ML20009E531
| ML20009E531 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1981 |
| From: | Book H, Cillins M, Cillis M, Fish R, Scown K, Sears R, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009E521 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-81-19, NUDOCS 8107280282 | |
| Download: ML20009E531 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000206/1981019
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:-_ _ ..-_ . _ . . . - . . _ _ - - ._ = .- ' < . . . U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT , REGION V Report No. 50-206/81-19 Docket No. 50-206 License No. DPR-13 Safeguards Group Licensee: Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead. California 91770 Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 1 ! Inspection at: Camp Pendleton, California Inspection conducted: May 11-15, 1981 i 7h/7/ Inspectors: R. F. Fish, Radiation Specialist - Team Leader D&te Signed En 9 $) - M. Cillis, Radiation Specialist Date Signed , bkom i 7//o / ~K. Scown, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator /Date / Signed , -$$8Yb2 7hlM J. Sears, Senio'r Nuclear Engineer Dite' Signed Approved By: A '/!/0[[/ F. A. Wenslawski, Thief, Reactor Radiation Protection Dhte / Signed Secti n '[[/0/[/ Crc -- Approved by: , - Date Signed H. E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch Summary: Inspection on May 11-15,1981 (Report No. 50-206/81-19) Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of the emergency plan exercise and associated critiques. The inspection involved 99 hours onsite by seven (7)'NRC inspectors and observers. Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, U U e107280282 sto71o PDR ADOCK 05000206 G PDR . - - - . . . - . . - - .. .,_- . - . . . - . - . - - - - . - . - . - - . - . .. - -. - . - . -
' - . . DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted J. Curran, Plant Manager K. Barr, Manager, Health Physics J. Schram, Watch Engineer S. Mc Mahan, Supervisor, Plant Maintenance D. Bennette, Nuclear Engineer S. Medling, Chemical and Radiation Protection Engineer E. Bennett, Foreman, Health Physics J. Comings, Reactor Operator D. Pilmer, Supervising Engineer (Health Physics & Emergency Planning) G. Allen, Nuclear Engineer (Emergency Planning) Other licensee personnel and contractor health physics technicians participating in the-emergency plan exercise were also interviewed. 2. Emergency Exercise Plan The emergency exercise plan was developed by Southern ' California Edison Company (SCE) Health Physics ar.d Emergency Planning Group in concert with the several participating offsite jurisdictions. The plan document provided information on the objectives of the exercise, the guidelines to be used by the various participants during the exercise, the duties of the observers, the contents of reports prepared by designated controllers and observers and applicable references. The second volume of the plan document, which had a restricted distribution, described the scenario to be used during the exercise and the expected responses for each event. The scenario was initiated by informing the control room operator that a sample frora the reactor coolant system showed a high concentration of iodine-131. During the next eight (8) hours various events occurred that required classifying the emer an alert (initial event, high concentration of iodine-131)gency as , a site and a general emergency situation. The events included releases of airborne radioactivity under changing meteorological conditions so that the several offsite jurisdictions could implement their emergency , plans. The objective of the exercise was to evaluate a major portion of the basic elements existing within the emergency preparedness plans
l and organizations of the several involved offsite jurisdictions and i SCE. The ability to provide a coordinated response by all participating parties was also appraised. This emergency plan exercise was intended ' to comply with the requirement for an exercise to be conducted within the first year of emergency plan implementation as required by Section i III.F, Appendix E,10 CFR Part 50. l l l l l l /
. ' -2- 3. Observers Three groups of observers were involved in the exercise evaluation. The licensee provided observers for all onsite areas where exercise activities took place. Some SCE observers were also used at offsite locations. In addition some of the SCE observers served as controllers. The function of the controller was to provide cue cards and data packages at the approp.'iate times and, if necessary, certain controllers could alter the course of the exercise or provide needed guidance. The various offsite jurisdictions also provided observers for their portions of the exercise. The NRC observers represented a second group. The NRC observed activities in the Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center, Emergency Support Center (ESC) and near- site Emergency Operations Facility. The SCE medical response and radiological / environmental monitoring teams were also observed by the NRC. A team of observers under the direction of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IX were present to evaluate the portions of the exercise that involved local, state and federal agencies as well as the interfaces with those responsibilities under the jurisdiction of the NRC (e.g. the Emergency Operations Facility / Emergency Operations center at the San Clemente Civic Center Building). On May 11, 1981 SCE held a briefing for all controllers. This meeting provided an opportunity for discussions on the schedule of activities, tne role of the controllers, personnel identification system and teleohone numbers for controller communications. The packages containing cue cards and scenario related data were distributed. There was confirmation that the attendees had all necessary materials, including the scenario and anticipated responses, and they were invited to ask questions. The controllers (and observers) were required to complete an evaluation form at the end of the exercise. 4. Exercise The exercise was initiated at about 6:30 a.m. on May 13 and continued until about 2:45 p.m. The exercise involved the following locations described in the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit 1 Emergency Plan: Control Room; Technical Support Center; (0nsite) Operations Support Center; Emergency Support Center; Station Assembly Area (Administration and Warehouse Building); Media Center and near-site Emergency Operations Facility (San Clemente Emergency Operations Center). According to the SONGS Unit 1 Emergency Plan, the on-site Emergency Support Center and the near-site Emergency Operations Facility constitute the interim Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The exercise included a simulated injured SCE employee who was transported to South Coast Comunity Hospital for treatment. Radiation monitoring by SCE at onsite and near-site locations was performed as part of the exercise activities. ._ ..
. . . -3- Other locations were involved in the exercise; however, these were all offsite. The activities at these various offsite locations will be covered by a separate renort issued by FEMA Region IX. 5. Critiques Shortly after the termination of the exercise, SCE held-a critique session to review the sequence of events and identify any items that may require some form of corrective action. Controllers, observers, participants and management attended the cr;tique. - The results of the critique were to be' documented. The Health Physics and Emergency Planning group in Nuclear Engineering and Safety (Rosemead) has been assigned the responsibility for imp _lementing any corrective actions identified during the c'.4tique process. On May 14 a second critique was held to provide preliminary comments to SCE from the various participating offsite organizations. SCE requested the attendees to submit a chronology of important eventr. and comments on items the exercise disclosed needed improvement or change. SCE intends to publish a critique document covering the exercise witain the near future. The offsite organizations will be given an opportunity to review the documor.t when it is in draft form. The following items were discussed during the May 14 session: (a) Communications There is a need to better coordinate the use of the telephone system that connects the several Emergency Operations Centers (E0C) with the San Onofre site. At the time a " general emergency" was declared by SCE the City of San Clemente was not listening to the notification; however, SCE became aware of this situation before the notification was completed and took corrective action. The iorms used by the various organizations and SCE need some modification (s) to assure better transmission ard recording of information and data. The California Office of Emergency Services (Sacramento) could receive more current information if they were also connected to the telephone system that connects the E0C's to the site. (b) Meteorology There was some confusion regarding wind direction and the forms used by the various organizations should. clarify whether the direction being reported is "from" (this is the normally used direction) o r " to" . The use of sectors along with wind direction resulted in some difficulties. The potential problem resulting from the difference between true and magnetic north was also identif. , +s- - y .- + ----- g- -- w,v--y 4 -g-,.
__ - - - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ . . _ . . , , -4- %.- 1 l (c) Dose Assessment . The offsite dose assessment team'(representatives of State Radiologic ' Health Section and.0 range County) . expressed a need for more data including source terms. -There was a problem relative to the adequacy of data in connection with the' reported " puff release". It was alsr reported that the media (center) had some difficulty handling the reported puff release. The dose assessment team also experienced a time problem because of the changing conditions. SCE noted that this was done to involve the several,offsite organizations and the identified problem may have been caused by the scenario. (d) Response to Declaration of General Emergency Following SCE's declaration of a general emergency, discussions were held at the San Clemente E0C regarding the sounding of the warning system that satisfies criteria E.6 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA- REP-1, Rev. 1. Supposedly SCE was having similar discussions; however, a question was raised during the critique whether these separate groups were also talking to each other on this matter. 5. Exercise Summary J On Thursdsy afternoon, May 14, a suamary of the exercise results was presented at the San Clemente City Hall. This presentation was open to the public and media. The Leader of the FEMA Region IX observers chaired this session. Representatives of the following organizations sunnarized the exercise findings from their standpoint: FEMA Region IX, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, City of San Clemente, City of San Juan Capistrano, Orange County, San Diego County, California Parks and Beac ies, California J' .ca of Emergency Services and SCE. 7. Exit Interview On May 15, at the conclusion of the irspection, an exit interview was held to discuss the NRC findings. Attachment A is a list of those persons attending this meeting. The licensee was informed that there were no items of noncompliance or deviations. The following items were specifically discussed during this meeting: (a) Two aspects of the handling of the simulated injured employee may require some corrective action. Improvement in the response time of the emergency team is possible. The team knew the injury was major, but there was a review of the response procedures before they went to the injured persen. Also it did not appear that proper attention was paid to a possible shock condition. In addition the injured persen was placed in a plastic carrier - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - -__ __
. ., , N -S .! upon removal from the building. This carrier.is such that first aid care (e.g. check of pulse, check of breathing or administration of oxygen) cannot easily be accomplished when it is closed. It was possible that the specifics of the scenario had an impact on this part of the exercise. (b) Some items needing improvement were identified during observations of the SCE monitoring team. At times the monitoring team had to alter their communicator's location in order to be neard by the intended receiver. The importance of regular maintenance of the portaHe communications equipment and training on its proper use was also mentioned. A more permanent means for storing the emergency equipment needs to be established. The monitoring team should record their results at the time of the measurements and the records should be in the units actually measured. (c) The exercise disclosed some procedures could be improved through changes. Some of the monitoring procedures appeared to need expansion of the " Procedure" section. Also the proper form of the data and appropriate record keeping should be addressed in the procedures. The procedure covering dose projections appears to include mathematical steps that may not be proper or correct. (d) The operation of the E0F during the exercise did not appear to fully accomplish its intended functions. By letter dated April 25, 1980 the NRC clarified the requirements for the interim Emergency Operations Facility. The ESC, with the support of the TSC, provided overall management of the licensee's emergency response. Dose projections and recommended public protective actions were prepared in the TSC, but the ESC decided whether the latter were acceptable and could be communicated to the offsite organizations. It was not obvious that the E0F was invol;2d in the coordination of emergency response activities with State and local agencies. In addition there was a lack of coordination on the part of the E0F in the area of radiological and environmental assessment. Radiological and environmental data collected by SCE apparently was not being provided to the offsite organizations. The licensee provided the following responses and coments to the above discussed items. The same identification relates licensee response to NRC comment: (a) There will be a review of the handling of the injured person during the exercise to assure a minimum delay in responding to an injury during an emergency situation. In addition there will be a review of the first aid treatment provided during the exercis" - , e , - - , , ,-
- .. .. -6- to make sure that in an actual situation injured personnel will receive proper first aid attention. (b) For this exercise the emergency equipment was kept in temporary storage containers. A more permanent system, involving the use of seals, is planned for the future. Also they were aware of the comunications problems and intended to see if some action could be taken to alleviate the difficulties. With respect to the preparation of records by the monitoring team, the SCE observer / controller had copies of the records made by the monitoring team in his possession. (c) An SCE contractor has been writing and rewriting many of the radiation safety procedures that are being used or will be used at the SONGS site. Presently these procedures' are in the process of being examined and used on a trial basis by SCE personnel. They have already identified some changes in these procedures that will be necessary. Thcy are aware of some modifications- that will have to be made to the procedures relating to dose projections. SCE intends to factor in the above NRC coninents concerning procedure improvements. (d) The licensee expressed their opinion that the interim E0F was involved in the coordination envisioned by the NRC for this emergency response facility. They stated that they were aware of the discussions by the local agencies concerning possible evacuation of San Juan Capistrano before San Clemente, but they did not participate because a satisfactory resolution was reached by these agencies. To show that they could participate if necessary, they said they became involved in the discussion when Camp Pendleton decided to evacuate some of their areas even though SCE had only recommended sheltering. According to the licensee the ESC was aware of the offsite monitoring results reported to the San Clemente E0C and these were in agreement with the results of the SCE monitoring team. Because they were monitoring the Interagency Telephone System on a continuous basis, the ESC became aware of the wind direction problem and that all intended parties were not on the system during one of the important SCE offsite notifications. They believe the ESC took corrective action on a timely basis. The NRC observed in the TSC that corrective action had been taken with respect to wind direction and providing all offsite organizations with notification information. The 1% ensee also stated that during the exercise it was necessary for the ESC to contact an SCE representative at the near-site E0F, using a dedicate telephone established specifically for this purpose, to provide the latter with clarifying infonnation. _ . _ -. _- - _
~ .. .. -7- The NRC Team Leader held a follow-up discussion of the exercise findings with Jerry Haynes, SCE, by telephone on June 2,1981. ~ Based upon the above described May 15 discussion of the E0F activities during the exercise and a subsequent review of the' requirements for the interim - , E0F, as identified in an enclosure to the February 18, 1981 generic letter (no. 81-10, Subject: Post-TMI Requirements for the Emergency Operations Facility) that D. G. Eisenhut sent to all licensees of operating plants, it appears,that SCE met the established requirements. The cormlunications capabilities-between the ESC and near-site E0F made it possible for the two locations to accomplish the objectives of the E0F. SCE appears to have been involved in the coordination of emergency response activities with State and local agencies to the extent that their participation was necessary for satisfactory decisions. Also SCE appeared to have current o- fsite radiological and environmental data developed by the offsite jurisdictions; however, there still remains a need for corrective action to assure that such data obtained by SCE is provided to the dose assessment group at the near-site E0F/ San Clemente E0C. Mr. Haynes was infonned that the SONGS Unit 1 Emergency Plan should be modified to better describe the operations of the ESC and near-site EOF to show how they accomplish the requirements assigned to the interim E0F. Mr. Haynes stated that SCE would agree that the plan could better describe the operations of the ESC and near-site EOF and this will be done. The licensee had been informed that if significant deficiencies preventing appropriate protective measures were identified during the emergency plan exercise, they would be notified in writing and given an opportunity to correct them within a four (4) month period. None of the items needing corrective action were considered by the NRC to be significant because they did not prevent appropriate protective measures from being taken. With respect to those areas being evaluated by FEMA, the NRC would also notify SCE in writing of those matters that needed to be corrected within a succeeding four month period. Separate correspondence may be used to provide the FEMA findings. ' -- -- -
. - ..;.~ . . ATTACHMENT A Southern California Edison R. Dietch, Vice President J. Haynes, Manager, Nuclear Operations H. Ottoson, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Safety D. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance D. Pilmer, Supervising Engineer (Health Physics & Emergency Planning) J. Curran, Station Manager- H. Morgan, Assistant Station Manager, Operations K. Barr, Manager, Health Physics J. Dunn, Project Quality Assurance Supervisor B. Katz, Station Supervising Engineer D. Bennette, Nuclear Engineer 2 - F. Briggs, Compliance Engineer E. Gault, Compliance Assistant J. Willis, Training Manager G. Allen, Nuclear Engineer (Emergency Planning) .' - . S. Garry, Health Physicist SCE Contractors- . . .i , G. Beatty, Health Physicist, NUS , J. Massey, Radwaste Consultant, ATI . NRC R. Fish, Radiation Specialist, Region V R. Pate, Senior Resident Inspector J. Sears, Senior Nuclear Engineer, Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch I i . - l l . ! . }}