ML20009C038
| ML20009C038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1981 |
| From: | Arterburn J, Vogel T, Wiederstein G NUTECH ENGINEERS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009C031 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-14, NSP-37-061, NSP-37-61, NUDOCS 8107200196 | |
| Download: ML20009C038 (27) | |
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NSP-37-061 L
Revision 1 July 1981 IE BULLETIN 79-14
{
SAFETY RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS PHASE 2
{
INACCESSIBLE PIPING INSPECTION REPORT MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
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Prepared for:
Northern States Power Company i
Prepared by:
NUTECH San Jose, California I
Approved by:
Iss d by:
I ltL k)as,L meelu' 'aul{
G.
A. Wiederstein, P.E.
T. N. Vogel, P.E.
Pr.; ject Engineer Project Director se. AJu--
J.
R.
Arterburn, P.E.
Engineering Manager nutech
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L REVISION CONTR"L S51EET Specification:
NSP-37-061
==
Description:==
IE Bulletin 79-14 Safety Related Piping Systems
[
Phase 2 Inaccessible Pipina Inspection Report Monticello Nuclear Generation Plant r
This page is a record of all revisions of the inspection report.
Prep.
Chk.
Rev.
Date Eb[
Ib[
Pages Remarks 0
5/13/80 GAW DKM All Initial Issue J
7/14/81 G/?W pgA iii,2,15,16 As Noted 17,18,19 i
NSP-37-061 Revision '.
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PREFACE k
On July 2, 1979, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued IE Edlletin 79-14, " Seismic Analysis for As-B' lilt Safety Related Piping Systems".
The issue addressed in the Bulletin is that input used for seismic analysis of safety-related piping systems may not be representative of the as-built configuration.
The Bulletin requires that each utility compare the as-built configuration of the piping systems to the input information used for the seismic analyses.
All nonconformances that are identified in the inspection must be evaluated for their effects I
on system operability.
The inspections of the piping systems were performed in two phases.
The Phase 1 inspection covered one system in each set of redundant, normally accessible systems and all non-redundant accessible systems.
The remaining redundant systems and the inaccessible systems were inspected in Phase 2.
Summary reports for the Phase 1 and Phase 2 accessible system inspections for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant were issued on September 21,
- 1979, and October 8,
- 1979, respectively.
The purpose of this document is to prescnt the results of the inspections of the T'hase 2 inaccessible piping systems at the plant.
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L L
[
TABLE OF CONTENTS
)
Page
[
LIST OF TABLES........................................iv
~
I,IST OF FIGURES.......................................iv l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 SYSTEMS INSPECTED.............
4......................
3
3.0 DESCRIPTION
OF THE PHASE 2 INACCESSIBI.E PIPI'1G....... 7 INSPECTION 3.1 As-Built Inspection..............................
7 3.2 Compilation of Analysis Input Data...............
7 3.3 Correlation of As-Built and Analytical Data......
8 4.0 REPORTING AND RESOLUTION OF DISCREPANCIES.............J3 3.0
SUMMARY
OF DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED DURING THE...... 15 PHASE 2 INACCESSIBLE PIPING INSPECTION 5.1 Discrepancies Resolved by Engineering Judgment.. 15 I
5.2 Discrepancies Requiring Further Analysis to.....
15 Evaluate Operability 5.3 Discrepancies Requiring Further Analysis to.....
15
'I Evaluate FSAR Compliance 5.4 Discrepancies Identified During the Field...... 16 Inspection
6.0 CONCLUSION
19 7.0 AEFERENCES...........................................
20 1
1 NSP-37-061 Revision 1 iii nutech
LIST OF TABLES
[
.t m
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TABLE 2.1 INACCESSIBLE PHASE 2 PIPING SYSTEMS...........
4 TABLE 3.1 INSPECTION DATA...............................
9 TABLE 3.2 INSPECTIOil CORRELATION TOLERANCES............ 10 TABLE 5.1 LINES REQUIRItN REANALYSIS TO EVALUATE....... 17 FSAR COMPLIANCE I
I I
LIST OF FIGURES I
Page FIGURE 3.1 DISCREPANCY FORM.............................
11 FIGURE 3.2 NONCONFORMANCE REPORT........................
12 1
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I NSP-37-061 Revision 1 iv nutech
4 l.0 E TRODUCTION In July 1979, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) identified a
series of generic issues which could potentially cause the seismic analysis of safety-related piping s
systems to yield inaccurate results.
One of these issues
(
involves the correlation of the as-built piping configuration and the information used for the seismic analysis mf the piping system.
Due to this concern, the NRC published IE Bulletin 79-14 (Refer-ence 1),
and the subsequent supplements to the Bulletin (Reference 2), which require that an inspection be conducted to verify that the input information for the seismic analysis of safety-related piping systems reflect as-built configurations.
Further, the Bulletin requires that, where deviations are found, the licenseo must consider the need to reevaluate the scismic analysis to the as-built configuration or modify the hardware.
l On July 31, 1979, an Inspection Plan (Reference 3) was issued to describe the inspections to be conducted on the Seismic Category I and safety-related piping systems at Northern States Power Company's Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.
Subsequently on August 30, 1979, a revision to the Inspection Plan (Reference 4) was issued incorporating all new Bulletin requirements.
The inspections compare the as-built configuration to the information which is required for the seismic analysis of the piping, e.g.,
piping size an'd wall thickness, piping configuration geometry, valve locations, valve operator orientations, support locations, and type of support.
As described in the IE Bulletin and the l
Inspection Plan, the inspections are to be performed in two phases.
The Phase 1 inspections covered one system in each set i
NSP-37-061 I
Revision 1 1
s
of redundant, normally accessible systems.
Se remaining redundant systems and the inaccessible systems are included in the Phase 2 inspections.
This document reports the results of the inspections conducted oc.
the Phase 2 inaccessible systems.
These systems are defined in Section 2 with the details of the various tasks associated with the inspection being described in Section 3.
The general procedures for resolving all discrepancies and the discrepancies that have been identified are provided in Section 4 and Sec-tion 5, respectively.
Based on engineering judgement, it is concluded that none of the discrepancies would impair operability.
- However, computer analysis was necessary to demonstrate compliance with the original design requirements specified in the FSAR (Reference 5) for nine (9) lines.
As indicated in Section 5, all analyses have [
been completed.
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I NSP-37-061 Revision 1 2
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2.0 SYSTEMS INSPECTED During February and March of 1980, NUTECH, wir, support from Northern States Power Company (NSP) and Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel), conducted an inspection of the inaccessible Phase 2 piping systems at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.
These systems consist of all inaccessible Selccnic Category I
and safety-related systems with outside diameters of 2-1/2 inches or greater which are inaccessible for inspection during normal plant operations.
The list of the Seismic Category I and safety-related systems considered in this portion of Phase 2 is given in Table 2.1 along with the apo?icable line segments and isometric drawing numbers used in the comparison.
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TABLE 2.1 L
INACCESSIBLE PHASE 2 PIPING SYSTEMS r
i L
APPLICABLE
[
SYSTEM LINE SEGMENTS DRAWING NUMBER
_=
CORE TW7-10GE 6400 TW7-8ED, EF 6400 SPRAY TWil-8ED, EF 6405 HPCI PS18-8ED NX-13142-42
[
TW3-12ED 6414 RCIC PS17-3ED 6417 s
~
RHR TW20-16DB 6348 TW30-16DB 6411 TN36-4GE, ED 6350 TW37-4GE, HC 6432 REW10-18EF, ED 6423 REWil-31IE 6441 SW9-8GE 6422 TW23-10GE 6425
[
RHR SW9-18GF, GE 5452, 6342 SEPVICE SW10-18GF 5451 WATER
[
NSP-37-061 Revision 1 4
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TABLE 2.1 (continued) i L
INACCESSIBLE PHASE 2 PIPING SYSTEMS r
APPLICABLE REFERENCE SYSTEM LINE SEGMENTS DRAWING NUMBER EMERGENCY SW30A-3HF 6445 SERVICE SW30B-3HF 6446 WATER 1
l l
REACTOR REW3-4ED, EF 6433 WATER REW6-3DB, ED 6423 CLEANUP FEEDWATER FW2A-14DE, ED 6426 FW2B-14DE, ED 6427 FW2A-10ED 6426 FW2B-10ED 6427 FW5-4ED 6404 PRIMARY PSl-18ED 6407 REACTOR PS2-18ED 6408 STEAM PS3-18ED 6409 PS4-18ED 6410 PS15-3ED 6416 NSP-37-061 Refision 1 5
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TABLE 2.1 (concluded)
INACCESSIBLE PHASE 2 PIPING SYSTEMS L
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APPLICABLE SYSTEM LINE SEGMENTS DRAWING NUMBER REACTOR REW32-22"GE RECIRCULATION REW13A-28"GE REW13B-28"GE REW14-12"GE REW15-12"GE REU16-12"GE 161F277
?EW17-]2"GE REW18-12"GE REW19-12"GE REW20-12"GE 09 REW21-12"GE REW22-12"GE REW23-12"GE REW24-4"GE REW25-4"GE I
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3 "3
NSP-37-061 Revision 1 6
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3.0 DESCRIPTION
OF THE PHASE 2 INACCESSIBLE PIPING INSPECTION t
g The Phase.i inaccessible inspection consisted of three separate tasks: (1) an as-built inspection of the piping systems at the plant site, (2) a compilation or the input data used for the piping analyses, and (3) a correlat i.on of the results from tasis 1 and 2 abo ~e to show conformance/nonconformance between the installed and analyzed piping.
The details associated with each task are described in the following sections.
3.1 As-Built Inspection NUTECH, with support from NSP, performed the as-built inspection of the Phase 2 inaccessible piping systems.
The inspection consisted of measuring and recording physical dimensions and hardware information in enough detail to allow a
complete comparison with the analysis input data.
The information gathered at the site and the methods used to obtain the data are provided in Tc.ble 3.1.
I Prior to the inspcction, data books were prepared for each system.
These books specify the dimensions and other information to be gathered at the site and are based er the drawings listed in Table 2.1.
The completed, signed, and approved data books were maintained at the site until completion of the Phase 2 inaccessible piping site inspection at which time the books were transferred to the NUTECH offices in San Jose, California, to be used for the work described in Section 3.3.
3.2 Compilation of Analysis Input Data Bechtel and General Electric compiled the input data used for the analysis of the piping systems.
This work effort consisted of NSP-37-061 Revision 1 7
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organizing dimensions and information used in the p4. ping stress analysis in the form of piping stress isometrics a rid supporting data.
L 3.3 Correlation of As-Built and Analytical Data NUTECH, with the help of Bechtel, correlated the results of the inspections described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, and identified discrepancies by completing the discrepancy form shown in Figure 3.1.
The as-built data and the analytical data were considered in conformance so lonn as the as-built to as-analyzed differences remained within the tolerances specified in Table 3.2.
These tolerances, while allowing for some deviation, are sufficiently restrictive to ensure system operability under specified earth-quake loadings.
Any measurement which exceeded the specified tolerance limit was identified as a discrepancy and evaluated in accordance with the requirements of Section 4.
In addition, any discrepancies requiring repair which were found at the time of the site inspection were reported to NSP via a Nonconformance Report Form, Figure 3.2.
These included primarily conditions such as loose bolts, etc.
i NSP-37-061 Revision 1 8
r" TABLE 3.1 L
INSPECTION DATA TYPE OF METHOD OF FIELD VERIFICATION IF DATA VERIFICATION OTHER THAN FIELD I. Piping Data (1)
- a. Size Tape MeasurInent of Circunfer-ence
- b. Wall-Bickness Ultrasonic Digital nickness Gage
- c. Configuration Tape Measurement of lengths
- d. Branch Connec-Visual Comparison with is&.
tion Drawings
- e. Material N/A Q.A. Inspection Report (Reference 6)
II. Insulation nickness Tape Measurement of Rickness III. In-Line Eqpt.
- a. Vahes
- 1. location Tape Measurement of Pipe 1ength
[
- 2. Operator Visual Inspection Orientation
- 3. Weight N/A Vendor / Vendor Dwg./
Eng. Judgment
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- b. Othe Iarge Equipment
[
- 1. Location Tape Measurement of Pipe length
- 2. Weight N/A Vendor / Vendor Dwg.
E*, Supports r
- a. Iocation Tape Measurement of Pipe length l
- b. Type Visual Comparison with Fab.
I Drawing 4
- c. Anchorage Visual Comparison with Fab.
Drawing y
- d. Orientatsen Visual Inspection I
- c. Size or load Visual Comparison Capacity I
- f. Design and Visual Comparison
[
Assembly De-tails.
V. Clearance
- a. Floor or Wall Visual Inspection Penetrations g
- b. Directional Visual Inspection g
{
Changes
,dats was obtained by removing Forinsulatedpipingdingdirectaccesstothesystem.
NOIE 1: insulation and provi l
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NSP-37-061 9
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TABLE 3.2 1
INSPECTION CORRELATION TOLERANCES TYPE OF DATA TOLERANCE I. Piping Data
- a. Size (Outside Diameter)
+ 5% of OD
- b. Wall thickness T 12% of nominal thickness
- c. Configuration Ex of + 5% of straight run length, 6" or 1 OD
- d. Branch Connection Same Type
- e. Material Same type as QA inspection document II. Insulation
- a. Type Same type
- b. Thickness
+ 20%
III. In-Line Equipment
- a. Valves
- 1. Location Max gf + 5% of straight run length, 6" or 1 OD
- 2. Operator Orientation
+ 15 Gr operator angle
- 3. Weight i 10% of total weight IV. Supports
- a. Location 6" for pipe sizes < 4" 2 pipe diameters for pipe size > 4" but < 12" 24" Er pipe size > 12"
- b. Tvpe Same type as design documents
- c. Anchorage Samg as design drawings
- d. Orientation
+5 for vertical supports T 15 for remaining supports
- e. Size or Load Capacity Yame size or load capacity or larger than indicated on design drawings,
- f. Design and Assembly Same as design drawings Details V. Clearances
- a. Wall Penetration 1/8" minimum
- b. Directional Changes Visually ensure no evidence of contact with adjacent items.
I 1.
Based on information developed and supplied by Bechtel (References 7 6 8).
NSP-37-061 10 Revision 1
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FIGURE 3.2 NONCONFORMANCE REPORT L
I SYSTEM NONCONFORMANCE NO.
DESCRIPTION OF NONCONFORMANCE:
[
PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF NONCONFORMANCE:
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ORIGINATED Bi:
CHECKED BY:
APPROVED BY:
DATE:
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN:
j ACTION TAKEN BY:
DATE:
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PLANT COORDINATOR PLANT SUPERINTENDENT, DATE ENGINEERING / RADIATION PROiECTION NSP-37-061 12 gg Revision 1
2 4.0 REPORTING AND RESOLUTION OF DISCREPAt3CIES e
L NUTECH was responsible for resolving all discrepancies, subject p
j 4
to NSP review and approval.
In resolving each identified dis-crepancy, the following approach was taken:
An engineering evaluation was made of the discrepancy to determine if it impaired the operability of the system.
This evaluation was performed at two levels.
The first level consisted of applying engineering judgment to the discrepancies to obtain an immediate, i.e.,
within two (21 days, evaluation of the impact
)
of the discrepancy on system operability.
When required, a second-1cvul evaluation consisting of an
[
analytical evaluation of the discrepr,cy was made.
In some
- cases, this evaluation required the same I
{
degree of sophistication as was utilized in the orig-inal seismic analyces.
However, most discrepancies did not warrant such a rigorous analysi, technique.
2.
Subsequently, an additio ul evaluation of the dis-
[
crepancy was made to determine if the piping system still met the original design criteria described in the PSAR.
Where it was determined by use of the i
original analyses that the as-built systems were adequate to meet the FSAR requirements, no further action was taken.
However, if the as-built condi-tions were judged to have a potential for exceeding a
FSAR requirements, reanalysis of the piping system to the as-built condition and the original design s
requirements was accomplished.
[
NSP-37-061 Revision 1 13 nutech
In general, for those lines where reanalysis was deemed f
necessary, a revised stress report, and, where appropriate, d rav:ing s reflecting the as-built conditions will be issued to document the changes.
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NSP-37-061 Revision 1 14 nutech E f.
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5.0 S_IJMMARY OF DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED DURING THE PHASE 2 INACCESSIBLE PIPING INSPECTION
[
The discrepancies identified in the inspection are discussed below.
These discrepancies can be categorized in one or more of the following categories.
(
5.1 Discrepancies Resolved by Engineering Judgment These discrepancies are those that exceeded the tolerances specified in Table 3.2, but were judged to be of no significant consequence to operability or compliance with FSAR requirements, e.g.,
an as-built pipe run which is shorter than the as-analyzed length, whereby the analysis is judged to be conservative, since the shorter unsupported length would have lower stresses.
The discrepancies in this category require no further action.
[
5.2 Discrepancies Requiring Further Analysis to Evaluate Operability These discrepancies required reanalysis rather than engineering judgement to ensure that an operability concern did not exist.
No line segments were in this category.
5.3 Discrepancies Requiring Further Analysis to Evaluate PSAR
(
Compliance
{
Discrepancies in this category are those which did not produce an operability concern, but did require reanalysis to verify that the original FSAR margins were maintained.
Table 5.1 lists the line designations with such discrepancies, the discrepancy or reason for reanalysis, and the results of the reanalysis.
A total of nine (9) lines required reanalysis in this category.
d
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NSP-37-061 Revision 1 15
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L 5,. 4 Discrepancies Identified During the Field Inspection During the field inspection of the inaccessible piping, a total [
of sixteen (16) conditions requiring repair were found to exist
(
in the piping systems.
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1 TABLE 5.1 mZ om
<t LINES REQUIRING REANALYSIS e-i mw py TO EVALUATE FSAR COMPLIANCE ooo HP S*1 STEM LINE DESIG REASON FOR REANALYSIS RESULTS OF REANALYSIS CORE SPRAY TW7-8ED,EF Valve location not within speci-Maximum stress 64%
Book 1 of 2 (Inside fied tolerance, of Code allowable Containment)
HPCI PS18-8ED Valve location and pipe segment Maximum stress 98%
Book 1 of 2 lengths not within specified of Code allowable (3) j{g tolerances.
RHR TW23-12GE Snubber support (SS-33) not Maximum stress 80%
l s
Book 3 analyzed in correct orientation.
of Code allowable (3) l l
I RHR TW36-4GE Seismic suppo.c missing.
Maximum stress 64%
Book 10 of Code Allowable (3) l RHR TW36-4ED Analyzed pipe segment lengths Maximum stress 86%
Eook 11 (Inside not within specified tolerance.
of Code allowable Containment)
RHR TW37-4 Aralyzed pipe segment lengths l Maximum stress 96%
jf{'
l Book 17 nct within specified tolerance.
of Code allowable (3)
Missing seismic restraint.
(1) This line was inspected during the Phase 2 accessible inspection; however, the reanalysis E3 was not completed before the Phase 2 report was issued.
Cl (2) A portion of this line was reanalyzcd during the Phase 1 inspectica.
Inaccessible piping f9" from the Phase 2 inspection has been added to the nodel and the system was reanalyaed.
Ud (3) System modification required to achieve this stress level.
O7 w
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m w-yy TABLE 5.1 (Concluded)
<m 70 LINES REQUIRING REANALYSIS H-Q Oh TO EVALUATE FSAR COMPLIANCE
~~
SYSTEM LINE DESIG REASON FOR REANALYSIS RESULTS OF REANALYSIS EMERGENCY SERVICE SW30A-3HF Analyzed pipe segment lengths Maximum stress 72%
WATER not within specified tolerance.
of Code allowtble (2) l Books 1,2,3,&5 l
E"ERGENCY SERVICE SW30B-3HF Analyzed pipe segment lengths Maximum stress 79%
WATER not within specified tolerance.
of Code allowable (2)
Books 9,10,11,12,
/f(
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RHR SERVICE SC10-3GE Surveyed pipe segment lengths Maximum stre'ss 47%
CONDENSATE not within specified tolerance.
of Code allowable Book 22 RHR SERVICE WATER SW9-12Gr' Analyzed pipe segment lengths Maximum stress 98%
Books 3 & 4 SW9-18GF,HF and support locations outside of Code allowable (3)
I specified tolerance.
- GO
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6.0 CONCLUSION
An inspection surve7 addressing the concerns of IE Bulletin 79-14 was conducted at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant in February and March of 1980 for the inaccessible Phase 2 piping
(
systems.
Results of that inspection revealed that, based on engineering judgement, no operability concerns exist, and for all but nine (9) of the Phase 2
inaccessible piping segments, d
(
stresses meet the original design requirements for the p) ant.
[
For the nine (9) piping segments described above, a detailed analysis was performed to evaluate compliance with original
[-
design requirements.
For all nine (9)
- lines, the detailed analysis has been completed and indicates stresses to be within b
original design requirements.
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NSP-37-061 Revision 1 19
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7.0 REFERENCES
w 1.
" Seismic Analysis for As-Built c
Safety-Related Piping Systems," Original Issue dated July 2, 1979, and Revision 1, dated July 18, 1979.
2.
Supplements to IE Bulletin 79-14, " Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Gystems," dated August 15, 1979, and September 7, 1979.
[
3.
"IE Bulletin 79-14, SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS, INSPECTION
- PLAN, MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT", NUTECH Report NSP-37-005, Revision 0,
dated July 31, 1979.
4.
"IE Bulletin 79-14, SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS, INSPECTION
- PLAN, MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT", NUTECH Report NSP-37-005, Revision 1,
dated August 30, 1979.
5.
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING
- PLANT, MONTICELLO, FINAL SAFETY ANALYS!b REPORT, Northern States Power Company, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
6.
Quality Assurance Audit on NSP Pipe and Pitting Data, performed by Nuclear Services Corporation in November 1970.
[
7.
Letter from C.
B.
Hogg to D.
Anthony, dated July 24, 1979;
- Subject,
" Job
- 10040, Muaticello Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1,
Northern States Power Company, NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, As-Built Tolerances."
NSP-37-061 Revision 1 20
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l l
l 8.
Letter from C.
B.
Hogg to D.
Anthony, dated August 8, 1979;
- Subject,
" Job
- 10040, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1,
Northern States Power
- Company, NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, Revised As-Built Tolerances."
9.
"IE Bulletin 79-14, SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS, PHA9E 1 INSPECTION
- REPORT, MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT" NUTECH Roport NSP-37-025, Revision 0, dated September 21, 1979.
10.
"IE Bulletin 79-14, SAFETY-RELATED PIPING SYSTEMS, PHASE 2 INSPECTION
- REPORT, MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT" NUTECH Report NSP-37-031, Revision 0, dated October 8, 1979.
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g-I NSP-37-061 Revision 1 21 8
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. _ _ _ _ _