNIGHT SERENADE OF SONGS 1, 2, AND 3 ,2 J'?L : : 1931 > 2

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With the increase in the news of sabotage and internationa 'vl N terrorism including the recent Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear power plant I am concerned about the possible vu$rability of all nuclear power plants. Nuclear power plants may become prime targets for sabotage and terrorism.

Da San Onofre plant could be substantially attractive to terrorism because one half of the population in California lives within 100 miles of the site and when units two and three are licensed and operating San Onofre will be th6 tecond largest nuclear power plant in the United States.

I therefore conducted my own study of possible weak points in the security systems and discovered through the materiai, open to the public at Mission Viejo Public Library, the San Onofre Visitors Center personnel, and persons who have worked at the construction site that even an average person can within a very short time obtain information useful to potential acts of damage, destruction, and the worst being a core meltdown.

This study of sabotage and terrorism was primarily focused on the ocean cooling system. There are nosecurity systems protecting I

the antrance of the ocean intake structures of all three reactors and all three are extremely vulnerable to irrepa rable destruction by way of knocking out the systems that provide critical. cooling ocean water to the main steam condensers, the component circulating water heat exchangers, and the turbine plant circulating water heat exchangers. " Critical" in that without the millions of gallons of l water per minuite that are pumped through these condensers anni a core meltdown would be eminent.

An example of this vulnerability is that a scuba diver can easily swim into the intake structures (fig.1) and 3300 feet through the large nipes (fig.2) and be inside the plant in about eight minutes e

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place explosives near the pump impellers. Then with the help of a boat and line be pulled out and after some miles away detonate the explosives stqping all cooling waters to the condensers, creating within hours a core meltdown.

The following three of many interesting scenarios have already taken place at San Caofre.

During a plant tour of unit one a tour member shockingly displayed a bottle labeled " nitroglycerin' while in 'the control room. This person was demonstrating how lax the security was at the most strategic location of the plant. Security was substantially tightened after ttlis incident.

Another example was when some people partially made a film on how easy it was to h$ jack the trucks that carry away the spent fuel rods to the federal depositories. The film was shown to the power company which then prom %d the action of plac ing a special armed escort with the shipments from then on.

Another incident was when unsafe chemicals were being poured into the water at the plant to clear some problem up but was obviously environmentally harmful to the ocean life. The power company denied the use of the chemical additives so a concerned person jumped over the fence and photographed them in the act. He safely got back out e

undetected.- After the expose security was tightened up around the perimeter. ,

Yet uncorrected are the important control panels at unit one that can be shot out from the highway. There is a two mile off limits air space around the plant that is not enforced. A half dozen terrorists can easily take over the plant and demand most anything

they want from this country. Honest and sincare people from the anti-nuke movement say that maybe if we don't publicly bring up the subject of terrorist vulnerability no one else will think of it.

I think thir. is pretty naive!

By the above stories it seems like it takes a person outside of the nuclear industry to show the vulnerable spots in the plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, San Diego Gas and Electric, and Southern California Edison have been grossly negligent in protecting 2.

the many people that work at the plant and the thousands of people who live in the surrounding communities. I propose that a "public safety monitor" be at the plant at all times to protect the nearby citizens. This person should not be an employee of the NRC or the power companies but an outside observer from the los al community.

Undoubtedly unfriendly nations have devised attack scenarios on United States nuclear power plants. The vulnerability.of San Onofre to acts of sabotage and terrorism invite immense destruction without even having to fire a misste at it.

Since the outcome of acts of terrorism may have far-reaching, costly, and obviously disasterous consequenses, an indepth study and investigation must be made to determine the importance of these and other potential weaknesses of the total security planning at San Onofre.

In the interest of both public safety and national security it is imperative that unit one be shut down and the licensing of units two and three be delayed until such safeguards can be met.

Brian P. Moucka 28222 Stonehouse Rd.

Lake Elsinore, Ca. 92330 71h-67h-6576 i

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