ML20009G449

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Rept 50-327/81-18.Corrective Actions:Heavy Gauge Iron Plates Welded Into Place on 810522 to Reduce Roof Opening
ML20009G449
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 06/29/1981
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19260H990 List:
References
NUDOCS 8108040273
Download: ML20009G449 (3)


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TENNESSEE VALLEY AuTRopITY: N CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSYE[sh4Oh.

i 400 Chestnut Street Tower II i

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nu. 20 June 2,

81 l

Mr. J.ames P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement 1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2

Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

1 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - NRC-0IE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT l

50-327/81 RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS 1

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The subject inspection report dated June 2, 1981 cited TVA with two Severity Level V Violations in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201.

Enclosed i

is our response to those violations as discussed with C. D. Ferny on June 29, 1981.

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If you have any questions, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

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To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are t

complete and true.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALIEY AUTh0RITY Y

L.

. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc:

Mr. Victor Stello, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, DC 20555 8109040273 010721 PDR ADOCK 05000327 0

PDR An Equal Opportunity Employer

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ENCLOSURE SEQUOYAH N,UCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS u

Violation 327/81-18-01 10 CFR 73.55(c)(1) requires that access to vital equipment shall require passage through at least two physical barriers of sufficient strength to meet the performance requirements of 73.55(a).

10 CFR 73.2(f)(2) defines physical barriers as building walls, ceilings and floors constructed of stone, brick, cinderblock, concrete, steel or comparable materials (openings which are secured by grates, doors, or covers of construction and fastening of sufficient strength such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by any opening). Section 5.2.1 of the licensee's security plan states that all vital area barriers will be resistant to penetration. The penetration resistance of the barriers will not be diminished by doors, windows, and other openings in the barrier. Additionally, section 3 1.2.2 of the security plan states that roof and exterior wall penatrations of plant buildings (air intake, exhaust openings, etc.) larger than 81 square inches shall be grilled. Overlapping steel bars, grills, etc., will be constructed to ensure that openings are no larger than 9 square inches.

Contrary to the above, openings greater than 81 square inches, in the roof of the Emergency Raw Cooling Water building, a vital area, were not covered by a grill.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement III.E).

Admission or Denial of Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

Reason for Violation Failure to recognize that the subject opening violated the requirements of j

the plant's security plan.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved Heavy gauge iron plates approximately 18 inches wide by 3 to 4 feet long have been welded in place in order to reduce the..bject openings to an acceptable size (less than 81 square inches). This was accomplished by May 22, 1981.

Actions Taken to Prevent Further Noncompliance A review of designated vital areas revealed no further areas of noncompliance.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved We are now in full compliance.

Violation 327/81-18-02 10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) requires the licensee to control all points of personnel and vehicle access irao the protected area. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure to assure their ability to respond or to summon assistance. Sections 3 2.1.4.3 and 3.2.2.4 of the licensee's security plan state that Post 3 is responsible for all vehicles entering the protected area. The vehicle access portal will be manned by a Public Safety Officer when open and observed from the access control portal.

Contrary to the above, the last access control function was not being performed by Post 3 in the bullet resistance structure in that at 4:00 p.m., on May 12, 1981, the inspector observed a security officer unlock the protected area vehicle gate and allow a vehicle to exit without notifying Post 3 that the gate was going to be opened.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement III.E).

Admission or Denial of Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

Reason for Violation The cause of this violation was a security employee oversight.

Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved The individual officers responsible for the violation were reinstructed of their responsibilities through informal management discussions and the issuance of Memorandum Instruction No. 50.

Actions Taken to Prevent Further Noncompliance All officers and supervisors have reviewed " Post Orders for Vehicle Gate Control" as well as all section instruction letters. A Memorandum Instruction (MI-50) was issued with additional guidance to avoid any further noncompliance.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved We are now in full compliance.

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