ML20009F271
| ML20009F271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1981 |
| From: | Vandenburgh D YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009F259 | List: |
| References | |
| FYC-81-7, NUDOCS 8107300229 | |
| Download: ML20009F271 (2) | |
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h,...., YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY 1671 Worcester Road, Framingham, Mossochusetts 01701 2.C.2.2 ANKEE FYC 81-7 March 24, 1981 Dr. Joseph M. Hendric, Chairman Uni *ed States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Dr. Hendrie:
As you re undoubtedly aware, there was a serious incident at Cape Canaveral recently involving the use of nitrogen gas to " inert" the
.stmosphere of the space shuttle engine compartment.
The incident resulted in asphyxiation of five skilled techninians, one of whom died. Apparently an "all clear" signal was given to the technicians at the same time that the nittogen gas was being pumped into the compartment.
Fortunately trained personnel nearby were able to pull the stricken men from the compartment, thereby saving four lives.
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This incident clearly illustrates the point that Vermont Yankee has repeatedly tried to make on the issue of containment inerting. We feel compelled to point out again that inerting an accessible arca, with nitrogen gas, presents a clear and present hazard to p;rsonnel who must work in that area. During the ASLAB heuring we discussed an incident at the Tarapur power station in which several men were suffocated as a result of incomplete de-inerting of the containment prior to entry.
Cape Canaveral demonstrates that Tarapur was not merely an aberration, but is indicative of the hazard involved in working with nitrogen atmospheres in closed spaces.
The most striking thing about the Cape Canaveral incident was that it involved highly trained and eg erienced personnel working under strict safety procedures.
Certainly, these technicians were no less concerned about their own safety than would be the personnel at a nuclear power station.
In spite of this, the incident occurred with serious consequences.
The Cornission is in the throes of issuing the Proposed Interim Require-ments Related to Hydrogen Control and Certain Degraded Core Considerations (Fed. Reg. Vol. 45, No. 193) which, among other things, requires the inerting of the Vermont Yankee drywell.
In this proposed rule the Commission states:
"While the decrease in residual risk due to inerting these containments is small, as determined by probabilistic analysis (a) there are no significant countervailing safety disincentives;...." We remain firmly convinced that the "...small... decrease in [ theoretical] risk..." is overwhelmingly 0107300229 sto7po DR ADOCK 05000029 PDR
A Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman
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March 24, 1981 Page Twc counterbalanced by the significant real risk to the health and safety of plant employees as demonstrated by the incidents at Tarapur and Cape Canaveral. We strongly encourage your serious reconsideration of the relative importance of theoretical risk and real risk before you take final action on this rule.
Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY D. E. Vandenburgh Senior Vice President DEV/kg cc:
Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Ahearne W.
J.
Dircks
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