ML20009F844
| ML20009F844 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1981 |
| From: | James D ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., BECHTEL GROUP, INC., PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8108030096 | |
| Download: ML20009F844 (11) | |
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Of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Of NUCIZAR REGUIKIORY COMMISSION T'
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JUL 291981 > 9 37 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board cm:e ;f t'.: Se:retM e::keti-g & S:aice 9
9 Er In the Matter of
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O PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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Docket Nos. 50-387 and
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50-388 ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
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(Suscuehannu ' team Electric Station,
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Units 1 and 2)
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WL?y hp s,g AFFIDAVIT OF D. W. JAMES g[
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SUMMARY
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DISPOSITION OF CONTENTION 11 i9 i
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g' u,.am mum comunen County of San Francisco)
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State of California
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D. W. James, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says:
1.
I am a Nuclear Engineering Supervisor for the San Francisco Power Division of Bechtel Power Corporation. My business aSdress is Fifty Beale Street, San Francisco, California.
I give this affidavit in support i
of Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 11 in this proceeding.
I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein l
l ard believe them to be true and correct.
A summary of m', professional qualifications and experience is attached as Exhibit "A' tereto.
2.
Contention 11 in this proceeding states:
The proposed project creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the health and safety of petitioners and their private property, and violates the Canmission's standards for protection against radiation in 10 CFR SS20.1 and 20.105(a), in that the Applicants have failed to provide adequately for safe onsite storage, for periods of up to 10 to 15 years, of spent fuel and low-level radioactive wastes.
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2-The purpose of this affidavit is te respond to that portion of Contention 11 which is addressed to safe onsite storage fo spent fuel.
Specifically, the affidavit shows that the spent fuel storage facilities of the Susquehanna facilities can safely store spent fuel for periods at least as long as the duration of the operating licenses (i.e. through the year 2013). '1he capability of the spent fuel itself to be stored for this period of time is dealt with in the Affidavit of Clair Herrington in Support of Partial Summary Disposition of Contention 11.
3.
At the Susquehanna facility (as at other nuclear power reactors) nuclear fuel which has been discharged frm the reactor is stored in water-filled basins called spent fuel pools.
The water provides both for heat removal and for radiation shielding.
4.
Each of the Susquehanna units has its own spent fuel storage facility. This facility, located in the reactor building, consists of a water-fill'ed reinforced concrete basin lined with stainless-steel, racks for storing the fuel, cranes and material handling equipnent, a heat exchanger for cooling the water, a clean-up system for controlling water purity, and pumps to circulate the water.
Both units share a comon cask I
pit that accepts the spent fuel shipping casks and accumudates underwater fuel transfer frm either unit through its respective transfer canal.
5 The_ pool walls are six foot thick reinforced concrete. The pools.
i themselves are part of the reactor building structure and meet all the codes and standards for the reactor building. The pools are also designed -
for the same loads and loading conditions as th? Qactor building. All components of the spent fuel storage facilities are located within tb reactor building.
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), 53.8.4.
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Scent Fuel Pool Liner 6.
Each spent fuel pool is lined with a stainless steel liner.
The fuel pool liner is not load bearing; it is directly supp3rted by a system of stiffeners and anchors embedded in the pool wall. We liner plates are weJded to those embeds. The pool wall with its embeds and liner is designed to withstand all credible loadirg cmbinations resulting from natural phencmena and plant operation.
Liner material is stainless steel to minimize corrosion formation and possible leakage. Experience with stainless steel in denineralized water service has not shown measurable corrosion.
l For design purposes a corrosion allowance of 0.0001 inch per year is made for the 1/4 lach thick liner. Therefore, liner corrosion over the lifetime of the plant is considered insignificant.
7.
A leak detection system is provided to verify leak tightness following liner installation and during plant operation. Any leakage
- old be contained by a system of channels welded behind the liner weld joints which permit free gravity flow throtph isolation valves to a leak detection station. We liner is capable of withstanding a terperature l
of 212*F during an accident situation involving pDol boilirg.
Liner l
repairs can be (and have been) made even when there is spent fuel in a i
pool.
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Soent Fuel Pool Racks 8.
The spent fuel racks are of all anodized aluminum, bolted construction and are attached to the pool' walls through embeds and anchors.
The neutron absorber material, Boral (a ceramic mixture of boron carbide and aluminum oxide), contained in the poison cans of the racks, is completely encapsulated in aluminum and, hence, is totally isolated frcm the pool water. Each poison can is pressure and vacuum leak-tested prior WP36/4-3
I to installation. Seismic restraints of welded stainless steel construction tying to the pool liner embeds are provided to enable the racks to withstand all credible loading cmbinations resulting from natural i
phenomena and plant ooeration. To reduce any galvanic corrosion, inconel pins are used between the wall seismic restraints and the racks.
Ebr the same purpose, the leveling screwc of the racks butt against ABS plastic M discs that are crimped into stainless steel pads.
9.
'Ihese design features will prevent any sionificant degradation of the racks from water submersion, radiation, thermal, hydrodynamic, and 1
seismic loading conditions over the 40 year design lifetime of the plant.
Furthermore, test coupons consisting of actual poison can sections installed adjacent to the racks will permit verification of the long-term mechanical and material integrity of the poison cans over the plant lifetime.
I Scent Fu5 Pool Coolinq I
10.
The fuel pool water temperature is maintained below 125'F by l
normal and backup cooling systems. Normally, fuel pool cooling is provided by the Fuel Pool Coolirg and Cleanup (FPCC) system. One FPCC system is provided for each spent fuel pool. The FPCC system is sized to cool the l
maximum normal heat load, which is the heat generated by the 2,840 fuel i
l assemblies which could be placed in the spent. fuel pool, assuming that all the fuel assemblies are discharged at the normal refueling rate.
See FSAR Table 9.1-2a and 2b. The fuel pool cooling pumps circulate the pool water in a closed loop; taking suction frm the skimmer surge tank through 1/ ABS plastic is copolymer of' acrylonitrile, butadiene and styrene.
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heat exchangers where the decay heat of the irradiated fuel is transferred to the service water system. A partial flow frcm the cooling loop is directed through filter demineralizers and returned with the bypass flow back to the pool. Were are three, one-third capacity pumps and three, one-third capacity heat exchangers in each FPCC system.
Early in the plant life, when the cooling recuirements are lower, unneeded ptmps and heat exchangers will be kept in reserve.
11.
The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system serves as backtp to the FPCC system and is also used to carry the emergency heat load. Me emernency heat load will occur when the fuel pool is filled to its maximum capacity of 2,840 fuel assemblies with the last discharge a full core unload (rather than the 1/4 core discharge in the maximum normal case).
See FSAR Tables 9.1-2c and 2d.
12.
One RHR pump out of the four RER pumps and one RHR heat exchanger out of the two RHR heat exchangers will provide sufficient cooling for either the maximum normal or emergency heat load. We l
remaining RHR pumps and heat exchanger provide additional backup capability.
1 l
The RHR system interties with the outlet line of the skimmer surge tank and discharges to the pool through two independent Seismic Category I lines.
Makeuo Water.Systen l
In the highly unlikely event that both the FPCC system and its 13.
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backups (the RHR system) are lost, the primary consequence would be to sionificantly increase the evaporative losses frca the pool. mis would l
occur as a restdt of pool boiling.
(It should be noted that the " boiling" l
l which would take place would be in the form of steam escaping frcm the WP36/4-6 l
pool surface, rather than the type of violent bubbling cmmonly associated with that term). Using very conservative assumptions (such as no heat loss through conduction or evaporation), boiling in the pool would not begin until 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> after loss of all external cooling at the maximum normal heat load and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after cooling at the emergency heat load.
During these time periods, one or more of the cooling systems could be isolated and repaired to restore cooling. Neither loss of external cooling nor pool boiling restricts accessibility to the cooling systems for repairs.
14.
Even if the boiling occurs, fuel damage cannot take place so long as the fuel remains under water.
(It should be noted that in a BWR, fuel when it is in the reactor is normally exposed to a boiling reghne.)
There are at least four independent sources of makeup water for evaporative losses, each one capable of providing water at a rate greater than the maximum boil-off rate.
Makeup for evaporative losses is normally supplied from the Makeup Demineralizer System. Tw:) independent, Seismic Category I backup sources of water are provided frem the Emergency Service Water System. As further backup to these backup systems, makeup water to the pool can be provided through a fire hose on the refueling floor. Because the tops of the spent fuel are under twenty-three feet of water, the plant would have a long time in wh'ich to a3d makeup water before reaching a situation
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where damage to the fuel could occur. With the redundancies in cooling systems and makeup water sources, there is no conceivable way in which the spent fuel could be damaged due to failures in cooling or makeup systens.
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15.
It should be noted that the pools have no bottom drains or connections frcm which the water could be inadvertently drained. Check valves and siphon breakers are provided at the high points of supply lines to prevent siphoning of water frcm the g>ols. We manual valves for backup cooling or backup water supplies are in accessible areas in the reactor building. Were is no credible mechanism for a sudden loss of water frcn the pools.
16.
Fuel storage is essentially a passive system and recuires little operator intervention. Alarms indicating a high pool water temperature, high or low wate'r level in the pool, and high area radiation are provided in the control rocn.
17.
The spent fuel pool including the spent fuel racks, the redundant fuel pool cooling system (RHR) and the redundant water makeup provisions, are designat!ed Seismic Category I and, as such, are designed to withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. They are therefore protected against any credible seismic event.
Criticality l
18.
The spent fuel racks are designed to assure that the spent fuel remains in a suberitical condition under both normal and abnormal storace.corditions.. te. criticality. analysis. performed for the Susquehanna fuel pools uses a series of diffusion theory calculations for its principal mathematical model. W e results of the reference case so calculated are further ccmpared with the results of an independent calculation using l
the multi-croup, multi-dimensional Monte Carlo Neutron Transport Code, l
l Keno-IV, which has been bench-marked against actual critical experiments.
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To ensure that the analysis followed a conservative approach and conformed to the generic guidelines for criticality safety analysis, the following assumptions were made:
a.
A uniform 3.25 percent by weight of U-235 distribution in an 8 x 8 assembly, i
b.
Fresh fuel, no burnable poison.
c.
Minor structural members replaced by water.
d.
Fresh water at 68*F (reactivity decreases with increasing water i
temperature).
e.
Ebel assemblies are channeled and centered within the storage cavity (cht_nneled fuel is more reactive),
f.
An infinite array of storage fuel was assumed. All of these assumptions are more conservative than the situation that will actually exist in the spent fuel pool.
19.
The effects on reactivity of various uncertainties and variables I
such as water temperature, void effect, Boral width, channel effect and spacing sensitivity were also evaluated. The analysis shows that Li any conceivable conditica, the multiplication factor !Keff) is maintained below 0.95.
This includes the worst case postulation of a dropped fuel element.
l' Aircraft, Scacecraft and Meteors 20.
There is no significant aircraft traffic in the plant area.
FSAR S2.2.2.
The probability of an aircraft striking the Susquehanna facility and resulting in a potential nuclear safety hazard has been I
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FSAR 53.5.1.6.
The likelihood of such an accident affecting the spent fuel pool itself is even smaller. The probability of spacecraft and meteors i:rpacting the spent fuel pool is negligible.
21.
For all of the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the spent fuel storage facilities at the Susquehanna facilities can safely store spent fuel for at least the duration of the operating licenses.
}. w hem D. W. JAMES Subscribed and sworn before me this
/7 day of July,1981.
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Notary Publig/
j BtrfY L. VASIL l
. NOTARY PUBLIC CALIFORNIA CITY AND COUNTY OF
.AN FRANCISCO My Commission Expires War 25,19M
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EXHIBIT A D. W. JAW. S NUCLEAR ENGINEERING SUPERVISOR FOR SAN FF.ANCISCO POWER DIVISION OF BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION EDUCATION:
Bachelor of Chemical Engineering, University of Minnesota, 1968 Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering, Purdue University, 1970
SUMMARY
Mr. Ja=es has eleven years of experience in nuclear safety design and engineering in nuclear power stations.
In his current position, Mr.
James is the supervisor of the Radiological Assessment Group which includes the Radiological Dose Assessment Group and the Radwaste Systan Design Group.
In this capacity he is respone sible for the overall supervision and direction of all radioattive waste treatment system design for the San Francisco Power Division. His acti-vities include studies of alternate liquid rad-waste treat =ent =ethods, alternate solidification systems, available volu=e reduction processes including calcination and incineration, system-capital and operating costs, vaste generation rates from operation and deco==3ssioning, and design features to reduce operator exposure.
The Dose Assess =ent Group, which is under Mr.
Ja=es' supervision, is responsible for all dose analysis work for nuclear power plant projects.
This work includes dose analyses and application of meteorological models for nor:21 and accident conditicus, design review of safety systems de-signed to mitigate activity releases, and develop-ment of criteria for radiological monitoring systems.
Mr. Ja es is responsible for the deve-lopment and maintenance of the ce=puter codes i
used for dose assessment by hil Bechtel offices.
I Under his supervision, studies of fuel pool boiling and the radiological consequences of heavy load drop accidents in the spent fuel pool are performed by Bechtel SFFD.
Prior to his currert position, Mr. James has held nuclear enginetring positions of increasing responsibilities on Bechtel projects in the U.S.
and Spain.
Most recently, Mr. James spent two years in Madrid, Spain as Nuclear Advisor on
" Central Nuclear de Vandellos".
Prior to that, Eb. James served as Nuclear Group Leader for three years on the Skagit Nuclear Power Project.
D. W. JAMES (Continued)
SI29' RY:
A In both positions, Mr. James held supervisory responsibilities relating to the full range of nuclear design activities, including detailec design of radioactive waste treatment systems and the fuel pool cooling and cleanup systems, specification and procurement of spent fuel racks including high density fuel racks on the Skagit projects, coordination of special safety system criteria such as for leakage detection, seismic, separation and other environmental criteria ste= ming from NRC licensing requirements.
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS:
Registered Professional Nuclear Engineer, State of California (No. 871)
Registered Professional Engineer, Chemical, State of Minnesota (No. 10771)
Me=ber, American Nuclear Society l
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