ML20009F813
| ML20009F813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1981 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009F812 | List: |
| References | |
| DD-81-14, NUDOCS 8108030047 | |
| Download: ML20009F813 (13) | |
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DD-81 -14 l-i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMllISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR In the itatter of
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Docket Nos. 50-443 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
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50-444 NEW HAMPSHIRE et al.
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(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
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DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. 2.206 i
l On February 11, 1980, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation denied under 10 C.F.R. 2.206 a petition filed by Mr. Robert A. Backus on behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL). 00-80-6, 11 NRC 371 (1980). SAPL's petition requested that the Director issue an order sus-pending or revoking Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-135 and CPPR-136 which authorize construction of the Public Service Company of New Hampshire's l
Seabrook Station. While the Director's decision was pending before the j
Commission, Mr. Backus filed a letter on June 30, 1980, before the Comission l
in support of SAPL's petition. Although the Commission declined to review the Director's decision, the Comission referred SAPL's June 30th letter to the Director fcr consideration as a separate petition under 10 C.F.R. 2.206.
SAPL has also submitted a videotape and photographs for consideration in connection with its June 30th letter.
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, SAPL's June 30th petition essentially reiterates its earlier request for suspension or revocation of the Seabrook permits.
In support of this request, SAPL raises the following contentions in its June 30th petition as a basis for taking action to suspend or revoke the Seabrook permits.
1.
The NRC Staff considers the Seabrook to be one of 12 " problem" fixed nuclear sites'in the country.
2.
Notification of 100". of the population within a five mile area within 15 minutes is impossible.
3.
Evacuation within the time frame indicated in NUREG-0396, Table 2 is impossible.
4.
In the absence of a finding that evacuation is feasible, construction should not be permitted to continue at the site as the Commission's June 9,1980, interim policy on Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 4S FR 40101 (June 13,1980) recognizes construction may foreclose options that may be important for protecting the public safety and health.
On March 13, 1981, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a memorandum in support of SAPL's request. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts' memorandum also argued that there were significant deficiencies in the permittee's evacuation time estimates which, in the Commonwealth's view, result in short evacuation time estimates.
STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTION 1 I
SAPL's first major contention is:
"[I]t has now become known that the NRC's staff considers the Seabrook site to be one of 12
- problem' fixed nuclear sites in the country.
, A letter from Mr. John W. Macy, Jr., Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to Governor Hugh Gallen of April 22, 1980, lists the Seabrook site, along with Indian Point, Zion, and nine others as one which has 'the highest population density within the 10 mile emergency planning zone or mutually agreed upon by FEMA and NRC.'"
Under the Memorandum of Understanding of January 11, 1980, between the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEftA), FEf1A, in support of the NRC licensing reviews, agreed to " provide NRC with an independent assessment of evacuation times around 12 reactor sites which have the highest population density within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone or are mutually agreed upon by FEMA and NRC."
45 FR 5847, 5848-49 (January 24,1980). This independent assessment is used by the NRC as part of the review of the licensees' evacua-tion time estimates. The fact that an independent assessment was requested by the NRC based on population density, while indicating the' staff's concern with the site, does not itself indicate that the Seabrook site or any of the other selected sites presents a special problem that prevents effective evacuation.
That a site is selected for exanination does not mandate suspension of construction pending completion of analyses or t'ie ultimate application of such analyses in the operating license review. See Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363,1367-70 (D.C. Cir.1979).
STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTION 2 SAPL's second major contention is:
" State Civil Defense officials have now publically [ sic]
conceded that the task of notifying 100% of the population within a five mile area within 15 minutes of notification to State or local officials is impossible.
Yet, the 15
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minute notification requirement is found in NUREG-0654,
' Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Regonte Plans and Preparedness Support of Nuclear Power Plants', Appendix 3."
The Commission has promulgated revised requirements for emergency preparedness at power reactor sites.
See Emergency Planning, Statement of Consideration and Final Rule, 45 FR 55409_et, seg. ( Aug. 19,1980) (amend-t ments to 10 C.F.R. Parts 50 & 70). The Commission's new requirements set forth conditions which rJst be met with respect to emergency preparedness before receiving a-construction permit or operating license. See 10 C.F.R. 50.34(a) & (b), 50.47, & Part 50, Appendix E.
Th? Commission has provided guidance on meeting the standards for acceptable emergency response plans in Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Jan.1980 & Rev.1, Nov.1980).
The revised emergency preparedness regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 9 IV.D., state, "The design objective [of the alerting sy:dm]
shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notifica-tion of the public within the plume expot ure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes." The design objective is intendvd to provide essen;ially complete coverage by the notification system of the population within about 10 miles of the site.
Contrary to the implication of SAPL's contention, the design objective is not intended to constitute a guarantee tnat erly notification can be provided for everyone with 100% assurance or that the system when tested under actual field conditions will meet the design objective in all cases.
1 See NUREG-0654, Ap ndix 3, at 3-1 (Rev.1).
The NRC recognizes that it will be impossible to assure that everyone within the-plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will actually be notified within 15 minutes. The requirement is to create a notification system that is capable of reaching essentially 100% of the population, not a sysrem that guarantees actual notification.
Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654 (Rev.1) provides guidance on acceptable means to meet the design objective. There is clearly no technical barrier to the accomplishment of this objective, e.g., by a system of sirens.
Such systems are ncw being installed around other nuclear power plant sites. As indicated in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3, at 3-3 (Rev.1),
"Every year, or in conjunction with an exercise of the facility, FEMA, in cooperation with the utility operator, and/or the State and local governments will take a statistical sample of the residents of all areas within about ten miles to assess the public's -ability to hear the alert-l ing signal and their awareness of the meaning of the prompt notification message as well as the availability of information or what to do in an emergency. "
This review will assure that deficiencies in the notification system will be identified and that an effective system will be maintained during the plant's lifetime.
STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTION 3
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SAPL's third basis for considering suspension or revocation of the l
l construction permits is:
"[M]any local chials have now in sworn state-ments indicaten their belief that evacuatien within the time frame indicated in NUREG-0396, TP ie 2, is impossible."
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. The times specified in NUREG-0396,. Tabic 2, provide ranges of time within which some offsite hazard may occur for purposes of developing emergency plans. These times are not intended to be a standard for determining or_ implementing a particular response, such as evacuation, to an accident. An emergency plan must describe a means for assessing the magnitude and impact of releases and for determining the need for and extent of protective ma sures.
See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 9 IV.B.
As described in NUREG-065A (Rev.1), Criterion J.7, "Each licensee saall establish a mechanism for l
recommending protective action to the appropriate State and local authorities.
These shall include Emergency Action Levels corresponding to projected doses to the population-at-risk, in accordance with Appendix 1 and with the recommendations set forth l
in Table 2.1 and 2.2 of the Manual of Protective l
Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear l
Incidents".
l Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654 specifies that a range of protective actions, including sheltering and evacuation, may be appropriate.
See also 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(10). The intent of these requirements is for the licensee and State and local officials to predetermine decision-making criteria for protective action that take into consideration plant conditions, evacuation times, shelter factors and other factors that, under the conditions at the time of the accident, will minimize the impact of the accident.
This does not imply that in the case of the most serious low probability events that all serious health effects will be absolutely prevented.
Indeed, for the i
very lowest likelihood events, some serious health effects could be expected at most operating reactor sites even with emergency preparedness programs f
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I i which fully meet thE regulations. The primary purpose of requiring i
evacuation time estimates is to provide cecisionmakers during an accident with knowledge of the available options for taking protective measures.
STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTION 4 SAPL's fourth contention is:
"In the absence of a finding of feasibility [of evacuation] construction should not be permitted to continue at the site, for as the Commission's June 9th [1980] Interim Policy Statement [on severe accident considerations] recognizes, this l
construction is intending to foreclose options that may be important for protecting the public health and safety."
In support of SAPL's questioning of the feasibility of evaucation, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts' states that "it seems likely tnat the licensee's current evacuation time estimates are too low." Memorandum at l
l 12.
In support of this statement, the Commonwealth presents the following l
matters as significant deficiencies in the evacuation time estimates, particularly with regard to peak season conditions:
I (1) The estimates failed to include time for decision, notification, preparation and confinnation; j
(2)
The estimates " failed to provide estimates based l
on simultaneous evacuation during the peak summer season of all beach areas lying from NE to SSE of the site or even simultaneous evacuation of Hampton Beach and either of the other two beach areas,
f Seabrook Beach and Salisbury State Beach". Memorandum at 10-11.
The evact.ation time for the " summer Sunday" case is determined almost totally by the rate at which the beaches can be evacuated.
There will be very little preparation time required by the beach population before evacuation.
Before the plant is license 1 to operate a prompt public alerting system to essentially complete the initia! notification of the beach population within 15 minutes must be installed.
The staff's preliminary review of the Seabrook applicant's evacuation time estimates, submitted in response to the staff's request of December 1979, confinned that simultaneous evacuation of the beaches within 2 and 5 miles of the site was not addressed. The Seabrook applicant has been requested to revise its evacuation time estimatas for the 2 and 5 mile i
radius to address this issue. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts also questions other aspects of the estimates, including off-season evacuation coiiditions. Memorandum at 11-12. The matters raised with respect to off-season evacuation are not considered significant, since off-season evacuation considerations for the Seabrook site are similar to those at other sites and do not, therefore, present unique problems at Seabrook.
Moreover, the evacuation time estimates for the peak summer conditions envelop the off-season considerations with respect to the general population and associated evacuation times.
As indicated above, the applicant has been asked to refine its recent estimates and may be asked to provide further estimates during the staff's operating license review to assure that all j
appropriate factors are considered in the estimates of evacuation time.
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However, evacuation estimates for the 2 and'5 mile radius summer populations have been developed as part of FEMA's independent assessment of the Seabrook evacuation times.
Sel Dynamic Evacuation Analyses:- Independent ~
Assessment of Evacuation Times from the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zones of Twelve Nuclear Power Stations,. FEftA-REP-3 (Feb.1981).
The evacuation time estimates provided by the independent FEMA study are based on current planning activation.
Implementation of evacuation traffic management plans, which are currently under development, will probably result in reduced evacuation times. Table 1 provides a comparison of the FEMA peak l
summer evacuation time estimates, winter weekday normal weather time estimates, and the median and maximum of the estimates provided by the 52 operating nuclear power sites in response to a November 29, 1979 NRC request.
As can be seen from Table 1, even the peak summer population evacuation time estimates for Seabrook are within the range 'of"the rdraal' condit! ion evacuation time estimates for the 52 sites analyzed-and, therefore, do not l
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warrant, merely on the basis of evacuation time estimates, special con-sideration now of either additional features or other actions which would prevent or mitigate the consequences of serious accidents.
The evacuation times estimated for the Seabrook site, which are based l
or'" on currently available comunications, notification systems and traffic ment capabilities, while longer than the median evacuation time for l
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currently operating plants, are within the range of current evacuation time estimates for operating nuclear power plants.
Current infonnation does not indicate that it is infeasible to develop an emergency plan, including an evacuation plan, for the area surrounding the Seabrook site. The emergency
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, plan may well furthek shorten the estimated evacuation times because of the requirement for a prompt public notification capability and the development of refined traffic management plans for emergency planning purposes. On the basis of available informe^ ion, we conclude that plans can be developed for the Seabrook site that will assure that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
Continued construction does not prejudice the ability to develop or implement effective emergency plans.
To put this decision in perspective, it must be emphasized that this decision does not presume to decide the adequacy of emergency preparedness for the Seabrook Station. That issue must be resolved, of course, in the context of the staff's review of the recently tendered application for operating licenses. A notice of opportunity for hearing will be published when the application is docketed. All that is at issue here is whether I should take the extraordinary step of suspending construction of the Seabrook Station pending resolution of a matter that will be addressed in the operating license review.
Neither the new emergency planning regulations nor the Commission's policy on severe accident considerations direct the institution of a permit suspension proceeding under these circumstances. As indicated in this decision, the current evacuation time estimates for Seabrook are not so extraordinary that institution of proceedings apart from the opera-ting license proceeding is warranted.
Continued construction of a facility does not in itself pose any danger to public health and safety even though there may be issues which remain for resolution in the operating license review.
Porter County Chapter of the l
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Izaak Walton League, Inc., supra, 606 F.2d at 1369. The adequacy of emergency planning, including plans for evacuation, is a consideration that is relevant to the asscdsment of whether a plant should operate.
While SAPL and the Comenwealth of Massachusetts argue that institution of proceedings is nececsary to protect public health and safety, neither demonstrates any irminent threat to public health and safety that would require institution of proceedings apart from the operating license review.
As a basis for instituting a show cause proceeding, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts suggests that permitting continued construction may result in "perhaps billions" of dollars of wasted investment if the Commission ultimately rejects the S'eabrook operating licenses on the basis of inability to adequately cope with emergencies. That risk of lost investment is the risk that every holder of a construction permit carries.
See Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 395 (1961). The permittee's investment in constructing the facility is not, however, a proper factor for consideration in determining at the operating ifcense stage wh!ther a nuclear power plant is safe to operate.
Id. at 415.
In order to receive an operating license, the applicant must do all things necessary to ensure safe operation of the facility.
See Public Service Comoany of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-623, 12 NRC 670, 677-78 (Dec. 9,1980).
Institution of proceedings at tnis juncture is not necessary to assure that the Commission's requirements for emergency planning are met before the Seabrook Station operates.
I have detennined, therefore, not to institute a proceeding to suspend or revoke the Seabrook Construction Permits. Accordingly, SAPL's request, l
l in which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts joined, is denied. A copy.of l
this decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Commission's review l
in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As l
provided in-10 C.F.R. 2.206(c), this decist'on will constitute the final action of the Cor.imission 25 days af ter the date of issuance, unless the Commission on its own motion institutes the review of this decision within that time.
AN/&
l Ha~rold R. Denton, Diregtor~
l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Bethesda, Maryland I
this 15 day of July, 1981.
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Enclosure:
Table 1 l
Table 1 Evacuation Time Comparisons Hinter Weekday Peak Summer Seabrook Other Sites
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Normal Weather _
FEMA Estimates Normal Conditions
- NUREG/CR-1856 NUREG/CR-1856 Median Maximum 2 mile radius 5.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 6.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> j.
5 mile radius 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 2.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 8.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> 10 mile radius 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 6.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 5.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> 21.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> **
General Population Evacuation Times - Normal Conditions from NUREG/CR-1856, "An Analysis of Evacuation Time Estimates Around 52 Nuclear Power Plant Sites".
- Licensee estimate, judged to be too high. Next highest licensee estimate is 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.
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